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Abstract 
A Historical Analysis, Critical Interpretation, and Contemporary Application  
of the Virtue of Temperance 
Maria Russell Kenney 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a thorough and relevant account of the virtue 
of temperance, working from within its status as a cardinal virtue in classical and 
Christian moral thought.  With this objective, it undertakes an historical analysis and 
interpretation of temperance in the work of seven major philosophers and theologians 
before applying it to the contemporary issue of consumerism. 
Of the four cardinal virtues, only temperance has virtually disappeared from 
common usage.  The ‘temperance movements’ of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries left temperance with a highly restricted definition and scope; at present, its 
principal definition is either ‘abstinence from drinking’ or ‘everything in moderation’.  
As a result – and despite the resurgence of interest in virtue ethics – temperance is 
often forgotten or dismissed, as when Peter Geach called it ‘humdrum’ virtue and 
‘nothing to get excited about.’   
Yet temperance was once a dynamic component of the moral life.  For 
centuries, within both the classical and Christian traditions, temperance engaged the 
interest of numerous philosophers and theologians.  Through an historical survey and 
critical analysis, this thesis explores the nuanced history of the virtue of temperance in 
the work of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, and Wesley.  
Their portrayals of temperance provide an ideal starting point for any retrieval of the 
virtue.  Within this historical analysis, various interpretive threads begin to emerge – 
self-control, knowledge, mode, humility, and harmonious order.  These five 
components of temperance are the center of this thesis and its interpretation of the 
virtue of temperance. 
The thesis then applies this new understanding of temperance to the modern 
issue of consumerism, using it as a lens to examine the tenets and ethos of Western 
consumer culture.  Rather than commonplace and irrelevant, the virtue of temperance 
emerges again as a vibrant component of contemporary moral discussion.   
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Chapter One 
 
The Virtue of Temperance: 
An Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Temperance: An Introduction 
Of the four cardinal virtues – temperance, courage, justice, and wisdom – temperance 
is the only one where neither the word nor the concept remains an active part of 
contemporary moral discourse.  The virtue of temperance has all but disappeared from 
the ethical landscape, with over ninety percent of the results of an internet search of 
‘temperance’ referencing the Temperance Movement in some fashion.  What little 
attention it does receive often reinforces this association; in The New Temperance, 
sociologist David Wagner names the rising emphasis upon regulation of personal 
morality ‘the New Temperance.’1  Identifying the ‘ideology, social movement, and 
strategy’ of the Temperance Movements both old and new, Wagner decries the 
hypervigilant and pervasive concern with immorality as an underhand means of social 
control, which distract the public from more genuine and pressing social issues.
2
   
However, concerns over the ‘New Temperance’ are not the only criticisms of 
the virtue, nor are these concerns unrepresented in philosophical discourse.  Feminist 
philosopher Mary Daly calls traditional temperance ‘notoriously tedious’, a ‘timid 
and/or fiercely fanatic but always grim insistence upon moderation, restraint, and self-
control.’3  Ecotheologian Louke van Wensveen notes its association with such dour 
qualities as ‘small-mindishness, prudishness, preachiness, missionary zeal, and 
                                                 
1
 David Wagner, The New Temperance: The American Obsession with Sin and Vice (Boulder CO: 
Westview Press, 1997).  He continues: ‘Although I mean to define temperance as being more than a 
movement against alcohol, there are persuasive reasons to recall this earlier movement’ (5). 
2
 Ibid., 8-9. 
3
 Mary Daly, Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy (Boston MA: Beacon Press, 1984), 223. 
13 
 
especially lack of joy.’4  Even among the supporters of virtue ethics, temperance is 
often overlooked.  Howard Curzer notes the ‘surprising neglect’ of Aristotle’s account 
of temperance amidst the renewed interest in virtue ethics.
5
  Jesuit theologian Josef 
Pieper notes dolefully that the meaning of temperance ‘has dwindled miserably to the 
crude significance of “temperateness in eating and drinking”.’6  And in a recent series 
in Catholic moral thought, a text on virtue contained essays on charity, justice, 
prudence, courage, and humility.
7
  When I enquired about the absence of temperance, 
the editors replied that they ‘agonized over leaving out temperance’ but observing the 
page limit led to ‘some tough decisions.’8  Their decision, while understandable, 
demonstrates a lacuna in both the specific literature on virtue and the larger moral 
conversations.  As the ‘the least glamorous’ and ‘least endorsed’ of the group of 
arguably central virtues, temperance continues to be damned with faint praise.
9
 
Perhaps the commonly cited critique of temperance is that of Peter Geach, 
who calls temperance ‘a humdrum, commonsensical matter’ and ‘nothing to get 
excited about.’10  An attribute neither of God nor of the ‘holy angels’, temperance is, 
at best, a sub-virtue preparing the way for more important moral goals.  Indeed, it 
cannot arouse undue enthusiasm, nor should it; as this would lead one into an 
‘intemperate asceticism’, a ‘morbid self-hatred’ instead of an Aristotelian mean.  
Even the objects of temperance – food and alcohol – are themselves too dull to elicit a 
                                                 
4
 Louke van Wensveen, ‘Attunement: An Ecological Spin on the Virtue of Temperance’, Philosophy in 
the Contemporary World 8:2 (2001), 67-79 (71). 
5
 Howard Curzer, Aristotle and the Virtues (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 65. 
6
 Josef Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues (South Bend IN: University of Notre Dame, 1966), 145. 
7
 Charles E. Curran and Lisa A. Fullam, Virtue, Readings in Moral Theology 16 (New York: Paulist 
Press, 2011). 
8
 Personal email correspondence with Charles Curran.  He concluded, ‘We do not have anything 
against temperance!’ 
9
 Ryan M. Niemiec and Jeremy Clyman, ‘Temperance: The Quiet Virtue Finds a Home’, PsycCritiques 
54 (2009); http://www.viacharacter.org/www/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ssTKEveJsrg%3D&portalid=0 
10
 Peter Geach, The Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 132.  The bulk of this 
paragraph is drawn from Geach, 131-9.  Harry Clor, On Moderation: Defending an Ancient Virtue in a 
Modern World (Waco TX: Baylor Press, 2008) makes a similar observation about moderation, the 
cousin of temperance; see Clor, 7.   
14 
 
passionate response.  Moderate versions of gluttony or drunkenness are ‘only a fault, 
not a vice’ and therefore of no particular concern.  Geach does find chastity and 
virginity worthy of serious consideration (which, along with suicide, comprise the 
bulk of the chapter), although he places them outside the proper realm of 
temperance.
11
  Thus, while ostensibly engaging the topic of ‘temperance’, Geach 
essentially dismisses the virtue as irrelevant to significant moral concerns.
12
 
Yet closer examination reveals pockets of interest and encouragement.  Pieper 
laments the present devaluation of temperance precisely because it conceals its 
fullness.
13
  Temperance is an ‘ambivalent’ virtue, notes Catholic theologian Richard 
White, because the ‘impoverishment’ of its present meaning contradicts an intuitive 
inclination against wanton self-abandon.
14
  Even after acknowledging its many 
negative associations, van Wensveen still identifies temperance as an important 
environmental virtue.
15
  And moral theologian Margaret Atkins argues for the 
relevance of the ‘forgotten’ and ‘neglected’ virtue.16  In the words of Monty Python, 
this classic virtue is not dead yet.  The crucial question, however, is whether 
temperance can experience its own renaissance within the renewal of virtue ethics and 
theory.  Any attempt at reclamation should begin with an assessment of the virtue’s 
location within the current moral landscape. 
 
                                                 
11
 According to Geach, this is because the uniquely generative nature of the sexual appetites makes 
them much more serious than the appetites for food or alcohol (133). 
12
 To my view, Geach’s chapter title belies the content, as temperance disappears for the last seventeen 
of nineteen pages, and the chapter focuses almost entirely on sexual morality and suicide.  Thus, I find 
Geach’s analysis to be eisegetical rather than exegetical, and less than reliable as an indication of the 
import of temperance; see 7.3.1 below.  However, his critique has had lasting impact and cannot be 
lightly dismissed. 
13
 Pieper, 145. 
14
 Richard White, Radical Virtues: Moral Wisdom and the Ethics of Contemporary Life (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 58. 
15
 Van Wensveen, ‘Attunement’, 67-79.  See also Peter Wenz, ‘Synergistic Environmental Virtues: 
Consumerism and Human Flourishing,’ in Environmental Virtue Ethics, ed. Ronald D. Sandler and 
Philip Cafaro (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005) 197-214; and Dale Jamieson, Reason in a Dark 
Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 187. 
16
 Margaret Atkins, ‘Can We Ever Be Satisfied?’, Priests and People 12:2 (1998), 45-9 (45). 
15 
 
1.2 Two Primary Meanings 
In his dialogues on particular virtues, Socrates often begins with the definition already 
present within Athenian culture.  Beginning with common understanding and opinion, 
he explores the adequacy of the prevailing definition before considering possible 
alternatives.
17
  Following this model, this study considers the two primary meanings 
of modern-day temperance: abstinence from alcohol and ‘everything in moderation.’  
We begin with an examination of the temperance movement, which has given 
temperance its most enduring popular characterization – abstinence from alcohol.  
How did a once-cardinal virtue receive such a negative and enduring label? 
 
1.2.1 Christian Temperance Unions (the ‘Temperance Movement’) 
The Christian Temperance Unions (henceforth referred to collectively as the 
‘temperance movement’) were a central feature of late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century moral life.  Arising from a constellation of religious, secular, and economic 
concerns, the temperance movement viewed alcohol as hazardous to physical, 
spiritual, and societal health.  With recommendations ranging from moderation in 
consumption to complete abstinence, the temperance movement sought to enforce 
their convictions in religious, social, and legislative arenas.   
 
1.2.1.1 Societal Concerns of the Temperance Movement 
For many, the temperance movement was less a movement against alcohol itself than 
a movement for the many things alcohol was seen to destroy.  Amidst concerns 
among industrialists facing absenteeism and low work productivity, the movement 
found roots in the ‘market revolution’, which promoted such philosophical goods as 
                                                 
17
 See Laches and Charmides as two examples of this methodology.  
16 
 
rationality, sobriety, and order.
18
 In its connections to the reform of such social evils 
as slavery, malnutrition, neglect, and work-related abuses, the temperance movement 
worked in concert with sabbatarianism, feminism, and the women’s suffrage 
movement.  Suffragists, in particular, called the temperance movement a ‘benevolent 
feminism’ for the concern it displayed towards women and children.19  Daly names 
temperance activist Carry Nation as a refutation of the characterizations of the 
Women’s Christian Temperance Union as ‘timid’ and ‘dreary’, a series of ‘fixations’ 
by ‘small-souled women.’  Rather, they were crusaders who sought freedom for 
families from the oppression of alcoholism.
20
  Indeed, a central motivation for both 
the American and British temperance movements was the amount of sheer misery 
traceable, directly or indirectly, to alcohol consumption.
21
  In particular, large 
numbers of women and children suffered from alcohol-related abuse. In the book 
Temperance Sermons, ‘The Saloon and the Child’ emphasizes the importance of 
children and their vulnerability to Christ as it contrasts the tavern with the home, the 
school, and the church.
22
  Alcohol abuse (which, in the opinion of many, was alcohol 
consumption writ large) stood to undo the progress made in various aspects of child 
welfare and the easing of the burdens of the poor more generally. 
Yet concern for the poor and working-class often arose from a deeper moral 
distress.  Underlying much of the drive behind the temperance movement was a wide-
                                                 
18
 Thomas R. Pegram, Battling Demon Rum: The Struggle for a Dry America, 1800-1933 (Chicago IL: 
The American Ways Series, 1998), 17. 
19
 See Janet Giele, Two Paths to Women’s Equality: Temperance, Suffrage, and the Origins of Modern 
Feminism (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995). 
20
 Daly, 285.  
21
 Even anti-abstinence positions admit the attendant evils of drunkenness: E.A. Wasson, Religion and 
Drink (New York: Burr Printing House, 1914), 266. 
22
 Temperance Sermons by Various Authors, compiled by The Board of Temperance, Prohibition and 
Public Morals of the Methodist Episcopal Church, (New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1917). 
17 
 
ranging concern for social and political stability.
23
  The new paradigm of post-
Revolutionary America, with its separation of church and state and emphasis upon 
civil and religious liberties, caused many New Englanders to worry that a ‘spiritual 
free-for-all had replaced cosmic order’.24  This ‘reform cosmology’ drew the attention 
of temperance reformers, among others, to issues of restoring social order and 
stability.  The religious passion felt by Benjamin Rush, a physician and early 
American statesman, directly influenced an emerging ‘Enlightenment Christian 
reform vision of individual, society, and cosmos’ that sought to restore order to all 
areas of human life.
25
  This indicates another central motivation of the temperance 
movements: religious conviction. 
 
1.2.1.2 Religious Foundations of the Temperance Movement 
The American temperance movement was decidedly religious in nature, particularly 
within the churches of Puritan derivation – Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and 
Methodists.
26
  Moving from moral models of intoxication – drunkenness as vice – 
towards more medical and social models – drunkenness as disease – pushed many 
Protestant churches towards teetotalling positions.
27
  However, evangelicalism 
maintained a solid opposition to drunkenness (with a particular focus upon distilled 
‘spirits’) that predated the official temperance movement.  Believing that increased 
                                                 
23
 Robert H. Wiebe argues that a ‘search for order’ characterizes the period otherwise known both as 
the ‘Progressive Era’ and the ‘Gilded Age’; see The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1967). 
24
 Robert H. Abzug, Cosmos Crumbling: American Reform and Religious Imagination (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 5. 
25
 Ibid., 12-3. 
26
 A good introduction to the American temperance movement is Pegram, Battling Demon Rum.  For a 
comprehensive source on the temperance movement in Great Britain, see Brian Harrison’s Drink and 
the Victorians: The Temperance Question in England, 1815-1872 (Keele: Keele University Press, 
1994).  For a focus on the changing attitudes towards alcohol addiction, particularly within theology 
and religious communities, see Christopher C. H. Cook, Alcohol, Addiction, and Christian Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
27
 Cook, 77-8, citing Benjamin Rush’s influential characterization of drunkenness as disease (78). 
18 
 
physical health would improve spiritual openness, evangelicals viewed alcohol as a 
stumbling block to reception of the gospel, which left people ‘befuddled in mind and 
degraded in spirit.’28  Thus, sobriety was preached as a necessary prerequisite to true 
conversion.
29
  Because early evangelicals focused more on supporting humanitarian 
causes than prosecuting vice, the temperance movement was an area where they could 
address a genuine public need while remaining embedded in the life of faith.
30
   
The early Methodist Church took a serious view of alcohol consumption.  For 
numerous reasons, Wesley was unreservedly against ‘dram-drinking.’31  In his 
‘Thoughts Upon the Present Scarcity of Provisions,’ Wesley connects the scarcity and 
expense of foodstuffs in England to the use of corn and other grains in distilling 
(I.3).
32
  Wesley’s opposition to alcohol consumption was also based in his 
commitment to the purposes of fasting, thrift, and ‘expediency’, as he notes in his 
journal: ‘And I think the poor themselves ought to be questioned with regard to 
drinking tea and beer.  For I cannot think it right for them to indulge themselves in 
those things which I refrain from to help them’ (Jrnl. 11/20/1767).  In his ‘General 
Rules’ of 1743 for societies in both Great Britain and the United States, John Wesley 
explicitly prohibits ‘drunkenness, buying or selling spirituous liquors, or drinking 
them, unless in a case of extreme necessity.’33  Directions were given to the Band-
Societies on December 25
th, 1744, ‘to take no spirituous liquor, no dram of any kind, 
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unless prescribed by a physician.’34  These rules were adopted by the Methodist 
Episcopal Church in 1798 in the Doctrines and Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal 
Church, after which their General Conference ‘added precept to example’ by banning 
members from participation in the liquor business.
35
   
Here the Methodist societies laid the groundwork for the nascent temperance 
movement.
36
  However, the Methodist position stopped short on insistence upon total 
abstinence.  Although the Temperance Unions labeled Wesley ‘a total abstainer’,37 
and while he was consistently opposed to ‘dram-drinking’ and distilled liquors, 
Wesley himself drank beer and wine on occasion; he comments on a periodic 
abstinence from ‘the use of flesh and wine’, which he later resumed (Jrnl. 
10/20/1735).  He once questioned why someone should ‘condemn wine toto genere, 
which is one of the noblest cordials in nature!’ (Jrnl. 12/9/1771).  The Moravians, 
under whom John Wesley was converted, believed that ‘drink is Christian’ and even 
operated a brewery in France.
38
  Francis Asbury, Wesley’s onetime assistant and co-
superintendent, preached on the virtues of moderation: ‘We must not indulge in the 
unlawful use of lawful things: it is lawful to eat, but not to gluttony; it is lawful to 
drink, but not to drunkenness.’39   
Other denominations shared Wesley’s reservations concerning total 
abstinence.  The Lutheran, Episcopal, and Catholic churches viewed total abstinence 
as ‘a matter of conscience’ and focused instead upon the promotion of moderation.  In 
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this, they saw themselves as ‘following the old teaching, and the old way, of Church 
and Bible, of saint and seer and Savior, the way of self-control and sobriety.’40  This 
was an important acknowledgment of the mixed history towards the consumption of 
alcohol within the Christian tradition.  And although deeply inspired by the American 
temperance societies, even John Edgar – Presbyterian minister, professor of theology, 
and one of the founders of the British temperance movement – never abandoned the 
moderation position in favor of total abstinence.
41
  Nevertheless, the Second Great 
Awakening – with its foundations in postmillennialism and its emphasis on personal 
holiness moving onwards to perfection – laid the groundwork for a push towards total 
abstinence.  The temperance movement thus gradually evolved from a call to 
moderation in all drink, to abstinence from distilled liquor and moderation in beer and 
wine, to total abstinence from alcoholic beverages.  Indeed, the conflation of 
‘temperance’ and ‘abstinence’ still appears on the official website of the Women’s 
Christian Temperance Union, which cites Xenophon as their authority: 
‘WCTU members choose total abstinence from all alcohol as their life style and they 
adopted this definition of temperance: Temperance may be defined as: moderation in 
all things healthful; total abstinence from all things harmful.’42  Their use of a 
classical text leads to a consideration of the sources and authorities employed by the 
temperance movements. 
 
1.2.1.3 Sources Employed by the Temperance Movement 
The temperance movement employed numerous historical authorities, both classical 
and Christian, in support of its arguments.  However, advocates for total abstinence 
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often incorporated a variety of viewpoints into their more severe position.  In 
‘Historical and Philosophical Notes on Intemperance,’ the pro-abstinence 
Cyclopaedia of Temperance and Prohibition admits that both ‘temperance’ and 
‘moderation’ are functionally imprecise, as ‘that which is (or is supposed to be) 
moderation for one drinker may be excess for another.’  Still, it maintains that ‘the 
best temperance is purity’, citing Homer, Herodotus, Xenophon, Hippocrates, Plato, 
Aristotle, and the Church Fathers to bolster its call for abstinence.
43
  It employs 
Aristotle’s connection between abstinence and temperance (Eth.Nic. II.8); and it cites 
both Xenophon (Mem. I.5 and IV.5) and Aquinas on the importance of abstaining 
from ‘things contrary to soundness or a good condition of life’ (ST q.141, art.6).  It 
concludes: ‘It is by virtue of good authority, therefore, that the word ‘temperance,’ as 
specifically used at this day, is generally recognized as an equivalent for “total 
abstinence”.’44  Thus, the abstinence position claimed strong historical support. 
However, there is also significant engagement with classical philosophy and 
theology in the writings of those who favored moderation over strict abstinence.  The 
Teaching of Temperance and Self-Control acknowledges the reality of alcohol abuse 
and the need for self-control in its consumption; however, its larger goal is ‘to awaken 
the interest of teachers in a great moral ideal, and to encourage the habit of reflection 
on moral ideas.’45  Inspiration for true temperance should be positive, not negative: 
‘Self-mastery is a noble ideal, essential to the good life.’46  If intemperance is ‘the 
complete mastery of Man by a base appetite’, then the solution is not the complete 
suppression of this appetite, but the elevation and restoration of reason.  ‘Happy Day,’ 
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declared Abraham Lincoln, ‘when, all appetites controlled, all passions subdued, 
mind, all conquering mind, shall live and move the monarch of the world.’47   
Some arguments were Platonic in nature, referencing self-mastery and internal 
management.  The adult should ‘observe and govern himself’; men and women are 
‘free and responsible beings, capable of “self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-
control”.’48  Others sound more Aristotelian: children should be raised ‘so that their 
appetites shall be normal, that they shall not desire excess, but shun it “instinctively” 
– if you like that word – without the need of conscious self-restraint.’49  And the pro-
moderation text Religion and Drink engages the gospel of Matthew in a surprisingly 
Stoic manner; citing Matt. 10.16 (‘Behold, I send you out as sheep in the midst of 
wolves; so be wise as serpents and innocent as doves’), the author says, ‘This wisdom 
would enable them to choose between the evil and the good.’50  This echoes Zeno’s 
definition of temperance as wisdom in choosing (SVF I.201).
51
  Classically, the 
moderation position appears to have significant support for its position as well. 
Thus, the proponents of both the abstinence and moderation positions viewed 
themselves as residing within the larger moral tradition of the virtue of temperance, 
while also claiming biblical and church support.  Without a closer examination of the 
sources themselves, however, it is difficult to adjudicate between their claims.  And 
while both positions remain technically present in the contemporary moral lexicon, 
the abstinence position has clearly had a more enduring influence.
52
  This echoes 
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Mark Twain’s characterization of Prohibition as an ‘intemperate temperance.’53  Even 
current translations of classic ethical texts may, for this reason, avoid the term 
‘temperance’ itself.  When I enquired why a noted translation of the Nicomachaen 
Ethics uses ‘moderation’ instead of ‘temperance’, the author stated her intention to 
avoid ‘the association that “temperance” has with abstention from alcohol, as in 
“Temperance societies”.’54  Thus ‘moderation’ as a term appears less burdened with 
negative and restrictive associations than ‘temperance’, and this appears better able to 
convey the essence of the virtue in question.
55
  Is moderation a significant 
improvement, either as a term or as a position? 
 
1.2.2 Moderation 
‘“Everything in moderation,” or so the saying goes,’ remarks one commentator.56  
The idea (and perhaps the ideal) of ‘everything in moderation’ has its roots in the 
Delphic oracle, where the axiom ‘Nothing in Excess’ hung above the entrance.  It is 
commonly associated with the Aristotelian mean of virtue – often referred to as the 
‘Golden Mean’ – wherein virtue lies in avoiding the extremes of excess and 
deficiency.  As a moral axiom, ‘everything in moderation’ has the advantage of being 
commonsensical.  This in itself is not wholly negative, as it makes sense to generally 
avoid extremes of behavior and mood.  Indeed, Jacques Maritain calls Aristotelian 
Thomism the ‘golden mean’ in the philosophical relationship between intellect and 
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common sense.
57
  More recently, moderation has been rediscovered as an important 
component of philosophical, political, and personal engagement.
58
  Clearly part of the 
classical moral heritage, it should not be dismissed lightly.   
Moderation is, in recent years, a common definition of temperance, with both 
positive and negative connotations.
59
  While this may appear benign, reading 
moderation qua virtue in this manner may result in a tepid mediocrity that contributes 
little of practical value to moral enquiry. 
Moderation of a sort thus plays a role as contributor to human 
flourishing—a secondary and derivative role.  But when severed from the 
passionate sources of inspiration, as nowadays it always is, the 
Aristotelianism of morals can only result in a toning down of the affects 
to a harmless, apathetic mean that prepares the way for ‘the last man.’60 
 
Calling moderation ‘practically equivalent’ to temperance, Richard White echoes 
these concerns when he states: ‘We want to be small, Nietzsche might say; we are 
afraid of anything exceptional or extreme, and so we praise temperance because we 
are mediocre and comfortable only with the virtues of mediocrity.’61  Similarly, Josef 
Pieper finds the current understanding of moderation an ‘emasculated concept’ that 
arises ‘when the love of truth or some other generous impulse threatens to take an 
extreme risk.’62  As a definition of temperance, moderation stands in stark contrast to 
‘the classic prototype of the fourth cardinal virtue.’  Moreover, it displays nothing of 
the love of God, the ‘fountainhead of the virtues… that knows neither mean nor 
measure.’63   
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It is difficult to countenance the demotion of a cardinal virtue to a subordinate 
and unoriginal trait of character; but alongside the stringency of the teetotalers, a 
‘moderate’ moderation may seem the lesser of the two evils.  Thus, temperance is 
caught between two rather unappealing alternatives: total and repressive abstinence 
from alcohol or ineffective and uninspiring moderation.  The next question is whether 
this impact is an inevitable result of the temperance movement and a lack of ethical 
interest, or whether the virtue has other, more constructive possibilities.  This study 
now turns to more recent work on the virtue of temperance, both to assess the impact 
of the temperance movement on current scholarly understandings of temperance and 
to discern trends in moral thought on the virtue’s meaning and significance. 
 
1.3 Literature Review  
Sources dealing with temperance include several monographs and larger theological 
and/or philosophical works on virtue or character.  Along with these, this study will 
consider several works within psychology, sociology, and more popular writing.  
Temperance, while not making deadlines in either popular or academic writing, does 
have a small but significant presence. 
 
1.3.1 Monographs on Temperance 
Regarding classical temperance, the standard is undoubtedly Helen North’s 
Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature, which remains 
the most comprehensive account of ‘classical temperance’, both in breadth and 
depth.
64
  It considers the position of temperance in the pre-Socratic Heroic and 
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Archaic periods; its location within the newly established, Platonic tetrad of cardinal 
virtues; its development in the works of Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Neoplatonists; 
and its transition into and appropriation by both Roman culture and early Christian 
morality.  Her narrative possesses tremendous strengths, particularly when read 
against recent accounts: it fully elucidates the richness and variety especially in Plato 
and in the variety of possible translations; it pays close attention to both the concept 
of temperance and the variety of the associated terms; and it acknowledges and 
engages the complexity of the virtue’s development, particularly as temperance makes 
its transition into the Roman and Christian worlds.  It is foundational for any 
competent analysis of temperance.  Its primary weakness, which is less a criticism 
than an acknowledgement of the scope of the author’s intent, is the brevity of its 
conclusion.  North offers a vital and compelling interpretation of temperance in Greek 
thought and language, opening the door for someone to continue both the study and 
the story of temperance. 
 An excellent complement to North’s comprehensive treatment of classical and 
patristic temperance is Josef Pieper’s The Four Cardinal Virtues, an extended 
discussion of Thomistic temperance.  Roughly following the virtue’s treatment in the 
Summa Theologiae, Pieper rejects the halfhearted depictions of temperance as fear of 
exuberance or excess.  Noting the richness and constructive nature of the Greek 
sōphrosynē and the Latin temperantia, Pieper characterizes the heart of temperance as 
the unification and integration of diverse parts.  This arises from a posture of ‘selfless 
self-preservation’ wherein the ‘single self’ is purified and made whole.65  Following 
Aquinas in discussing fasting, humility, curiosity, and the moderation of wrath, he 
sees the preservation of chastity as ‘the primordial form of the discipline of 
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temperateness.’66  Despite his creative analysis and interpretation of Aquinas’s text, 
Pieper warns against any forced originality. Instead, he looks to ‘the wisdom of the 
ancients’ which provides a ‘truly inexhaustible contemporaneity.’67  While Pieper’s 
main limitation, for this thesis, is his singular focus upon Aquinas, his detailed 
engagement with the material is absorbing and persuasive. 
The two most comprehensive current accounts differ in their topics and 
approach.  In his doctoral thesis ‘The Four Causes of Temperance’, Nicholas Austin 
completes an exegetical analysis of several Thomistic texts to construct Aquinas’s 
understanding of temperance via its ‘four causes’ (formal, material, final, and 
efficient).  Austin provides a meticulous account of Thomistic thought on the causes 
of virtue in general and temperance in particular; he concludes that Thomistic 
temperance is characterized by ‘a twofold mode of restraint and positive channeling’ 
of desires.
68
  He depicts temperance and its actions as positive forces in the moral life 
and concludes by relating seven ‘attractive marks’ of Thomistic temperance.69  The 
primary weakness in Austin’s work, similar to that of Pieper, lies more in the scope of 
the work than in its quality or internal adequacy; because Austin confines himself to a 
single (albeit very influential) historical figure, he rather limits the possible resources 
for the retrieval and application of temperance.  Nevertheless, Austin’s thesis adds to 
the current literature both a serious account of temperance as constructed by one 
particular historical figure and an engaged interpretation of this account. 
The second recent work on temperance is Mark Carr’s Passionate 
Deliberation: Emotion, Temperance, and the Care Ethic in Clinical Moral 
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Deliberation.
70
 Drawing from essentially the same sources as this thesis, Carr 
identifies six primary meanings, or ‘interpretive threads’ within temperance across its 
many historical treatments.  The ‘broad’ understandings include sophrosyne, 
moderation, temperantia as mixing, and decorum or social propriety; the ‘narrow’ 
treatments include self-restraint, and self-control.  Carr then proposes a ‘normative 
account of temperance’ that does not attempt to consolidate or strictly prioritize these 
interpretive threads, excepting that (1) self-restraint must not take priority and (2) 
sophrosyne is particularly beneficial for the kinds of ‘psychological temperance’ 
connected to the care ethic he promotes.
71
  Calling temperance ‘self-management of 
both sensate and intellectual desires’,72 Carr concludes by applying this normative 
account to the incorporation of emotion in the deliberative clinical setting, offering an 
alternative to the ‘dispassionate rationalism’ and reviving the medical code of 
aequanimas or imperturbability.
73
  Carr, as opposed to Austin and Pieper, offers both 
the broad recovery found in North and the focused application lacking in North and 
Austin.  However, he limits the deeper historical and exegetical work on the virtue 
itself, splitting his efforts between examinations of temperance, emotion, and clinical 
decision-making.  Thus, his account of temperance as a virtue is not as fully 
developed as one might like. 
North, Austin, and Carr, in different ways and through their different 
approaches, resemble the methods and aims of this thesis.  North offers a striking 
alternative concept to both temperance as abstinence and ‘everything in moderation’, 
but her account concludes too early in the historical journey to stand alone in any 
retrieval of temperance.  However, in its historical structure, its eye for significant 
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developments, and its attention to both terminological and conceptual associations of 
temperance, North’s work is an excellent model for any attempt to rediscover 
temperance.
74
  Both Austin and Carr make substantial contributions to the discussion 
of temperance, offering an alternative to Geach’s dismissive interpretation of 
temperance.
75
  In this, I believe they both succeed.  However, each contribution stops 
short of what this study shall argue is a wide-ranging yet exegetically competent 
treatment of the virtue.  Austin’s work is similar in approach and methodology to Part 
II of this thesis in its emphasis on historical and textual analysis; but whereas Austin 
examines only Aquinas, this study considers seven schools of philosophical and 
theological thought.  This, admittedly, allows for less depth within each analysis but 
adds to the study’s breadth of scope.  Carr’s work more closely resembles Part III of 
the present work; however, Carr formulates his six ‘interpretive threads’ apart from an 
intentional study of the history of the virtue of temperance.
76
  In contrast, this thesis 
derives its interpretive hermeneutic from (and places the bulk of its work within) a 
detailed examination of the source texts, in conversation with the relevant secondary 
materials.  It discerns the major interpretive threads after and within a careful 
diachronic study of the history of temperance.  Thus, this thesis attempts to 
incorporate the best of the approaches of North, Austin, and Carr, engaging critically 
with the historical texts, the interpretive possibilities, and the possible applications. 
  
1.3.2 Other Treatments 
While not possessing the monograph status of the works just discussed, temperance 
does appear in several comprehensive works on virtue and character.  These 
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treatments include philosophical, theological, and psychological explorations of 
virtue, adding to the discourse on temperance in small but meaningful ways. 
 
1.3.2.1 Philosophical and Theological Accounts 
The majority of the recent philosophical accounts are Aristotelian.  Charles Young 
provides a helpful distinction between intellectual temperance (typically understood 
as self-knowledge) and moral temperance (typically understood as self-control).
77
  He 
also centers his account on the importance of human animality for truly human living.  
Thus, intemperance is more than merely ‘overdoing it’; it is relating wrongly to our 
animality.  Howard Curzer’s work with Aristotelian temperance addresses several 
internal ‘tensions’ wherein Aristotle’s account contradicts common sense and even 
‘[his] own architectonic.’78 Whereas Aristotle stipulates that intemperance requires 
violating all the parameters of temperance, Curzer argues that violating a single 
parameter is sufficiently vicious; and Curzer finds Aristotle’s limitation of the sphere 
of temperance to the activities of the sense of touch unduly restrictive.  Curzer also 
advocates expanding the sphere of temperance beyond the strictly physical appetites 
for food, alcohol, and sexual relations.  More recently, Robert Roberts provides a very 
informative account of the relationship between temperance and rationality, arguing 
that appetites become temperate by incorporating ‘concerned understandings’ into 
their patterns of choices.
79
 
Treatments of Platonic ‘temperance’ have focused almost exclusively upon the 
sōphrosynē of the Charmides.80  These accounts consider the semantics of the term 
sōphrosynē, the role of knowledge (particularly self-knowledge) in Athenian 
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morality;
81
 the relationship between knowledge, ignorance, and wisdom;
82
 and the 
particularities and function of the text itself.
83
  While each adds richness to the general 
understanding of temperance, none substantially enhance its formulation.  Likewise, 
there is no recent philosophical discussion about temperance across the Platonic 
corpus, or among the Stoics or other Hellenistic philosophical systems. 
Similarly, most current theological accounts that specifically address 
temperance are Thomistic.  Jean Porter describes temperance as an ‘affective virtue’ 
plausibly translated as ‘self-restraint’ that brings nonrational desire into a more fully 
realized cognitive relationship with both rationality and the will.
84
  Because it is 
agent-based and therefore somewhat relative to the individual, temperance, like 
courage, has a special relationship to practical wisdom.  Moreover, it is ‘perennial’ in 
that it is required for crafting and maintaining the life of virtue, and therefore appears 
on a continuing basis.
85
  Diana Cates’ chapter in The Ethics of Aquinas is a detailed 
and nicely technical account, focusing on exposition rather than application.  Offering 
a clear and thorough exposition of temperance in the Summa, Cates gives attention to 
such underlying issues as the rule, standard, and central elements of temperance.
86
  
Although lacking any treatment of the ‘potential’ parts of temperance (humility, 
continence, modesty, and curiosity), her account is comprehensive and instructive.  
William Mattison takes a more broadly Thomistic approach in characterizing 
                                                 
81
 Susan D. Collins, ‘Sōphrosynē: Moderation and Self-Knowledge: An Interpretation of Plato’s 
Charmides.’ (MA thesis, University of Alberta, 1987). 
82
 Alan Pichanick, The Virtue of the Soul and the Limits of Human Understanding: The Search for 
Sophrosune in Plato’s Charmides (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2005). 
83
 N. van der Ben, The Charmides of Plato: Problems and Interpretations (Amsterdam: B.R. Gruner 
Publishing Co., 1985); and Walter T. Schmid, Plato’s Charmides and the Socratic Ideal of Rationality 
(Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1998). 
84
 Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990). 
85
 Jean Porter, ‘Perennial and Timely Virtues: Practical Wisdom, Courage and Temperance’, in 
Changing Values and Virtues, eds. Dietmar Mieth and Jacques Pohier (Edinburgh: T&T Clark Ltd., 
1987), 60-8. 
86
 Diana Fritz Cates, ‘The Virtue of Temperance’, in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 321-39. 
32 
 
temperance as ‘living a passionate moral life’, calling temperance ‘relatively 
straightforward’ and prototypical for examining how desires (‘emotions or feelings or 
passions’) may be integrated into the moral life.87  However, with his primary focus 
on the nature of emotions and their role in the moral life, he actually says very little 
about temperance itself.   
 
1.3.2.2 Other Contemporary Accounts 
Three recent, slightly more popular accounts provide more expansive views of the 
virtue.  In Pagan Virtues, John Casey takes a broad and inclusive view of temperance, 
including emotion, sloth, ordered love, sensuality, cruelty, and power within its 
sphere.
88
  Working primarily with Aristotle and Aquinas, Casey associates 
temperance with humility born of objectivity and grace, beauty born of well-ordered 
living, and the difference between sensuousness and carnality. Casey strongly 
associates temperance with the discipline of self-will; thus, the temperate person is 
‘tempered’ and ‘chastened.’89  André Comte-Sponville also draws broadly from the 
philosophical tradition to present a positive and compelling account of temperance.
90
  
Temperance is ‘not sadness, impotence, or asceticism’; it is enjoying better, not 
enjoying less.
91
  In mastering our pleasures, we experience them as ‘purer for being 
freer, more joyful, more serene.’92  Through temperance, we learn to respect human 
limits, not surpass them, working companionably with common sense.
93
   
                                                 
87
 William C. Mattison, Introducing Moral Theology: True Happiness and the Virtues (Grand Rapids 
MI: Brazos Press, 2008), 75-94. 
88
 John Casey, Pagan Virtues: An Essay in Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 104-43. 
89
 Ibid., 142-3. 
90
 André Comte-Sponville, A Small Treatise on the Great Virtues: The Uses of Philosophy in Everyday 
Life, trans. Catherine Temerson (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001). 
91
 Ibid., 38-9. 
92
 Ibid., 39.   
93
 Ibid., 40.  
33 
 
Finally, psychologists Christopher Peterson and Martin P. Seligman name 
temperance as one of six ‘core moral virtues.’94   Defined as ‘the virtue of control 
over excess’, they expand the term to include ‘any form of auspicious self-restraint.’95  
Secondary virtues collected under temperance include forgiveness and mercy, 
humility and modesty, prudence, and self-regulation.
96
  They note that the strengths of 
temperance are understood partially by what a person refrains from doing, and they 
may be noticed more by their absence than their presence.  This is perhaps 
unsurprising, as these qualities are seldom recommended or applauded in 
contemporary society.
97
   
Thus, current accounts of temperance reveal the promising and problematic 
nature of an attempt at recovery.  Navigating these issues necessitates a careful 
methodology, which comprises the final section of this introduction. 
 
1.4 Framing Questions, Sources, and Methodology 
Within the preceding overview of the temperance movement and current 
understandings of temperance, several questions have emerged:  
 Is temperance as abstinence from alcohol an adequate understanding of the 
virtue?  Did the movement utilize the classical sources accurately and in context? 
 Does ‘everything in moderation’ provide an attractive or helpful alternative?  
 Has the literature review provided answers to these questions?  Has the literature 
review gestured towards some appealing possibilities?   
This thesis, therefore, views its task as the philosophical and theological examination 
of the virtue of temperance – its origins as a cardinal virtue, through the classical and 
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Christian traditions, and into its present state.  It is structured around three sets of 
framing questions:  
 How and why has temperance disappeared from contemporary moral 
discussion?  How did temperance transform from a vibrant cardinal virtue 
into a repressive and ineffective pseudo-virtue?  What has temperance been in 
its ‘past lives’?  Who has employed it, and how, and why? 
 Is it possible to construct a fresh interpretation of the virtue of temperance?  
What would this contain? 
 What impact would this interpretation have on the contemporary moral 
landscape?  What difference would it make for issues such as 
environmentalism or consumerism? 
Answering these questions leads into the body of the thesis, which is divided into 
three progressive sections.   
 
1.4.1 Chapter Structure and Content  
The first section considers the virtue of temperance in the classical tradition of Greek 
and Hellenistic culture.  Chapter Two examines temperance in the works of Plato, 
including its adoption into the tetrad of the cardinal virtues and thus its ‘canonization’ 
as a virtue of universal import and enduring significance.  Chapter Three builds upon 
this understanding of temperance and examines its development within two schools of 
thought: Aristotle and the Stoics.  It considers the ways in which Aristotle inherited 
and modified the Platonic understanding of temperance and the lasting changes that 
ensued.  It then considers one example of the Hellenization of temperance within the 
different stages of Stoic philosophy, and the transmission and adaption of temperance 
(and the larger tradition of virtue ethics) to Roman culture via Cicero. 
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The second portion considers temperance within the emerging Christian 
tradition and its fluctuating relationship with classical moral thought.  Chapter Four 
tracks the development of temperance in the thought of Augustine and Aquinas, when 
the conversation between Christian and classical morality was still fairly explicit.  
Augustine and Aquinas demonstrate, in different ways, how the Christian tradition 
appropriated and incorporated classical morality, particularly the concept of virtue.  
Chapter Five follows temperance in the thought of John Calvin and John Wesley.  
The Reformation significantly altered the relationship between the classical and 
Christian traditions, resulting in the demotion and occasional demonization of virtue 
language and frameworks.  The tetrad of the cardinal virtues is no longer universally 
accepted as morally formative; rather, it is often linked to a potentially dangerous 
system of works righteousness.  Nevertheless, temperance remains active in moral 
discussion, although diminished in both form and content. 
The final section analyzes the insights gleaned from the historical analysis, 
develops a fresh account of temperance, and applies this account to contemporary 
moral discussions.  Chapter Six offers a fresh interpretation of the virtue of 
temperance.  It identifies the central components of temperance, which have been 
associated with temperance in its various historical constructions.  It considers some 
particular characteristics of this fresh interpretation of temperance, and it discusses its 
relationship to other current understandings of temperance.  Finally, it asks whether 
there exists, in fact, one singular ‘virtue of temperance’, or whether the virtue’s many 
manifestations are too determined by context to coherently speak of one ‘virtue of 
temperance’.  In conclusion, Chapter Seven argues for the legitimacy of the expansion 
of the sphere of temperance and applies this fresh interpretation of temperance to the 
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contemporary moral issue of consumerism, deliberating upon the idea of ‘temperate 
consumption.’ 
 
1.4.2 Methodology and Sources 
This thesis will consider the virtue of temperance within the thought of several central 
thinkers and schools of thought: Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Augustine, Aquinas, 
Calvin, and Wesley. These figures represent the highlights, so to speak, of the journey 
and the transitions of the virtue of temperance.  Rather than consider temperance 
within one single school of thought, as do many people in our literature review, I seek 
to understand temperance as it traverses the streams of philosophical and theological 
thought, noting the confluences and examining the divergences.  Instead of relying 
solely upon the particularities of one school of thought, the variety of the sources will 
act as a sort of ‘hybrid vigor’, contributing to the vibrancy and freshness of the 
discussion and its conclusions. 
These sources themselves share several methodological components.  First, 
they all work, to varying degrees, within a shared understanding and vocabulary of 
the concept of ‘virtue’.  To be sure, they have different understandings of the 
particulars of virtue and its role in the moral life.  Yet even Calvin, the least 
hospitable to the role and value of virtue, views it as a rational moral category.  
Second, each engages specifically with some moral characteristic called ‘temperance’.  
They may elevate or diminish it to different degrees; they may relate it differently to 
various related concepts such as continence, moderation, and self-control.  However, 
each one speaks directly of ‘temperance’ as something that, at the very least, affects 
the appetites for food, alcohol, and sexual activity.   
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Such a variety of sources begs the methodological question as well.  With such 
an assortment of sources, the interpretive task can easily become incoherent.  To 
accomplish its task, this thesis utilizes an integrated set of approaches: historical 
analysis and interpretive application. 
 
1.4.2.1 Historical, Analytical, Interpretive, Applicative 
The first approach is historical.  This thesis will examine temperance chronologically 
within seven particular contexts, attending to its particular voice within the moral 
thought of each author.  Attention will be paid to the ways in which temperance 
develops throughout its history, noting the similarities and considering the 
differences:   
 When temperance remains largely unchanged, why is this so?  What does this 
continuity emphasize about the virtue of temperance, its particularities and its 
universals? 
 When temperance is significantly changed, what are the causes and effects?  
What is different about this new temperance?  Are the changes permanent? 
 Within both scenarios, are the developments positive or negative? 
Because temperance has undergone such substantial changes since its inception, the 
historical survey is especially relevant.  Thus, the task of this thesis is simultaneously 
synchronic and diachronic.  It considers temperance qua temperance within each 
context, while acknowledging that virtues and other concepts have historicity and 
variability; they exist and travel within the stream of history and its philosophical and 
theological developments.
98
  Just as theological work can be both synchronic (as with 
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systematic theology) and diachronic (as with biblical theology), any work in virtue 
ethics must attend to both the scenes and the storyline.
99
  In this sense, the present 
thesis is also narratival, tracing the history of the virtue of temperance from its origins 
as a cardinal virtue in the writings of Plato, through the classical and Christian 
traditions and the temperance movement of the early twentieth century.  It offers one 
telling of ‘the story of temperance’ and proposes an exciting and relevant next chapter 
for that story. 
Proposing a new chapter in the story reveals the second approach as 
interpretive and applicative.  The historical analysis is interesting and valuable; 
however, any significant recovery of temperance qua virtue requires both analytical 
interpretation and contemporary application.  Is today’s temperance the same virtue as 
the Platonic, Aristotelian, or Thomistic versions?  If it is not the ‘virtue’ of the 
temperance movement, how should it be characterized?  An interpretation of the 
historical survey may suggest a fresh conception of temperance.  Moreover, the 
‘rediscovery’ of temperance as a compelling and relevant moral trait should, ideally, 
make some sort of difference to contemporary moral discussion.  In a sense, this is the 
raison d’être of this study. 
However, proposing to rediscover and reappropriate temperance begs the 
question of whether such a recovery is practically possible.  The aforementioned 
variety of sources may beg the question: is it possible to speak coherently of the 
‘virtue of temperance’?  Can the historical analysis yield an account of temperance 
that is both coherent and persuasive?  Extracting an idea from its context and 
tradition, particularly with an end in mind, risks ‘proof-texting’ and assigning false 
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meaning.  Heeding Alasdair MacIntyre’s assertion that moral concepts cannot be 
studied apart from their historical context has influenced the structure and approach of 
this thesis. 
Furthermore, a central methodological question in any study of a historical 
concept is whether it will center primarily upon terminological or conceptual 
associations.  If there is one ‘virtue of temperance’ to study, will it be represented 
only by the word ‘temperance’?  This thesis primarily traces the virtue of temperance 
as represented by three terms: the Greek sōphrosynē, the Latin temperantia, and the 
English temperance.  The transitions between the terms themselves will be 
considered, as the virtue of temperance evolves between terms and between 
languages.  Do the etymological changes necessitate an entirely new understanding of 
the virtue, or is there any continuity?  Moreover, while this thesis will attend to the 
presence of the word ‘temperance’ in the historical contexts, it will also consider such 
related concepts as ‘continence’, ‘moderation’, and ‘self-control’ (as well as 
enkrateia, continentia, moderatio, and frugalitas) that intersect with discussions of 
temperance and often communicate the essence of the virtue.
100
  Limiting this study 
solely to the eponymous terms risks narrowing the field of research unnecessarily and 
overlooking potentially helpful material. 
 
1.4.2.2 Assumptions and Limitations 
This thesis proceeds upon several philosophical and theological assumptions.  First, it 
stipulates the presence and continuing validity of the ongoing tradition of virtue 
ethics.  While it will not attempt to argue for the universal applicability of the tetrad 
of the ‘cardinal virtues’, it will assume their relevance as a moral framework.  Second, 
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it assumes the continuing presence and continuity of something commonly called 
‘temperance’ such that a study of the ‘virtue of temperance’ is a coherent project.  
Whether we have (or whether history has) actually been discussing the same virtue 
will be considered as the thesis progresses; however, it will proceed upon an 
assumption of the affirmative.  Third, it assumes the continuing relevance — or at 
least the possibility of the continuing relevance – of the virtue of temperance for the 
moral life. 
With temperance intersecting with such a variety of subjects, it is helpful to 
explicitly state what this thesis will and will not address.  First, it will not consider the 
full nature of desire and/or appetite, be it epithumia, cupiditas, concupiscentia, or the 
‘flesh’; nor will it consider the full nature and role of emotion or pathē.  On a related 
point, the education of these emotions and desires will likewise not be explored.  
Second, it will not argue for the authority of the tetrad of ‘cardinal virtues’, but will 
assume their continuing viability as a moral framework.  While the ‘cardinality’ of the 
cardinal virtues has endured since Plato, its structure has been questioned (whether 
directly or indirectly) beginning with Aristotle’s failure to incorporate its framework.  
Recent critiques portray the cardinal virtues as overly simplistic and premised upon an 
anachronistic anthropology, lacking an adequate consideration of human 
relationality.
101
  Although worthy of consideration, these criticisms will not be 
addressed here. 
Finally, although a large portion of this thesis is comprised by a historical 
survey, it is not a sustained engagement with the thought of Plato, Augustine, or 
others; nor is it an argument for their particular moral systems.  While it strives to 
accurately convey each author’s thought on temperance, it necessarily engages each 
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thinker in a more abbreviated manner than an individual study.  This can be 
challenging with such engaging conversation partners; it can be difficult to pull back 
and keep the larger view of the forest amidst the fascinating trees.  However, it is 
essential for staying true to the interpretive and applicative task of this thesis. 
Many commentators have proposed that the temperance of today is a shadow 
of its former self and propose its reclamation.  However, any attempts at recovery 
must first ascertain whether there is, in fact, anything worthwhile to recover.  
Answering this question leads us to the next portion of this thesis, with a historical 
and contextual study of the past lives of the virtue of temperance.  We will begin with 
Plato, as he institutes the tetrad of the four cardinal virtues and thus establishes 
temperance as a virtue of lasting import. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 
The Beginning of a Journey: 
Temperance in Plato 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, temperance is scarcely present in the current moral 
lexicon.  Yet temperance once occupied a vital position in philosophical thought; 
together with prudence, justice, and fortitude, it was a cardinal virtue, one of the four 
‘hinges’ of the moral life.  To fully understand the temperance of today, its history 
and development must be considered.  The Platonic dialogues are the natural starting 
point for any consideration of the virtue of temperance.   
 
2.1 Introduction to Classical Temperance 
While both the concept and the term itself appear before the time of Plato, his 
sustained examination of temperance (Gk. sōphrosynē) – combined with its inclusion 
in his original scheme of the tetrad of cardinal virtues – is sufficiently innovative to 
validate it as a point of departure.
102
  A consideration of Plato’s account of 
temperance logically begins with the early dialogue Charmides, the most focused and 
comprehensive treatment of the virtue in the Platonic corpus.
103
  However, to remain 
exclusively within the confines of this dialogue would be to limit our understanding 
of the term to one specific period of Platonic thought.  Plato’s development of the 
concept of temperance throughout his work, moving from the Charmides to the 
middle and late dialogues, enhances the virtue’s cognitive elements without 
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dismissing them.  While the Charmides explores such aspects as self-knowledge and 
knowing one’s own business, it also indirectly presents temperance as self-control, an 
idea which is developed in both the Gorgias and the Republic.  These ideas are, 
however, incomplete without the idea of temperance as order (kosmos), symphony 
(symphonia), or harmony (harmonia), which follows from insights in the Gorgias, the 
Republic, the Laws, the Statesman, and elsewhere.  By holding together the three 
main elements of Platonic temperance – self-knowledge, self-control, and harmonious 
order – a fuller conception of the virtue emerges.  After a brief introduction to 
Platonic philosophy and ethics, the definitions and implications of temperance will be 
examined in fuller detail. 
 
2.2 Ethical Foundations: Eudaimonia and Aretē 
Platonic ethics is virtue-based and teleological in focus.  The telos or highest aim of 
moral thought and conduct is eudaimonia, usually rendered as ‘happiness.’  To 
modern ears, the word ‘happiness’ implies a positive emotional state often associated 
with pleasure.  However, the classical understanding of ‘happiness’ implied in 
eudaimonia involves a more holistic definition of well-being and distinctively human 
flourishing, connoting the idea of blessedness and living in accordance with one’s 
chief good or ultimate purpose.  Thus, to be ‘happy’ is to be fulfilled as a human 
being, living in accordance with the larger world and the larger good.  The most 
thorough discussion of eudaimonia occurs in the Euthydemus.  Plato asserts that 
‘there could hardly be a man who would not wish to do well’ (278e4-6).104  Although 
material goods – health, wealth, and so on–are not antithetical to happiness, they must 
be put to good use to produce any true benefit.  Eudaimonia results from the proper 
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use of those goods which we possess: ‘The man who means to be happy must not only 
have such goods but must use them too’ (Euthd. 280d7-9).  This ‘proper use’ will 
only be possible through the possession of virtue; and conversely, the possession of a 
virtue will also be revealed in the happiness it produces.  Thus, the virtues (aretae) are 
the requisite skills and character traits needed to achieve the goal of eudaimonia.  The 
Euthydemus also stresses the connection between virtue and wisdom, the progression 
from eudaimonia to sophia:   
Since we all wish to be happy, and since we appear to become so by using 
things and using them rightly, and since knowledge was the source of 
rightness and good fortune, it seems to be necessary that every man 
should prepare himself by every means to become as wise as possible. 
(Euthd. 282a1-5) 
 
If virtue is required for happiness, of what does it consist?  That is, exactly what does 
Plato mean by virtue?  The question requires some consideration, as Plato does not 
approach his topics systematically.  To be sure, Plato’s ethical and philosophical 
thought reveals the influence of his mentor Socrates, especially his early work, with 
its focus on the connection between virtue and knowledge.  Thus, Plato’s early 
dialogues and thought have been called ‘Socratic,’ in that they tend to promulgate the 
notion of virtue as knowledge (epistēmē).105  Virtue arises chiefly out of a process of 
examination – the Socratic dialogues or elenchus – which leads one into a fuller, more 
developed understanding of his or her own views and their shortcomings.  Socrates 
sought not to impress people with grandiose, otherworldly ideas, but engaged them at 
the level of common moral beliefs.
106
  This was, however, an intellectual rather than 
directly moral undertaking, and involved being able to give an accounting of the whys 
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and wherefores of one’s actions.107  Called both ‘sufficient and necessary,’ knowledge 
takes the leading, perhaps even solitary role of informing and instilling Socratic 
virtue.
 108
   
Plato, however, gradually develops a more nuanced view of the human soul, 
with implications for the development and possession of aretē.  In the middle 
dialogues, he innovatively treats virtue as involving all three parts of the soul – 
appetite, thumos (often translated as ‘spirit’), and intellect.  Acquiring virtue moves 
beyond the merely intellectual to include the training of dispositions and emotions, 
which ideally occurs prior to any philosophical instruction.  Things such as music and 
poetry will lay the groundwork for the epistemic work to come (Rep. 376e-377c).  
The intellect no longer merely ruled over the unruly appetites; rather, all the parts 
could and should participate in the inculcation of virtue.
109
  The Socratic elenchus is 
no longer sufficient in itself.  These distinctions become quite central to the discussion 
of temperance, particularly in a comparison between its intellectual and moral 
components.   
Plato also modifies the Socratic conception of aretē throughout his corpus.  
The early Platonic dialogues describe virtue as technē, a ‘craft-knowledge’ or what 
Socrates calls a ‘science of the self’ (Char. 165c4-e2).  In contrast, Plato’s maturing 
position on virtue suggests that it is a good in itself, which is revealed by one’s 
knowledge of the Forms.  This is foreshadowed in the lengthy discussion in the 
Charmides, and elsewhere, about the possession of a virtue requiring an ability to 
define it adequately.  In Book I of the Republic, Plato introduces the notion of aretē as 
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following from something’s fulfilling its intended purpose; this is known as the 
‘function’ argument (335b6-11).  The proper work of anything is enabled by the 
working of that thing’s particular virtue (Rep. 353b2-d1).  Moreover, performing 
one’s intended function well, through the possession of aretē, will ensure one’s 
happiness.  Socrates maintains that the just ‘live better and are happier’ than the 
unjust, a position which he accepts as true, but seeks to explore more fully (Rep. 
352d1-4).
110
   
Regarding human aretē, Plato states that the soul has both a function and a 
virtue of its own, the latter being necessary for the former (Rep. 353d3-e2).  Virtue as 
a state of the soul also appears in the early discussions of the Charmides, where 
Socrates argues against temperance being adequately seen merely in external actions 
(Char. 159b-161a).  There are also several types of aretē evidenced in humans.  
Virtue may be natural, revealed in the innate differences between persons (Rep. 
370ab, 376a).  It may be habituated or educated, the product of the training of 
emotions and attitudes apart from any intellectual exercise (Rep. 410d-e).  And it may 
reach its crescendo in the attainment of philosophical virtue.
111
  Reaching this level of 
virtue results in a person who is ‘as divine and ordered as a human being can be’ 
(Rep. 500c7-d1).
112
  And underlying these classes of virtue are the unquestioned 
assumptions that human aretē is admirable, good, and beneficial (Char. 159c1).   
The study now turns to Plato’s treatment of temperance.  The diverse settings 
of the dialogues involving temperance, and the evolving nature of Plato’s moral 
philosophy and metaphysics, necessitate the examination of several dialogues.  And 
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nowhere is the subject given more consideration than in the early dialogue 
Charmides.   
 
2.3 Plato’s Introduction to Temperance: The Charmides 
The Charmides is an explicit investigation into the nature of temperance.
113
  Even 
among the cardinal virtues, temperance has been called the most ‘Socratic’ of the 
four, with the acknowledgment of Socrates as the ‘sōphrōn anēr’ notably impacting 
many dialogues.
114
  In seeking to understand temperance, the dialogue proceeds 
through several proffered definitions, only to reject them all in the end.  However, the 
task is more complex than mere description of a Greek term, as the dialogue is 
situated firmly within the context of Plato’s larger concerns for wisdom and ethical 
conduct.  North and van der Ben accurately identify the dialogue, not as a 
straightforward pursuit of a single answer, but as a journey through multiplex and 
overlapping issues.
115
  It is no surprise, then, that a discussion of the Charmides is less 
coherent than that of other dialogues.
116
  Nevertheless, it is rich with meaning about 
Socrates himself and his attempts to reach an understanding of this elusive virtue, 
especially if one lets the dialogue speak from its own location in the corpus and on its 
own terms.  Remembering where the Charmides occurs in the Platonic corpus may 
save the reader from unnecessary burdens in its construal, as many ideas such as 
metaphysics and epistemology receive treatment in later dialogues that should not 
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factor into considerations of this early work.
117
  The Charmides cannot be expected to 
do the task of later dialogues; rather, it addresses a particular topic at a point fairly 
early in Plato’s ethical and philosophical development.   
 
2.3.1 Prologue 
While not contributing directly to the set of definitions of temperance, the prologue 
provides insight into general Socratic philosophy and lays the groundwork for the 
body of the dialogue.  The opening assertion that young Charmides should have an 
opinion on temperance (if he truly possesses the virtue) hints at what will become 
arguably the dialogue’s most complex and controversial issue: that the possession of a 
virtue will necessarily entail a good knowledge of its content and nature.  This early 
allusion to self-knowledge will prove important as the dialogue progresses.
118
  The 
reaction of Socrates to the beauty and youthful wisdom of Charmides also 
foreshadows a conception of temperance that will only be explored in later dialogues, 
that of temperance as self-control.  Socrates begins the dialogue by getting worked up 
over the beautiful youth, then getting himself under control again. 
Another interesting facet of the prologue is the presence of Critias and his 
nephew Charmides as Socrates’ dialogue partners.119  To the historically informed 
reader, the setting and composition of the dialogue is decidedly satirical, as two 
members of the infamous Thirty Tyrants could hardly be expected to display any true 
measure of temperance.
120
  As aristocratic males, with all that class and education 
could offer, they should have been first-rate expressions of the virtue of temperance, 
and yet they were later to descend into tyranny and the abuse of power.  Moreover, 
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the presence of Socrates, and the contrast of his behavior with their own, increases the 
sense of irony regarding how the sōphrōn man ought to behave.121  Their discussion 
thus illustrates Socrates’ goal of utilizing the Socratic elenchus to mold the privileged 
into suitable rulers of the polis.
 122
  Still, the focus is not limited to the aristocracy, as 
the Charmides investigates ‘the common property of being a temperate person that 
belongs to all temperate people.’123  This is a helpful move, as temperance is often 
considered to be the virtue, alternately, of aristocratic males, youth, and aged persons.  
It is in the definitions that the reader will attempt to discern this common property.   
 
2.3.2 The Definitions of Temperance 
The Charmides moves through a catalog of definitions of temperance,
124
 all of which 
are considered, but ultimately rejected by Socrates and his interlocutors.   
1) ‘Doing everything in an orderly and quiet way’ (159b) 
2) Modesty, that which ‘makes people ashamed and bashful’ (160e) 
3) Doing one’s own business (161b), and the doing of good actions (163e) 
4) Derivations of knowing oneself (164d) 
4a)  Knowledge of oneself (165c5-7) 
4b)  Knowledge of various types, knowledge of knowledge itself (166c2-3) 
4c) Knowledge of what one does and does not know (167a6-7) 
4d)  Knowledge that one does and does not know (170d2-3) 
5)       Knowledge of good and evil (174b-c) 
 
These definitions proceed from the superficial to the philosophical, from behavior to 
understanding.  The first two are straightforward and partially true, like the first 
thoughts of an intelligent youth.  The remaining definitions, however, aim to 
introduce the element of knowledge and to unite good and truth in a single science.  
The dialogue’s manner of progression is itself demonstrative of Socratic temperance, 
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as the replacement of ignorance by knowledge is part and parcel of both the Socratic 
ethos and his dialectic.
125
 
 
2.3.2.1 Behavioral Definitions of Temperance 
In response to Socrates’ request, the first answer volunteered by Charmides is that 
temperance is ‘doing everything in an orderly (kosmiōs) and quiet way’ (159b).  The 
‘quietness’ component of his response is quite unsurprising, considering Charmides’ 
age and social status.  As a young man in aristocratic Athens, he would be expected to 
behave with appropriate youthful modesty, and to this his mind would naturally 
turn.
126
  Although unsurprising, this is nonetheless a partial response, both because it 
reflects the aspect of temperance most associated with young men, and because it 
limits itself to external behavior.
127
  Yet the answer is not grossly incorrect, as 
Charmides would have learned both the meaning and the model of temperance from 
his elders.  Thus, Charmides’ first attempt at defining temperance is imperfect, yet 
understandable.  What is not addressed is the first part of Charmides’ initial attempt at 
a definition, that of kosmiōs prattein.128  Socrates’ choice to focus upon the 
‘quietness’ portion of the answer skates over an interesting and ultimately fruitful 
notion of temperance, that of order (kosmos).  While the language of kosmos does not 
appear again in the Charmides, this foreshadows developments in later dialogues. 
When pressed by Socrates to ‘start over again and look into yourself with 
greater concentration’ (160d), Charmides ventures that temperance is aidōs, or a sense 
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of shame or modesty (160e).  This definition may be considered an improvement over 
quietness, as it moves beyond behavior and to its motivations.
129
  The Greek concept 
of aidōs, like that of temperance, is fairly complex and defies any simplistic 
understanding, evoking a sense of right behavior and observance of one’s situation in 
the polis.  When Charmides identifies temperance as shame and modesty, he is again 
displaying the social training he has received as an Athenian youth.  He is sōphrōn 
because he is cognizant of others’ considerations of him and his fulfillment of societal 
standards.
130
  Nevertheless, this definition is also insufficient, as it presents ‘a merely 
negative aspect of virtue’ and fails to get to the heart of the matter.131   
Charmides now offers an answer presumably supplied by Critias, as it is more 
nuanced than the previous attempts.  Temperance, he suggests, is ‘doing one’s own 
business’ (161b).  This answer introduces concepts central both to the Charmides and 
to the larger Platonic corpus, as any understanding of ‘one’s own’ implies a certain 
level of self-knowledge.
132
  Critias then makes a subtle shift in the definition, from 
‘doing one’s own business’ (161e) to ‘the doing of good things’ (163e).  This 
modification provides Socrates with three opportunities: to liken the sōphrōn anēr to a 
craftsman, to emphasize the utility and beneficial nature of temperance, and to 
associate temperance and knowledge.
133
  Socrates thus transitions into the longest and 
most difficult part of the discussion, the relationship between virtue and knowledge.  
 Like the previous definitions, this attempt to define temperance is imprecise 
and ultimately unsatisfactory.  Socrates calls the definition a ‘riddle’ and states that ‘it 
is difficult to understand what is meant by “one’s own”’ (162b), resulting in an 
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answer that is unhelpful in its breadth.
134
  Van der Ben correctly saw in this answer, 
not only a third attempt to define temperance, but a pivotal moment in the discussion, 
a loss of focus on temperance itself and devolution into a wide range of issues.
135
  
More importantly, it is not enough merely to do the right things; they must be done 
out of an awareness of their rightness and in an intentional manner.  The conversation 
has returned to Socrates’ connection of virtue and knowledge.   
 
2.3.2.2 Intellectual Definitions of Temperance 
Upon Socrates’ question in 164b regarding the craftsman’s knowledge of his good 
actions, Critias now forgets himself somewhat and takes an entirely different 
approach, claiming that temperance is ‘to know oneself’ (164d) and that ‘“know 
thyself” and “be temperate” are the same’ (164e).  It is a compelling assertion, as the 
directive ‘Know Thyself” greeted those who entered Apollo’s temple at Delphi.  
However, Tuckey rightly reminds us that this relationship between terms is more 
allusion than equation, as the assertion is not explicitly supported by the elenchus.  
This definition is not altogether removed from previous considerations – such as 
modesty, doing one’s work, and even the religious connotations of knowing one’s 
place in the scheme of things – as the term ‘self-knowledge’ suggests a familiarity 
with one’s particular capacities and an awareness of the attendant limits.136  
Moreover, Socrates does not appear to hold the answer in contempt, as his penchant 
for rigorous self-knowledge was well known.
137
  Thus, Critias seems to have found an 
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important aspect of temperance that may be useful in clarifying what the previous 
answers attempted to express.
138
   
The dialogue reaches a crossroads, as the discussion moves from the 
traditional understandings of temperance into an exploration of its intellectual 
basis.
139
  The particular understanding and derivation of the term ‘self-knowledge’ is 
informative.  Critias’ ‘Know Thyself’ arises from gnōsis – gnōthi sauton – which 
denotes both knowledge and acceptance of one’s place in the world.  However, the 
discussion now turns to knowledge as epistēmē, which represents the science of 
knowledge than its ethical outcomes.
140
  This semantic modification paves the way for 
the understanding of temperance as an awareness of the content and limits of one’s 
knowledge, a ‘thoroughly Socratic notion.’141  Within this new paradigm, Socrates 
and his interlocutors explore his contention that temperance is some form of 
knowledge.  The following definitions of temperance are considered: knowledge of 
itself, knowledge of other sciences, knowledge that one does and does not know, 
knowledge of what one does and does not know, and finally knowledge of good and 
evil.  The dialogue progresses from superficial to profound, from action to 
knowledge.
142
  Thus, the subject has become the examination of the Socratic equation 
of virtue and knowledge, rather than the purported definition of the particular virtue of 
temperance.  This ‘atheistic interpretation of Delphic self-knowledge’ leaves behind 
the established Greek understanding of temperance and launches a new branch of the 
discussion.
143
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The importance and impact of this topical shift is complicated and somewhat 
ambiguous.  Plato is grappling with central issues in Socrates’ ethical framework, 
notably the question of how one might know what one knows.
144
  Furthermore, this 
paradigm shift regarding self-knowledge takes the definition, and the reader, even 
further away from anything commonly associated with temperance.  Without being 
completely sidetracked by complex epistemological issues, there are several insightful 
connections to be made.   
Alan Pichanick sees within the Charmides the connection between four 
interconnected types of knowledge: knowledge of ignorance, self-knowledge, 
knowledge of the good, and knowledge of the whole.
145
  He correctly observes that 
true Socratic self-knowledge is connected to knowledge of ignorance, and he 
strengthens his claim with a reference to the Apology, wherein Socrates says that 
‘human wisdom has little or no value’ and ‘the wisest of you men is he who has 
realized, like Socrates, that in respect of wisdom he is really worthless’ (23b).146  
Furthermore, the structure of the dialogue suggests that there are limits to what may 
be known or practiced in a sōphrōn manner.147  When these limits are recognized and 
embraced, self-knowledge will more closely approach truth.  This acceptance of 
natural limits then fosters an appropriate self-knowledge, as later indicated in the 
Theatetus: ‘You will be more modest and not think you know what you do not know’ 
(Theat. 210c3-4).    The truly sōphrōn soul will be aware of its limits and allow its 
words and actions to reflect this awareness.  And although Socrates may be its 
exemplar, this idea is not original to him.  Adriaan Rademaker documents the idea 
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that, in Isocrates and others, Athens in its early stages was more modest: ‘In its 
humble origins, a city is forced to moderation, temperance and metriotēs, and to 
careful deliberation.’148  As Athens grew in standing and influence, the polis grew in 
hubris as well.   
Despite these relevant insights, the nature of temperance remains 
undiscovered.  The investigation into epistēmē yields nothing definite; yet the 
dialogue never offers any viable alternative, as Socrates always identifies temperance 
as a variety of knowledge.
149
  Moreover, he also fails to recognize the role of any 
affective condition in attaining eudaimonia,
150
 which Plato will correct later in the 
Republic when he discusses the role of education in instilling virtue.  It is no wonder 
that the dialogue closes in a state of confusion.  
 
2.3.3 Unspoken Definitions and Implicit Assumptions 
The Charmides ends in a difficult place.  It concludes in aporia, and the reader must 
wait for Plato’s development of temperance in the later dialogues.  Furthermore, the 
definitions explored therein seem disconnected from the term’s current meanings, as 
none of the standard translations (such as ‘self-control’ or ‘moderation’) easily aligns 
with the four definitions given in the Charmides.
151
  However, there is one more 
semantic alternative present in the dialogue, although it reveals itself within the action 
and not the discussion.  Socrates’ own actions (and his reflections upon those actions) 
reveal another key meaning, that of temperance as self-control and self-restraint.  
While this definition is never explicitly discussed in the Charmides, Socrates himself 
models that precise aspect of temperance upon his introduction to the beautiful 
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Charmides.  When Socrates is overtaken with desire, he must pause and regain control 
of himself before proceeding, not allowing his desire to interfere with his rationality.  
Thus, the reader is led, in an almost circular fashion, back to the common 
understanding of temperance as self-control. 
While the Charmides does not explicitly consider this aspect of temperance, 
its presence is important, perhaps fundamental, for Plato’s later treatment of the 
virtue.
152
  Interestingly, it is Socrates’ actions, not his rhetoric, which emphasize this 
aspect of temperance.
153
  Therefore, in spite of the overtly intellectual nature of the 
bulk of the dialogue, the moral allusions are present and important, as is the portrayal 
of Socrates as the paradigm of the virtue.  Indeed, before the word temperance even 
mentioned in the dialogue, it is apparent that Socrates himself is the sōphrōn anēr.  
Finally, it must be noted that the moral and intellectual components of temperance are 
by no means divorced.  They both proceed from Socrates’ commitment to self-
knowledge and from the discipline that accompanies that commitment.
154
  Socrates’ 
rational self-control honors both Charmides and himself; in this, it reveals the extent 
to which ‘the multi-dimensionality of Socratic dialectic’ makes one rational as well as 
moral, redefining the ancient Greek ideal of self-knowledge.
155
 
One additional point is important.  Running through the dialogue and 
unobtrusively underwriting the entire discussion is a set of virtually unchallenged 
presuppositions, against which the definitions of temperance are considered and 
judged.  These deal not with the definition of the virtue per se, but with the purpose 
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and value of the virtue in daily life.  They are found in the prologue, body, and 
epilogue, and are as follows: 
1) Temperance is intimately linked to both physical and mental wellness: ‘When the 
soul acquires and possesses temperance, it is easy to provide health both for the 
head and for the rest of the body’ (157a). 
2) Temperance will not be possessed unknowingly: ‘It is clear that if temperance is 
present in you, you have some opinion about it’ (159a). 
3) Temperance is meritorious: ‘The temperate life is necessarily an admirable thing’ 
(160b); temperance is ‘placed among the admirable things’ (160d). 
4) Temperance will benefit and bless those who possess it: ‘Now I divine that 
temperance is something beneficial and good’ (169b); ‘I think that temperance is a 
great good, and if you truly have it, that you are blessed’ (176a). 
5) Temperance is not just one good thing among many; rather, it holds the 
superlative place among things, ‘the thing we have agreed to be the finest of all’ 
(175b). 
 
Socrates spends an entire dialogue debating the finer points of knowledge and 
temperance, yet holds the above premises as sacrosanct.  Indeed, they are the 
yardsticks against which the veracity of each definition is measured.
156
  In response to 
Critias’ suggestion that temperance is of no benefit, Socrates scolds himself for being 
so inept as to arrive at this obviously untenable conclusion: 
At the end of the Charmides Socrates claims that, despite the apparent 
tendency of the argument, he does not believe that temperance is really 
useless; on the contrary, he thinks (oimai) that he has been a bad inquirer 
and that, in fact, temperance is useful, indeed that it is sufficient for 
happiness (Char. 175e5-176a1).  In this case Socrates does not accept the 
ostensible conclusion of the elenchus, but he implies that we would have 
to accept it if it did not conflict with our firm convictions about 
temperance.
157
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Despite his apparent failure, Socrates retains his ‘firm convictions about temperance’ 
as a ‘genuine virtue.’ This, in itself, gestures towards one of the premises that guide 
the study of temperance (and aretē in general) at its most basic level. 
 
2.3.4. Conclusions on the Charmides 
Although complex and often convoluted, the dialogue yields several important points.  
First, the Charmides brings both body and soul under the purview of temperance, an 
assumption that is all the stronger for its unobtrusiveness.  Irwin correctly observes 
that ‘Socrates never even argues against the restriction of temperance to desires for 
bodily satisfaction; he assumes that temperance is unrestricted in its scope.’158  
Second, the search for an acceptable definition of temperance proves virtually 
impossible to conclude in any satisfactory manner.  The dialogue thus concludes in 
abrupt aporia, as Socrates remarks, ‘But now we have got the worst of it in every way 
and are unable to discover to which one of existing things the lawgiver gave this 
name, temperance’ (Char. 175b3-5).  This frustrates him, as he firmly believes in the 
value of temperance and hopes to see its value realized. 
However, the lack of resolution does not mean that Socrates lacks a viewpoint 
on temperance.
159
  This one virtue is seen, in the Charmides, to be all encompassing 
and sufficient for health and happiness.  Socrates’ early connection of temperance 
with physical and mental health indicates that temperance actually reveals the 
presence of virtue within the soul.
160
  Although Socrates finds himself in a conundrum 
over where the dialogue has taken them, this is no cause for despair, as – true to the 
nature of the Socratic elenchus – it invites us to participate in the search for the 
                                                 
158
 Irwin, Moral Theory, 87. 
159
 Irwin states, ‘On the contrary, it is his firm view that creates the puzzle.  He has found that the 
different conceptions of temperate behavior and different criteria for temperance lead us to one virtue, 
not to several virtues’ (Ethics, 42). 
160
 Ibid., 35. 
59 
 
virtue’s meaning.  There are allusions to the direction Plato will take in later 
dialogues, as careful exegesis reveals areas of possible development (i.e. temperance
 
 
as self-control and temperance as order).
161
  Thus, both the implicit and the explicit 
definitions of temperance will prove themselves more important to Plato’s overall 
treatment of temperance than a superficial review of the Charmides would suggest. 
 
2.4 Development of Temperance in Other Dialogues 
As was stated in the introduction, limiting the study of Platonic temperance to the 
Charmides would fail to appreciate the development of Plato’s thought on the virtue 
and would conceal what I argue is the maturity of the virtue’s applications and scope. 
To gain a full view of temperance, one must journey through several other dialogues, 
notably the Gorgias, the Republic, the Phaedrus, and the Laws.  They and a few 
others will be considered to see what insights they bring to bear on the discussion.  
This foray is particularly important when one considers that, according to at least one 
commentator, the two most enduring images related to temperance – the charioteer of 
the Phaedrus and the sōphrōn man as the friend of God in the Laws – come from 
dialogues not normally associated with this particular virtue. 
 
2.4.1 The Gorgias 
The Gorgias marks the beginning of Plato’s expansion of temperance beyond the 
sheer intellectualism of the Charmides.
162
  If self-control is the one definition of 
temperance that is never explicitly addressed in the Charmides, then the Gorgias is 
the initial corrective.  Socrates reminds Callicles that bravery is not enough, that the 
superior man must first of all rule himself (491d).  When Callicles equates this with 
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stupidity, Socrates likens the undisciplined man, bent only upon pleasure, to a leaky 
jar which cannot hold anything of importance (493b-494a).  Although he begins by 
calling temperance ‘self-control’ and ‘mastering of oneself’ (491d-e), he then moves 
away from the sheer intellectualism of the temperance of the Charmides, Socrates 
defines it both as discipline (paideia) and order (kosmos).  By comparing structure 
(taxis) with kosmos, Socrates explains how the soul, like a house, needs to be 
‘organized and orderly’ (503d-504c).  This order he calls ‘self-control’ (504d).  Here 
Plato makes an intriguing and significant connection of terms.  Self-control is said to 
lead to orderliness of the soul, a cause-and-effect relationship.
163
  Instead of merely 
refuting the cognitive emphasis of the Charmides, the Gorgias seeks to unite the two 
notions in a cohesive unit.  Thus, defining temperance as ‘self-control’ initiates a new 
direction in Platonic thought on temperance without completely rebutting the previous 
conclusions.  
Socrates then states that the sōphrōn soul is ‘a good one,’ and that the ‘foolish 
(aphron) and undisciplined (akolastos)’ soul is the opposite and is therefore bad 
(507a).  Note that this comparison cleverly combines both the intellectual and 
affective aspects of temperance (507a).  This self-control, he says, will lead one to ‘do 
what’s appropriate with respect to both gods and human beings,’ or acting justly 
(507b).  After discussing its connection with piety and bravery, he concludes that the 
sōphrōn man is ‘a completely good man’ who ‘does well and admirably whatever he 
does’ and who is ‘blessed and happy’ (507c).  In a move which foreshadows the 
social importance of temperance, Socrates states that the undisciplined man will have 
neither community nor true piety, as he will be unable to have true partnership. 
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The presence of temperance as ‘orderly arrangement’ highlights its other 
semantic gloss in the Gorgias, that of order (kosmos) (506e-507a).  Following the 
concept of ‘nature as order,’164 temperance is displayed in the proper arrangement and 
interaction of things.  This may also serve as a bridge between temperance and self-
control.  As it stabilizes the soul, temperance brings discipline and harmony to all its 
varied parts through their proper interaction, and thereby facilitates self-control.  
Although the exact nature of this kosmos is unclear, it contains elements of both 
rationality and control, based on its contrast with akolasia and aphrosynē.  The 
Gorgias is thus a turning point in Plato’s treatment of temperance.165  
Additionally, the Gorgias foreshadows the Republic in two important ways.  
The first is the connection between temperance and justice.
166
  When Callicles 
applauds those who are capable of  ‘getting a greater share,’ he cites the common 
opinion that getting more than one’s share is ‘shameful’ and ‘unjust’; thus, justice and 
temperance (harkening back to the Charmides) are connected (483c).  Thus, Callicles’ 
attack on temperance and justice sets the stage for their close connection, which is 
strengthened in 507b.  The second is the relationship between the soul and the state.  
Socrates recommends the cultivation of discipline to everyone, whether ‘a private 
citizen or a whole city,’ in order to properly direct ‘all of his own affairs and those of 
his city’ (507d4-6). The communal, political application of this counsel is the special 
function of temperance. 
It is no longer sophia which offers the unifying factor between the virtues, 
and Gorgias avoids Socrates’ reduction of all virtue to knowledge.  
Instead, sōphrosynē with its multiple uses now provides Socrates with a 
powerful tool to vindicate the compatibility of the virtues, without having 
to identify them all with knowledge.
167
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This anticipates the state-soul connection in the Republic, wherein temperance unites 
both the three aspects of the soul and the various classes of the polis.
168
 
 
2.4.2 The Republic 
The Republic follows the Gorgias in its emphasis on the moral rather than intellectual 
nature of the virtue, as temperance in the Republic has no ties to epistēmē; it is in 
some ways the opposite of the temperance of the Charmides.  The first appearance of 
temperance in Book III combines two common uses of temperance – obedience to the 
rulers and ruling one’s physical pleasures.  Socrates names ‘obeying the rulers’ and 
‘ruling the pleasures of food, drink, and sex for themselves’ as the ‘most important 
aspects of moderation for the majority of people’ (389d-e).  On its own, this can be 
read as an unduly thin account, construed as ‘no more than a certain narrowness.’169 
Temperance next appears in Book IV, where Socrates states that he knows of 
no way to discuss justice without considering temperance as well (430d).  
Immediately the text defines the virtue as ‘a kind of consonance and harmony… a 
kind of order and the mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires’ (430e).  When 
the interlocutor questions how the self can, in fact, control itself, we have the first 
discussion of the tripartite soul, although it is not yet named as such.  The wisdom of 
the ‘superior few’ will ‘measure and direct… the desires of the inferior many,’ (431c); 
this he calls ‘moderation’ (431d).  It is agreed that the ‘better’ part should rule the 
‘worse,’ and that self-control lies in this rule (431a, 442c).  This worse part is the 
‘appetitive’ part of the soul – the largest part – and is ‘most insatiable’ and ‘not fitted 
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to rule’ as the rational part is fitted to do (442a-b).  This results, however, not in 
martial law but in friendly agreement, and introduces the notion of temperance as the 
congruous interaction of the various parts of the soul.  When both the rulers and the 
ruled agree on this arrangement, temperance may be said to ‘resemble a kind of 
harmony (harmonia)’ (431e).  When pressed on this point, Socrates makes an 
interesting move, stating that temperance ‘spreads throughout the whole’ and makes 
all its members ‘sing the same song together’ (432a).  This ‘unanimity’ between ‘the 
naturally worse and the naturally better’ regarding the order of rule is the hallmark of 
temperance.  Raphael Demos describes this unanimity as a ‘sense of community… a 
sense of a common loyalty,’ which is ‘the essence of sōphrosynē.’170 
Temperance thus makes a key shift in importance.  As a moral virtue, 
temperance may belong to the ‘inferior many,’ as they would be the ones most in need 
of regulation.  But as a civic virtue, it brings consonance to the disparate parts. 
He [the sōphrōn man] puts himself in order, is his own friend, and 
harmonizes the three parts of himself like three limiting notes on a 
musical scale – high, low, and middle.  He binds together those parts and 
any others there may be in between, and from having been many things he 
becomes entirely one, moderate and harmonious (443d). 
 
What was separate is now a unified, purposeful whole.  The unity present within may 
be due to a ‘harmony of belief,’ with each part in agreement on who should rule.171  
This assessment of capacity to rule arises from an accurate self-knowledge on each 
part, their knowing whether or not they are specified as the part designed to rule.  
Thus, the three components of temperance – self-knowledge, self-control, and 
harmonious order – are connected in this image. 
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Plato later provides a contrast in the pseudo-virtue of the oligarch of Book 
VIII, who would ‘establish his appetitive and money-making part on the throne, 
setting it up as a great king within himself’ (553c2-4).  Although he would seek to 
appear virtuous and trustworthy, he would suffer constant internal instability. 
He holds them in check, not by persuading them that it is better not to act 
on them or taming them with arguments, but by compulsion and fear, 
trembling for his other possessions …For this reason, he’d be more 
respectable than many, but the true virtue of a single-minded and 
harmonious soul far escapes him (554d1-e4). 
 
Temperance now disappears until Book IX, where it again regulates the appetitive 
part of the soul.  Concerned with the delights of food, drink, sex, and the money by 
which they are obtained, these ‘unnecessary pleasures and desires’ are ‘beastly,’ 
‘savage,’ and ‘lawless’ (580d-e, 571b-c), and likened to a many-headed hydra (589a-
b).  Temperance now must control this beast lest it destroy the entire person.  It does 
so in three ways – by awakening reason, by feeding the appetites in a moderate 
fashion (feeding the gentle heads and curtailing the savage ones), and by quieting the 
spirit (571d-572a). 
Having considered the textual evidence, one question might be said to 
summarize the central issue of the Republic on temperance: Are the appetites merely 
controlled by reason, or is there agreement between the parts on how to function as a 
whole?
172
  In the final analysis, the dialogue does not appear to resolve this question, 
but allows the two models to remain in tension.
173
  Plato’s overall impression of the 
appetites was not as negative as that of a pure Socratic, 
 
although his position on them 
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remained ambiguous.
174
  And although kosmos does not make as strong an appearance 
here as it does in the Gorgias, it is present nonetheless (430e) and does reinforce the 
theory of agreement of parts, as order implies a lack of chaos.
175
  An excellent 
example of the shift from control to agreement is in C.S. Lewis’s The Great Divorce.  
When a young man with a lizard called Desire roosting on his shoulder, compelling 
him to go this way and that; when the man resists, the lizard digs his claws in 
painfully.  But when he agrees to cast away his longtime companion of desire, it 
transforms from an adversarial burden into a beautiful and powerful horse, which 
becomes a cooperative addition on the journey.
176
  And because the regulatory 
function of temperance applies to all three parts of the soul, an agreed-upon 
arrangement is implied between the higher and lower members.  Temperance is now 
the ‘shared property’ of all three classes, uniting the different virtues of each class 
into a coherent whole.
177
  Thus, the Republic builds upon the ideas found in the 
Gorgias and expands temperance beyond its scope in the Charmides, both 
theoretically and practically. 
 
2.4.3 The Phaedrus 
For our purposes, the Phaedrus is noteworthy for its ambivalence towards 
temperance.
178
  In a discussion on the merits and dangers of erōs, Plato frames the 
discussion of temperance around the contrast of the ‘inborn desire for pleasures’ 
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against the ‘acquired judgment that pursues what is best’ (237d8-9).  Consequently, 
the two possible outcomes of this struggle for control are ‘being in your right mind’ 
(sōphrosynē) and ‘outrageousness’ (hubris) (237e4-6).179  Judgment and desire are 
different in the ways by which they induce change: judgment ‘leads us by reasoning’ 
while ‘desire takes command in us and drags us’ (237e3-5).   Temperance is read as 
sobriety and ‘right-minded reason’ which stands against the ‘madness’ (mania) of 
erotic love.  The appearance of this new antonym for temperance broadens the scope 
of the virtue: not only does it guard against the unruly nature of inborn desires; it also 
defends its possessor from the ‘external’ danger of erōs, wherein a man who is in love 
‘has by necessity lost his mind’ (241c1-2).  Thus, it protects against dangers both 
inside and outside one’s control.  Yet these ‘dangers’ may also be read as gifts from 
the gods, as ‘there is no greater good than this that either human self-control or divine 
madness can offer’ (Phdr. 265b).  Thus, temperance may be understood as ‘a sanity 
which happily coexists with a certain type of madness.’180 
The Phaedrus also contains one of the most enduring images of Platonic 
temperance, the myth of the charioteer (246a6-b1, 253d1-254e10).  The soul is 
likened to a chariot driven by reason and pulled by two horses, one white and one 
black.
181
  In addition to its physical beauty, the white horse is ‘a lover of honor with 
modesty and self-control; companion to true glory, he needs no whip, and is guided 
by verbal commands alone’ (253d6-8).  In contrast, the black horse is ‘companion to 
wild boasts and indecency, he is shaggy around the ears – deaf as a post – and just 
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barely yields to horsewhip and goad combined’ (253e3-5).  When confronted by erōs, 
the white horse ‘is still controlled, then as always, by its sense of shame ’; whereas the 
black horse ‘no longer responds to the whip or the goad of the charioteer; it leaps 
violently forward and does everything to aggravate its yokemate and its charioteer’ 
(253e5-254a5).  It is only through the harshest discipline that the black horse is 
brought into submission, leaving behind its ‘insolence’ and becoming ‘humble’ 
(tapeinothesis).   
This dialogue is also ambivalent about the nature of the soul and the passions.  
It is striking that the internal harmony which is said to characterize the sōphrōn soul 
of the Republic is not an option in the Phaedrus, due to the inbred deficiencies of the 
black horse.  This raises the question as to whether the charioteer of the Phaedrus is 
actually an attractive or accurate depiction of temperance, particularly in light of its 
heavy (and varied) appropriation by the early Church Fathers.
182
   
 
2.4.4 The Laws 
In many ways, the temperance of the Laws flows along the same stream as many of its 
previous conceptions, particularly the tributary of self-control, as when Clinias calls 
self-mastery ‘the first and best of victories’ (626e2-3).  In discussing the virtues (here 
‘divine benefits’) the Athenian names phronēsis as the primary virtue to pursue, 
followed by temperance, ‘the habitual self-control of a soul that uses reason’ (631c5-
7).  In its concern to avoid ‘crass ignorance’ in its rulers, the Laws condemns the 
disaccord (diaphonia) that arises when desire wars against reason, calling it ‘folly’ 
(aphrosynē) and ‘the worst kind of discord in a state and individual’ (689a-c).  
Instead, one should seek concord (symphōnia) which is the ‘greatest wisdom’ (689d).  
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Note that temperance is never seen as the primary virtue in the Laws, and the 
Athenian calls it a ‘mere additional element’ (696d).  Yet the Athenian now calls 
temperance the ‘essential adjunct’ that allows their proposed dictator to employ the 
other virtues which have been attributed to him and which they have deemed essential 
to his task (709e).
183
  This self-control need only be the ‘everyday kind… the 
spontaneous instinct that flowers earlier in life’ (710a), and not the ‘heightened sense’ 
of the virtue, which requires it ‘to be good judgment as well.’184  There is nothing 
terribly unusual about this version of temperance. 
It is further into Book IV that temperance manifests in a different manner.  In 
the midst of discussing the merits of various rulers, Plato contrasts the ordinary 
dictatorship with something else – ‘a very rare occurrence in the history of the world,’ 
during which the state will ‘reap the benefit on a grand scale.’  This would occur 
when those in control are guided by ‘an inspired passion for the paths of restraint and 
justice.’  Allowing for the near impossibility of such a person, the Athenian 
nevertheless declares, ‘Blessed is the life of this man of moderation, and blessed they 
who listen to the words that fall from his lips’ (711d1-712a1).  He then elaborates 
with the story behind his statement: 
Now then, our address should go like this: ‘Men, according to the ancient 
story, there is a god who holds in his hands the beginning and end and 
middle of all things, and straight he marches in the cycle of nature.  
Justice, who takes vengeance on those who abandon the divine law, never 
leaves his side.  The man who means to live in happiness latches on to her 
and follows her with meekness and humility.  But he who bursts with 
pride, elated by wealth or honors or by physical beauty when young and 
foolish, whose soul is afire with the arrogant belief that so far from 
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needing someone to control and lead him, he can play the leader to others 
– there’s a man whom God has deserted (715e10-716b1).185   
 
When asked the moral of the story, the Athenian replies: 
So what kind of conduct recommends itself to God and reflects his 
wishes?  There is only one sort, epitomized in the old saying ‘like 
approves of like’ (excess apart, which is both its own enemy and that of 
due proportion).  In our view it is God who is preeminently the ‘measure 
of all things,’ much more so than any ‘man,’ as they say.186  So if you 
want to recommend yourself to someone of this character, you must do 
your level best to make your own character reflect his, and on this 
principle the moderate man is God’s friend, being like him, whereas the 
immoderate and unjust man is not like him and is his enemy (716c1-d3). 
 
This vignette covers some familiar ground.  Temperance is connected to justice and 
restraint.  It leads to blessedness.  It can be sabotaged by an incorrect self-image, 
particularly one tainted by undue pride or foolishness.
187
   
It also contains several startling features.  In contrast to the earlier assertions 
of 626e, self-mastery gives way before man’s need to be controlled and led by 
something altogether greater.  This something (or someone) greater is God, who is the 
measure (metron) of all things.  Thus, temperance is derived from the emulation of 
God, and the sōphrōn man is ‘God’s friend, being like him’ (716d).  And for the first 
time in the Platonic corpus, temperance is connected to something other than an 
obvious Athenian virtue; it accompanies a posture of meekness and humility 
(tapeinosis), which enable his partnership with justice and his journey towards 
happiness.  Humility, hardly a virtue for Plato or his predecessors, appears in a 
positive light, however briefly.
188
  This is not as radical as it would seem at first 
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glance.  In the Charmides, the behavior of Critias highlights the connection between 
the love of honor (as intimately connected to the love of one’s own opinions) and the 
inability to know the truth, particularly the truth about oneself.  Temperance, then, is 
tied to ‘a certain humility before the truth.’189  Yet this humility before the truth does 
not negate the search for truth; rather, it invigorates it, giving the sōphrōn person the 
ability to pursue truth in a more virtuous manner.
190
  Temperance both empowers and 
grounds the journey of the truthful life.  Thus temperance, measure, restraint, 
humility, accurate self-knowledge have been connected in this portion of the Laws. 
 
2.4.5 Additional Dialogues 
Although the previous dialogues have the greatest content regarding temperance, 
various others inform the discussion of this virtue in more implicit and tangential 
ways.  Four dialogues in particular – the Protagoras, the Phaedo, the Sophist, the 
Statesman, and the Philebus – contain valuable secondary information on the 
argument at hand. 
In the Protagoras, temperance is the opposite of folly (aphrosynē) (332b-e).  
Yet, Socrates has earlier called folly the opposite of wisdom, particularly wisdom qua 
prudence (332a), so the two virtues are somewhat conflated.  Socrates asks if this 
makes wisdom and temperance ‘one thing,’ but is sidetracked in his question about 
the equivalence of the virtues when he attempts to compare temperance and justice 
(333b-334b).
191
  Temperance is also equated with acting ‘correctly and beneficially,’ 
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properly controlling one’s actions (332a).  Thus, to control one’s actions is to act 
correctly, which in turn is to act sensibly, from a sound mind.  Thus, several key 
meanings of temperance find convergence in this dialogue. 
In the early work Phaedo, temperance serves a more ascetic function, as the 
passions are to be ‘disdained,’ not merely controlled (68d1).  While a normal man will 
‘fear to be deprived of other pleasures which they desire’ – temperance through 
intemperance, as it were – true temperance  belongs to philosophers. However, it is a 
special kind of virtue, ascetic as opposed to moderate, as well suited to those ‘who 
most of all despise the body and live the life of philosophy’ (68c-d).192  Even so, this 
temperance is not the high, Socratic virtue of self-knowledge, but the dealing with 
bodily passions.  It is later in the dialogue, then, that temperance receives yet another 
interpretation.  Socrates compares the soul both to a well-tuned instrument and a 
healthy, harmonious body.
193
  He then calls the soul ‘a mixture and harmony of those 
things, when they are mixed with each other rightly and in due measure (metron)’ 
(86c).
194
  Essential to note is that the Greek word harmonia refers to the tuning of an 
instrument to one particular pitch or key, the focusing upon a certain octave or 
scale.
195
  Significantly, it appears to be a term of precision and concordance.  
Although temperance is not explicitly named as the provider of this harmony, the 
soul’s need for harmony has been introduced. 
In the Statesman, temperance is posited sharply against andreia as a necessary 
balance to this more aggressive virtue.  Characterized as ‘orderliness,’ temperance 
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includes softness, slowness, quietness, moderation, and depth (307a-b).  However, 
when left to their own devices, these qualities will become ‘cowardly and lethargic,’ 
always seeking the quietude of the private life and ‘being ready to preserve peace of 
some sort in any way they can’ (307c-e).  It is the job of the statesmen to blend the 
courageous ‘warp’ and the temperate ‘weft’ into a fabric suitable for the polis (311b).  
Temperance does not display here any of the nuances of self-control or harmonious 
order found in other dialogues, but is largely seen as a set of emotional and acting 
tendencies towards steadiness and calm.   
While not explicitly connected to temperance, Plato’s employing the phrase 
‘in due measure’ (to metrion) seven times between 283e-284e is also instructive.  
Calling it a state of truthful being through which excess and deficiency are made 
apparent, it strongly foreshadows Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean – ‘what is in due 
measure, what is fitting, the right moment, what is as it ought to be – everything that 
removes itself from the extremes to the middle’ (284e6-8).196   
Finally, temperance in the Philebus continues to stress the importance of 
measurement for the virtuous life, with the addition of several helpful terms, 
particularly ‘limit’ (peiras).  Limit is defined as keeping ‘measure to measure,’ 
(metriotēs) (25b2).  Regarding pleasures, the application of limit ‘takes away their 
excesses and unlimitedness, and establishes moderation and harmony’ (26a5-6).197   
Temperance describes those things that ‘possess measurement’ (52d1-2).  And it 
revisits its connection to the Delphic maxim, as ‘the moderate people somehow 
always stand under the guidance of the proverbial maxim “nothing too much” and 
obey it’ (45d7-9).  Those who rebel against this counsel are both foolish (aphrosynē) 
and driven to madness (mania) (45d9-10). 
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Temperance also arises from the proper mixture of opposing goods.  ‘We 
stand like cup-bearers before the fountains,’ declares Socrates, ‘the fountain of 
pleasure, comparable to honey, and the sobering fountain of intelligence, free of wine, 
like sober, healthy water – and we have to see how to make a perfect mixture of the 
two’ (61c4-7).198  This proper and proportionate synthesis maintains the goodness of 
each component (64d8-10), and will ‘manifest themselves in all areas as beauty and 
virtue’ (64e6-7).   Measure, limit, proportion, and mixture are, thus, essential 
ingredients in the quest for the good life. 
 
2.5 Particularities of Platonic Temperance 
This chapter has investigated the virtue of temperance across the Platonic corpus, 
wherein three distinct understandings of temperance have emerged.  These will now 
be revisited, accompanied by the full range of their semantic domains.  Some issues of 
particular interest will then be considered. 
 
2.5.1 Three Primary Definitions 
Plato employs three main accounts of temperance: self-knowledge, self-control, and 
harmonious order.  Self-knowledge is understood as being in one’s right mind, the 
opposite of arrogance, foolishness, outrageousness, and madness.  It is tied to self-
control in that it indicates the need for it; Socrates understands himself as a lover of 
wisdom, and as such he cannot act on every inflamed passion he feels.  It is tied to the 
Delphic maxim Gnōthi sauton, ‘Know thyself.’  Thus, it is also connected, at least 
initially, to the concept of gnōsis, with an emphasis is on understanding, not merely 
collecting factual information.  It has religious connotations – to know oneself is to 
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know one’s place in the scheme of things.  It is also tied, at least implicitly, to the 
concept of humility; the sōphrōn person is cognizant of their need to be led by God.  
This arises from the knowledge of limits and to our knowledge (and acceptance) of 
their appropriateness.  It is understood as acceptance of the extent and limits of one’s 
knowledge, the ‘knowledge of our ignorance.’ 
Self-control is first displayed in Socrates’ actions in the prelude to the 
Charmides.  It is associated with self-mastery, which suggests a deeper level of the 
conquering of desires than mere self-control.  At times it is depicted as a distinct 
struggle between factions of the soul, as lawless desires war against the rule of reason. 
At other times it is presented as that which provides order and concord.  It is defined 
as obeying the rules established by the higher powers.  It is called ‘the first and best of 
victories.’ 
Harmonious order is understood as consonance and congruence.  It is 
connected to discipline, and is often realized by self-control via the mastery of 
pleasures.  It is friendly agreement between things which are different but related.  
This friendly agreement arises out of a harmony of belief, which (in Plato) arises from 
an accurate knowledge of who is best equipped to rule.  The harmony it engenders is 
like the three limiting notes in scale or a musical chord.  It is defined as symphony 
and concord, and is opposed to disaccord; it is the proper arrangement and interaction 
of things; it is tied to an understanding, and acceptance, of proper measure and limit; 
it is accomplished through the proper mixture of various elements. 
 
2.5.2 Points of Particular Interest 
There are several points of particular interest.  First, not only is Plato’s treatment of 
temperance both vigorous and maturing, his treatment of the virtue is justifiably 
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considered a benchmark, a climactic reinterpretation and unification of the previous 
understandings of temperance that transformed all future understandings of 
temperance.
199
  Remembering the intensely dynamic and multifaceted virtue found in 
Plato may help to reclaim the larger implications of the virtue.  
Second, the Republic contains a twofold approach to the social and political 
implications of temperance.  Temperance was originally the particular virtue assigned 
to the merchant class of the polis.  Through Plato’s use of the city-soul analogy in the 
Republic, temperance applies to the masses in the same way that it applies to the 
appetitive part of the soul, so that neither ‘lower part’ rebels against the rule of its 
superiors.
200
  However, temperance has significant implications, not merely for its 
designated class, but for the welfare of the entire polis and one’s participation therein, 
as all citizens had to act in ways that contributed to the well-being of the city.
201
  
Sōphrosynē is a virtue of the state as a whole, as everyone should be in agreement 
about who is to rule.  Thus, by weaving together the disparate strands of its three 
classes, temperance signified and contributed to ‘the all-embracing order and the 
morality of restraint and limitation which the polis demanded.’202  It is important to 
recognize that while Republic names justice as harmony between all members, it is 
temperance which paves the way for this harmony to occur.   
Finally, temperance as harmonious order – a connotation which lacks the 
immediate appeal of self-knowledge or self-control – must be recovered for any 
thorough consideration of the virtue.  The discussions concerning the prevalence or 
influence of various individual definitions are certainly important; however, in a 
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significant way they miss the point.  It bears asking whether the various connotations 
of temperance are, in fact, independent of one another.  Perhaps a more compelling 
paradigm is Plato’s own concept of harmonia as the model for their interactions.  
Self-knowledge, self-control, order, and attunement – these are all notes in the scale 
of Platonic temperance.  Individually they may ring clear and true, but when brought 
together in the intentional and related manner of a musical chord, the effect is 
qualitatively different, and altogether more powerful.   
 
2.6 Conclusions on Platonic Temperance 
Across the breadth of the Platonic corpus, the virtue of temperance undergoes 
significant and (I contend) positive development.  The Charmides makes two major 
points regarding temperance: its explicit definition as self-knowledge (despite its 
aporetic conclusion), and its implicit description as self-control.  It also centers on the 
conviction that temperance is good – life-giving, praiseworthy, beneficial – truly the 
greatest good of all.  The Charmides makes big claims for temperance, even if it has 
trouble keeping them tidy. 
Although the Charmides is the sole dialogue that focuses directly on 
temperance, the contributions from other dialogues paint a fuller picture of Plato’s 
evolving understanding of the term. After the early focus upon self-knowledge with 
Socrates as the virtue’s exemplar, the (explicit) definitions of temperance as self-
control and order begin to emerge, especially in the Gorgias and The Republic.  These 
arise from two very different types of interactions between appetite and reason – 
control and agreement, respectively.  While it may appear that the only way to control 
the restless appetites is to declare martial law, cooperation and rehabilitation are other 
options.  And to bring the appetitive element in the soul to a place of collaboration, it 
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is necessary to bring order to this microcosm of a soul, as reason brings order out of 
chaos in the macrocosm of the universe.
203
  Although Plato does not mention the 
tripartite soul in the Gorgias, the concept of different parts within the whole is 
definitely present.
204
 Kosmos, or the ‘orderly arrangement,’ results in harmonia, an 
important move in Plato’s thinking on temperance.205  The incorporation of the idea of 
order transforms the largely negative image of domination into the positive image of 
cooperation, ‘the harmonious product of intense passion under perfect control.’206 
In summary: the three major characterizations of temperance are self-
knowledge, self-control or self-mastery, and order or harmony.  The opposites of 
temperance include wantonness or lack of self-control (akolasia), outrageousness 
(hubris), madness (mania), folly or ‘being inferior to oneself’ (aphrosynē), and 
disorder or disharmony (akosmia or stasis).  Therefore, temperance must provide 
restraint; groundedness; sound-mindedness or ‘common sense’; and order, harmony, 
or friendly agreement.  Its scope is broad and varied; its objects include the physical 
appetites, self-understanding, the human striving towards knowledge, and the desire 
for power.  It has significant connections with concepts including justice, good sense, 
measure and the mean, knowledge of limits, the accurate assessment of what is (and 
can be) known, religious propriety, and even humility.  It is part of the tetrad of 
cardinal virtues, and it is linked to the most enduring moral axiom of the time, that of 
the oracle at Delphi.  Whether the virtue retains any or all of these qualities as it 
journeys forward is the next point of inquiry. 
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 North, 152. 
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 Socrates states his hope never ‘to be out of harmony with myself, to contradict myself’ (Gorg. 
482c), which foreshadows his assertions that the superior man will first rule himself (Gorg. 491d).   
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 North calls this Plato’s ‘distinctive contribution’ (152). 
206
 Ibid., x. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Continuing the Classical Tradition: 
Aristotelian and Stoic Temperance 
 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter Two, Plato’s understanding of temperance is vigorous, 
detailed, and complex.  He presents a virtue that is concerned both with physical 
appetites and with the desire for self-knowledge.  The next chapter of the story will 
chart the course of the virtue through the conclusion of the classical period, focusing 
upon Aristotelian and Stoic moral thought. 
 
3.1. Aristotelian Temperance  
Aristotle’s primary consideration of temperance appears in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
III.10-12.
207
  In addition to this focused treatment, this study will examine facets of 
his thought that bear directly upon his ethics in general and his treatment of 
temperance in particular.  Yet, these considerations need to be placed within the larger 
picture of Aristotelian thought, both on its own and as the primary successor to the 
Platonic heritage.  The logical place to begin is with a consideration of the primary 
differences between Aristotle and his mentor. 
 
3.1.1 Differences and Particularities 
Although Aristotle spent nearly twenty years at the Academy, his mature thought is a 
development of Plato’s work.  Points of agreement include their eudaimonistic 
teleology, the role of virtue as the means of achieving this eudaimonia, the centrality 
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 All citations from the Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter Eth.Nic.) are taken from Sarah Broadie and 
Christopher Rowe, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  Where no 
title is given in the citation location, it is presumed to be from the Eth.Nic.  While Broadie and Rowe 
translate sōphrosynē as ‘moderation’, I have substituted ‘temperance’ for continuity in reading. 
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of logos in the inculcation of virtue, and the belief in the soul.  However, three 
primary points of divergence emerge, along with their ethical corollaries. 
 
3.1.1.1 Monism over Dualism 
In Book I.13 of the Eth.Nic., Aristotle defines ‘human virtue’ as ‘virtue of soul, not of 
body’, and eudaimonia as an ‘activity of soul’ (1102a16-18).  To understand fully the 
ethical import of these statements, the differences between Plato and Aristotle’s 
notion of the soul must be considered.  For Plato, the soul is eternal, incorporeal, and 
tripartite (Phdo. 414a20, Rep. IV).  In contrast, Aristotle views the soul as tied to the 
physical body as ‘what makes you alive’ (de an. II.1).  It is its ‘first actuality,’ as 
‘knowledge as possessed’ (de an. 415B5).  The soul is a ‘connected series of 
capacities,’ with the human soul possessing three: nutritive, sensitive, and rational (de 
an. 412a27).  The soul is constituted by the primary activity of the being in question, 
its function or ergon.  Because humans are the only animals with the capacity of 
rationality (logos), our particularly human function must be connected to our 
particularly human capacity.  Because the one capacity particular to humans is our 
logos, therefore, our particularly human function is the activity of our logos in 
accordance with aretē (1097b22-1098a20).   
 
3.1.1.2 Empiricism over Rationalism  
This difference of opinion regarding the soul arises from another difference.  Whereas 
Plato roots his search for metaphysical meaning in the realm of the Forms, Aristotle 
begins his metaphysical inquiries in the physical sciences, which he considers the 
only available (and reliable) source of knowledge.  He rejects Plato’s rationalistic 
foundation in favor of a scientific, empirical method of enquiry.  This leads to the first 
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particularity of Aristotelian ethics: the importance of human animality.  Aristotle calls 
humans ‘the best thing possible out of all animals’ (1141a35).  He does make some 
distinctions, particularly in the Metaphysics I.1, where he states that ‘the animals 
other than man live by appearances and memories, and have but little of connected 
experience; but the human race lives also by art and reasonings’ (Meta. 980b25-
28).
208
  Yet, in Book X.8 he speaks of the shared ‘genus’ of animality, ‘the common 
nature’ shared by horses and humans, albeit ‘very differently.’  For Aristotle, 
investigating the nature of our animality provides the answers Plato sought in the 
heavens; notably, the consideration of how different animals naturally seek out their 
own good.  Aristotle refers to this natural inclination to self-care in Eth.Nic. VI.8: 
‘Hence the fact that people say some kinds of animals are wise, i.e. those that clearly 
have a capacity for forethought about their own lives’ (1141a27-28).  Aristotle’s 
emphasis on reason does not undermine his insistence upon human animality; it 
merely qualifies it.  Aristotle may revise the pure rationality of Plato, but he does not 
reject it altogether.  On the contrary, the distinctly human aspect of our happiness 
arises from the logos, the one aspect particular to humans. 
 
3.1.1.3 Artistic Imprecision over Scientific Precision 
Because Aristotle recognizes that ethics, like life, is a messy, imprecise enterprise, the 
practice of ethics is therefore less scientific than artistic in nature.  Despite the 
systematic nature of the Eth.Nic., Aristotle admits the decidedly experiential, 
imprecise character of ethical enquiry.  ‘Let it be agreed,’ he says, ‘that everything 
one says about practical undertakings has to be said, not with precision, but in rough 
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outline’ (1104a1-3).  His celebrated doctrine of the mean provides a good example of 
this imprecision: 
It is not easy to define how and with whom and on what grounds and how 
long one should be angry, and up to what point one does correctly in so 
doing and where error begins.... Now how far and in what way someone 
must overstep to be blameworthy is not easy to set out by principle, since 
what matters here are the details of the case, and the judgment lies in 
perception. (1126a32-34, b2-4) 
 
In point of fact, Aristotle does not distinguish sharply between science and ethics; in 
trying to discover the good for human beings, he is not asking an ethical question 
rather than a scientific question.  However, this does not lead him to view ethics as a 
set of equations that invariably yield tidy answers, but as a journey with unexpected 
twists, something being newly created each moment.  His recognition of the 
importance of the particularities of life, as we mentioned above, further underscores 
the inexact nature of the endeavor: ‘But if what one says universally is like this, what 
one says about particulars is even more lacking in precision; for it does not fall under 
any expertise or under any set of rules – the agents themselves have to consider the 
circumstances relating to the occasion’ (1104a6-9).  Moreover, ethics is not 
theoretical; it should help us to actually live well.  The human telos is not merely 
virtue, but virtuous activity (1098b30ff).  These three particularities – monism, 
empiricism, and artistic imprecision – underlay Aristotle’s ethical enterprise.   
 
3.1.2 Ethical Foundations in the Nicomachean Ethics 
The Nicomachean Ethics is a philosophical inquiry into the nature of the good life for 
a human being.  Aristotle states his conception of goodness in the opening sentence of 
the Eth.Nic.: ‘Every sort of expert knowledge and every inquiry, and similarly every 
action and undertaking, seems to seek some good.  Because of that, people are right to 
affirm that the good is “that which all things seek”’ (1094a1).  The required 
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characteristics of the ultimate good, which Aristotle (like Plato) calls eudaimonia, are 
its being complete, final, self-sufficient and continuous.   
 
3.1.2.1 Eudaimonia and the Function Argument 
To discover the nature of human happiness, it is necessary to determine the telos of a 
human being, as a person's happiness will consist in fulfilling this natural end toward 
which their being is directed.   This end or natural ‘function’ must be something that 
is specific to human beings, something essential to our basic humanity.  According to 
Aristotle, the one activity unique to humanity is the ability to reason, the employment 
of the highest part of the soul – the rational.  ‘A human being's function we posit as 
being a kind of life,’ he states, ‘and this life as being activity of soul and actions 
accompanied by reason, and it belongs to a good man to perform these well and 
finely’ (1098a8-10).  Although the ‘lower animals’ have feelings, sensations, and the 
like, humans are the only animals able to make rational judgments.  Human 
happiness, therefore, consists in activity of the soul according to reason, which is to 
function properly as a human.  In practical terms, this activity is expressed through 
ethical virtue, when a person directs his actions according to reason.   
 
3.1.2.2 Aristotle’s Definition of Moral Virtue 
In Book II, Aristotle addresses the subjects of virtue, a concise summary of which can 
be found in his formal definition: ‘Virtue, then,’ he says, ‘is a disposition issuing in 
decisions, depending on intermediacy of the kind relative to us, this being determined 
by rational prescription and in the way in which the wise person would determine it’ 
(1106b36-1107a2).209  Each element of this definition is important.  Virtue is not 
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simply an isolated action; rather, it is a disposition, a habit of acting well.  For an 
action to be virtuous a person must do it deliberately, knowing what he is doing and 
deciding upon it, and doing it because it is a noble action.  In each specific situation, 
the virtuous action is a mean between two extremes.  Finally, prudence or practical 
wisdom is necessary for ethical virtue because it is the intellectual virtue by which the 
mean specific to each situation may be ascertained.  Aristotle distinguishes two types 
of virtue: the intellectual virtues, which pertain to the rational part of the soul, and the 
moral virtues, which pertain to the irrational parts of the soul (1103a1-10).   
 
3.1.2.3 Disposition and Habituation 
In II.5, Aristotle distinguishes three components of the soul with regards to virtue: 
‘Now since the things that occur in the soul fall into three things, i.e. affections, 
capacities, and dispositions, virtue will be one of these’ (1105b19-20).  He thinks 
neither of the former two items can be human virtues, however, because the virtues 
are that with respect to which we are praised or blamed, and these must be modes of 
choice or involve choice in some way: ‘Again, we are angry and afraid without 
decision, whereas the virtues are kinds of decisions, or anyway involve decision’ 
(1106a3-4).  As neither affections nor capacities involve choice, the virtues must 
therefore be hexeis, dispositions or states of character:  ‘As for dispositions, it is in 
terms of these that we are well or badly disposed in relation to the affections, as for 
example in relation to becoming angry, if we are violently or sluggishly disposed, we 
are badly disposed – and similarly too in relation to the other things in question’ 
(1105b25-29).   
Are all hexeis virtuous?  Defective states of character are also hexeis, but they 
are tendencies to have inappropriate feelings. The significance of Aristotle's 
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characterization of these states as hexeis is his decisive rejection of the thesis of strict 
intellectualism, found throughout Plato's early dialogues and mentioned earlier, which 
states that virtue is nothing but a kind of knowledge, and vice nothing but a lack of 
knowledge. Although Aristotle frequently draws analogies between the crafts and the 
virtues (and similarly between physical health and eudaimonia), he insists that the 
virtues differ from the crafts and all branches of knowledge in that the former involve 
appropriate emotional responses and are not purely intellectual conditions. 
The virtues are acquired, Aristotle claims, through a process of habituation.  
They are not inborn, nor are they acquired by any natural process that does not 
involve our own activity, as well as the activity of parents and other elders.  This is 
because ‘we acquire the virtues through having first engaged in the activities’ 
(1103a31-32):  
For it is through acting as we do in our dealings with human beings that 
some of us become just and others unjust, and through acting as we do in 
frightening situations becoming habituated to fearing or being confident, 
that some of us become courageous and some of us cowardly… We may 
sum up by saying just that dispositions come about from activities of a 
similar sort. (1103b16-23) 
 
Virtue is acquired by doing virtuous acts.  However, it is not enough that a person 
have the knack, the know-how, or even the habit of doing what the virtuous person 
does; she must also do them virtuously (excellently); that is, they must be done as the 
virtuous person would do them.  This involves both discrete actions and the state of 
character revealed through these actions.  For Aristotle, action must be coupled with 
intention. 
With regards to intention, it is also important to consider what it means for an 
action to be voluntary, since only voluntary actions can be virtuous.  For an action to 
be involuntary, there must be some external principle causing the action and the 
person must not contribute anything to the action.  An action done through fear is only 
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partially voluntary, and an action done through ignorance may have different degrees 
of voluntariness, depending on whether or not the person would have wanted to do it 
if he had known what he was doing.  As noted above, a proper intention is necessary 
for virtuous action.  Intention is not a desire, a wish or an opinion, but rather a 
deliberate and predetermined plan of action.   
  
3.1.2.4 The Doctrine of the Mean 
Furthermore, Aristotle views virtue as a hexis in mesotēs, a disposition intermediate 
between two other states – one involving excess, the other involving deficiency.  In 
this respect, the virtues are no different from technical skills: every skilled worker 
knows how to avoid excess and deficiency, and is in a condition intermediate between 
two extremes.  Aristotle applies the same topography to every ethical virtue: all are 
located on a map that places the virtues between states of excess and deficiency: 
‘Virtue is a kind of mean, as it aims at what is intermediate’ (1103b21).  Aristotelian 
virtues are mean states in two principal ways.  First, they are members of a triad, 
centered along a line of polarity whose termini are extreme and inappropriate modes 
of behavior: ‘It is intermediacy between two bad states, one involving excess, the 
other involving deficiency’ (1107a2-3).  Second, they are mean states because they 
generate passions and actions that, relative to those of its correlated vices, 
demonstrate some sort of intermediate response: ‘Virtue has to do with affections and 
actions, things in which excess, and deficiency, go astray’ (1106b24-25).  As both 
actions and affections may err towards either excess or deficiency, virtue will be the 
state that ‘both finds and chooses the intermediate’ (1107a6).   
Complicating Aristotle’s account of the mean is how the moral agent arrives at 
the intermediate, particularly given the imprecise nature of moral enquiry: ‘Let it be 
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agreed that everything one says about practical undertakings has to be said, not with 
precision, but in rough outline’ (1104a2-3).  Instead of a predetermined solution, ‘the 
agents themselves have to consider the circumstances relating to the occasion’ 
(1104a8-9).  In each situation, the intermediate will consist of ‘proportionate 
amounts’ arising from the particular scenario (1104a19).  To use Aristotle’s own 
example, there is no universal rule, for example, about how much food an athlete 
should eat, and it would be absurd to infer from the fact that ten pounds is too much 
and two pounds too little for me that one should eat six pounds (1106a33-b5).   
Aristotle does not fully commit to either the proportionate or the mathematical 
position of the formulation of the mean.  On the one hand, Aristotle does speak 
mathematically: ‘With everything continuous and divisible, it is possible to take a 
greater and a lesser and an equal amount’ (1106a26-28).  Yet he immediately speaks 
against a mathematical precision, ‘either with reference to the object itself or relative 
to us’ (1106a28).  He maintains that ‘this is not one thing, nor is it the same for all’ 
(1106a33) and that ‘the intermediate, that is, not in the object, but relative to us’ 
(1106b8).  There are, however, two points that Aristotle explicitly affirms: hitting the 
mean involves getting it right, and getting it right involves practical wisdom.   
The first point appears, in a way, to be Aristotle’s attempt to navigate between 
the poles of precision and approximation.  Whether the approach is mathematical or 
not, Aristotle emphasizes that the result is somehow correct; that is, the mean ‘is 
praised and gets it right’, thus embodying two features of virtue (1106b26-27).  As 
Aristotle struggles to identify the measurable and quantifiable aspect of the mean, he 
continues to stress the ‘correctness’ of the virtuous response: ‘doing [the virtuous act] 
to the person one should, to the extent one should, when one should, for the reason 
one should, and in the manner one should’ (1109a27-29).  However, arriving at this 
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response is complicated, as ‘it is not easy to determine not only how, but with whom, 
in what sorts of circumstances and for how long’ (1109b15-17).  Aristotle frankly 
states that while one may err in many different ways, there is ‘only one way of getting 
it right’ (1106b31-21).  Thus, the second point of the Aristotelian mean is that its 
difficulties require practical wisdom (phronēsis), as the mean is ‘determined by 
rational prescription and in the way in which the wise person (phronimos) would 
determine it’ (1107a1-2).  Finding the virtuous response, even for the wise person, is 
difficult, ‘for such things depend on the particular circumstances, and the judgement 
of them lies in our perception’ (1109b24-25).  Indeed, Aristotle admits that ‘getting it 
right is a rare thing’ (1109a30).  Finding the Aristotelian mean in any given situation 
is neither mechanical nor thoughtless; it requires a full and detailed acquaintance with 
the circumstances and the phronetic ability to correctly assess them. 
Having established a foundation of Aristotle’s thinking on ethical virtue in 
general, the focus now turns to the particular virtue of temperance.  
  
3.1.3 The Account of Temperance in the Nicomachean Ethics 
For Aristotle, temperance is the virtue concerned with the non-rational parts of the 
human soul (1117b25).  In general, Aristotle limits his treatment of temperance to 
three chapters at the conclusion of Book III, where it sits as a companion piece to his 
treatment of the virtue of courage in III.6-9.  However, occurring throughout the 
Eth.Nic. are various references to temperance which, when read alongside the account 
of III.10-12, provide a fuller picture of its place in Aristotle’s ethical system.  His 
‘narrow’ account of temperance will be considered first, followed by the ‘broad’ 
account. 
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3.1.3.1 The ‘Narrow’ Account of Temperance (III.10-12) 
A) Book III.10 – The Sphere of Temperance 
In III.10, Aristotle opens his treatment of temperance with three assertions.  First, he 
states that it (along with fortitude) pertains to the irrational parts of the soul (1117b23-
24). This identifies temperance as a moral rather than intellectual virtue.  Second, he 
further identifies temperance as ‘a mean with regards to pleasures’ (mesotēs esti peri 
hēdonas) (1117b24-25).   Two things stand out here.  One, temperance (like the other 
virtues) is a mean state.  Two, the subject, or sphere of the virtue of temperance, is 
‘pleasures’.  He also notes that ‘it is less concerned, and in a different way, with 
pains’, and that intemperance (akolasia) is concerned with them as well (1117b26-
27).  Thus, temperance is a moral virtue revealed as a mean state dealing with 
pleasures and, to some degree, with pains (as yet unidentified).
210
     
Third, he carries out a four-step process of delineating this sphere of 
temperance.
211
  In keeping of his view of temperance as concerned with the 
epithumetikon, he first separates bodily pleasures from ‘pleasures of the soul’, 
removing from consideration those related to money, learning, honor, friendship or 
mere chatter (1117b28-1118a3).  He eliminates the pleasures derived solely from 
sight, smell, and sound, as ‘pleasure does not occur from these senses among animals 
except incidentally’, as indicators of the object of their desire (1118a1-26).  He then 
subtracts taste from consideration, as an appreciation of certain tastes is rooted more 
in our humanity than our animality, and temperance deals with those pleasures which 
we share with other animals (1118a26-32).  Finally, he removes those pleasures ‘most 
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appropriate to free men’ – the pleasures of physical activity and those concerning the 
whole body, such as massage with its ‘rubbing and warming’ (1118b3-8).   This 
leaves only the pleasures of food, drink, and sex (1118b9).  Aristotle has now isolated 
the physical processes required by physical necessity and involved in self-
propagation, though he does not say this explicitly. 
Throughout this chapter, Aristotle ties two elements together: the rooting of 
these pleasures in our animality, and the consequently serious nature of their being 
allowed to rule.  Their gratifications ‘seem to be servile and brutish’ (1118a25-26); 
because touch is the sense ‘most widely shared’ and ‘shared with animals’, 
intemperance is ‘justly a matter for reproach’ (1118b2-3).  More importantly because 
it fails to engage our rationality, intemperance ‘does not exist in man as belonging to 
what is proper to him’ (1118b3-4).  To prioritize these is to prioritize our animality, 
which is ‘bestial’ (1118b5).  In his commentary on the Eth.Nic., Aquinas uses even 
stronger language, saying that intemperance is ‘really despicable’ and ‘possesses the 
most disgusting shamefulness’, whereby ‘man is rendered notoriously evil and 
blameworthy.’212  With temperance newly circumscribed, Aristotle moves on to 
consider the various manifestations of the virtue. 
 
B) Book III.11 – Different Appetites and Different Types of Persons 
In III.11, Aristotle explores the vice-virtue-vice triad in more detail, discussing the 
various types of appetites and persons.  He first makes a distinction between 
‘peculiar’ and ‘shared’ appetites:  
Of the appetites, some seem to be shared, others peculiar and acquired; so 
e.g. the appetite for nourishment is natural to us, since everyone has an 
appetite for nourishment when they lack it… but as for the appetite for 
this or that sort of food, not everyone has that. (1118b9-13) 
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Taking excessive pleasure in the ‘peculiar’ sensual matters Aristotle calls self-
indulgence or intemperance (akolasia).  This may be manifest in three distinct ways:  
‘For given that people are called lovers of such-and-such either because they enjoy 
the sorts of things one shouldn’t, or because they enjoy things more than most people 
do, or because they don’t enjoy them in the way one should – well, the self-indulgent 
go to excess in all respects’ (1118b21-25).  They err on the object – ‘enjoying the 
things one shouldn’t’; they err on degree – ‘enjoying things more than one should’; 
and they err on manner – ‘not enjoying them in the way one should.’  The self-
indulgent, says Aristotle, go wrong in all respects (1118b24-25).  They also suffer 
pain when their desires go unfulfilled and even when their appetites arise, even if they 
are eventually filled.  Thus, the akolastos feels pain both at the absence of the object 
and with the desire for the object.  The sōphron, on the other hand, is the opposite of 
the akolastos; what the akolastos most enjoys will disgust the sōphrōn (1119a12-13).  
The sōphrōn will be open to what Aristotle calls ‘proper pleasures’: they are 
conducive to health and fitness; are pleasant; serve the fine; are within his means; and 
are as the ‘correct prescription lays down’ (1119a16-20).   
While the akolastos struggles against the peculiar appetites, some struggle 
against the natural appetites.  These Aristotle calls ‘brutish’ and ‘servile’, noting that 
few people go wrong with regard to the natural appetites, and only in one direction 
(1118b15-21).  According to Aristotle, the vice of insufficient desire for pleasure 
hardly exists – indeed, it has no proper name, although Aristotle ventures to call it 
insensibility (anaisthesia).  When present, it takes the form either of innate 
insensitivity to pleasure or of asceticism, limiting the appetites to less than their 
proper function in relation to life as a whole.  Although rare, they are cause for 
concern: ‘For to be insensate like this is not human – all the other animals too, after 
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all, make distinctions between foods, and enjoy some but not others.  If there is 
someone to whom nothing is pleasant, and nothing is preferable to anything else, he 
would be a long way from being human’ (1119a6-11; also 1119a8).213  This raises an 
important and easily-overlooked point: To feel pleasure at these things is human.  
Aristotle concludes with the observation that in all matters pertaining to pleasure, the 
temperate person follows the mean.  He does not enjoy what is most pleasant to the 
self-indulgent and feels no pain, or only to a moderate degree, when his appetites are 
unfulfilled.  He desires only pleasures that are within his means, which are compatible 
with the fine and which contribute to his health and well-being. 
Several words contain particular significance.  The sōphrōn will have 
‘moderate desires’ (orexetai metriōs).  Interestingly, Aquinas translates this as 
‘according to right measure’, which he explains as arising from ‘right reason.’214  The 
ability to perceive the right measure of something echoes Aristotle’s discussion of 
‘willing’, wherein he describes virtue as a measure: ‘What most distinguishes the 
good person is his ability to see what is true in every set of circumstances, being like a 
carpenter’s rule or measure (kanōn kai metron) for them’ (1113a30-33).  Canon is 
defined by ‘an accepted principle or rule; a criterion or standard of judgment; a body 
of principles, rules, standards, or norms.’   That the Greek kanōn, which translates 
here as ‘rule’ or ‘measuring stick’, is connected with metron suggests the calculative, 
evaluative, almost prescriptive nature of this concept.  Right reason provides the 
sōphrōn (and the virtuous in general) with the ability to recognize a ‘recipe’ of sorts 
for each particular situation.  This section also highlights the connotative overlap in 
Aristotle’s use of metrios and sōphron – both of which are translated as ‘moderate.’  
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While Aristotle probably does not intend for these terms to be interchangeable, the 
manner of their use highlights their similarities.  Temperance, although officially 
defined from the standpoint of intemperance, is still sōphrosynē, with the attendant 
richness of its connections with measure and mean. 
  
C) Book III.12 – The Intemperate Appetite of the Akolastos 
In III.12, Aristotle considers the nature of the self-indulgent appetite in greater detail.  
In contrast to cowardice, which is motivated by probable pain, self-indulgence is 
motivated by pleasure and desire.  Because pain upsets and destroys the nature of 
man, but pleasure does not, the decisions and actions of the akolastos are always 
voluntary, as they are due to desire and do not involve danger or the prospect of self-
harm.  Thus, self-indulgence is ‘more voluntary than cowardice, and more 
reproachable’ (1119a23).  
Furthermore, wanton self-indulgence in adults is similar to the naughtiness of 
children, as both are governed entirely by their appetites and desires.  They are 
unrestrained by rationality; whereas in the virtuous person, rationality and appetite 
cooperate: ‘Hence in the moderate person the appetitive should be in harmony with 
reason; for the fine is the goal for both, and the moderate person has appetite for the 
things one should, in the way one should, and when – which is what the rational 
prescription also lays down’ (1119b15-18).  Akolasia resembles the errors of children 
in many ways: it desires shameful things; it can become large; it is characteristic of 
children, who ‘live according to appetite’; it is unstable and indiscriminate; and its 
activity augments congenital tendencies; and perhaps most importantly, it is capable 
of ‘knocking out’ the ‘capacity for rational calculation’ (1119a36-b7).  Conversely, in 
the sōphrōn, the appetites will be ‘moderate’ (metrioi) and ‘few.’  They should be 
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ready to obey and be controlled by the ruling element (1119b7), ‘offering no 
opposition to rational calculation’ (1119b12).  They will act ‘in accordance with what 
reason prescribes’ and will ‘be in harmony with reason’ (symphōnein toi logoi) 
(1119b15-16). 
This has clear echoes of the progression of Republic IV.  For Plato also the 
appetites are ‘big and strong’ and try to ‘enslave and rule’ (442a).  They should be ‘in 
harmony’ with the rulers (430e).  Temperance is ‘order, mastery of pleasures’ (430e).  
Desires should be simple, measured, and directed by calculation (431c).  They are to 
be controlled by the superior elements (431d), which will result in harmony (431e). 
  
3.1.3.2 The ‘Broad’ Account of Temperance (VI.5, II.7, IV.3-4, VII) 
While Aristotle’s focused treatment of temperance in III.10-12 centers on the physical 
appetites, there are occasions in the Nicomachaen Ethics where he examines the 
virtue in a broader manner.  These are found in three indirect treatments of the virtue 
that center on the relationship between temperance and three other moral concepts: 
practical wisdom, magnanimity, and continence. 
 
A) Temperance and Practical Wisdom 
In VI.5, Aristotle defines practical wisdom (phronēsis) as the way in which people 
‘deliberate about the good life in general’ regarding situations ‘where no exact 
technique applies’ (1140a28-9).  He distinguishes practical wisdom from other 
intellectual virtues: it is not skillcraft (technē), because action is not the same as 
production (1140b2-4).  It is not intellectual accomplishment (epistēmē), because 
actions ‘can be otherwise’ and action is not demonstration (1140b2-4).  Thus, it does 
not point towards an external end (as is the case with production), because doing well 
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‘itself serves as end’ (1140b7).  Thus, it is a disposition ‘accompanied by rational 
prescription, true, in the sphere of human goods, relating to action’ (1140b20-22).  
And it is therefore the intellectual virtue most closely tied to the moral virtues, where 
decisions result in actions, and actions can indeed be otherwise.  It is not the univocal 
judgments of epistēmē that are corrupted by excessive pleasure, but the open-ended 
and practical decisions guided by phronēsis.  Thus, it is quite important that practical 
wisdom not be corrupted and become unable to do its job.  
Temperance, says Aristotle, has a particular role in the safeguarding of 
practical wisdom. He outlines their relationship etymologically: ‘This is why we give 
temperance (sōphrosynē) its name, as something that preserves wisdom [sōzei tēn 
phronēsin] (1140b11-12).’ Aristotle states that practical wisdom receives its very 
name from temperance (whose name, sōphrosynē, literally means ‘saving phronesis’), 
because this reflects the true nature of practical wisdom, as something concerned with 
the doing of good versus bad things.    Sōphrosynē – literally ‘sound-phronēsis’ – is 
the savior (sōzei) or preserver of phronēsis.215  Thus, sōphrosynē has a special, almost 
reciprocal relationship with phronēsis instead of epistēmē.  This differs significantly 
from Socrates’ view that the virtues are forms of epistēmē.216 
Moreover, it is more than semantic gymnastics: ‘And it does preserve the sort 
of belief in question.  What is pleasant and painful does not corrupt, or distort, every 
sort of belief’ (1140b13-14).  Because pleasure and pain can (and do) distort one’s 
capacity for judgment (although not one’s capacity for epistemic evaluations), 
temperance is necessary to prevent this from happening.  When inordinate pleasure or 
pain distorts one’s vision of the true and good end of life, then practical wisdom 
cannot make an accurate assessment of one’s choices.  But when the sōphronoi makes 
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decisions, practical wisdom is allowed to fulfill its task.  These people, says Aristotle, 
‘clearly have a capacity for forethought about their own lives’ (1141a28-9).  Thus, it 
is temperance which safeguards the pursuit of virtue itself. 
 
B) Temperance, Magnanimity, and Humility 
Aristotle first mentions the relationship between temperance (the ‘unnamed virtue’)217 
and magnanimity (megalopsychia) in his preliminary discussion on the moral virtues 
in II.7.
218
  This virtue is ‘concerned with honour on a small scale’ (1107b26) and is 
exhibited by ‘desiring honour to the proper amount’ (1107b27).219  He both identifies 
temperance (sōphrosynē) by name and expands upon this connection in IV.3 where he 
discusses its relationship to megalopsychia: ‘The person who is worthy of small 
(mikrōn) things and thinks himself worthy of them is moderate (sōphron),220 but not 
megalopsychos’ (1123b5-6).   
However, it is not merely ‘small’ things to which the sōphron person should 
aspire, but moderate (metriōn) things (1123b11).  This association appears again in 
IV.4, where it renders its possessor ‘disposed as one should in relation to moderate 
(metria) things’ (1125b4).  This person, says Aristotle, will be ‘indifferent to honour’ 
and may be described as ‘decent and moderate (metriōn kai sōphrona)’ (1125b13-14).  
Sōphrosynē is thus explicitly connected to a moderate, well-proportioned, relationship 
with honor. And in calling this virtue ‘the intermediate (mesotētos)’ (1125b17), 
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temperance is again connected, in the broad sense, with moderation and intermediacy. 
Thus, book IV provides some of the clearest connections between the ideas of 
sōphrosynē, metrios, and mesotēs – temperance, moderation, and the intermediacy of 
the mean.  Aristotle also connects sōphrosynē to the concept of symmetry and proper 
proportion, saying that small people are ‘well-proportioned’ (symmetroi) rather than 
beautiful (1123b7).  Temperance is thus connected to being – and to knowing oneself 
to be – moderate, well-proportioned, intermediate, and symmetrical in one’s 
relationship to honor.  This section also highlights the virtue’s connection to the pre-
Socratic, religious, Homeric connotation of knowing one’s place in the midst of lives 
of valor.  Curzer states:  
Aristotle’s treatment of megalopsychia constitutes a particularly 
interesting juncture in the history of ideas: the point at which the vestigial, 
Homeric value of greatness and grandeur seems to clash with the newer 
value of moderation and the mean.  Aristotle tries to reconcile these two 
apparently incompatible values by formally defining megalopsychia as a 
combination of greatness and self-knowledge.
221
  
 
Temperance thus participates in the blending and balancing of two very different 
worldviews and the virtues they generate. 
Reading these passages together, this broad conception of temperance is 
characterized by three things.
222
  First is the particular state of worthiness.  The 
sōphron person is worthy of mikra and metria things – not large things, as this 
intrudes into the realm of megalopsychia.  Second is the possession of the proper self-
knowledge – a recognition of being worthy of small or moderate things.  This person 
comprehends his state of worthiness for exactly what it is.  Third is the conformity of 
desires to this self-knowledge.  He does not aspire to a station not his own; he is 
content to be – and to be seen – just where he is.  Thus, being sōphron brings together 
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one’s place in the polis, an accurate knowledge of that place, and the proper 
correspondence of one’s desire for honour.  Even for the megalopsychoi, however, the 
relationship between megalopsychia and honor is less about honor itself than about 
the state of abundant virtue that occasions such honor.
223
  This view may plausibly be 
read from Aristotle’s further remarks in IV.3: ‘He [the megalopsychos] will bear 
himself with moderation (metriōs) towards wealth and power and all good or evil 
fortune, whatever may befall him, and will be neither over-joyed by good fortune nor 
over-pained by evil.  For not even about honor does he care very much’ (1124a13-17).  
Although honor is the highest tribute available to Aristotle and his contemporaries, it 
is merely the outward manifestation of one’s possession of virtue.224   
So, these three things emerge – one’s state of worthiness, an awareness of this 
state of worthiness, and an appropriate desire for a corresponding amount of honor.  
Together, they suggest a possible relationship between temperance and what might 
legitimately be called humility, although Aristotle is generally believed to have 
counted humility as a vice.  Certainly, he counts neither of the Greek words 
commonly associated with humility – mikropsychia and tapeinosis – as virtues.  The 
word used in the vice-virtue-vice triad of IV.4, mikropsychia, is often translated as 
‘humility’, although ‘pusillanimity’ is also common.225  A more literal rendering is 
‘small-souledness’, which reflects its etymological opposition to megalopsychia 
(literally ‘great-souledness’).  The mikropsychos, says Aristotle, is ‘the man who 
thinks he deserves lesser things than he deserves – whether the things be great, 
ordinary, or little’ (1123b9-10).  Mikropsychia keeps one’s mind focused upon petty 
things, rather than on the great achievements of which he might be capable (1123b12-
13); it prevents him from aspiring to great things, and likewise to great virtue.  
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Hutchison correctly says: ‘The humble man thinks he deserves less than he does, a 
trait which Aristotle disdains; he would prefer us to be vain than humble, because 
humility is commoner, and therefore worse.’226  Moreover, the micropsychos is 
‘deficient in regard to his own worth’ (1123b24); he is self-deluded.  Thus, the 
primary error for the micropsychos is an error of understanding; he will consistently 
underestimate and undervalue himself, whatever his state of genuine merit.   
However, the word most commonly associated with classical ‘humility’ is not 
mikropsychia, but tapeinosis.
227
  Tapeinosis has several connotations, largely 
negative: as smallness (as opposed to largeness); as lowness with regard to the earth; 
as the degradation of defeat; and as attendant to one’s state in slavery and 
subjugation.
228
  For Aristotle (as for most others in classical Greece), the tapeinoi are 
the ‘little people’, the ones who truly have no value.  Unlike mikropsychia, tapeinosis 
is not an intellectual issue.  It is not having a low opinion of yourself that makes you 
tapeinos; it is having a low estate in life.  Nevertheless, it occasionally has positive 
content.  As discussed above, the Laws depicts tapeinosis in contrast to the hubris of 
those who look only to themselves.
229
  Joseph Tadie also discusses other constructive 
glosses of tapeinotēs within the classical tradition.  In addition to the passage in the 
Laws 715-716, he discusses Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, where Prometheus’ 
punishment ‘is only the wages of too boastful speech.  You still have not learned 
humility, nor do you bend before misfortune.’230  Prometheus has overstepped his 
mortal limits and displayed a prideful arrogance, which has greatly offended Zeus, the 
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immortal.  Learning humility (tapeinosis) is his only recourse if he wants to escape 
his punishment.   
The question remains: does Aristotle have a conception of what might be 
plausibly called ‘humility’?  He certainly commends nothing resembling Christian 
humility (understood variously as submission, modesty, or Christ-like meekness), and 
considers it the greater of two evils in the triad of IV.3.  He would likely never 
conceive of humility as a virtue per se.  However, he does describe a particular 
combination of being and mindset, which stands contrary to hubris and excessive 
pride.  It is virtuous to possess a proper understanding of your worthiness and 
position, and to bring one’s aspirations into agreement with this understanding.  
Whatever the rendering of mikropsychia, common sense suggests that Aristotle here is 
recommending, particularly for the sōphron man who possesses the ‘unnamed virtue’, 
some version of humility.   
  
C) The Distinction between Temperance and Continence 
Whereas Book III.10-12 discusses virtuous and vicious dispositions regarding the 
physical appetites (temperance and self-indulgence, respectively), Book VII 
introduces two other possibilities: continence (enkrateia) and incontinence (akrasia).  
Some persons, having reached a decision about what to do on a particular occasion, 
experience some counter-pressure brought on by an appetite for pleasure, or anger, or 
some other emotion; and this contrary influence is not completely under the control of 
reason.  Within this category, some are typically able to resist these counter-rational 
pressures. Such people are not virtuous, although they generally do what a virtuous 
person does; here is another example of the importance of the inner state of reason 
and order.  Aristotle calls these persons continent (enkrates), possessing strength of 
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will.  Others are less successful in resisting these counter-pressures.  They are 
incontinent (akrates), possessing weakness of will.  Aristotle distinguished 
temperance from continence in a twofold manner.  First, he acknowledges (contra 
Socrates) that akrasia does exist; second, he distinguishes continence (contra Plato) 
from true virtue, temperance in particular.  These states are neither as blameworthy as 
the vices nor as praiseworthy as the virtues. 
Plato commonly renders enkrateia as ‘self-control’; it is one of several 
categorizations of temperance, notably in Republic IV.
231
  Aristotle, however, treats it 
as a category all its own while retaining the connection to temperance.
232
  Continence 
differs from true temperance in the internal state and motivations of the person at the 
time of their actions: while both the continent and the temperate persons will perform 
actions that align with and reflect practical reason, only the temperate one will do so 
easily, taking wholesome pleasure in the act.  Aristotle’s use of the term enkrateia 
reflects its derivation from kratos, meaning ruler or ruled.  The enkrates will be 
struggling with his desires, experiencing them as subjects to be ruled, rather than as 
willing participants in the decisions of phronēsis.  It is because of this struggle that 
continence merely ‘resembles’ true temperance (1152a1).  This highlights the 
difference between the Platonic and Aristotelian views on temperance; whereas Plato 
defines temperance in the Republic IV as domination of the epithumia by the 
logistikon (430e6-9), this would only qualify as continence for Aristotle.  
Additionally, the charioteer of the Phaedrus who struggles with the unruly black 
horse displays only continence, not temperance.
233  
He associates continence per se 
with the particular sphere of temperance, as they relate to the same pleasures, but not 
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in the same way (1148a14-17).  Other instances of ‘continence’ do exist, but they are 
associated to true continence by analogy (1148b12).  Moreover, incontinence with 
respect to appetite is worse than with respect to temper (thumos), because the objects 
of appetite are merely ‘necessary’ and, unlike the objects of thumos, they do not 
participate in reason (1149a24-b3).   
Furthermore, to the categories of temperance and continence, Aristotle adds 
‘resistance’ (karteria).  He acknowledges the ‘common view’ that both continence 
and resistance are considered praiseworthy (1145b8-11).  It can be difficult, he says, 
to distinguish between the three (1145b14, 1146b12-13), as the common view tends to 
confuse them.  This ‘resistance’ refers to the type of person who ‘can overcome even 
those [pleasures and pains] that most people are too weak not to give in to (1150a12-
13).’  Although this sounds quite similar to self-control, it is actually even farther 
down the virtue-vice continuum, as it is refers to merely withstanding one’s passions, 
rather than overcoming them.  Resistance, for Aristotle, relates to self-control ‘as not 
being defeated is different from winning – which is why self-control is also a more 
desirable thing than resistance’ (1150a34-b2).  This yields an insight central for later 
discussion.  For Aristotle, there are some persons who are simply better at holding out 
against adverse pleasures; they have a high tolerance for the ‘pain’ of unfulfilled 
desires.  This is associated not with the cultivation of any moral virtue, but is simply a 
result of one’s particular personality and nature.   
Aristotle concedes that continence can be a good thing (1151b29), but it is 
more likely to reflect a battle with appetites that are both ‘strong and bad’, which is 
not indicative of true virtue (11466a9-16).
234
  However, if there is to be a struggle, it 
is more fitting that it be with strong desires, since it is shameful to struggle against a 
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weak appetite, or none at all (1150a27-29).  Aristotle also acknowledges that 
continence, acting on its own, may become problematic.  He commends standing firm 
to the correct decision as opposed to just any decision (1151a29-a33).  He warns that 
continence may do more harm than good when abstracted from the guidance of 
practical reason; if someone simply digs in their heels, they risk reinforcing a bad 
decision (1146a17-19).  He labels these persons ‘stubborn’ and calls them 
‘opinionated, uneducated, and boorish’.  Although they may ‘resemble’ the continent, 
they instead display, not excessive appetites, but inflexible reason, and are not likely 
to change their minds (1151b5-13).  For Aristotle, self-control must truly be led by 
reason if it is to have any value at all.   
  
3.1.4 Three Particular Issues in Aristotle’s Account 
These examinations of Aristotle’s treatment of temperance highlight three distinctive 
contributions to the journey of this virtue.  These are the drastic restriction of its 
sphere of activity, the distinction between temperance and continence, and its 
association with the doctrine of the mean.   
 
3.1.4.1. The Restriction of the Sphere of Temperance 
As previously discussed, Aristotle takes great pains in III.10 to precisely define the 
sphere of temperance.
235
  Yet even his first references to temperance virtually define it 
in opposition to self-indulgence: ‘To the mean in some cases the deficiency, in some 
the excess is more opposed … and not insensibility, which is a deficiency, but self-
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indulgence, which is an excess, that is more opposed to temperance’ (1108b36-
1109a5)  He continues: 
We ourselves tend more naturally to pleasures, and hence are more easily 
carried away towards self-indulgence than towards propriety.  We 
describe as contrary to the mean, then, rather the directions in which we 
more often go to great lengths; and therefore self-indulgence, which is an 
excess, is the more contrary to temperance. (1109a12-19) 
 
Temperance is, both by its own nature and because of human nature, expressed in 
opposition to the human tendency towards self-indulgence.  This association results in 
a distinctive contribution of Aristotelian temperance: the narrowing of the scope of 
the virtue.  This narrowness stands in stark contrast to the expansive view of Platonic 
temperance, particularly in the Charmides.
236
  What was, for Plato, an ‘architectonic 
science’ is now limited to the control of the most basic physical appetites.237  While 
Aristotle may be commended for the precision he applied to the characterization and 
demarcation of the various virtues, his meticulous approach sacrifices complexity for 
the sake of clarity.  Moreover, he is quite explicit in his limitation of the sphere of 
temperance to only those pleasures arising from our animality – a strictly physical set 
of appetites.
238
   
 
3.1.4.2 The Distinction between Temperance and Continence 
The second particularity of Aristotle’s treatment of temperance is its relationship to 
continence or self-control.  It is important to remember that continence is not a virtue, 
as ‘by talking about virtue in ways that sets its standard too high or too low, we 
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diminish it in practice.’239  The inner order and beauty of the temperate should not be 
equated with the internal struggle of the merely continent.
240
  Alasdair MacIntyre 
interprets this as a mark of the superior nature of Aristotelian temperance over its 
Platonic predecessor, as ‘enkrateia is the quality of self-control and sōphrosynē is 
more and other than enkrateia.’241   
The differences are subtle, and they bring subtlety to the discussion of virtue 
and bodily appetites.  Robert Roberts notes that self-control may appear to be the 
morally superior choice, as it ‘seems to be a more rational state of mind or character 
than temperance, because it looks as though rationality is doing more work here, and 
doing it “on its own,” while in temperance the state of appetite is doing the “work” in 
place of reason.’  He continues: 
This is perhaps a Kantian way of thinking about reason and appetite: 
reason is most active, and most in evidence, and most pure, when it is 
clearly distinguished from appetite, and it is most clearly distinguished 
when it is in opposition to appetite. Aristotle appeals to oppositional cases 
to establish that reason is different from appetite (NE 1.13, 1102b14–18), 
but he doesn’t think that the whole person is more rational when the two 
are disjoined.
242
 
 
This is an important point in light of Aristotle’s eudaimonism.  The mere exercise of 
self-control is clearly not sufficient for human happiness, ‘for the self-controlled 
person has to force himself not to indulge an appetite, and being conflicted in this way 
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is not a happy way of being.’243  This is especially evident when we consider the 
largely positive account of temperance found in the Eth.Nic.  Far from the ‘privative 
motivational state’ given in his earlier Eudemian Ethics, which offers no idea of the 
‘proper enjoyment of food and drink,’244 the positive aspects of temperance are 
unpacked in the Eth.Nic., notably as that which either contributes to, or is consistent 
with, health and fitness.  For the temperate person, pleasure serves as an indicator of 
what is healthful, as the temperate person ‘delights in’ the pleasures of food, drink, 
and sex (1119a16-20).
245
   
 
3.1.4.3 Temperance and the Doctrine of the Mean 
The third area of particular interest is the relationship between temperance and the 
doctrine of the mean, which has been viewed as ‘foundational, in a larger sense.’246  
As discussed earlier, Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is central to his ethical 
thought.
247
  It locates each virtue between the vicious extremes of excess and 
deficiency, although proportionately rather than mathematically (1103b21, 1106a33-
b8, 1107s2-3).  It is also relative to the agent and the circumstances (1104a8-19, 
1106a28-33).  It is particular, in that there is only one way to get it right (1106b31, 
1109a27-29) and yet is simultaneously imprecise (1104a23, 1109b15-17,24-25).  
Thus, ‘getting it right’ is a rare occurrence (1109a30).   
Described as ‘the most famous (or notorious) part’ of Aristotle’s ethical 
theory
248
 and ‘that most vulgarized notion of the Ethics’249, the doctrine has generated 
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vigorous debate.
250
  Its adherents call it ‘architectonic’251, structurally supporting his 
entire theory of character.
252
  It describes – and attempts to account for – the range of 
moral behavior found within human action.
253
  North, who perceives the doctrine of 
the mean as arising from ‘the traditional Greek feeling for moderation,’ also sees 
Aristotle as ‘seeking greater precision than he found in Plato’s reliance upon 
phronēsis.’254  Its detractors lament its ‘practical vacuity’ and lack of ‘conceptual 
utility’,255 which is rendered ‘platitudinous’ when factually applied.256  They question 
whether the use of quantitative language conceals its emphasis on the rightness of an 
action as morally normative (cf. 1106b22-23).
257
  This language also masks the 
connection of the mean to practical wisdom and ‘perception’ (aesthesis) (1109b23).  
One commentator speculates that the mean would not have passed muster should 
Aristotle have written a third work of ethics.
258
 
While the academic debate is generally thoughtful and nuanced, it stands in 
danger of being eclipsed by the more common, somewhat intuitive tendency for the 
doctrine of the mean to be equated with the doctrine of moderation.
259
  At first glance, 
this view appears to be easily refuted.  Some interpret Aristotle as recommending a 
mean state with regard to the passions, not a settled state of moderate passions.
260
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The doctrine of the mean is ‘a disposition toward the mean, not a mean disposition’; 
and that is not the same as the doctrine of moderation.  However, the two are not 
easily differentiated: the doctrine of moderation is neither contained within nor 
resultant from the doctrine of the mean, although they are ‘perfectly compatible.’261  
Others argue that they are distinct yet connected; the doctrine of the mean is ‘an 
outgrowth and generalization’ of the doctrine of moderation.262  Thus, Aristotle was 
likely ‘a believer in the doctrine of moderation, sensibly interpreted.’263  Yet this 
assumption becomes problematic when applied to ethical particulars:  
If we are to give genuinely independent content to the notion of the mean 
amount of feeling, we would seem to end up with a moderate amount of 
feeling, and the doctrine of the mean would amount to the claim that if 
she has developed the disposition to do the right thing, then she will 
characteristically feel a moderate amount of feeling or emotion: she will 
not be either indifferent or highly worked up about what she is doing.
264
   
 
While some consider this a call for regulating one’s responses, even the later 
Peripatetics held to the moderating aspects of metriopatheia.
265
  This is significant 
because of the interpretation it superimposes upon the doctrine of the mean; that is, 
the virtuous response will be moderate (i.e. medium) in emotion and action. 
Thirty years into his work with Aristotle, one commentator declares: ‘It might 
turn out to be false, but to dismiss the doctrine of the mean as trivial, foolish, 
metaphorical, or peripheral takes chutzpah.’266  And indeed, the doctrine of the mean 
contains genuine insights.  One is its acknowledgement that the virtue-vice 
relationship is not binary or ordinal.
267
  Another is Aristotle’s emphasis on an agent-
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specific mean, which shows interesting continuity with the Delphic aphorism ‘Know 
Thyself.’  One fascinating medico-biological basis for the doctrine of the mean 
connects it to metriotēs, defined as ‘equilibrium” and ‘blend’ (krēsis).268  This is 
particularly helpful because it highlights the dynamic nature of metrios and meson, 
which is essential for the mean to function responsively according to practical 
wisdom.
269
  Yet even its staunchest defenders feel compelled to ‘rehabilitate it’ to 
increase ‘its plausibility and usefulness as an organizing principle.’270  It is arguably 
ambiguous in its application and misleading in its implications.  Despite its ethical 
insights, the doctrine of the mean contains significant challenges for moral reasoning.   
  
3.1.5 Conclusions on Aristotelian Temperance 
Aristotle’s treatment of temperance contains several distinctive contributions.  He 
reconnects the moral life – particularly the area governed by temperance – with 
human animality, while pairing it with our particular rationality.  It is true that 
brutishness, or animality without rationality, is one of the lowest possible fates for 
free men; yet the biological and empirical nature of Aristotle’s ethics arises directly 
from our embodied, creaturely nature.  He strips temperance from its cardinal status 
via the dissolution of the tetrad, and he outlines the discrete spheres of each virtue, 
essentially limiting the scope of temperance to its ‘paradigm cases’ of food, drink, and 
sexual relations.  He engages the ‘broader’ sense of temperance in both the 
relationship between temperance and practical reason and the connection of 
temperance and some form of humility (although the connection is implicit).  He 
differentiates the sub-virtue of continence from the virtue of temperance, making 
explicit what was only implied by Plato.  His overall treatment may be somewhat 
                                                 
268
 Tracy, 335. 
269
 Ibid., 339. 
270
 Curzer, Virtues, 1-2. 
109 
 
limited in scope compared to Plato’s treatment of the virtue, but this distinction is 
central.  Moreover, it highlights Aristotle’s emphasis upon proper pleasure in the 
functioning of true virtue; virtue cannot exist where its exercise is painful.  Finally, 
through its connection to the doctrine of the mean, temperance begins to be conflated 
with a static, unresponsive concept of moderation.   
 This is a different temperance from that in Plato: altered in status, restricted in 
scope, more clearly defined, less dynamic in nature, and exercised without struggle.  
This paper now turns to the treatment of temperance in Stoic philosophy. 
 
3.2 Stoic Temperance 
 
The Stoics make several distinct contributions to ethics in general and temperance in 
particular.  First, as a philosophical school, they reinstate the tetrad of cardinal virtues.  
Second, the Roman Stoics are responsible for the transmission (and translation) of the 
virtues into Roman language and culture; they attempt to adapt them to the new and 
quite different culture of Rome, and they help to craft the accompanying vocabulary.  
Third, via this transmission, they have a significant impact on early Christian thinkers, 
perhaps the most significant until the Neoplatonism of Augustine and the recovered 
Aristotelianism of Aquinas.  And fourth, they make significant changes to Platonic 
and Aristotelian notions of temperance, changes which significantly impact Christian 
ideas of the virtue. 
 
3.2.1 Foundations of Stoic Ethics 
Stoicism arose during the Hellenistic age, when Greek culture was disseminated 
throughout the surrounding cultures.  It was arguably the most influential of the 
Hellenistic philosophies; yet sketching an overview of Stoic thought is no small 
110 
 
feat.
271
  It is difficult to adequately summarize Stoic teachings, as their doctrine 
underwent numerous and significant changes throughout its hundreds of years as an 
active philosophical school.
272
  Despite their broad range, they possessed numerous 
shared assumptions, questions, and vocabulary.  Generally considered an expansion, 
rather than a divergence, from the Platonic and Aristotelian schools, they were 
decidedly Socratic in their origins, to the point of being labeled ‘the Socratics’; 
influenced by him in both theory and practice, they were particularly taken with his 
seemingly unshakable self-sufficiency.
273
  Often called ‘radical Socratics’ due to their 
identification of virtue with the presence and exercise of human reason, they were 
scrupulously intellectual in their discussions and frameworks.
274
  Their ethics were 
also highly rational, with all virtue seen as forms of wisdom.  Their most significant 
contribution to the Socratic legacy, however, was the presentation of its ideas in a 
systematized fashion.
275
   
 
3.2.1.1 Stoic Physics and Cosmology 
Ethics holds a central place in Stoic thought, as ‘in its broadest sense ethics informs 
all the parts of Stoic philosophy.’276  The Stoics took pride in the coherence of their 
philosophical system, which viewed humanity and the cosmos as microcosm and 
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macrocosm of the same rationality.
277
  This coherence extended from the philosophy 
itself to its application, as a Stoic philosopher ‘is not only one who can think and 
construct systems, but is chiefly one who can live and die in harmony with his 
system.’278  Unlike other classical systems of philosophical thought, of which ethics is 
only one part, Stoic ethics is foundational in determining the very nature of happiness 
and the best means of achieving it.
279
  Physics and logic exist for the sake of ethics; 
Stoic philosophy exists to show the Stoic sage how to live (D.L. 7.84).
280
  Stoic ethics 
is intimately tied to Stoic physics, particularly its cosmology.  The early Stoics 
retrieved the materialism of Heraclitus, substituting physics for metaphysics and 
materiality for transcendence.  In their rejection of Platonic and Aristotelian dualism, 
the Stoics teach a monistic materialism, which is bound together by an all-embracing 
logos (be it known as Zeus or divine reason).  The human soul, material and 
undivided, is related to the universe as microcosm to macrocosm.  Thus, the soul and 
its proper ends of the human soul may be found within the realm of nature. 
 
3.2.1.2 Eudaimonia, the Human Telos, and Appropriate Acts 
For the Stoics, as for Plato and Aristotle, the aim of human life is eudaimonia.  Zeno 
describes the human telos both as a ‘smoothly flowing life’ (SVF I 184) and as a life 
‘consistent with reason’ (SVF I 202, III 39; D.L. 7.87).  This happiness will be found 
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in living in accord with nature (SVF I 179).
281
  Zeno received this definition from the 
Cynics, although he gave it a new and positive content, the largely negative Cynic 
connotation consisting primarily of ‘the rejection of conventional ways of 
behaving.’282  Stobaeus called this ‘living in accordance with one concordant reason’ 
(2.77, 16-27; SVF 3.16).  More specifically, it is living with a human nature that 
reflects its participation in the nature of the ordered cosmos, ‘in accordance with the 
nature of oneself and that of the whole’, always observing ‘the universal law’.  In a 
phrase reminiscent of Aristotle, Chrysippus equates this universal law with ‘the right 
reason pervading everything’ (D.L. 7.87).  
The existence of a ‘universal law’ naturally leads to the Stoic ‘engaging in no 
activity wont to be forbidden by the universal law’ (D.L. 7.87).  Yet how does one 
determine which activities follow this law?  As noted above, Stoicism said that one 
should, first, live according to the larger nature of the universe, and second, we should 
live according to the particular nature of humanity.  As Diogenes Laertius said, ‘And 
since reason, by way of a more perfect management, has been bestowed on rational 
beings, to live correctly in accordance with reason comes to be natural for them’ (D.L. 
VII 85-86).  However, the goal is merely to try to obtain things in accordance with 
nature; it matters not whether they are actually obtained.  This is due to the Stoic 
distinction between to kathēkon, a fitting or appropriate action, and to katorthōma, a 
correct or virtuous action (i.e. a kathēkon which is in accordance with the human 
telos) (Ecl. 2.7.8, 93.15-16).  Although both actions are ‘appropriate’ for human 
beings, it is only katorthōma that both springs from and reflects a correct logos.    
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3.2.2 Virtue 
Happiness is not merely living in accordance with nature; it is also tied to virtue.  
Zeno states, ‘Living in agreement with nature is the end, which is living in accordance 
with virtue (sēn kat aretēn)’ (SVF I 179, D.L.7.87).  This relationship is not artificial 
or forced, as ‘nature leads up towards virtue’ (D.L. 7.87).  It is part of the human 
design, as human beings ‘naturally seek to be in harmony with nature.’283  Thus, the 
universal law is the ‘goal and norm of virtue, just as it is the ruling principle of the 
cosmos.’284  Although virtue, which Seneca called ‘perfect reason’ (SVF 3.200a), is 
not synonymous with happiness, happiness will flow directly from virtue’s possession 
and practice.  In a move away from the classic Hellenic positions, virtue was 
considered the only true ‘good’, and vice the only true ‘evil.’  All other things – 
health, wealth, power – are not good but ‘indifferent’, as ‘that which can be used well 
and badly is not something good’ (D.L. VII 101). Although everything except virtue 
is technically ‘indifferent’, some indifferents may be ‘preferred’, while others are 
rejected or neutral.  Residing between kathēkonta and katorthōmata are mesa 
kathēkonta (intermediate appropriate acts), which are aimed towards the preferred 
indifferents, at least those which are in accord with nature (A.D., 86.12-14).  
Although Aristotle viewed the truly happy life as requiring some external goods, the 
Stoics reject Aristotle’s claim that some natural goods are necessary for true 
happiness, asserting that moral goodness was all one needed for fulfillment.  Thus, the 
indifferents should be regarded with unruffled detachment, as their possession 
ultimately made no real difference to one’s overall happiness   
Although they maintain the classical commitment to eudaimonism in their 
ethical framework, the Stoics significantly depart from tradition (particularly from the 
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Peripatetics) with the belief than virtue – as the perfection of reason and therefore as 
perfect happiness – is sufficient for the attainment of happiness (D.L. 7.127; Disp. 
5.82).  This standard of Stoic thought also brought peace and assurance to its 
possessors.
285
  In this matter the Stoics focus upon one’s point of departure, or 
intentionality.  Virtue is entirely a matter of properly aligning oneself internally.  A.A. 
Long notes, ‘The Stoics stressed the importance of aiming at rather than achieving a 
desirable result.  Moral judgments and human well-being are related to the agent’s 
inner attitude, his state of mind.’286 Virtue, therefore, is tied to reason and wisdom.  
This was, however, a practical wisdom, with phronēsis eclipsing epistēmē.  Zeno 
considered phronēsis constitutive of virtue in general, and related the other cardinal 
virtues to this as expressions of this phronēsis in particular situations.  Thus, their 
ethics also tended towards the practical (the ‘practical’ part of ‘practical wisdom’).287  
Moreover, virtue is acquired instantaneously; as the rational mind properly positions 
itself and accepts the reality of various indifferents, the ‘decision’ for happiness is 
sufficient for its achievement.  Both happiness and virtue are immediately present.   
 
3.2.3 Assent, Passion, and Apatheia  
In addition to the distinction between preferred and undesirable indifferents, the 
Stoics distinguished between things we can affect and things we cannot affect.  For 
the Stoic sage, the only thing entirely under one’s control is the ability to conform the 
will to reason’s dictates.  Any occurrence, whether welcome or tragic, must be 
accepted as the will of God (Disc. 1.4.111).  If all is Fate, and all is God’s will, and 
God’s will is to live according to nature, then the essence of Stoic goodness is ‘assent’ 
(sunkatathesis), the willing acceptance of living as one should.  Stoic assent is the 
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means by which man acknowledges the divine logos and its workings.    Because 
assent is affiliated with and chosen by the will, it is something which must be 
intentionally chosen.
288
   
The thing most likely to stand in the way of reason and impede one’s ability to 
assent is emotion or passion (pathos).  Passion is ‘an impulse which is excessive and 
disobedient to the dictates of reason’, or a movement of the soul which is irrational 
and contrary to reason’ (Ecl. 2.88, 8-90, SVF 3.378).  The Stoics considered the 
passions to be the ‘source of any unhappiness’ and the result of false opinions about 
good and evil.  A weak logos leads to a false opinion and generates an irrational 
movement of the soul that ultimately becomes a passion.  Passions are uniformly bad 
because they reflect errors in judgment; they are like a disease (Disp. 3.10.23).  
Therefore, the Stoic sage will be apathēs, or without passions.  However, he will have 
‘good feelings’ (eupatheia).  The important point to note is that because passions arise 
from errors in logos, they cannot be restrained or limited; they must be uprooted and 
destroyed.  This is Stoic apatheia. 
Those who believe in Plato’s tripartite soul will wonder how this apatheia will 
come about, as the soul wars against itself.  But for Chrysippus, there is no conflict in 
the soul between reason and desire, as he claimed, ‘There is no such thing as the 
appetitive and the spirited elements, for the whole of the human governing-principle 
is rational’ (SVF 3.115).’  This placed the Stoics in a somewhat untenable position, as 
they were compelled to deny the existence of innate human irrationality, ‘reducing it 
to errors of reason.’289  Perhaps most notorious is the example of the Stoic sage who 
does not grieve after trying and failing to rescue a child from a burning building.  The 
primary difference between the sage and ordinary people is a ‘difference in attitude 
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and motivation’, which may or may not be readily apparent to modern readers. 290  
The central point is true apatheia cannot be shaken by desires or losses, both of which 
arise from a flawed logos.  As the realization of this ethical prescription, the Stoic 
sage possesses all the virtues and is thus at the highest level of happiness. 
 
3.2.4 Stoic Accounts of Temperance 
Temperance regained its cardinal status with the Stoics, both due to the reinstatement 
of the tetrad and the Stoics’ lack of distinction between intellectual and moral 
virtue.
291
  The virtue, its nature and function, and many related topics often found 
their way into Stoic discussions.  Under their watch, temperance found new nuances 
and regained much of the semantic breadth lost under Aristotle. 
 
3.2.4.1 The Early Stoa 
The Stoics’ definitions of temperance evolved with each head of the school.  Zeno 
defined sōphrosynē as wisdom (phronēsis) in choice (SVF I.201, D.L. 7.92).  This 
focus upon choice echoes Aristotle’s description of moral virtue as connected with 
prohairesis (‘choice’ or ‘decision’) both conceptually and etymologically (Eth.Nic. 
1105a31-32,1113a1-b2).
292
  Zeno also joins Aristotle in naming akolasia as the 
opposite of temperance (SVF I.190), despite the differences in their accounts of the 
virtue itself.  However, he renders akolasia as ‘profligacy’ (D.L. 7.93), a gloss which 
gives the term a different emphasis than its rendering as ‘self-indulgence’ in the 
Eth.Nic.
293
  Interestingly, Zeno names ‘folly’ (aphrosynē) – one Platonic antonym for 
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temperance
294
 – as the vice contrasted to phronēsis.  This is unsurprising in light of 
the Stoic doctrine of virtue as knowledge; the central virtue, phronēsis, would stand in 
contrast to a mindless foolishness.  Zeno’s definition is both revision and evolution; 
temperance loses its connection to self-control, limit, and metron – prominent ideas in 
Plato and Aristotle – but becomes more closely coupled to the concept of moral 
choice, which Aristotle assigned to virtue in general.
295
  North calls this a ‘genuine 
innovation’, which echoed ‘earlier ways of looking at the virtue (especially ways 
attributed to Socrates), but emphasizing an aspect that had never before been so 
prominent.’296  This account of temperance will remain foundational through the end 
of the Old Stoa.
297
 
Subsequent work in this period is more adjustment than overhaul.  Cleanthes, 
in his Physical Treatises, describes the internal tension which may become ‘strength 
and might’; when developed, this tension is called self-control (enkrateia) when 
dealing with matters requiring persistence, and called temperance (sōphrosynē) when 
facing matters of choice and avoidance (OSSC, 1034C-E).  Cleanthes makes more 
explicit the nature of phronēsis as a meta-virtue, removing it from the tetrad of 
cardinal virtues and adding enkrateia in its place (SVF I.563).  The appearance within 
the tetrad of two virtues concerned with control and mastery shows the importance of 
this family of virtues to the attainment of apatheia, and thus to the attainment of 
eudaimonia.  Ariston follows Zeno when he defines temperance as phronēsis in 
choosing the good and avoiding evil (SVF I.374); again, this is its fundamental 
definition in the Old Stoa.  However, Ariston also names temperance as that which 
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controls desire and brings the pursuit of pleasure under the rule of the hegemonikon 
(SVF I.375), which echoes its previous Platonic and Aristotelian interpretations.
298
  
Chrysippus makes three significant modifications in his treatment of virtue, 
both generally and regarding temperance.  The first is the Socratic identification of 
virtue with epistēmē and technē, rather than phronēsis.  This leads to two definitions 
of temperance, which emphasize the intellectual and moral dimensions of the virtue 
respectively.  Theoretically, temperance is epistēmē in matters of choice and 
avoidance (SVF 3.262); practically, temperance stabilizes the impulses in order not to 
conflict with the ruling reason (SVF 3.280).  ‘Temperance,’ says Stobaeus, ‘has as its 
own principal task to render the impulses stable and to oversee them’ (Ecl. 2.7.5b5).  
The second change is the quasi-Aristotelian description of temperance as a ‘hexis in 
matters of choice and avoidance, which preserves the judgments of reason’ (SVF 
3.274, 3.275).  The first part of this definition echoes Aristotle’s designation of 
general virtue as hexis in matters of choice (Eth.Nic. 1106b36); the second recalls 
Aristotle’s assertion that temperance ‘preserves wisdom’ (sōzei tēn phronēsin) 
(Eth.Nic. 114013).  His third modification is assigning each virtue a group of 
secondary characteristics, possibly trying to categorize popular morality within formal 
Stoic ethics.
299
 Those appended to temperance include self-restraint (enkrateia), 
proper arrangement (eutaxia), shamefulness (aidēmosynē), and orderliness 
(kosmiotēs) (SVF 3.264).  In this list, Chrysippus ‘subordinates’ to temperance two of 
the three main Platonic glosses for the virtue – self-control and order.  North observes 
that ‘the persistent alliance of kosmiotēs and sōphrosynē finds a new expression in a 
Stoic doctrine recorded by Diogenes Laertius (7.100).  The four species of the 
beautiful are the just, the brave, the orderly (kosmion), and the wise.’  This list 
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emphasizes Chrysippus’ definition of temperance as the stabilization of the hormae, 
as all the secondaries are concerned with regulation and control.  Thus, he lays the 
foundation for the thought of the Middle Stoa, which will make the hormae a point of 
practical ethical engagement.
300
  However, the most prominent and enduring feature 
of temperance for the Old Stoa remains its relationship to choice and avoidance.  
  
3.2.4.2 The Middle Stoa 
After Chrysippus, Stoics ethics yields some of its intellectual rigor and strict moral 
code.  The two leaders of the middle Stoa, Panaetius and Posidonius, show an almost 
Platonic or Aristotelian openness to three things: the presence of an irrational 
component of the soul, the possibility of growth in the life of virtue, and the necessity 
of the indifferents in achieving eudaimonia, which they saw as necessary correctives 
to what they perceived as errors in Chrysippus’ overly rational psychology.301  
Panaetius’ most innovative position is the location of virtue in the impulses (hormae) 
themselves (Off. 1.4.11-14), an unimaginable position for the early Stoa.
302
  Thus, 
temperance loses connection with choice and avoidance and becomes more closely 
associated with pleasure and the impulses.  This, in turn, revives the traditional notion 
of temperance as control of the passions.   
Panaetius further defines temperance as the natural desire for decorum, order, 
and ‘due measure’ (Off. 1.4.11-14).  Annas sees this as ‘an aesthetic as well as a 
psychological drive’, which aligns itself to temperance through the hegemony of 
reason.
303
  He makes another connection to classical temperance in his emphasis upon 
virtue arising from the nature appropriate to each individual; we are ‘to stick closely 
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to the characteristics peculiar to us, so long as they are not flawed’ (Off. 1.30.110-11).  
This observance of the individual contains echoes of both the Aristotelian ‘mean 
relative to us’ and the Platonic ‘Know Thyself.’  While this does not specifically 
mention temperance, the connection between virtue and self-knowledge has 
reappeared. 
Panaetius here emphasizes the concept of to prepon – style or social decorum 
– whereby the control of the appetites is present, but as an aesthetic rather than moral 
function.
304
  To prepon is the external manifestation of the fine, originating in the 
Peripatetic discussions of rhetoric.  Following from individual nature (Off. 1.30.110-
11), it connotes appropriateness and propriety and indicates a socially mediated type 
of behavior in civilized society.  Its Latin equivalent decorum (Off. 1.27.93-94) is tied 
to self-control, temperance, the subjection of the passions, and moderation; as such, it 
‘gives a polish to life’ (Off. 1.27.93).  The focus upon phronēsis in choice is 
supplanted by a renewed interest in symmetry, harmony, and order; however, this is 
order as prepon, not as kosmos as seen in the internal harmony of Plato’s Republic.  
Whereas Panaetius acknowledged the moral possibilities inherent in the 
impulses and passions, Posidonius, in point of fact, both acknowledges the existence 
of irrational faculties within the soul and restores the passions to them.  Temperance 
becomes, once again, the virtue of the irrational appetite, submitting it to reason as 
described by Aristotle and Plato.
305
  Thus, in the middle Stoa, choice and avoidance 
have been replaced by decorum, order, measure, and the restraint of appetite. 
  
 
 
                                                 
304
 North, 222. 
305
 North notes that the word sōphrosynē does not appear in the extant Fragments of Posidonius (224 
n.80). 
121 
 
3.2.4.3 The Roman Stoa 
Under the Roman Stoa, temperance undergoes particularly important developments.  
It continues to be understood as restraint of the appetites, which is not surprisingly 
given that the Roman Stoa are quite concerned with the practical aspects of virtue.  
Arius Didymus defines temperance as ‘health of the soul’, which ‘rids us from the 
excess of emotions’ (124, 5.3).306  He then connects it, by analogy, to wealth: ‘For 
wealth takes care of most mistakes (we make), as well as health takes care of bodily 
disorders and temperance of excessive emotions’ (125, 5.5).  Musonius shows a 
particular affinity for temperance (perhaps due to his high opinion of simplicity) and 
emphasizes its aspects of frugality and self-control (enkrateia).
307
  His claims that it is 
preferable to actually be self-controlled and temperate than to possess correct 
knowledge about them illustrate his high regard for these nuances of temperance.
308
  
However, it was Cicero who made the most important and most enduring changes to 
the virtue of temperance. 
 
3.2.5 Cicero – From Sōphrosynē to Temperantia 
This section considers four issues regarding Cicero and temperance: his philosophical 
position and particular philosophical task; his definitions of the concept of 
temperance, the cardinal virtue (sōphrosynē); his translations of sōphrosynē and 
associated terms; and his legacy in the journey of temperance. 
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3.2.5.1 Cicero’s Philosophical Task and Position 
Ethics is of primary importance for Cicero, who believes that among the various 
branches of philosophy, only ethics can both engage the meaning of various truth 
claims and explore the practical import of these claims.
309
  Moreover, Cicero had a 
‘strong yet elastic commitment’ to the Stoic school of philosophy and draws very 
heavily from Stoicism in his ethical treatises.
310
  Cicero, like the other Roman Stoics, 
defines virtue (honestum in the Latin) as living in accord with reasoned nature (Fin. 
3.3.10-14),
311
 and he adheres to the Stoic position that virtue is sufficient for 
happiness (Disp. 3.17.37).  He advocates a radical extirpation of the irrational 
judgments of pathē, rejecting utterly the Peripatetic notion of metriopatheia (Disp. 
3.6.13-3.10.21).  He also explores the traditional understandings of the cardinal 
virtues, including temperance.  
Yet while Cicero engages Hellenic and Hellenistic philosophies and their 
central concepts, he struggles throughout to assimilate these virtues with the Roman 
catalogue of virtuous activity (the virtus Romana).  His task was not the rote 
transmission of Greek philosophy; rather, he worked to both evaluate and 
communicate their core wisdom in a manner that could be integrated into the extant 
ethos of Rome.
312
  Cicero was the first Roman to propound a reasoned defense of 
philosophy to a community lacking an indigenous tradition of speculative thought; 
and this task of ‘interpretation and reformulation’ is perhaps Cicero’s chief 
contribution to the heritage of philosophy.
313
  Nowhere is this task as complicated as 
in his treatment of temperance, as North observes, ‘Of all the forms of Greek aretē, 
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sōphrosynē proved the most difficult to assimilate to the virtus Romana.  In its origins 
– social and political, as well as temperamental – it was entirely foreign to Rome.’314  
This paper will now consider Cicero’s attempts to render sōphrosynē both 
comprehensible and palatable to his audience, and the lasting effect of these attempts 
upon the virtue of temperance.  As stated above, these attempts fall into two distinct 
yet interrelated categories: his definitions of the virtue and his Latin translations of 
the Greek sōphrosynē.  These will now be considered, beginning with the definitions 
of the virtue. 
  
3.2.5.2 Cicero’s Definitions of Temperance 
Cicero offers several definitions of temperance throughout his corpus.  His early work 
de Inventione reflects the Stoic designation of pathē as errors of judgment, calling 
temperance ‘the form and well-regulated (moderata) dominion of reason over lust and 
other improper affections of the mind’ (Inv. 2.54).315  Its parts are called continence 
(continentia), clemency (clementia), and modesty (modestia), a list which both echoes 
Chrysippus and foreshadows Aquinas (albeit indirectly).  Temperance and the other 
cardinal virtues ‘are to be sought for themselves, even if no advantage is to be 
acquired by them’ (2.54), thus affirming the Stoic valuation of virtue for its own sake.  
His opening definition is straightforward and largely unsurprising.  
Temperance receives a broader treatment in Cicero’s later works, starting with 
his treatise on the emotions, the Tusculan Disputations.  Here temperance still 
includes the regulation of emotion by reason: It ‘allays the cravings and causes them 
to obey right reason, and maintains the well-considered judgments of the mind’ (Disp. 
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4.9.22); it prevents ‘transports of immoderate eagerness’ (Disp. 5.14.42).  Simply put, 
it is the ‘governance of all our feelings and agitations’ (Disp. 5.14.178) and is thus 
considered as the health of the mind, ‘when its judgments and opinions are not at 
variance with one another’ (Disp. 4.13.139).  To this definition, Cicero adds the 
restraint of lust (Disp. 3.17; 5.14.42), which recalls both its Platonic and Aristotelian 
glosses.
316
  Moreover, temperance acts a center of moral stability, preventing 
shameful or depraved actions (Disp. 3.36) and preserving a ‘decent steadiness 
(moderata constantia) in everything’ (Disp. 3.17).  Governance of emotions, restraint 
of lust, avoidance of shame, and preservation of moderation: this is a surprisingly 
Peripatetic lineup. 
In de Finibus, temperance is explicitly defined as ‘the control (moderatio) of 
the appetites in obedience to the reason’ (Fin. 2.60), thus reinforcing the primary 
existing meaning.  It is also temperance ‘that warns us to be guided by reason in what 
we desire and avoid’ (Fin. 1.47), a move that recalls the primary definition of the Old 
Stoa.  Temperance receives a slightly more positive gloss in this work, as Cicero 
maintains that temperance is desirable ‘not because it renounces pleasures, but 
because it procures greater pleasures’ (Fin. 1.48).  This work is also important 
because it is Cicero’s first mention of order and harmony in connection with 
temperance.  Temperance ‘bestows peace of mind, and soothes the heart with a 
tranquilizing sense of harmony’ (Fin. 1.47).  Moreover, it is connected to the principle 
of order and moderation, which Cicero calls ‘beauty in the moral sphere of speech and 
conduct’ (Fin. 2.47).  These are small but significant references to the positive side of 
temperance.  However, his parting remarks on the subject are more negative and less 
surprising: temperance is, ‘in a word’, ‘modesty, restraint, and chastity’ (Fin. 2.73). 
                                                 
316
 See Rep. IV 430-431; Eth.Nic. III.10-12. 
125 
 
De Officiis is considered by many to be Cicero’s most influential ethical 
treatise, and it is perhaps his only work that considers temperance to be of primary 
importance to the Roman public morality.
317
  Its treatment of temperance opens with 
some innovation, connecting the virtue to order and, for the first time for Cicero, to 
‘due measure’ (Off. 1.4.14); by these both words and deeds will ‘reflect an underlying 
moderation and self-control’ (Off. 1.5.15).318  Although this passage does not 
specifically name temperance as such, it clearly addresses the cardinal virtues as the 
sources of ‘all that is honourable’ (Off. 1.5.15).  Here Cicero connects temperance 
with humanitas, the particularly human nature, as only humans crave beauty, 
consistency, and order (Off. 1.4.14).   
In its next appearance, which also addresses the components of the 
honourable, temperance receives no official name; but within it ‘we discern modesty, 
temperance (the jewel, so to say, which embellishes life), moderation, total cessation 
of mental disturbances, and due limit in all things’ (Off. 1.27.93).  Temperance is also 
connected here with decorum (‘the fitting’), one of Cicero’s favorite philosophical 
and rhetorical virtues; indeed, it contains ‘the very essence of decorum’ (Off. 
1.28.100).  Temperance still retains the role of conforming appetite to reason, 
allowing them neither to run ahead nor lag behind, steering clear of rashness and 
carelessness, and always following a praiseworthy motive (Off. 1.28.101).  
Temperance serves tranquility of soul, strength of character, and self-control; through 
it we observe due limits (Off. 1.29.102).  Instead of surrendering to excess, luxury, 
and greed, temperance leads to thrift, self-control, austerity, and sobriety (Off. 
1.30.106).   
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 Thus, the primarily negative connotations attributed by Cicero to temperance 
include the control of affections and appetites by reason, the restraint of lust, the 
avoidance of shameful actions, and a general modesty, chastity, and self-control.  The 
primarily positive connotations include the preservation of internal steadiness, the 
procurement of the ‘greater’ pleasures, order and beauty in one’s speech and conduct, 
and internal peace and harmony.  However, the actual definitions given by Cicero are 
only one part of the equation; what will now be considered are the various Latin 
translations of  sōphrosynē which Cicero employs, for these choices have a significant 
impact on the journey of this virtue. 
 
3.2.5.3 Cicero’s Translations of Sōphrosynē and Associated Terms 
The Roman Stoa, among others, undertook a particular linguistic task when they 
brought Greek philosophy to Rome, as the Greek language possessed a substantial 
number of technical philosophical terms with no exact Latin equivalents; and they 
struggled to find points of connection that were philosophically sound.  Cicero was 
not starting from scratch, as numerous and variable translations were present in 
popular usage before systematic philosophical exchange began.
319
  He employs 
various terms, valuable yet incomplete, in his translations of sōphrosynē.  Many of 
these emphasize the Roman sentiment towards propriety and reserve; some examples 
include pudicitia (‘chastity’), sobrius (‘sobriety’), castus/castitas (‘chastity, chaste’), 
and verecundia (‘shamefulness, modesty, reserve’).320  Another subordinate, 
continentia (‘self-control’), may be associated more directly with classical Greek 
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morality, as it generally translates enkrateia.
321
  On one occasion it is subordinated to 
temperantia, as that 'by which cupidity is kept down under the superior influence of 
wisdom’ (Inv. 2.54).  Although temperantia and continentia generally translate 
sōphrosynē and enkrateia, respectively, the two terms were often considered 
synonymous.
322
  This conflation proves important in later generations; Augustine, 
among others, makes the terms almost interchangeable.
323
   
While these terms connect sōphrosynē directly to the virtus Romana, Cicero 
nevertheless employs others with greater frequency, perhaps because they more 
clearly reflect the full intent of the original.  Although there are no exact translations 
of sōphrosynē, two primary word families emerge: temperare and modus.324  Perhaps 
his most common choice, temperare has several semantic domains:
325
 
 to observe proper measure, be moderate, restrain oneself 
 to forbear, abstain, refrain 
 to mingle in due proportion, combine suitably, compound properly 
 to qualify, to temper (e.g. a tempered blade) 
 to rule, regulate, govern, manage, arrange, order 
 
Cicero employs many of these connotations in his renderings of sōphrosynē.  While 
some contain material commonly associated with the Greek virtue, the concept of 
‘mixing’ imbues the virtue with fresh meaning.326  This meaning is represented by the 
image of pouring water into wine, intensifying the connotation of moderation or 
restraint.  This image of dilution is unfortunate, as it results in the loss of a dynamic 
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aspect of the virtue’s function.  Within this etymological family, temperantia is the 
most common, and is in fact Cicero’s first translation of sōphrosynē (Inv. 2.54).327   
The other primary word family for sōphrosynē in Cicero’s work is modus 
(‘limit’).328  Within this family, Cicero primarily uses modestia (‘modesty’) and 
moderatio (‘moderation’).  Cicero defines modestia as ‘that feeling by which 
honourable shame (pudor honesti) acquires a valuable and lasting authority’ (Inv. 
2.54); its connotations include unassuming conduct, modesty, discretion, 
shamefulness, sense of honor, and correctness of conduct.  Cicero uses moderatio 
more commonly as a direct translation of sōphrosynē, and at times he connects it 
directly to virtue itself (Inv. 2.53).  Its associations include guidance, government, 
regulation, and self-control; along with temperantia, it conveyed the essence of Latin 
temperance, the restraint and governance of passion, appetite, and desire.  
Furthermore, its connection to modestia emphasizes its restrictive undertones.  In 
reality, both temperare and modus, as utilized by Cicero, are typified by their negative 
facets.     
The most notable characteristic of the group as a whole is their emphasis 
on the negative aspects of sōphrosynē, the repression of appetites and 
desires.  Either in etymology (sobrius, castus) or in meaning (temperans, 
moderans, continens), these terms imply restriction or denial.  It was 
much easier to grasp the negative than the positive significance of 
sōphrosynē, just as it was easier to assimilate the concept in a fragmentary 
way than to embrace its totality.
329
 
 
However, both terms can be given a more positive meaning.  Modus possesses a 
semantic richness not adequately conveyed by Cicero’s use of modestia and 
moderatio: 
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 measure, extent, quantity 
 proper measure, due measure 
 measure, rhythm, melody, harmony,  
 way, manner, mode, method 
 
This interpretation gains support when read alongside the associated terms ordo 
(‘order’) and modus (‘measured limit’) in Cicero’s later works (cf. Off. 1.5.15).  These 
associations become even more interesting when one considers the domain of tempus 
(‘time’), another cognate of temperare.  Symbolized by an image of an hourglass, it 
connotes: 
 portion of time, period, season, interval 
 occasion, opportunity, leisure 
 appointed time, fit season, right occasion, proper period, opportunity 
 
These words give a sense of proportion, cooperation, and timing.  This sense is 
strengthened by adding some lesser-known glosses of temperantia: ‘combine suitably, 
compound properly, temper as a blade.’  Taken together, they suggest a mode or 
manner of living which incorporates all things in due course, a collaboration of 
disparate parts based in rhythm and revealed in harmony.  In his study of world 
harmony, Leo Spitzer offers a different and quite compelling read of temperare as 
something wherein the Greek ideals of order and measure imbue all of life, from the 
exalted to the mundane.
330
  ‘Accordingly,’ he continues, ‘temperare would mean an 
intervention at the right time and in the right measure, by a wise (sōphron) 
“moderator” who adjusts, adapts, mixes, alternatively softens or hardens.’331  This is a 
much richer understanding of the movements of temperance.  These nuances, if 
recovered, could enrich the substance of temperance and open new avenues for an 
understanding of the virtue.  
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3.2.5.4 Cicero’s Legacy 
Cicero engages a task which is triply difficult: examining an ethical ideal quite 
foreign to Rome, attempting to reconcile it to a virtue of his own, and constrained in 
his choices of the representative terms.  Seen this way, it is unsurprising that Cicero 
should admit, decades after first using temperantia in De Inventione, that there still 
existed no precise translation of sōphrosynē.332  Yet Cicero is largely successful in his 
task; North correctly identifies calls him as ‘the key figure in the naturalization of 
sōphrosynē.’333  In all fairness, Cicero makes solid choices in utilizing temperantia 
and moderatio; they convey central aspects of the character and intent of sōphrosynē.  
However, had he chosen to emphasize the aspects of temperare and modus that 
connote measure, proportion, and harmony, he could have enlarged and dynamized 
the scope and import of the virtue as it was received by the Church Fathers.
334
 
 
3.2.6 Particularities of Stoic Temperance 
The Stoic treatment of temperance both maintained and diverged from earlier 
accounts; many of the previous connections are present, but none are indiscriminately 
adopted.  One vital contribution is the reintroduction of the tetrad of cardinal virtues, 
through which temperance would always retain something of its classical identity and 
meaning.
335
   With the early Stoa, temperance governs the realm of choice and 
avoidance, calling to mind the knowledge of good and evil in the Charmides.  The 
Stoics return to the concept of virtue as knowledge, although the type of knowledge 
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changed between thinkers; the Socratic epistēmē is eschewed by Zeno in favor of 
phronēsis (although Chrysippus does return to epistēmē).  Also, Panaetius’ emphasis 
upon natura propria nostra echoes both the Delphic admonition to self-knowledge 
the nature of the Aristotelian mean as relative to the agent.   
One clear continuation within the tradition is the aspect of self-control, which 
is elevated to a new level in Stoic ethics.  Enkrateia both appears as a virtue 
subordinate to temperance and is elevated to the canon of the cardinal virtues.
336
  And 
with Cicero and the Latinization of the concept, temperantia and continentia (the 
usual translation of enkrateia) become, at times, virtually interchangeable, a startling 
alteration from the Aristotelian distinction of the two concepts.  While the Stoics do 
not find merit in self-control qua self-control, their insistence upon the complete 
suppression of the passions awards it an increased importance.  Moreover, under their 
doctrines of instantaneous virtue and total apatheia, there is no continuum between 
temperance, continence, incontinence, and intemperance, as there is for Aristotle.  
Regarding apatheia, a related point is the role of temperance in control of the 
appetites, with its arena of control expanded to include all passions and appetites.  The 
Stoics held varying attitudes towards appetites and desires, from moderation to full 
suppression.  But whatever the particular view, passion must always be controlled by 
sōphrosynē. 
Other areas display significant divergence from the classical history, one of the 
most significant being the shift from metriopatheia to apatheia.  The early and middle 
Stoa allow no equivocating; apatheia is required for virtue, and thus for happiness.  
This is a significant departure from the Aristotelian position of metriopatheia, and one 
                                                 
336
 Annas notes that the Stoics ‘define enkrateia as a subdivision of the virtue of sōphrosynē (Arius 
60.21, 61.11-12) and so do not explicitly set it up against virtue as a whole.  But they recognize, and try 
to account for, the distinction as a matter of common sense; see Plutarch, Virt. mor. 445 b-d, 446 c’ (53 
n.13). 
132 
 
not always maintained by Cicero; he claims that ‘if someone should be found who 
sets some value upon sensual gratification, he must keep it strictly within the limits of 
moderate (modum) indulgence’ (Off. 1.30.106).  However, the spirit, if not the form, 
of the radical nature of apatheia will be passed on to the patristic writers, informing 
their views on sexual pleasure.   
Interestingly, and problematically, the relationship between temperance and 
order is far from uniform.  The early Stoics perceive no direct connection between the 
two ideas, as their cosmic order arises from something larger than the kosmos 
associated with temperance.
337
  Moreover, both to prepon and its Latin rendering 
decorum have an aesthetic factor tied to fulfilling the expectations of others, which is 
a vastly different type of order than the harmonious order of kosmos or the early Stoic 
cosmological emphasis on life according to nature.  In an ironic note, Aristotle 
indicates that to prepon lends itself to credibility, if not to truthfulness (Rhet. III.7.4).  
Aesthetics now matter more than more ‘traditional’ morality, with Cicero’s focus 
upon approbatio and the ‘outward aspects of sōphrosynē’ (Off. 1.28.98).  ‘Order’ is 
now determined, not by conformance to cosmic or religious forms, but rather by the 
social expectations arising from ‘civil’ society.  Therefore, any appeals to morality 
arising from something metaphysical are subsumed within sociological guidelines.  
Furthermore, there need not be any continuity between the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ 
person; one may be conflicted internally, as long as the external self confirms to 
decorum.  This is not a positive development for the moral agent, as it (as Aristotle 
noted) may sacrifice truthfulness for credibility. 
Finally, temperance survived its rather tumultuous journey into the Latin 
language and culture.  Cicero’s depiction and transmission of the virtue heretofore 
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known as sōphrosynē resulted in an entirely new set of terms – temperantia, 
moderatio, continentia, abstinentia, castitas – which deeply took root in moral 
discourse, as they are largely the same terms – temperance, moderation, continence, 
abstinence, chastity – found in contemporary English usage.   
  
3.2.7 Conclusions on Stoic Temperance 
Temperance is invaluable in realizing the Stoic telos of living according to perfect 
reason, untouched by the errors of the passions; it is the virtue ‘most immediately 
associated with achieving the summum bonum.’
338
  In Rome, it served the function of 
restraining the avaricious desires which were so offensive to the decorum expected of 
the Roman citizen.  As temperance left Athens and entered Rome, as sōphrosynē 
became temperantia, it acquired new meanings which impact conversations on 
temperance to the present day.  Thus, the virtue inherited by the early Christian 
thinkers was significantly altered.  Temperantia, and the Stoicism which bred it, 
would have a decided impact on the Church Fathers, alongside Neoplatonism and the 
particular moral concerns of the emerging Christian religion. 
 
3.3 Conclusions on Classical Temperance 
In summary, the Platonic account of temperance underwent changes in both sphere of 
influence and internal content as it was handled by Aristotle and the Stoics.  Its central 
action is to constrain the appetites shared with other animals, both in their natural and 
peculiar manifestations.  Its presence is indicated by the presence of appropriate 
pleasure in the satisfaction of appetites, and by the absence of pain at the absence of 
their satisfaction.  Through these actions, it preserves the practical wisdom necessary 
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for the realization of virtue, a role particular to this virtue.  Temperance is also 
accurately and helpfully distinguished from continence by the presence or absence of 
harmony between desire and decision.  Therefore, while the explicit gloss of 
temperance as harmony does not appear in the same form as appears with Platonic 
temperance, its presence is seen both in the parallels between Eth.Nic. III.12 and Rep. 
IV, and also in the distinction between temperance and continence.  Another of 
Aristotle’s significant contributions is radically circumscribing its sphere of action, as 
part of his effort to distinguish each virtue from the others.  While temperance in 
many ways does lose status under Aristotle, it simultaneously (and paradoxically) 
occupies an especially high position as the underpinning of the doctrine of the mean.  
However, this connection is legitimately problematic, as temperance becomes 
unhelpfully associated with moderation and medial responses.  Hints do remain of its 
broader significance in Aristotle’s treatment of the ‘unnamed virtue’ connected to 
megalopsychia.  Most notable among these is the possibility of temperance signaling 
some sort of humility in its possessor, as indicated by the presence of a proper self-
knowledge of one’s social location and its attendant honors, however moderate.    
 Temperance regains much of its broader import under the Stoics, particularly 
the early Stoa, as the particular manifestation of phronēsis in the arena of choice, and 
also via the reestablishment of the tetrad of cardinal virtues.  Temperance is the 
‘health of the soul’ and is wisdom in matters of choice.  The addition of enkrateia to 
the tetrad after the extraction and elevation of phronēsis underscores the importance 
of the regulatory function of these virtues to the Stoic moral life.  While Stoic ethics is 
rooted in a materialistic cosmology, it is not until the Middle Stoa, via Panaetius, that 
temperance regains its association with order, although as decorum instead of kosmos.  
However, temperance undergoes its most important Hellenistic change in the Latin 
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translations for sōphrosynē utilized and popularized by Cicero, with temperantia the 
most common and certainly the most lasting.  I have argued that this development is 
generally unhelpful, as the core concept of temperantia transmitted (as opposed to 
possessed) is the idea of mixing, with an emphasis upon dilution; note the familiar 
image of diluting wine with water.  Had the dominant glosses involved time or a more 
dynamic image of ‘mixing’ (as opposed to ‘dilution’), the concept of temperantia 
bequeathed to the following philosophical and theological traditions might have 
possessed a more bracing content, contributing more than mere images of weakening 
(such as the weakening of wine by water).  Similarly, had modus been more often 
employed as ‘modulation’ and ‘measure’, rather than as ‘modesty’ and ‘moderation’, 
the unhelpful connotation of a bland mediocrity might have been avoided.  This 
usage, combined with the doctrine of moderation arising from the doctrine of the 
mean, establishes a legacy of middling mediocrity which will plague the virtue 
throughout its subsequent history.   
 Temperance, at the conclusion of the classical period, is a cardinal virtue 
primarily identified with control of the appetites and a general moderation.  It now 
must find its footing within an entirely different worldview, that of early Christianity. 
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Chapter Four 
 
The Intersection of Traditions: 
Augustinian and Thomistic Temperance  
 
 
The previous two chapters explored the virtue of temperance in the thought of the 
three main schools of classical thought: Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics.  These schools 
of philosophy remained prominent conversation partners in Rome and the ancient 
Near East, with Cicero, Seneca, Philo, Plotinus, Porphyry, Varro and others 
continuing the transmission of the ethics of eudaimonia and virtue.  This study 
resumes after a three hundred year hiatus, and a new partner has entered the 
conversation: the Christian religion.  Consequently, the next two chapters examine the 
journey of temperance through historical Christian moral theology, first in the 
Patristic and mediaeval periods, and then after the pivotal event of the Reformation.  
The Reformation not only divided the Church into Protestant and Catholic; it also 
decisively changed the way Christian moral theology appropriated the virtue tradition.  
Chapter four engages Augustine and Aquinas, while chapter five examines the 
thought of John Calvin and John Wesley.   
 
4.1 Early Christian Moral Reflection 
As Christianity entered the dialogues of the late classical world, particularly the Latin 
West, it found itself engaging the same issues and topics as its ‘pagan’ neighbors.  
Christianity was in constant conversation, either directly or indirectly, with its 
classical heritage.  Yet the arrival of Christianity brought a new conversation partner 
to moral philosophy, namely the canon of scripture with its particular (and 
particularistic) ethos of Jesus and the Old and New Testaments.  The intersection of 
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these new elements with classical moral philosophy set the stage for the moral 
theology of Augustine and Aquinas. 
From the beginning, Christianity contained its own form of moral thinking, 
complete with new vocabulary, new paradigms, and a new telos.  It prioritized a new 
set of norms, such as faith, righteousness, discipleship, and love.
339
  The humility of 
the kenotic Christ was in stark contrast to the honor of Aristotle’s megalopsychos.  
The cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance were supplanted 
by the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love (1 Cor. 13.13).  Yet the Christian 
Church was also birthed into a world suffused with the Hellenistic culture, resulting in 
a complicated relationship between the two groups. On the one hand, the early 
apologists and patristic authors freely utilized the language of the philosophies of the 
day, especially Stoicism and Epicureanism.  Moreover, many of them were still 
impressed with the classical educations they had received and were comfortable 
working within the classical categories.   
However, the first centuries of Christianity also saw a multi-fronted attempt to 
distinguish itself from its pagan neighbors, and temperance becomes a key player in 
this endeavor.  The patristics particularly appreciated the connection between 
temperantia, purity, virginity, and sexual abstinence, seeking to appropriate 
temperance as a distinctively Christian virtue.
340
  Thus begins the association of 
temperance with its more ascetical characteristics, specifically chastity.
341
  Augustine 
may certainly be located within this moral trend, applauding (though not always 
embracing) the ‘ascetic preference’ for the practice and doctrines of continence and 
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the difference between the ‘lower and higher morality’ of the church in that day.342  
Thus, both his philosophy and his lifestyle suggest a fruitful discussion of the 
Augustinian treatments of continence and temperance.  
 
4.2 Augustinian Temperance and Continence 
Although Augustine is not primarily known for his attention to the cardinal virtues 
and eudaimonism, he did in fact engage them in a somewhat systematic and 
continuous manner.  And within the tetrad of prudence, justice, temperance, and 
fortitude, none received more attention, nor established so deep a connection with the 
man himself, as the virtues of temperance and continence.  His early works On the 
Happy Life, On the Morals of the Catholic Church and On Free Will, his classic 
Confessions, and his later works On Continence and City of God show the depth and 
breadth of his treatment of the concept.  Moreover, they demonstrate how temperance 
and continence were deeply foundational virtues within Augustine’s moral thought, 
participating in his own conversion and affecting numerous aspects of Christian 
conversion and sanctification.  While they retain their importance in his other late 
works, his conceptual shifts result in their being presented in less classically 
philosophical ways.   
 
4.2.1 Philosophical and Theological Location 
Discussing Augustine’s ethics is problematic, as he never produced a formal 
systematization of his ethical thought.
343
  For Augustine, ethics is a central element in 
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all his theological enterprise, incorporated throughout his treatises and reflections.
344
  
This would later be true of many Christian moral theologians, with the exception of 
Aquinas.  Although not highly systematized, Augustine’s thought is nonetheless quite 
innovative, managing to incorporate various moral sources, both Greek and Roman, in 
a cohesive and innovative manner which both reflected their influence and moved 
beyond it, giving voice to ideas which had been circulating, in nebulous form, through 
the minds of his contemporaries.
345
 
 
4.2.1.1 Location Within the Classical Tradition 
Like other young men of his class and station, Augustine received an education rich in 
the philosophies of the day.  His earliest influences included Cicero and Varro, the 
Latin curators of the Stoic response to Aristotle.  The earliest and most significant was 
reading Cicero’s Hortensius, which he admired on both stylistic and substantive 
grounds.
346
  Through it, Augustine was stirred ‘to love wisdom itself, whatever it 
might be, and to search for it, pursue it, hold it, and embrace it firmly’ (sol. 
1.10.17).
347
  Stoicism and Neoplatonism are both present in his writings, although the 
respective importance and the interactions between the two schools of thought can be 
viewed in various ways. Two points are generally agreed upon.  First, Stoicism 
provided Augustine with a foundation and with categories for a lifetime of ethical 
contemplation; from it he obtained an interest in happiness and the end of man, 
resulting in a lifelong eudaimonism.
348
  He also incorporated the Stoic ideals of virtue 
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and the assuredness of true happiness.  Second, through the writings of Plotinus and 
Porphyry (via the sermons of Ambrose), he was introduced to Neoplatonism; here 
Augustine discovered the idea of an ascent to the transcendent Good, which he 
viewed as the metaphysical foundation of the Stoic interrelationship of self-
sufficiency, virtue, and happiness as found in wisdom.
349
  These two ingredients – 
Stoic virtue and Neoplatonic ascent to the Good – are the earliest and most classical 
components of Augustine’s ethical thought. 
 
4.2.1.2 Location within the Christian Tradition 
Augustine comes to the Christian faith by a circuitous route.  Raised by a Christian 
mother, he received a characteristically classical education which ignited in him the 
study of philosophy, although he remained a participant of the Catholic Church.  His 
commitment to wisdom and the prevalent image of Christ as ‘the Wisdom of God’ (s. 
279, 7) led him to peruse the Bible, which he found both aesthetically unappealing 
and encumbered with gory narrative.  He was soon drawn to Manichaeism, which 
combined his favorite elements of philosophical rigor with the ‘name of Christ’; nine 
years later, his growing disillusionment with Manichaeism led him into a brief 
identification with Skepticism, then to Neoplatonism.  However, the critical 
connection was his growing relationship with Ambrose, the bishop of Milan, who was 
both a Catholic and able to intellectually engage the younger Augustine.  Ambrose’s 
willingness to bring Neoplatonism and Scripture into conversation had a lasting 
impact on the young theologian.   
These factors, plus pressure from Monica, his mother and a devout Catholic, 
acted in concert to effect Augustine’s radical conversion to Catholic Christianity in 
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386 (which for him and others was strongly shaped by Neoplatonism and classical 
philosophy).  Augustine was drawn to the contemplative, monastic possibilities of the 
life of faith, the desire ‘to be at leisure and see that you are God’ (conf. 9.2.4).  His 
exposure to the informal monastic communities in Rome led him to establish a lay 
community: the Servi Dei, or ‘Servants of God’, existing within an informal 
relationship with the Catholic Church.  Here he resided happy for over two years until 
being forcibly conscripted as bishop of Hippo, a post he occupied until his death. 
 
4.2.1.3 Style of Writing 
Accordingly, for all of Augustine’s philosophical abilities, his written works are often 
formulated as a response to issues that are primarily ecclesiological or doctrinal.  His 
language and style are therefore somewhat malleable, oriented to the needs of the 
homiletic and educational tasks at hand.  While not a systematic theologian in the 
mode of Aquinas, Augustine did possess a coherent and integrated architectonic, 
which may be seen most fully in his comprehensive City of God.
350
  However, he 
employed this architectonic as the situation and topic demanded, more closely 
resembling a ‘call and response’ model than any sort of philosophical prearrangement.  
Furthermore, both the architectonic and its implementation developed and matured 
over the course of his career.
351
  Thus, his fluidity of thought and flexibility of 
emphasis complicate both Augustine’s patterns of ethical thought and his ‘position’ 
on particular ethical issues.   
With classical philosophy taking a stronger role in Augustine’s early works 
than in the later works, it bears asking whether there is sufficient continuity within his 
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thought to make examination of his early works worthwhile.  Some scholars argue for 
a continuity of thought between the ‘young’ and ‘old’ Augustine; others describe 
Augustine’s thought in On the Morals of the Catholic Church and On Free Will as ‘a 
set course’ and ‘first principles’ of his life’s work.352  This is not to say that his 
thought underwent no development or maturation; his later work shows a clearer 
distinction from Hellenistic thought and less dependence upon intellectual elitism.
353
  
However, a careful reading should identify certain themes throughout his corpus.   
 
4.2.2 Foundations of Augustinian Ethics 
Augustine bases his ethical thought upon two sets of premises, one philosophical and 
one theological.  Philosophically, he operates on two basic assumptions.  First, he 
holds, in various forms, the Stoic belief that virtue is necessary to realize true 
happiness, which should not be subject to the vagaries of fortune.  Second, he sees the 
Christian journey as something akin to the Neoplatonic ascent of the soul to a 
transcendent Good.  Theologically, he amends these classical doctrines in the 
following manner.  First, God is the source of the ordered world and is the proper 
subject of awe and worship.  Second, humanity falls short of the Creator’s intentions 
and stands in need of redemption; this is a direct rejection of the Stoic ideal of 
virtuous self-sufficiency.  Third, although God Himself transcends both time and 
history, He has acted within both, particularly and conclusively in the person of Jesus 
and through the ongoing work of the Spirit.   It is upon these foundations that 
Augustine builds his moral thought, which he expands in the following ways. 
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4.2.2.1 Teleological Eudaimonism 
Like the classical philosophers, Augustine begins his ethical speculations in the 
framework of teleological eudaimonism, asking about happiness and the proper end 
for humans to pursue.  This end Augustine calls the summum bonum, our ‘chief 
good.’  As he prepares to consider the proper ends of humanity, Augustine asks the 
question: ‘What is man?  Is he both of these, body and soul? Or is he the body only, 
or the soul only?’ (mor. 4.6).  Augustine elects not to answer the question outright, 
but he does take a stand on where our chief good is located: ‘For whether the name 
man belongs to both, or only to the soul, what is the chief good either of both soul and 
body, or of the soul only, that is man’s chief good’ (mor. 4.6).  For Augustine, 
happiness occurs ‘when that which is man’s chief good is both loved and possessed’ 
(mor. 3.4).  He stipulates two conditions for this chief good, that it is ‘superior to 
man’ and ‘can be possessed by the man who loves it’ (mor. 3.5).  Furthermore, and in 
agreement with the Stoics, it must be something which cannot be lost against the will 
(mor. 3.5).  And ultimately, what cannot be lost against the will can only come from 
God, as ‘God alone remains’ (mor. 6.10).  Stated more clearly, God is the perfection 
of all our good things and our perfect good (mor. 8.13, 11.18).   
Central to Augustine’s eudaimonism is the relationship between what is to be 
enjoyed and valued for its own sake (frui) and what is merely to be utilized to achieve 
this end (uti); this echoes Cicero’s analysis of the honestum and the utile in De 
Officiis.  Only God, and the enjoyment of him, should be pursued for its own sake; all 
other goods should be utilized in service of this one proper end.  This is not merely a 
reflection of the ‘early,’ Platonic Augustine; many years later, he maintains, ‘If I were 
to ask you why you became Christians, every man will answer truly, “For the sake of 
happiness”’ (s. 150.4).  For Augustine, ‘following after God is the desire of 
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happiness,’ and that ‘to reach God is happiness itself.’  He continues, ‘We follow after 
God by loving Him’ (mor. 11.18).  Later in the work, he states that to ‘have in view to 
reach eternal life,’ one must love God with all one’s heart, soul, and mind (mor. 
25.47).  And what is the function of this happiness, our summum bonum?  It is that by 
which the soul is perfected, ‘in following which the soul comes to the perfection of 
good of which it is capable in its own kind’ (mor. 5.7).  This perfection Augustine 
later calls sanctification (mor. 13.22).  Thus, for Augustine, to seek happiness is, 
simultaneously: to pursue one’s chief good, to follow after God, to love God, to seek 
eternal life, and to be sanctified.  Augustine was to retain his eudaimonistic 
orientation throughout his career.
354
 
 
4.2.2.2 God as Divine Order 
Order (ordo) is one of the cornerstones of Augustine’s theology.355  In his early 
works, Augustine locates the basis of divine order in Reason: ‘Man finds a happy and 
peaceful life when all his impulses agree with reason and truth’ (ord. 1.9.27).  Yet 
order, for Augustine, is always divine in its origins; in the Confessions he names God 
as that ‘from whom is every mode, every species, every order; from whom are 
measure, number, weight; from whom is everything which has an existence in nature, 
of whatever kind it be (conf. 5.11).   
Augustine identifies order with measure and mode, a significant classical 
echo; indeed, he consistently connects measure (modus), form (species), and order 
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(ordo).
356
  This connection is not limited to his early, ‘philosophical’ works, but 
extends throughout his corpus. In On the Nature of the Good, he calls these three 
things ‘universal goods’ that exist in ‘all things made by God’ (nat. b. 3); if they were 
consistently observed, ‘there would be no evil’ (nat. b 37).  And even the heavenly 
city sees order as the foundation from which all creation proceeds. 
His beginning, then, is the handiwork of God; for there is no nature, even 
among the least, and lowest, and last of the beasts, which was not the 
work of Him from whom has proceeded all measure, all form, all order, 
without which nothing can be planned or conceived. (ciu. 11.15)
357
 
 
While order is concerned with hierarchy and proper regulation, Augustine makes a 
further – and positive – connection between order and harmony (concordia).  In the 
City of God, Augustine locates the ‘peace of the body’ in ‘the duly proportioned 
arrangement of its parts’ (ciu. 19.13).  He then locates the peace of both the rational 
and irrational souls in a state of harmony, ‘the harmony of knowledge and action’ and 
‘the harmonious repose of the appetites’, respectively (ciu. 19.13).  Peacefulness, or 
blessedness (beatitude), occurs in every sphere – bodily, familial, political, and 
spiritual – when harmonious order is present: ‘The peace of all things is the tranquility 
of order.  Order is the distribution which allots things equal and unequal, each to its 
own place’ (ciu. 19.13).  This ‘allotment of place’ sounds quite Platonic, echoing both 
the definition of temperance in the Republic and the definition of justice in Rep. IV.
358
  
However, to both recognize and acknowledge humanity’s place in the divine order 
requires the third particularity of Augustinian moral theology, humility.
359
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4.2.2.3 The Centrality of Humility 
Augustinian humility has a christological foundation: ‘This way of humility comes 
from another source; it comes from Christ… what else did he teach but humility?’ 
(en. Ps. 31.2.18).
360
  Christ is the standard (norma) of our humility, and we are to 
learn from him (s. 68.11).  Augustine’s praise of humility is an important distinction, 
as his primary criticism of pagan morality was its self-reliance; indeed, the two cities 
of The City of God were contrasted by pride and humility.
361
  The Stoic emphasis 
upon self-achievement was at stark odds with Augustine’s belief in human depravity: 
‘Everywhere are to be found excellent precepts concerning morals and discipline, but 
this humility is not to be found’ (en. Ps. 31.2.18).  Augustine describes the way of 
‘seizing and holding the truth’ in the most straightforward terms: ‘The first is 
humility, the second is humility and the third is humility …if humility does not 
precede, accompany and follow all our good undertakings… pride will tear all good 
from our hands’ (ep. 118.22).  Thus, humility acts as something of a meta-virtue for 
Augustine, strengthening and supporting all further movement into righteousness.
362
 
Humility also rightly orders humanity to God, as they recognize their status as 
sinful creatures: ‘Know what you are, know yourself as weak, know yourself as a 
man, know yourself as a sinner’ (s. 137.44).  Pride is a rejection of divine order, a 
‘disorderly love of one’s own excellence.’363  Because humility requires recognition 
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of one’s place in the divine order, it necessarily arises from truthful self-knowledge.364  
At one level, this self-knowledge is concerned with one’s personal sinfulness.  In the 
garden at Milan, he was ‘set face to face’ with himself and made to confront the 
ugliness within (conf. 8.7.16).  Yet on a larger level, Augustine’s convictions on 
humility are a result of his acceptance of man’s place in the divine order.  His 
sermons and writings are replete with reminders of man’s mortal condition: ‘Man, 
man, notice that you are just a man’ (s. 341A.2).  ‘Remember,’ he writes, ‘you are 
mortal and clothed in decaying flesh’ (en. Ps. 38, 39).  As sinners, our true self-
knowledge is only possible when we are enlightened by God, ‘“like noonday” before 
your face’ (conf. 10.5.7).  It comes from within: ‘Go not outside yourself, but return 
within yourself, for truth resides in the inner part of man’ (beata u., 39.72). 
This is not an abject humiliation, but an understanding of humanity’s complete 
reliance upon the grace of God: ‘You are not being told, “Be something less than you 
are.” But “Understand what you are.  Understand that you’re weak, understand that 
you are merely human, understand that you are a sinner’ (s. 137.4).365  Augustinian 
humility has been described as a mean between hubris and acedia: ‘But just as we 
must hold to the path between fire and water so that we are neither burned nor 
drowned, so we ought to steer our journey between the peak of pride and the 
whirlpool of indolence’ (ep. I, ‘Letter 48,’ 192).366   
Like order, humility is connected with moderation and limit.  In his 
Confessions, Augustine admires the humble, almost Socratic self-knowledge 
displayed by the Manichaean bishop Faustus as they discuss difficult matters: 
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For he was aware that he had no knowledge of these things, and was not 
ashamed to confess it …And for that I was even more pleased with him, 
for more beautiful is the modesty of an ingenuous mind than the 
acquisition of the knowledge I desired, – and such I found him to be in all 
the more abstruse and subtle questions. (conf. 5.7.12) 
 
As the word ‘modesty’ translates temperantia, Augustine characterizes an ingenuous 
mind – honest, candid, direct, and sincere – as temperate, which is more pleasing to 
Augustine than knowledge attained in arrogance.  Moreover, the phrase ‘of an 
ingenuous mind’ translates the Latin confitentis animi, which Henry Chadwick’s 
interestingly renders as ‘that admits limitations.’  Thus, the temperate mind 
recognizes and accepts its restrictions.  This reflects an interesting connection to the 
work as a whole, as confiteor is the root verb of confessiones. That is, only an 
ingenuous and temperate mind is capable of writing confessions, rendering it more 
beautiful than the mind focused solely upon the gathering of knowledge.
367
  Thus, 
through divine order and grounded in humility, one journeys towards the blessedness 
that is the human telos, a journey which involves the work of virtue.   
   
4.2.3 The Complicated Relationship between Augustine and Virtue 
Augustine has a complicated relationship with the idea of virtue.  At first glance, it 
might seem that he alters his position several times in the course of his career.
368
  
However, a careful reading across his various works reveals development and nuance, 
but not outright rejection, of his early ideas.  For Augustine, virtue originates in the 
classical virtue of perfected reason and develops into ordered love: and while it is 
distinguished from pagan virtue, it is never truly a splendid vice.   
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4.2.3.1 Virtue as Perfect Reason 
Augustine’s early works most frequently display a classical understanding of virtue.  
On the Happy Life echoes the primarily Stoic themes of moderation, restraint of 
desire, and inner moderation, wherein virtue is identified with the ‘measure of the 
soul’ (beata u. 4.32).369  Such moderation is both wisdom and happiness, because 
wisdom derives from the Truth which is God (beata u. 4.34).
370
  Virtue enables the 
soul to rule better and more honorably (mor. 5.8) and is ‘leading us to a happy life’ 
(mor. 15.25).  As ‘the perfect reason of man’, it enables the understanding and 
enjoyment of God (diu. qu. 30.2).  It is, in short, ‘a mental disposition consistent with 
reason and nature’ (diu. qu. 31.1).  It is a ‘splendid wealth’ and a ‘stronghold’ (lib. 
arb. 1.11).  Interestingly, he attributes virtue to those persons who love and value their 
own rational will (lib. arb. 1.13).   
On the Freedom of the Will connects virtue more directly with the Stoic 
concepts of ‘right reason’ as that which cannot be wrongly used (lib. arb. 1.12, 2.18), 
a point noticeably affirmed in the Retractions (retr. 1.9.6).  The virtues are ‘both true 
and unchangeable’ and are present to those whose mind can employ reason to 
approach them (lib. arb. 2.10).  They are ‘great goods’ that come only from God’s 
abundant generosity and goodness.  Like right reason, they cannot be wrongly used 
because their essential function is to make the right use of things (lib. arb. 2.19).
371
  
Calling virtue ‘the disposition of a soul that cleaves to the unchangeable good’ (lib. 
arb. 2.19) locates him squarely within the classical tradition.
372
  Through virtue, the 
soul ‘chastens’ the body, bringing it into proper order until the day when it encounters 
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heaven, which is ‘perfect order’ (lib. arb. 3.20).373  Augustine makes an interesting 
move from action to cognition in the Soliloquies, calling virtue ‘that right and perfect 
looking, which is followed by seeing’ (sol. 1.6.13).374   
Thus, the early Augustine makes use of reason in a manner which he neither 
entirely supports, nor entirely rejects, in the development of his work.  Although the 
early Augustine appears comfortable with these classical concepts of happiness and 
virtue, he does not leave them where they are.  In On the Morals of the Catholic 
Church, Augustine provides a clear and quite innovative definition of virtue, which he 
holds ‘to be nothing else than the perfect love of God’ (mor. 15.25).   
 
4.2.3.2 Virtue as Ordered Love 
In the historical journey of virtue, Augustine’s primary (and groundbreaking) 
contribution is that all virtues are forms of love for God, ‘the chief good, the highest 
wisdom, the perfect harmony’ (mor. 15.22).375  This definition bears a family 
resemblance to classical virtue, particularly virtue as forms of epistēmē or phronēsis.  
Yet it covers striking new ground, as reason is no longer the content or form of the 
virtues.  Augustine characterizes the difference in this way: reason is ‘the gaze of the 
soul’ (sol. 1.6.13), while love is ‘the hand of the soul’ (s. 125.7).   
Consider a man's love: think of it as, so to say, the hand of the soul.  If it 
is holding anything, it cannot hold anything else. But that it may be able 
to hold what it is given to it, it must leave go what it holds already. This I 
say, see how expressly I say it; ‘Whoever loves the world cannot love 
God; he has his hand engaged.’ (s. 125.7)376 
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Using language reminiscent of Aristotle’s Physics, Augustine will later name love as 
the weight of the human soul, that which directs the movements of body and soul 
towards the object of that love.  ‘My weight,’ he says, ‘is my love… by it I am drawn 
towards that which I desire’ (conf. 13.9.10).377  Love, desire, and delight work as a 
triad, as we desire to fulfill that which delights us and inspires our love.
378
   And 
moving ahead from On the Morals of the Catholic Church, Augustine introduces yet 
another key component of virtue-as-ordered-love in On Free Will, where the power of 
the will determines ‘what each one chooses to pursue and embrace’ (lib. arb. 
1.16.34).
379
 
Because the will can pursue what it chooses, the moral issue becomes the 
proper direction of one’s love.  ‘Are you told not to love anything?’ he asks.  ‘Not at 
all!  If you are to love nothing, you will be lifeless, dead, detestable, miserable.  Love, 
but be careful what you love’ (en. Ps. 31.2).  Virtue, therefore, is nothing more or less 
than loving rightly.  Recognizing and identifying the object of our love is terribly 
important, Recognizing and identifying the object of our love is terribly important, as 
it is never inactive but is always propelling its possessor towards some objective.
380
  
Thus, human love must be ordered, reflecting the divine order and aligned towards 
the summum bonum.
381
  Augustine keeps this ‘brief but true’ definition of virtue 
throughout his life, even into his vision of the heavenly city (ciu. 15.22).  Our love is 
rightly ordered when it loves God for himself ‘and not another thing in His stead… 
that which, when we love it, makes us live well and virtuously’ (ciu. 15.22).  
Augustine parses this ordering as the distinction between uti and frui; God alone is to 
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be loved, and everything else is useful when ordered to the love of God.  Thus, love 
itself is not enough; it must be properly ordered if it to reflect true virtue.   
For Augustine, love and virtue intersect at sanctification, as ‘when sanctified 
we burn with full and perfect love’ (mor. 13.22).   Through love, the mind is returned 
to God, and we are conformed to God (mor. 12.21, 13.22).  This is only possible 
because Christ is virtue’s exemplar; becoming conformed to God means ‘that we 
should be conformed to the image of His Son’ (mor. 13.22).  Christ is ‘the virtue of 
God, and the wisdom of God’ (mor. 13.22, 16.27).  To attain virtue is to become 
sanctified, and to become Christ-like (mor. 13.22).  Virtue, therefore, is a love rightly 
ordered, looking only towards God and conforming the bearer to the image of Christ. 
  
4.2.3.3 Virtue as Splendid Vice 
This discussion of virtue now considers Augustine’s oft-cited condemnation of the 
‘splendid vices’ of the pagans, arising chiefly from his comments on Roman virtue in 
book XIX of City of God.
382
  It is important to note that pagan virtue is what first 
drew Augustine towards the study of philosophy.  He does not believe that wisdom – 
pagan or otherwise – should be discarded without cause: ‘But let every good and true 
Christian understand that wherever truth may be found, it belongs to his Master 
(doctr. chr. 18.28).  However, apart from God, pagan virtue ‘is as deceitful as it is 
proud’ (ciu. 19.5). He regards Roman morality as ‘pressing towards the goal of 
possession – namely, to glory, honor, and power’ (ciu. 5.12; see also 14.28).  For 
although the pagan mind and soul appear to rule well over the body and its vices, their 
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hegemony is inherently flawed, as without God they are ‘prostituted to the corrupting 
influences of the most vicious demons’: 
It is for this reason that the virtues which it seems to itself to possess, and 
by which it restrains the body and the vices that it may obtain and keep 
what it desires, are rather vices than virtues so long as there is no 
reference to God in the matter. For although some suppose that virtues 
which have a reference only to themselves, and are desired only on their 
own account, are yet true and genuine virtues, the fact is that even then 
they are inflated with pride, and are therefore to be reckoned vices rather 
than virtues. (ciu. 19.25) 
 
Augustine sees two primary things that distinguish ‘true virtue’ from its pagan 
counterparts: ‘true piety’ and a right understanding of the ‘final happiness’ of 
humanity (ciu. 19.5).  He freely states that the ‘virtues of this life’ are ‘certainly its 
best and most useful possessions’ (ciu. 19.5).383  The centrality of piety is evident in 
Augustine’s categorization of human righteousness as consisting ‘rather in the 
remission of sins than in the perfecting of virtues’ (ciu. 19.27).  
Moreover, this righteousness is ultimately found only in Christ.  From pagan 
virtue, which is ‘necessary and useful in this valley of weeping’ (en. Ps. 87.11), the 
believer shall ‘mount unto that other virtue’ which he describes as ‘the virtue of the 
contemplation of God alone’, which is ultimately an encounter with both as Christ, 
‘the one Virtue.’  Thus, ‘they shall go from virtue to virtue’ (en. Ps. 87.11).  Whereas 
pagan virtue aims towards perfection or excellence – a human achievement based 
upon effort and rationality – true Augustinian virtue aims not for perfection but for the 
goodness of a life redeemed by Christ.
384
  And unlike classical philosophers, 
Augustine views the ‘habit’ of virtue as problematic, not productive.  It is ‘the 
unregenerate past, the weight which conversion would lift from the convert’s 
shoulders.’385 
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Thus, in the absence of God, pagan virtue is always vulnerable to pagan 
superbia.  Augustine continually emphasizes that true virtue is the gift of God, and 
belongs to no one unless God grants it (cont. 1).  Moreover, it is bound up with true 
piety arising from an informed humility: ‘Without true religion or the right worship of 
the true God, no one can have true virtue, and that no virtue motivated by human 
glory can be true’ (ciu. 5.19).386  This nuanced, rather complicated understanding of 
Augustinian virtue sets the stage for his treatment of temperance. 
 
4.2.4 Augustinian Temperance 
Despite his qualifications of ‘pagan virtue,’ Augustine makes use of the cardinal 
virtues in a variety of settings.  They are the qualities that ‘comprise the art of living’ 
(trin. 15.6.10); Augustine calls them the ‘four rivers of Paradise, which ‘signifies the 
life of the blessed’ (ciu. 13.21).  Through them, the rational soul ‘makes war upon 
error and the other inborn vices, and conquers them by fixing its desires upon no other 
object than the supreme and unchangeable Good’ (ciu. 22.24).  Among the four 
cardinal virtues, temperance holds a special interest for Augustine, both conceptually 
and experientially, and his treatment of it displays both continuity and innovation. 
 
4.2.4.1 Classical Echoes – Temperance as Measure and Restraint 
Augustine’s treatment of temperance contains two echoes of its classical treatment.  
The first, present largely in his early works and overlapping with Augustine’s earliest 
thoughts on virtue in general, centers on the concepts of moderation and just measure 
(beata u. 4.33).
387
  In one sense, this is a surprisingly Aristotelian notion of virtue, 
which Aristotle defined as a mean between two extremes (Eth.Nic. 1103b21).  It also 
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echoes Cicero, who sought an equivalent to frugalitas (‘the mother of all virtues’) 
among the Greek virtues and settled on moderation and temperance (beata u. 4.31, 
citing Disp. 3.8.16).
388
  With temperance derived from ‘harmonious balance’ 
[temperies] and moderation derived from ‘limit’ [modus], the emphasis is upon the 
plentitude that lies between neediness and abundance (beata u. 4.32, brackets in the 
original).  Here Augustine ties temperance to its Platonic roots as an intellectual 
virtue; the ‘limit of the mind’ is wisdom, which is the opposite of folly (beata u. 
4.32).  Augustine thus gives more specific content to his earlier assertion that 
happiness comes from observing a proper limit, which he calls ‘a moderation of the 
mind’ (beata u. 1.11).   
 The second classical echo, which is present throughout his corpus, is the 
definition of temperance as restraint of desires.  Named as a fruit of the Spirit (ep. 
28.9, bapt. 1.17.26), it is ‘the disposition that checks and restrains the desire for things 
that it is wicked to desire’ (lib. arb. 1.13).  It opposes drunkenness and luxury (en. Ps. 
89.6) and is the ‘emancipation from the thralldom of self-indulgence’ (ep. 144.2).  It 
is the ‘girding of the loins’ by which one ‘departs from evil’ (s. 58.2).  Augustine says 
that temperance is the particular weapon in man’s ‘perpetual war with vices’ that are 
‘within us’; it ‘bridles carnal lusts, and prevents them from winning the contest of the 
spirit to wicked deeds,’ wherein the flesh and the spirit war against each other (ciu. 
19.4).  While there will never be complete victory in this present life, temperance will, 
at least, help us ‘to preserve the soul from succumbing and yielding to the flesh that 
lusts against it, and to refuse our consent to the perpetration of sin’ (ciu. 19.4).  
For Augustine, the sphere of temperance is much broader than the physical 
appetites and extends to ‘carnality, curiosity, and conceit’ (trin. 12).  However, 
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temperance is concerned with all desires, even those that are based in God’s good 
creation.  The ‘honest use’ of peace, prosperity, and plenty is equated with 
temperance, moderation, and sobriety, as opposed to ‘running riot in an endless 
variety of sottish pleasures’ (ciu. 1.30).  Even the marriage bed must be regulated, as 
‘wantonness in regard to wives is intemperance’ (doctr. chr. 3.18.27, 3.19.28).  And 
despite its overtly negative gloss, Augustine roots this conception of temperance in a 
positive goal.  Temperance removes us from the ‘inordinate love of sensual pleasures’ 
and ‘attaches us to objects more lovely in their spirituality, and more delectable by 
their incorruptibility’ (ciu. 12.8).  It enables the soul to ‘draw away from the love of 
an inferior beauty’ and return to God, who is ‘its stability and support.’  Thus, it may 
pursue the ‘larger beauty’ that is the contemplation of God’ (mus. 6.15.50).   
While these classical models are important, Augustine pioneers an even more 
positive conception of temperance, predicated on his reformulation of virtue as perfect 
love for God.    
 
4.2.4.2 Temperance as Incorrupt Love 
In On the Morals of the Catholic Church, Augustine defines temperance as ‘love 
giving itself entirely to that which is loved,’ as love ‘keeping itself entire and 
incorrupt for God’ (mor. 15.25).  The promise of temperance is ‘a kind of integrity 
and incorruption in the love by which we are united to God’ (mor. 19.35).  The office 
of temperance ‘is in restraining and quieting the passions which make us pant for the 
things which turn us away from the laws of God and from the enjoyment of His 
goodness’ (mor. 19.35).  And the ‘whole duty’ of temperance is ‘to put off the old 
man, and to be renewed in God’ (mor. 19.36).  In a move away from Aristotle, the 
sphere of temperance, while paradigmatically seen as the physical desires for food, 
157 
 
drink, and sexual pleasure, extends beyond these to the entirety of the human person.  
Augustine includes ‘popular renown’ and ‘the knowledge of things’ or 
‘inquisitiveness’ in the realm of temperance.  ‘The soul, then,’ says Augustine, ‘which 
purposes to keep itself chaste for God must refrain from the desire of vain knowledge 
like this.  For the desire usually produces delusion, so that the soul thinks that nothing 
exists but what is material’ (mor. 21.38).   
Temperance affects our relationships and alignment with both temporal and 
eternal goods.  Material things such as food and drink are indeed created by God, but 
are properly to be subject to us, not us to them.  Augustine again makes the distinction 
between frui, that which should be loved, which is ‘God alone,’ and uti, ‘all sensible 
things which are to be despised yet used as this life requires’ (mor. 20.37).  This right 
rule involves a dispassionate response to their allure: ‘The man, then, who is 
temperate in such mortal and transient things has his rule of life confirmed by both 
Testaments, that he should love none of these things, nor think them desirable for 
their own sakes, but should use them as far as is required for the purposes and duties 
of life, with the moderation of an employer instead of the ardor of a lover’ (mor. 
21.39).  This formulation of temperance takes an interesting stand both on the 
Aristotelian view of virtue as moderation and the Stoic ideal of suppression of the 
passions.  The cardinal virtues are all ‘forms of an intemperate love for God.’389  One 
should approach all ‘sensible things’ with moderation, but only because one’s ardor is 
already directed towards God, the summum bonum.
390
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4.2.4.3 Conclusions on Temperance 
It is worth asking whether Augustine explicitly identifies temperance with virtue’s 
‘perpetual war with vices’ (ciu. 19.4).  However, the evil of consenting to sin, against 
which it wars, will not be ‘removed from this life’ by temperance (ciu. 19.4).  Thus, 
Augustine’s temperance sounds more like Aristotelian continence than Aristotelian 
temperance, in that internal struggle remains.   
In De Moribus, Augustine concludes the section on temperance with these 
comments, ‘These remarks on temperance are few in proportion to the greatness of 
the theme, but perhaps too many in view of the task on hand’ (mor. 21.39).  Like 
Plato, and unlike Aristotle, Augustine connected deeply with the varieties of meaning 
available to temperance.
391
  This is unsurprising, given the correspondence between 
the spheres of temperance and his particular struggles.
392
  What begins in On the 
Morals of the Catholic Church as one of four cardinal virtues is evolving into a 
foundational aspect of Augustine’s moral theology and soteriology. Yet as Augustine 
deals with both philosophical and ecclesiastical matters in his thought and writings, he 
often works with multiple, somewhat overlapping categories.  One example of this is 
the relationship of temperance to continence, its subordinate (in a classically 
philosophical sense).    
 
4.2.5 Continence in Augustine’s Moral Theology 
In the early patristic period, ‘continence’ generally signified the abstention from 
sexual activity, even between married persons.  With roots in classical philosophy, it 
was regarded as a hallmark of the devoted Christian life, one of the primary ways 
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devout believers distinguished themselves from their pagan neighbors.  Thus, it is no 
surprise that Augustine’s understanding of continence begins here. 
 
4.2.5.1 Continence as Lifestyle and Practice 
Upon reading the Hortensius, Augustine felt an immediate attraction to the Stoic 
recommendation to sexual continence, not least because of its ambivalent attitude 
towards the body.
393
  While his relationship with his concubine was physically 
rewarding (and while the emotional component was, by all accounts, equally 
satisfying), Augustine’s ‘conversion to philosophy’ left him internally divided.394  
Other influences, such as vestiges of Manichaeism and the tradition of the continent 
‘sage,’ added to his inner turmoil.395  It was here that he uttered the famous entreaty, 
‘Grant me continence, but not yet’ (conf. 7.16).   
This idea of continence as limited to sexual renunciation appears only twice in 
On the Morals of the Catholic Church, where it, along with abstinence, appears to 
denote the lifestyle choices that accompany the life of faith.  Augustine contrasts the 
‘abstinence’ of the Manicheans with what he calls the ‘customs and notable 
continence of perfect Christians, who have thought it right not only to praise but also 
to practice the height of chastity’ and later calls ‘absolute continence’ (mor. 31.65) 
and ‘abstinence and continence’ (mor. 31.66).  However, he hastens to add that while 
this ‘notable continence’ of the anchorites and cenobites is to be commended, it does 
not eclipse that of the Catholic clergy, ‘whose virtue seems to me more admirable and 
more worthy of commendation on account of the greater difficulty of preserving it 
amidst the manifold varieties of men, and in this life of turmoil!’ (mor. 32.69). This 
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sentiment is echoed in On the Good of Marriage, where he states, ‘Total abstinence is 
easier than perfect moderation’ (b. coniug. 21). 
 Augustine does not hold long to the narrow definition of continence as sexual 
abstinence.  His conversion experience breaks through this restricted meaning and 
places continence in an entirely new light. 
 
4.2.5.2 Continence as Conversion and Pivot 
In recalling his conversion in Confessions VIII, Augustine is clearly suffering, torn 
between his desire for God and his desire for sexual activity.  ‘Grant me chastity and 
continence,’ implored Augustine, ‘but not yet.  For I was afraid lest You should hear 
me soon, and soon deliver me from the disease of concupiscence, which I desired to 
have satisfied rather than extinguished (conf. 8.7.17).’  He then describes the approach 
of a beautiful, chaste woman ‘whose very name was Lady Continence,’ and whom he 
was invited to hold in a ‘chaste embrace’ (conf. 8.11.27).  Continence herself is 
present, ‘not barren, but a fruitful mother of children of joys, by You, O Lord, her 
Husband’ (conf. 8.11.27).  Because she appears in embodied form and greets him as a 
stranger, he realizes that continence cannot come from within: ‘He is addressed by the 
very virtue he lacks, and the form of the address emphasizes his own inability to fill 
the lack himself… He has reached an impasse.’396 
Where to go from this impasse?  Augustine still desires to embrace Lady 
Continence, who then advises the mortification of his ‘earthly, unclean members’ 
(conf. 8.11.27).  Now realizing the significance of this embrace, he finds release from 
his inner turmoil via resignation, an acceptance of the gift of grace which can only 
come from God: ‘You lift up the person whom you fill’ (conf. 8.28.39).  If God 
                                                 
396
 Wetzel, Limits, 151, citing conf. 8.11.27.   
161 
 
wishes for him to live this life, God shall enable him to do so: ‘And my whole hope is 
only in Your exceeding great mercy. Give what You command, and command what 
You will. You impose continence upon us, nevertheless, when I perceived, says one, 
that I could not otherwise obtain her, except God gave her me’ (conf. 10.29.40).  The 
innovation of Book X is that one’s ascent to God now results in an ‘inspired’ 
continence, a striking departure from tradition.  For the Greek Fathers, this order 
would have been reversed; they viewed life as an extended purgation, the continent 
lifestyle would be been the means by which man ascends to God, not the result of this 
ascent.  Thus, Augustine’s view of continence as effect, not cause, of man’s spiritual 
ascent clearly points to the role played by grace and to the nature of a changed life as 
the gift of God.
397
  This occasions what biblical scholars call a pivot, wherein the 
events following the pivotal moment are a radical reversal of the events that precede 
it.  The Augustine departing Book X is not the same man who entered it; Lady 
Continence has enfolded him, and he has submitted. 
The echo of 1 John 2.16 is equally significant, as continence acquires new 
territory: ‘the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life’ (conf. 
10.30.41).  In addressing the trifold lusts of the flesh, the eyes, and the world, 
Augustine takes continence firmly out of isolation in the sexual realm and identifies it 
as a virtue of the entire person – heart and mind, body and soul.  This alteration is 
doubly important: First, continence is rooted in the heart and the mind, not primarily 
in the body; second, it is given to us by God, a gift of grace.  Continence is, therefore, 
central to Augustine’s conversion narrative.398  In a manner similar to Plato’s 
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Charmides, the story reveals in both dialogue and action the potential fullness of the 
role of continence in the life of faith. 
 
4.2.5.3 Continence as Operative Love 
In his treatise On Continence,
399
 Augustine calls continence ‘the virtue of the soul’ 
(cont. 1).  It is, first and foremost, the ‘gift of God’: ‘No one can be continent, unless 
God grant it’ (cont. 1).400  The actions of continence, ‘when it curbs and restrains 
lusts,’ are twofold: it ‘both seeks the good unto the immortality of which we aim, and 
rejects the evil with which in his mortality we contend’ (cont. 6).  Augustine is 
interacting here with Romans 7, where Paul laments that he is unable to align his 
intentions and actions.  And here, as in the Confessions, continence is the virtue not 
only of the flesh, but also of the mouth and the heart; continence ‘must be set there, 
where the conscience even of them who are silent speaks’ (cont. 2).  Continence is 
also the remedy for unbounded pride; it will ‘restrain the proud appetite of man; by 
which he is self-pleased, and unwilling to be found worthy of blame’ (cont. 13).  In 
another echo of Romans, Augustine says that a ‘true’ continence ‘wills not to repress 
some evils by other evils, but to heal all evils by goods’ (cont. 28).401 The language 
also echoes Augustine’s earlier, more ‘philosophical’ treatises.  Continence is 
associated with many of the same classical standards as temperance and virtue in 
general.  Regarding marital sexuality, continence ensures ‘that a measure be 
observed’, for the purpose of ‘moderating, and in a certain way limiting in married 
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persons the lust of the flesh, and ordering in a certain way within fixed limits its 
unquiet and inordinate motion’ (cont. 27).  With the date of this treatise set around 
421, this gives additional support for the seriousness of Augustine’s use of the 
philosophical ideas of moderation, measure, and limit.
402
 
Yet the expansion of the sphere of continence, progressive though it is, does 
not fully reveal its fullest meaning.  Continence is that ‘by which we are gathered 
together and brought back to the One from whom we have dispersed into many 
things’ (conf. 10.29.40).  It is a gathering, a re-membering of the Christian person, 
body and soul, a ‘single-minded and single-hearted devotion to God.’403  This 
restoration has been framed by one scholar in the language of health, with continence 
‘ordered to the positive purpose of healing.’404  Continence is nothing less than the 
‘operative mode of Augustinian caritas.’405  This operative mode contains a ‘deep 
grammar’ the difference between continent clinging and concupiscent grasping.406  
Humans will grasp at lesser goods in order to possess them, but they must cling to 
God, even as he grasps us.  However, we may cling continently to each other: ‘When 
human beings rightly love their neighbors, friends, and fellow Christians in God, 
according to Augustine, they also cling to one another rightly.’407  By clinging 
continently to God and others, the self is restored to a place where it can continue the 
journey to the telos of blessedness.   
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 4.2.5.4 Conclusions on Continence 
Augustine’s treatment of continence, like much of his work, can be perplexing.  It 
refers, almost simultaneously, to a decision on sexual activity, a restraint upon various 
human temptations, and a function of God’s love in the human heart.  Such 
divergence can be difficult to negotiate.  Approaching continence as a virtue – or, as 
Schlabach stated earlier, as an operative mode – serves to bridge the gap between the 
various conceptions, given that a virtue is a fixed disposition issuing in a reliable 
mode of actions.  This provides continence with more interiority than in its present 
conception, while retaining more of a connection to praxis than if it was merely an 
attitude.
408
  Thus, Augustinian continence is neither merely an ascetic practice nor an 
Aristotelian sub-virtue.  It is, rather, the companion of salvation, the guardian of both 
body and soul, and the gift of God.  
 
4.2.6 Particularities of Augustinian Temperance and Continence 
Temperance, for Augustine, is first and foremost the soul keeping itself entire and 
incorrupt for the sake of the love of God.  By reframing virtue in terms of the love of 
God, Augustine gives virtue a positive content that simultaneously acknowledges 
human frailty and orients human efforts to a telos both external to and greater than 
oneself.  This reframing means that temperance, in particular, acquires a positive 
content that mediates its usual negative connotation of restraint.  Even the language of 
limit and restraint has positive overtones: Augustine’s use of est enim temperantia for 
‘admits limitations’ reveals that humility requires a modest and temperate mind, 
which is beautiful precisely because it acknowledges its limitations (conf. 5.7.12).  
With continuing connections to the classical ideas of control of desire, measure, 
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moderation, and limit, temperance regains a place of primacy in Augustine’s moral 
thought that it has lacked since Cicero.  
Augustinian continence is more of an amalgam.  It is a lifestyle, a calling, a 
gift of God, and a virtue.  It is operative, effective, and functional.  It is the means 
whereby the grace of God is activated within the human soul, and the means by which 
human beings reach and maintain their place in the order of God’s world.  The idea of 
continence as functional is an interesting echo of the Aristotelian function argument, 
whereby human beings accomplish the central purpose of their existence qua human 
beings.
409
  As discussed above, the fluidity of Augustine’s thought is reflected in the 
easy interchange of the terms temperance and continence.  Within this fluidity lies the 
correlation of the idea of temperance as a virtue or an internal state and the actual 
practices of continence, abstinence, & chastity, as Augustine calls virtue ‘efficacy in 
action’ (mor. 16.27). 
Augustine appears to treat the concepts of temperance and continence 
somewhat in parallel; his works contain examinations of both, without any systematic 
discussion of how the two are related.  When read against the classical distinction of 
the two, this collapse can be somewhat confusing.  Despite Augustine’s clear 
philosophical abilities, his primary vocation expressed itself in preaching, exegesis, 
and rhetoric.  Although quite capable of analytical philosophy when necessary, he 
tended towards a fluidity of language.
410
  This proves important in his treatment of 
temperance and continence.  On the one hand, Augustine engages temperance more 
systematically in his early works, working with (albeit expanding) the framework of 
the tetrad.  However, as his work progresses, he gives an increasing amount of 
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attention to continence, with temperance fading into the background (although not 
disappearing entirely).  Is Augustine changing his terminology or his ethical position? 
This may be accounted for in several ways.  Given the role that sexual 
struggles played in his conversion, he had an obvious interest in explicating 
continence, as traditionally understood.  Relatedly, although he was not a monk in the 
still-developing classical sense, he was also in the monastic tradition (even while 
pastoring, bishoping, and otherwise involving himself in ‘worldly’ matters) in which 
sexual abstinence played a role that modern interpreters, for various anti-puritanical 
reasons, probably downplay.  Finally, the Pelagian controversy, for better or worse, 
gave Augustine rhetorical reasons to talk far more about continence than temperance, 
inasmuch as the controversy led him into debates over original sin as inherited from 
Adam and Eve, with sexual transmission as the link in the human generational chain.  
There is no hard evidence, on either side, to assume there is any substantive difference 
between the two, although ‘continence’ appears to have a wider application than 
‘temperance’ throughout his corpus.  Additionally, the terms temperantia and 
continentia were often used synonymously in moral discourse.
411
  Thus, his conflation 
of the terms temperance and continence, while somewhat jarring, is more practical 
than conceptual; at no point in his corpus does Augustine make a substantive 
distinction between them.  And while he does not formally distinguish between the 
tasks of philosophy and theology,
412
 he tends to discuss temperance in a more 
classically ‘philosophical’ sense and continence in a more ‘religious’ context.  
Therefore, the working assumption is that Augustine probably conflates the two terms 
and used them more or less interchangeably. 
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Finally, temperance and continence are special for Augustine in a way that 
supervenes upon the theoretical.  Like the figure of Socrates in the Charmides, who 
must exercise self-control at the sight of the beautiful youth, Augustine’s discussions 
of these virtues are always conducted with them present, enhancing the conversation 
with their silent but obvious presence. 
 
4.2.7 Conclusions on Augustinian Temperance and Continence 
In considering Augustine’s use of and relationships with the virtues of temperance 
and continence, some questions are more easily answered than others.  Some points 
are quite clear: Augustine makes mention, throughout his corpus, of these two virtues.  
He primarily discusses temperance when his mind is considering the more classical 
questions, such as in the early works of On the Happy Life, On the Morals of the 
Catholic Church, and On Free Will, as well as in City of God when he is considering 
the contributions of Varro and others.  That is, he appears to remember temperance 
during his more philosophical moments.  What is also clear is the degree to which 
continence emerges as a wholly foundational virtue for Augustine’s moral theology.  
Present at his conversion, the very result of his ascent to God, and representing a 
singleness of heart and mind in devotion to God – continence loomed large on 
Augustine’s entire theological landscape. 
 Less clear, however, is the relationship between the two terms, and the degree 
to which Augustine himself recognizes their differences, or even concerns himself 
with them.  What is also unclear, in light of his views of the ongoing struggle against 
concupiscentia, is whether temperantia (in the sense derived from sōphrosynē) is even 
a human possibility for Augustine.  Rist observes that classical akrasia appears in 
Augustine’s early thinking, connected to discrete and occasional sins; while the 
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mature Augustine saw humanity’s struggle with concupiscentia, which is ‘all-
pervasive.’413  Yet both akrasia and concupiscentia seem to signify an ongoing 
struggle against the appetites which the Greeks would have found incompatible with 
true temperance or sōphrosynē.  Augustine explicitly identifies temperance with 
virtue’s ‘perpetual war with vices’ (ciu. 19.4).  However, the evil of consenting to sin, 
against which it wars, will not be ‘removed from this life’ by temperance (ciu. 19.4).  
Thus, Augustine’s temperance sounds more like Aristotelian continence than 
Aristotelian temperance, inasmuch as internal struggle remains.  So does Augustine, 
for theological reasons, leave behind the classical category of temperance in favor of 
continence?  Or is the conflation really more practical than theoretical, reflecting his 
tendency towards fluidity of terms?  I am inclined to believe the former, and to state 
that, despite his use of the term, Augustine’s theological anthropology ultimately did 
not allow him to view temperance as a truly functional category, in the way it had 
been for Plato and Aristotle (and would be for Aquinas). 
The question is this: Why bother considering Augustinian temperance and 
continence?  Some commentators consider Augustine far too negative in his views of 
the body and original sin to have anything positive to contribute to a discussion of 
temperance.
414
 However, to confine an examination of Augustine’s views on 
temperance to texts on original sin is to miss the fullness breadth and richness of his 
position.  It is certainly true that Augustine struggled mightily with his sexual 
appetites, particularly in his youth, and this struggle is apparent both in his location of 
original sin and its transmission in the sexual act, and also in his deep connection to 
and explication of the virtue which addresses that struggle.  A recovery of 
Augustine’s ongoing relationship with temperance and continence may serve as a 
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welcome complement to existing emphases on his sexual austerity, and may enable a 
conversation with Augustine that celebrates his wisdom without being taken hostage 
by his particular take on sexual issues.  Instead, his experiences may have yielded an 
additional richness to his thought, perhaps being ‘one of those for whom, in the words 
of Blake, the road of excess led to the palace of wisdom.’415 
Modern sensibilities may view Augustine as radically ascetic.  Yet his 
positions were, in reality, somewhat moderate in nature given his social, cultural, and 
ecclesiological locations.  Moreover, an understanding of the particular context of 
Augustine’s thought is essential.  Paul Ramsey insightfully notes that much of the 
current discomfort with Augustine’s association of sexuality with sin derives from his 
particular (and contemporaneous) view of the core of a human person, what Ramsey 
calls Augustine’s ‘rational voluntarism.’  Twenty-first century moral discourse does 
not hold the same view of the nature and function of rationality; and Ramsey 
maintains that by cogently discerning the current starting point vis-à-vis that of 
Augustine, the conversation will likely become much more fruitful.
416
 
Temperance emerges from its first major treatment within the Christian 
tradition with both classical content and an innovative association with love.  It would 
be almost a millennium before any significant reformulation of the cardinal virtues, 
which happens at the hand of Thomas Aquinas.
417
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4.3 Thomistic Temperance 
Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae is a concert of philosophical and theological 
thought, as strands of classical and Christian traditions, scripture and systematics are 
woven together in a fresh and systematic way.  His treatise on temperance is a good 
example of this interaction, as it draws from many disparate sources in its treatment of 
the topic.  This study will be dealing largely with the questions from the Secunda 
Secundae, qq.141-170, regarding temperance, but will discuss various portions of the 
Summa and other works as necessary. 
 
4.3.1 Theological and Philosophical Bases 
Like Augustine, Aquinas engages a wide array of theological and philosophical 
traditions in his moral theology.  It is true that Augustine reveals more of a Platonic 
and Stoic background while Aquinas displays a more overt Aristotelian influence; 
however, both theologians employ the vast majority of the traditions they inherit.
418
  
Within the works of Aquinas, Augustine and Aristotle are certainly the most common 
‘academic’ sources (with 1,630 and 1,546 citations respectively).  Other regular 
interlocutors include Cicero (often cited as ‘Tully’), Gregory, Ambrose, Pseudo 
Dionysius, and Jerome.
419
  However, scripture is by far the most frequent source of 
citations, totaling more than his citations of Aristotle and Augustine combined.  They 
approached their task in different manners.  As a rule, Augustine does not break his 
conversation into ‘philosophy’ and ‘theology,’ viewing them as two aspects of the 
same task.  For Aquinas, the distinction between ‘philosophy’ and ‘theology’ is 
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sufficiently developed for the broad use of Aristotle to be both deliberate and 
noticeable. 
The moral theology of Aquinas therefore shares characteristics of both the 
classical and Christian traditions.  Like Aristotle and Augustine, Aquinas frames his 
moral theory within a eudemonistic teleology; for Aquinas, the summum bonum is the 
beatitudo of the vision of God. Aquinas structured his moral theology around 
beatitude and virtue as a corrective to the moral methodology of his day, which 
consisted largely of lists of moral duties and lacked a coherent and unifying theme.  
Constructing the moral life around the virtues (with them acting in service to natural 
and supernatural happiness) provided a more comprehensive and intelligible 
foundation than cobbling together disparate elements of existing systems.   
 
4.3.1.1 General and Human Goodness 
For Aquinas, happiness is ‘gaining perfect good’ (I-II.5.1).420  Aquinas sees an 
interdependence of sorts between such concepts as goodness, being, and truth.  And 
much as Aristotle located eudaimonia in perfectly fulfilling our human nature, 
Aquinas locates ‘goodness’ in truthful or perfected being (I.5.3).  But goodness and 
being are not interchangeable, as Aquinas notes, ‘The essence of goodness consists in 
this, that it is in some way desirable’ and ‘things always desire their perfection’ 
(I.5.1).  For Aquinas, to be human is to possess agency, to be the source of one’s 
actions.
421
  This agency does not arise from pure instinct, as it does for other, non-
rational animals, but rather from the distinctly human capacity to rationally perceive 
and pursue the good (I.83.1; I.103.5 ad 2, 3).  The question is, then, what does it mean 
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to perceive the good and act towards it?  To answer this requires gaining an 
understanding of what is truly good for humans, which is an extension of general 
goodness (I-II.1-3).   
Despite human rationality, Aquinas follows Aristotle in recognizing the 
animality also present in human nature.  All animals will seek the good for themselves 
(I.5.4), whether through the workings of instinct or something higher, and human 
rational actions will in some ways correspond to the actions of the non-rational 
animals (I.60.5). Yet what is this goodness of which Aquinas speaks?  As noted 
earlier, Aquinas locates goodness in perfected being, existing as one ought to be 
(I.5.1, 3, 5).  Goodness is not equated with being in a strict sense; rather, goodness is 
being exhibiting a sort of desirability, in that goodness signifies perfection which is 
desirable (I.5.1, 48.1).  For Aquinas, the primary good for all things is its perfection, 
according to its own particular nature (I.5.1, I.6.1, I.60.3, 4).  Echoing Aristotle’s 
function argument (Eth.Nic. 1097b24-27), Aquinas claims that the knowledge of what 
something is can lead us into the apprehension of its particular good. 
 
4.3.1.2 Natural and Supernatural Ends – Eudaimonia and Beatitudio 
While Aquinas shadows both Aristotle and Augustine in his affirmation of a telos, he 
follows Augustine on the nature of that telos.  For Aquinas, man’s ultimate end lies 
outside any natural purview, a position that is ‘theocentrically humanistic.’422  As 
creatures which exist on both the natural and supernatural planes, humans have, 
unlike other animals, both natural and supernatural ends. 
The partial happiness we can hold in this life a man can secure for 
himself, as he can virtue, in the activity of which it consists: we shall 
discuss this later.  But man’s complete happiness, as we have found, 
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consists in the vision of the divine essence, and this is beyond the natural 
stretch of any creature. (I-II.5.5) 
Like Aristotle, Aquinas posits the question, ‘What is happiness?’  That is, what is the 
state of perfection of the human being?  Yet unlike Aristotle, Aquinas sees the 
ultimate end of rational creatures to be supernatural rather than natural.  This 
supernatural end is found in the perception of God, the beatific vision: ‘Final and 
perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence (I-
II.3.5).  This vision is possible because of divine grace, as ‘all knowing according to a 
manner of created thing falls short of seeing what god really is, for the divine 
infinitely surpasses every created nature’ (I-II.5.5).  Yet, it is also related to our 
rationality: ‘Complete happiness requires the mind to come through to the essence 
itself of the first cause.  And so it will have its fulfillment by union with God as its 
object, that in him alone our happiness lies’ (I-II.3.8). This contemplation of the 
divine or divine beatitude is achieved as one participates in the divine life through the 
power of Christ.
423
  This ethic subsumes the important but ultimately secondary issues 
of command and virtue under the headship of a supernatural telos.
424
  However, the 
existence and primacy of supernatural ends does not negate the existence or 
importance of our natural ones.  Aquinas recognizes the presence and role of these 
natural ends for creatures participating in the natural law (I-II.1.8); for him they 
represented an approximate moral telos for rational animals.
425
   
The ultimate point of human moral development, of this pursuit of natural 
ends, is the development of good action.  These good actions both serve and are 
served by the movement of human beings towards their state of perfected being.  The 
question then arises again as to what constitutes natural human perfection.  Aquinas 
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offers us two ways of considering the question.  Proximately, it is the perfection of 
natural human abilities (I-II.5.5, see above); ultimately, it is the attainment of the 
object of human happiness (I-II.3.1).  Thus, human happiness is both the object of our 
action, and the action itself.  It is the practical function of our intellect expressing 
itself in and through our actions (I.79.11).  Unlike other creatures, human beings are 
not guided by instinct in the perception and desiring of what is good.  They must 
constantly evaluate a variety of perceived goods, and will do so successfully only 
when guided by both natural rationality and supernatural grace (I-II.8.1).  And still the 
ultimate good is the contemplation of God in the beatific vision.   
 
4.3.1.3 Grace, Natural Law, and the Exitus-Reditus of the Summa 
Aquinas structures the Summa to reflect the design of exitus-reditus, or ‘procession 
from and return to’ the living God.  In the Prima pars, Aquinas describes the love of 
the creator God as it flows from Him into the created order.  In the Secunda pars, he 
examines the return of all creation to its Creator (through means both natural and 
divine); lastly, he describes in the Tertia pars how this return is accomplished through 
Christ and the sacraments.
426
  Aquinas sees humanity as being fitted, by design, to the 
possibility of achieving these ends: ‘That man has the capacity appears from the fact 
that his mind can apprehend good which is universal and unrestricted and his will can 
desire it.  Therefore he is open to receive it’ (I-II.5.1).   Not only are humans capable 
of seeing God, they can mirror His creativity and intelligence through the attainment 
of their natural ends, fashioning their lives ‘as God creates the world.’427 
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To many Christians, the idea of natural law has ‘an almost Pelagian 
insouciance,’ as if it disregards the devastating effects of the sinful nature.428  Yet 
Aquinas read his theory of natural law through the lens of grace, in such a way that 
each kept its place in the larger picture: ‘Though grace is more powerful than nature, 
nevertheless nature is more essential to man, and therefore more permanent’ (I-II.94.6 
ad 2).  Peter Geach correctly interprets Aquinas in stating that ‘a moral code “freely 
adopted” that ignores the built-in teleologies of human nature can only lead to 
disaster.’429  For Aquinas, nature and grace are functional complements whose 
interaction accounts for both God’s and humanity’s role in the virtuous life.  
However, it is not just natural law which must be infused with grace.  Morals and 
grace are also interrelated, one as the context for the other.  Natural law is indeed 
present in Aquinas’s thinking, but it is wholly submitted, not just to grace, but also to 
virtue.  While the virtues may assist us in fulfilling the requirements of the natural 
law, the larger goal is to be virtuous.   
 
4.3.2 Virtue and the Virtues 
Aquinas’ definition of virtue is multi-faceted, engaging a wide range of both 
philosophical and theological components.430  Aquinas’ typology contains three main 
kinds of virtue: intellectual, moral (also using the designation ‘cardinal’), and 
theological.  He follows Aristotle in his treatment of the intellectual virtues, which 
include ‘wisdom’ (sapientia, Gk. sophia), ‘science’ (scientia, Gk. epistēmē), and 
‘understanding’ (intellectus, Gk. nous). To these he adds the intellectual-moral virtue 
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of ‘prudence’ (prudentia, Gk. phronēsis), as well as the pseudo-intellectual virtue of 
‘art’ (ars, Gk. technē).  In a departure from Aristotle, Aquinas keeps the classical 
tetrad of cardinal virtues (prudentia, iusticia, fortitudio, and temperantia).431  The 
moral virtues Aquinas saw as the perfection of the appetitive powers of the soul (I-
II.50.3).  Justice perfects the rational appetite, also called the will; fortitude perfects 
the irascible appetite, and temperance perfects the concupiscible appetite.  The 
cardinal virtues must be addressed after the intellectual virtues, as the latter are 
required for the proper functioning of the former.  Lastly, he follows theological 
tradition by including the theological virtues of ‘faith’, ‘hope’, and ‘charity’ (fides, 
spes, and caritas), which were essential to bridge the gap between natural and 
supernatural happiness (I-II.62.1).  
 
4.3.2.1 The Thomistic Concept of Virtue 
Following Aristotle, Aquinas calls virtue a good habit (I-II.55.1 sed).  Habits are 
qualities which are ‘difficult to change’ and are related to our actions (I-II.49), 
affecting them in beneficial ways (I-II.55.3).  This resides in the very nature of virtue 
as an ‘operative habit’ (I-II.55.4).  Thus, a habit is something which effects change 
upon the powers of the soul.  These powers are both rational and irrational, and are 
the intellect and the appetitive powers.  The appetitive powers consist of the rational 
appetite, which is the will, and the irrational or sense appetites.  The irrational 
appetites are the concupiscible and the irascible, which lead us towards the pleasant 
and away from the unpleasant, and towards the beneficial and away from the harmful, 
respectively.  Any of these powers may be directed in many ways towards many ends.  
Because not all ends are good, and because not all desires will lead us towards the 
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proper goods, good habits are essential.  Through them, humans can create proper and 
stable dispositions towards good actions and ultimately, to human perfection (I-
II.4.4).  That which perfects these powers Aquinas calls a virtue (I-II.55.1). 
These perfected dispositions are intimately linked to human rationality.  
Closely following Augustine (lib. arb. 2.19), Aquinas defines virtue as ‘a good quality 
of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which 
God works in us, without us’ (I-II.55.4 obj 1).  It is also intimately related to human 
goodness, ‘since it is virtue that makes its subjects good’ (I-II.55.4 obj 1).  In one 
sense Thomistic virtue is ordinal, in that one acts either in conformity to reason 
(virtue) or as a deformity of reason (vice).  However, Aquinas follows Aristotle in 
designating virtue a mean between the two extremes of excess and deficiency (I-
II.64.1 sed).  Because the mean is rational and not ‘real’ (I-II.64.2), it is phronetically 
determined by circumstances; thus, while some actions may appear extreme in their 
practice, they are still virtuous through their adherence to the order of reason.432   
   
4.3.2.2 Attainment of Virtue  
Thomistic virtue is achieved in two different, though complementary, ways.  It may 
be ‘acquired’ through habituation and practice (I-II.63.2); that is, a sustained and 
rationally guided human effort will result in the inculcation of moral virtue.  Virtue 
may also be ‘infused’ through divine action, a gracious gift that supersedes human 
effort (I-II.63.3).  As acquired virtues, they will result in the natural happiness which 
is the perfection of human reason; as infused virtues, they will yield the supernatural 
happiness which is a divine gift (I-II.63.4).  The infused moral virtues are also 
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connected with the theological virtue of charity, ‘since it is through them that man 
performs each different kind of good work’ (I-II.65.3 ad 2, 3).  
Aquinas ordered the virtues by level of importance, following a threefold 
criterion.  First, each virtue may be assessed by the excellence of its source.  Thus, the 
theological virtues were superior to the moral and intellectual virtues due to their 
superior origins, arising as they do as a divine gift and not from mere human 
rationality.  Second, the respective excellence of a particular virtue may be derived 
from the excellence of its object.  That is, justice is a greater virtue than temperance, 
because the object of activity – the common good – is greater than the object of 
temperance, which is the good of the individual (I-II.66.4).  Third, the excellence of a 
virtue may also be determined by the greatness of the subject of its action.  Thus, 
justice is greater than temperance as the will is greater than the concupiscible appetite 
(I-II.66.3 ad 3). 
For Aquinas (as for Aristotle), the moral life consists of more than a series of 
discrete actions aimed at one’s goal, but rather of a sustained course of intentional 
activity that aims for one’s goal in a deliberate manner.  Certain habits are therefore 
necessary for any possibility of a moral life.433  This focus upon virtue is no mere 
transplant from ‘the Philosopher’; rather, it is a central tenet in his entire moral theory, 
acknowledging the means ‘by which we live righteously’ (I-II.55.4).  However, while 
happiness for Aquinas ultimately resides within a beatitude that is promoted through 
supernatural virtue, his ethic is neither passive nor irrelevant. For Aquinas, virtue 
stops short of its goal if it fails to change our actions: ‘Virtue denotes a certain 
perfection of a power… But the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be 
perfect, according as it is determinate to its act’ (I-II.55.1). Aquinas’s moral theory 
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thus avoids drawing a false dichotomy between virtues and rules, character and 
action.434  Indeed, the beauty of Aquinas’s formulation is that the immersion of both 
virtues and actions within an ethic of divine beatitude yields a morality that is 
undeniably positive.435 
 
4.3.3 Thomistic Temperance 
Contained in qq. 141-170 of the Secunda Secundae, Aquinas’ discussion of 
temperance is a broadly Aristotelian treatment containing a variety of philosophical 
and theological sources.  It considers the good and proper use of those objects 
perceived by the senses to be good – namely, the physical pleasures of food, drink, 
and sexual relations, which were the ‘paradigm cases’ of temperance.436  It then 
expands upon Aristotle’s categories to include related concerns, such as the habits 
associated with its proper exercise and its subspecies.  These considerations arise 
from an understanding of two things: the nature of temperance as a virtue, and the 
standard or rule of temperance by which to measure appetitive excellence.   
 
4.3.3.1 Temperance as a Thomistic Virtue 
For Aquinas, temperance draws from both Aristotelian sōphrosynē and Augustinian 
temperantia.  Like the Greek sōphrosynē, temperance is a habit which seeks to locate 
itself in the mean between surfeit and deficiency; it is established in concert with 
prudentia and is reflected in both feeling and action (I-II.59.1). More specifically, it is 
concerned with the natural appetite for objects and experiences of the sensitive nature, 
particularly what promises or provides physical pleasure.  Because those experiences 
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elicit a response from any feeling person (the lack of which would be the vice of 
insensibility), temperance is therefore to be ‘well-moved’ by those things which move 
us.
437
  The subject of the virtue of temperance is the concupiscible appetite; following 
Aristotle, he limits its objects to the pleasures of touch (II-II.141.4 sed).
438
    
Temperance also regulates desire for the good and pleasurable (II-II.141.3 ad 
2).  Pleasure is a good and proper accompaniment to the fully functioning human life 
(II-II.142.1); however, it is only proper if it is felt in a distinctively human way, and 
not as mere animals (II-II.142.4).  Temperance is concerned with the pleasure 
experienced in both the anticipation and attainment of pleasurable things (I-II.32.3).  
If guided by temperance, this pleasure will be associated with the proper, distinctively 
human functioning of the appetite (I-II.32.1, II-II.142.1).  This is qualitatively 
different than the manner in which animals experience pleasure (II-II.142.4), as 
humans are led by reason, infused by the theological virtues (II-II.141.3 ad 2).  
Temperance conveys beauty by constraining the lower parts of our nature, and by 
holding all things in their fitting proportions (II-II.141.3 ad 3).   
 
4.3.3.2 The Mode and Rule of Temperance 
Aquinas isolates three particular characteristics of temperance: attention to vital 
needs, restraint of physical appetites, and tranquility of soul.  Each of these emphases 
highlights one aspect of the particular function of temperance: conformity to the 
natural rule of life, discipline of the irrational appetite, and expression of the beauty 
that is attendant to virtue. 
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A) Attention to Vital Needs 
The first characteristic of temperance is attention to vital needs: ‘This is what 
temperance adopts as its guiding rule in its use of things that give us pleasure, in 
others words it applies itself to them so far as our vital needs require them’ (II-
II.141.6).
439
  Aquinas maintains that the objects of temperance are ‘profoundly natural 
to us’ (II-II.141.7) and ‘essential to human life’ (II-II.141.2 ad 2).  There are two 
ways to consider ‘vital needs.’  First, biological necessity will dictate what is 
minimally required for physical life, ‘those things without which we simply cannot 
survive, such as food for an animal’ (II-II.141.6 ad 2).  However, temperance is 
rightly concerned with more than ‘purely physical requirements’ (II-II.141.6 ad 3).  
Aquinas now makes allowance for ‘something without which a thing cannot be 
becomingly’ (II-II.141.6 ad 2).  This is determined with ‘moderation’ and ‘with due 
regard to place, time, and the good manners expected in living together’ (141.6 ad 2).  
Moreover, as an acceptance of social convention, it indirectly echoes the Stoic 
doctrine of decorum.
440
  This connection is strengthened by Aquinas’s inclusion of 
official duties and a concern for honor within the criteria for ‘being becomingly’ (II-
II.141.6 ad 3), categories that clearly exceed the physical domain. 
By acknowledging the particularly human need for ‘being becomingly’, 
Aquinas expands upon the traditional understanding of the ‘needs of this life’ as it 
was understood within moral theology; for although Augustine sanctions the use of 
worldly things ‘so far as they are requisite for the needs of this life and of his station’ 
(141.6 sed), Aquinas takes this concession to social need and expands it into an 
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approval (moderate, to be sure) of purely social concerns.  Vital needs, for Aquinas, 
are clearly more than purely physical; they are social and emotional as well.  This is 
in keeping with the summum bonum of human life; whereas vital needs are ‘the end 
which measures the execution of a temperate action …the end which measures being 
temperate itself is happiness’ (II-II.141.6 ad 1).   
Aquinas thus makes a nuanced point about this relationship: on the one hand, 
temperance must allow for what he calls ‘the burden of human nature’ (II-II.141.1 ad 
1).  On the other hand, temperance ‘is against the grain for merely animal nature 
uncomplying with reason’ (II-II.141.1 ad 1).  Temperance plays a special role in the 
lives of humans, as they, unlike other animals, stand in need of some external 
regulation upon their desires in determining the true extent of vital needs (II-II.141 ad 
6).  That is, appetitive morality is found in the using of food, drink and sex in such a 
way that contributes to the well-being of individual persons and the human 
community as a whole.  Human animality must be acknowledged and accommodated 
while simultaneously maintaining its distinction as ‘human’: it must not undermine 
general physical health; it is in proper relation to one’s context and peers, under the 
guidance of prudence; and it is secondary to the common good.  However, the nature 
of the concupiscible appetite can make this difficult, which necessitates another 
function for temperance.   
 
B) Restraint of Carnal Appetites  
The second characteristic of temperance is restraint of physical appetites: ‘It belongs 
to temperance, properly speaking, to restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of 
the good appointed by reason’ (I-II.68.4 ad 1).   Temperance ‘withdraws man from 
things which seduce the appetite from obeying reason’ (II-II.141.2); it ‘moderates’ 
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and ‘restrains’ the physical appetites (II-II.143), particularly the ‘most vehement 
concupiscences of the pleasures of touch’ (II-II.157.3).  This restraint arises from ‘the 
fear of the Lord’, albeit a ‘healthy fear’ that Aquinas recognizes as one of the gifts of 
the Spirit (II-II.141.1 ad 3).
441
  This restraint is often described in equestrian terms: 
temperance will ‘bridle the pleasures which are too alluring to the soul’ (II-II.146.1 ad 
3), and concupiscence, ‘like a child, needs curbing’ (II-II.151.1; cf. II-II.155.2 ad 
1).
442
  The importance of temperance as restraint stems precisely from its dealing with 
the pleasures and objects that are both natural and necessary, ‘so that it is more 
difficult to abstain from them, and to control the desire for them’ (II-II.141.7).  This 
demonstrates the particularly challenging role given to temperance, as its sphere is 
precisely where is both ‘best and most difficult to contain oneself’ (II-II.155.2 ad 1).  
The restraint effected by temperance is both the most demanding and the most 
necessary of all the actions of the moral virtues. 
Among the characteristics of Thomistic temperance, restraint is certainly the 
most common, with temperance being ‘commended for a kind of deficiency, from 
which all its parts are denominated’ (II-II.146.1 ad 3).  Indeed, some of the species of 
temperance are named for their restrictive actions, as when ‘chastity takes its name 
from the fact that reason “chastises” concupiscence’ (II-II.151.1).443  Nicholas Austin, 
in his monograph on the causes of Thomistic temperance, notes Aquinas’ tendency to 
(at least partially) derive the mode of a virtue from its names.  However, he calls this 
tendency ‘problematic’ for three reasons: temperance may be ‘badly named’; the 
method does not always hold true, as in his example of studiousness; and regarding 
temperance, the etymology itself is superficial.
444
  Thus, while Austin calls restraint ‘a 
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“shorthand” definition of the mode of temperance’, he qualifies this restraint as 
‘positive, non-repressive, and non-agonistic.’445  He argues for the continued 
inclusion of restraint in the concept of temperance, but emphasizes the teleological, 
cooperative nature of this restraint, which rules rather than represses and serves an 
end larger than itself.
446
  Temperance does not promote Stoic apatheia, but the 
ordering of passions to their rational end (I-II.34.1 ad 2; I-II.61.2).  Similarly, in his 
classic The Four Cardinal Virtues, Josef Pieper rejects ‘moderation’ as the definition 
of Thomistic temperance, as it is ‘too negative in its implication.’447  Moreover, the 
pleasure of desiring and attaining something pleasing will be increased by the honor 
and beauty attendant on the practice of temperance.
448
  Thus, balancing this emphasis 
is the third characteristic of temperance, beauty and tranquility of soul.   
 
C) Beauty and Tranquility of Soul 
Temperance results in beauty in two ways: it brings the agent into ‘a certain moderate 
and fitting proportion’, and it prevents the ugliness of defilement that occurs 
whenever the animal nature is allowed to rule (II-II.141.2 ad 3; cf. II-II.141.8 ad 1).  
This beauty coincides with the pleasurable use of sensible goods, ‘as the sensible 
objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their becomingness’ (II-II.141.4 
ad 3).  Tranquility of soul, which ‘though a general feature of every virtue, is 
especially prominent in temperance,’ is related to temperance in a similar manner; it 
both preserves beauty against the ugliness of defilement and preserves tranquility of 
soul against the disturbances of carnal desire (II-II.141.2 ad 2).
449
  This is similar to 
the function of ‘saving phronēsis’ assigned to temperance by Aristotle (Eth.Nic.IV.3), 
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but with added positive content; for Aquinas, the temperate soul is not merely wise – 
it is beautiful.   
This function of Thomistic temperance, which Aquinas himself mentions 
almost as an aside, is often overlooked.  However, it is an especially compelling 
aspect of the virtue, called by Ambrose ‘what we observe and seek most in 
temperance’ (de off. I.42).  Thus, while this understanding of beauty and tranquility 
can appear somewhat negative, due to its derivation from the avoidance of defilement, 
it is actually the fullness of the end towards which humanity is directed.  Pieper 
characterizes this particular function as ‘selfless self-preservation’ and calls it ‘the 
seal and fruit of order.’450  Beauty and tranquility serve as positive referents for the 
virtue of temperance, a healthy telos guiding the virtuous agent.  Moreover, they work 
alongside restraint (which is largely negative) and attention to vital needs (which is 
largely neutral) to yield a well-rounded and holistic virtue. 
 
4.3.3.3 The Specifics of Temperance – Integral, Subjective, and Potential Parts 
Like all cardinal virtues, temperance is comprised of integral, subjective, and potential 
parts (II-II.143.1).
451
  While concerned specifically with food, drink and sexual 
relations, temperance contains other elements that give the virtue fuller meaning and 
broader scope.  Its ‘integral’ parts, components without which the virtue could not 
function properly, are shame and honesty.  Shame is ‘a praiseworthy passion’ but 
‘falls short of the perfection of virtue’; it indicates fear at committing a disgraceful act 
(II-II.144.1).  Honesty, says Aquinas, is a kind of spiritual beauty: ‘Now the 
disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful: and opposites are most manifest of one 
another. Wherefore seemingly honesty belongs especially to temperance, since the 
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latter repels that which is most disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal 
lusts’ (II-II.145.4).  Honesty enables human to see themselves, their appetites, and 
their situations with clarity, which is connected to beauty. 
Aquinas follows Aristotle in naming the subjective parts or ‘species’ of 
temperance as food, drink and sex.  Temperance related to food is called abstinence, 
which indicates proper use instead of mere detachment, and seeks to observe the 
mean.  Abstinence is contrasted with gluttony, an ‘inordinate desire for eating and 
drinking’ that may be manifested in excess of quantity, inappropriate delicacy or cost,  
or exhibiting too much enjoyment in the meal itself (II-II.148.4 obj 1).  In addressing 
food at the start, Aquinas notes the problematic nature of its temperate use.  One 
cannot simply abstain from food indefinitely; its proper enjoyment is essential to life. 
This can be difficult, as ‘pleasures of the table are of a nature to withdraw man from 
the good of reason, both because they are so great, and because food is necessary to 
man who needs it for the maintenance of life, which he desires above all other things’ 
(II-II.146.2).  Sobriety is the temperate use of alcohol.  It is contrasted with 
drunkenness, which Aquinas regards most seriously, as it can create serious problems 
on our moral formation by becoming ‘a hindrance to the use of reason’ (II-II.149.2).  
Drinking is not altogether vicious, but can become so very easily.    
Sexual relations are governed by the virtues of chastity and purity and stand in 
contrast to the vice of lust.  Chastity is concerned with sexual acts themselves and 
‘takes its name from the fact that reason “chastises” concupiscence, which, like a 
child, needs curbing’ (II-II.151.1).  Purity, or virginity, addresses the outward 
indications of sexual interest.  Aquinas cites Augustine (civ. 1.18) in saying that 
‘virginity is continence whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and 
observed in honor of the Creator’ (II-II.152.1).  While chastity is expected of 
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everyone, virginity is a special calling and applies less broadly.  These virtues are 
contrasted with lust, which exists whenever a sexual act is performed that is against 
nature, morals, or a commandment (II-II.153.1).  Aquinas situates all temperate sexual 
activity within the realm of a stable Christian marriage that is open to and aiming 
towards procreation; without this intention, the sexual act is rooted exclusively in the 
pleasures of the flesh and thus becomes lust (II-II.154).   
 
4.3.4 The Potential Parts of Temperance 
The potential parts of temperance are the secondary virtues which moderate and patrol 
the desires for less dominant pleasures.  They include continence, which restrains the 
will as swayed by passion; clemency, which moderates external punishment; 
meekness, which moderates the desire for revenge; modesty, which manages the 
external actions of the body so as not to inflame lust; humility, which moderates the 
movements of pride, and studiousness, which is concerned with desiring and 
acquiring knowledge in an appropriate manner.  This study will examine two of these 
in greater detail: continence and humility.  
 
4.3.4.1 Continence 
Aquinas begins by acknowledging the dual understanding of continence he has 
inherited.  Drawing from Galatians 5, he first notes that continence can be appended 
to charity and denote complete abstinence from sexual activity, wherein virginity 
becomes ‘perfect continence’ (II-II.155.1).  Drawing next from Aristotle (Eth.Nic. 
VII.7) and the Conference of the Fathers (xii.10), continence is merely ‘resistance of 
evil desires’; in this understanding, continence is a virtue ‘in the broad sense’ and 
differs from temperance ‘just as imperfect differs from perfect’ (II-II.155.4; cf. II-
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II.143 ad 1).
452
  Like Aristotle, Aquinas identifies the ‘perfect’ virtue of temperance 
with reduced or eliminated reliance upon self-control (II-II.155.1).  Thus, continence, 
which ‘denotes curbing’ (II-II.155.2), is an ‘imperfect’ virtue, as ‘the good of reason 
flourishes more in the temperate man than in the continent man’ (II-II.155.4).  The 
continent person strives more than the temperate person (II-II.155.4 obj 2); and 
whereas temperance moderates, continence merely restrains (II-II.155.3 ad 1).  It 
therefore does not remove the evil desires of the concupiscible appetite, as it is 
actually located in the will and not in the concupiscible appetite (II-II.155.3 sed; cf. 
Eth.Nic. VII.9; I-II.13.1).  Continence ‘restrains the movement of the will when 
stirred by the impulse of passion’ (II-II.143); thus, while continence is connected to 
temperance because of a similarity of mode (the mode of restraint), it is closer to 
fortitude in similarity of subject (the subject being the will).
453
  
Aquinas’ comments on incontinence shed additional light on his moral 
typology.  Incontinence is sin because it ‘fails to observe the mode of reason’ (II-
II.156.2).  Yet their sin is exceeded by the intemperate; while the incontinent is 
ignorant of some particular aspect of their choice, the intemperate is ignorant of their 
true and final end (II-II.156.3 ad 1; cf. Eth.Nic. VII.7,8).  Moreover, unlike the 
incontinent, the intemperate is unrepentant and ‘rejoices in having sinned, because the 
sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit’ (II-II.156.3).  
Therefore, because ‘impenitence aggravates every sin,’ the intemperate person sins 
more gravely than the incontinent (II-II.156.3 sed).  Thus, the incontinent is ‘less 
comfortable, but more easily reformable.’454  However, more knowledge will deliver 
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neither the incontinent nor the intemperate from their vicious state; they both require 
‘the inward assistance of grace which quenches concupiscence (II-II.156.3 ad 2).  
In his characterization of continence, Aquinas follows Aristotle almost 
exclusively; surprisingly, he fails to mention Augustine even in his references to the 
practice of sexual continence (II-II.155.1).  Likewise, he makes no reference at all to 
Augustine’s larger category of continence as healing or conversion (whether from 
ignorance or choice it is difficult to say).  For continence, Aquinas adheres closely to 
the Aristotelian framework on this matter.  This he will not do in his treatment of 
humility.  
 
4.3.4.2 Humility 
Aquinas’ treatment of humility, wherein he places humility and magnanimity 
alongside one another as a pair of virtues guiding the moral agent in the proper use of 
hope, highlights the inherent difficulties of attempting to synthesize Aristotelian and 
Augustinian moral frameworks.
455
  Aquinas first defines humility as ‘the notion of a 
praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest place’ (II-II.161.1 ad 2).  This self-
abasement is not for its own sake, but is teleologically oriented in ‘the subjection of 
man to God, for whose sake he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others’ (II-
II.161.1 ad 5).  Humility expresses the ‘intrinsic principle’ of humanity’s relationship 
to God, ‘when a man, considering his own failings, assumes the lowest place 
according to his mode’ (II-II.161.1 ad 2).456  It arises from ‘divine reverence, which 
shows that man ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him 
according to the position in which God has placed him’(II-II.161.2 ad 3).   
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Aquinas’ second conception of humility is as a meta-virtue, preparing the soil 
for the cultivation of other virtues.  Humility ‘makes a man a good subject to 
ordinance of all kinds and in all matters’ (II-II.161.5).  It is the ‘first step in the 
acquisition of virtue… inasmuch as it expels pride… and makes man submissive and 
ever open to the receive the influx of Divine grace’ (II-II.161.5).  Humility duly 
orders the multiplicity of human goods, as it ‘especially removes the obstacle to man's 
spiritual welfare consisting in man's aiming at heavenly and spiritual things, in which 
he is hindered by striving to become great in earthly things’ (II-II.161.5 ad 4).  In this, 
Christ is the divine exemplar: 
Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spiritual welfare, 
showed by giving an example of humility, that outward exaltation is to be 
despised. Thus humility is, as it were, a disposition to man's untrammeled 
access to spiritual and divine goods. (II-II.161.5 ad 4) 
 
Humility, like the other moral virtues, can be both acquired and infused: ‘Man arrives 
at humility in two ways. First and chiefly by a gift of grace, and in this way the inner 
man precedes the outward man. The other way is by human effort, whereby he first of 
all restrains the outward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking out the inward 
root’ (II-II.161.6 ad 2).  Humility is, in a way, curiously placed underneath 
temperance.  Although it could be subordinated to courage, as the subject of humility 
is ‘the movement of the mind towards hope,’ Aquinas joins it to temperance, the 
mode and function of humility is ‘to temper and restrain the mind, lest it tend to high 
things immoderately’ (II-II.161.1).457  Thus humility, like continence, is connected to 
the irascible appetite through its subject and to the concupiscible appetite through its 
mode (II-II.161.4 ad 2).   
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Thomistic humility is related to several classical themes, including self-
knowledge and due proportion: ‘For this purpose he must know his disproportion to 
that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own deficiency belongs 
to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite’ (II-II.161.2).  Aquinas cautions ‘due 
moderation’ in the practice of humility to avoid causing spiritual harm in others (II-
II.161.3 ad 3).  Like all things, humility needs to observe right reason; humanity is 
still above the ‘senseless beasts’; to compare ourselves to them, and to become like 
them, takes humility beyond its proper mode (II-II.161.1 ad 2).  This precedes a 
citation from Origen wherein ‘that humility which God regards is the same as what 
they [the philosophers] called metriotēs, i.e. measure or moderation’ (II-II.161.4 sed).  
Thus, Thomistic humility is a mean in the classical sense, unlike the Augustinian 
understanding of humility as the ‘first, second, and third’ way to truth.458  
As stated earlier, Aquinas’ treatment of humility is a distinct departure from 
his broadly Aristotelian framework.  In his task of incorporating both Aristotelian and 
Christian virtue, he boldly yokes humility to its Aristotelian ‘opposite’, magnanimity, 
as both seek to direct the urge to greatness in accord with right reason: ‘Humility 
restrains the appetite from aiming at great things against right reason: while 
magnanimity urges the mind to great things in accord with right reason. Hence it is 
clear that magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this, that 
each is according to right reason’ (II-II.161.1 ad 3).459  For Aristotle, magnanimity is 
the ‘crown’ of the virtuous life, earned (and expected) by the truly honorable, truly 
virtuous person.  Pusillanimity (mikropsychia, more accurately ‘small-souledness’) is 
the vice of defect in the triad concerned with proper honor.  However, Aquinas 
explicitly contrasts humility with pusillanimity (II.II.162.1 ad 3).  Furthermore, he 
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draws an explicit connection between humility and temperance from an unlikely 
source, the Philosopher himself, who notes the use of sōphron in the discussion of 
magnanimity: ‘A man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not 
magnanimous but “temperate,” and such a man we may call humble’ (II-II.161.4).460   
Instead of the vice contrasted to magnanimity, humility is the virtue contrasted 
to pride.  For Aquinas, pride (superbia) denotes someone aiming higher (supra) than 
they should, in a way that exceeds the proportion determined by right reason (II-
II.162.1).  Pride is the ‘inordinate imitation of God’ (referencing ciu. 14.13, 19.12), 
and it is directly opposed to humility because it ‘scorns subjection’ (II.II.162.1 ad 3).  
Pride is opposed to all virtues (II-II.162.2 obj 2) in a manner similar to the way 
humility underlies all the virtues (II-II.161.5).  Thus, Aquinas’ treatment of humility 
is surprisingly brief, since pride may be considered the ‘most grievous of sins’ (II-
II.162.6 obj 2).  Thus, for Aquinas, humility is not the quasi-vice of Aristotle; in fact, 
it is explicitly contrasted to pusillanimity.  Neither is it the foundational meta-virtue of 
Augustine, although it does retain something of its status as an essential virtue. 
 
4.3.5 Particularities of Thomistic Temperance 
Several points are of particular interest in the Thomistic account of temperance.  First, 
when asking if ‘present life needs’ should be the yardstick for the virtue, Aquinas 
states, ‘This is what temperance adopts as its guiding rule in the use of things that 
give us pleasure, in other words it applies itself to them so far as our vital needs 
require them’ (II-II.141.6).  That is, the measure for temperance is intimately 
connected with the embodied needs of physical human bodies.  Holding this view in 
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tension with his distinction between natural and final ends (I-II.1.8) could prove 
useful in negotiating the numerous consumption choices of modern culture.  
However, it is now generally accepted that distorted human longing for the 
good goes beyond the objects of food, drink, and sex.
461
  Acquisitiveness runs 
rampant in modern culture; issues such as materialism and conspicuous consumption, 
planned obsolescence, debt schemes, convenience packaging of food, media and 
Internet addictions, and a surfeit of stimulation might, to their benefit, all come under 
the purview of temperance.  Aquinas also notes that temperance ‘scorns bodily 
allurements and popular praise’ (141.4.obj 1).  Although he qualifies this statement by 
restricting the ‘special virtue’ of temperance to ‘its own determinate subject matter’, 
he does acknowledge that the task of temperance is ‘to maintain due measure in our 
desire, chiefly and properly in those for pleasures of touch, secondarily in others’ (II-
II.141.4 ad 1).  Thus, temperance plays a primary role in the regulation of all human 
desires.  Another persuasive argument for an expansion of scope is that temperance 
addresses things ‘beyond purely physical requirements and extend to the befitting 
ownership of external things, thus wealth and a dignified profession’, wherein 
Aquinas connects temperance to ‘the responsibilities as well as to the necessities of 
life’ (II-II.141.6.ad 3).     
Second, Aquinas often gives the impression that, for him, temperance involves 
more active self-control than established self-order, feeling ashamed rather than 
feeling peaceful.
462
  This is particularly evident in a modification of a quote from 
Ambrose in II-II.155: when discussing the relationship of continence to pleasures of 
touch, Aquinas substitutes continentem (‘continent’) for concinentem (‘harmonious’) 
(II-II.155.2 obj 1). The original quote is an observance on decorum, which ‘has a 
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consistent form and the perfection of what is virtuous harmonizing (concinentem) in 
every action’ (de off. I.46). Aquinas seems to believe that decorum lies within 
restraint and not harmony, a significant (and, I will argue, unhelpful) development for 
the virtue of temperance.  
Some recent commentators have questioned this understanding.  Unlike the 
conflation present in Augustine, temperance and continence are established as related 
yet qualitatively different virtues, with the conscious (and constant) application of 
self-control being the major distinguishing factor.  Following Aristotle, his distinction 
between temperance and continence indicates that temperance is not a habit of 
constant inner struggle.  In short, temperance is not primarily a defensive habit; that 
would be confusing it with continence.  Moreover, this distinction of temperance and 
continence reveals the association of true temperance with an ease of body and 
serenity of spirit, the aspect of ‘being well-moved.’  Because this gloss runs counter to 
its puritanical connotations, it holds promise for a more positive retrieval of the 
virtue.
463
  Our responses to our sense appetites are to be beautiful, ‘moderate and 
fitting’ (II-II.141.2, ad 3), with a wholesome delight in the object of our pleasure.  
Simon Harak employs a lovely illustration of a woman enjoying a vine ripened 
tomato, reveling in the goodness of it and reflecting on the bounty of the Lord’s 
provision.  The pleasure she receives in eating the tomato fulfills all the criteria of a 
joyful, yet temperate and wholly appropriate response.
464
  Third, temperate responses 
are tranquil, reflecting the serenity of the soul from which they spring (II-II.141.2).  
Temperance ‘gives us inner rest and opens the mind for higher values’ (141.2).  The 
lack of straining and striving reveals an inner order and settled nature which can only 
come from true virtue.   
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4.3.6 Conclusions on Thomistic Temperance 
Aquinas has an interesting, somewhat equivocating relationship with the virtue of 
temperance, particularly when read alongside the account from Augustine.  On the 
one hand, Aquinas locates temperance, via humility, against the vice of pride, which 
is the most serious of vices.  He emphasizes the difficult nature of its task, due to its 
restraining the hardest and lowest of the passions.  However, it is considered less 
important than those virtues which affect society as a whole: ‘The greatest virtues are 
those which are most profitable to others… whereas temperance moderates only the 
desires and pleasures which affect man himself’ (II-II.41.8).  There is an expansion of 
its sphere, although not as Augustine does; it is not broadly operative like Augustine’s 
continence, but its sphere does include all of life in its connection with modesty (this 
follows its Latin translation from the Fathers and Cicero), and through modesty 
includes humility, studiousness, meekness, and clemency.  Strong things need to be 
tempered, but all things need to be moderated (II-II.160.1 ad.2).  Yet despite his 
broadly Aristotelian framework, Aquinas chooses to reinstate the tetrad of cardinal 
virtues, which grants temperance a priority found in Plato, the Stoics, and Augustine, 
but not Aristotle.  While somewhat reduced, temperance is still a cardinal virtue.  
Moreover, temperance is not a purely ‘negative’ virtue, as Aquinas follows Aristotle 
in associating temperance with beautiful and pleasing movements of appetite. 
Aquinas and Augustine display several key differences in the way they 
appropriate the tradition they have received.  First is the nature of the relationship 
between Christ and truth.  For Aquinas, Christ is utterly compatible with truth; 
therefore, the wisdom of Aristotle is fulfilled by the revelation of scripture.  For 
Augustine, Christ is truth, an essential part of any real understanding of reality.  
Second and similarly, they view the nature of love quite differently.  Despite his 
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extensive use of On the Morals of the Catholic Church in his discussion of 
temperance, Aquinas makes no mention of its groundbreaking definition of virtue as 
perfect and ordered love of God.  Aquinas has love in a different category; for him, 
love is grounded in the being of God.  Aquinas’ treatment of love exhibits the exitus-
reditus structure of his moral thought: God is himself love (I.20.1 sed, citing Jn 4.16).  
Love is thus the primary act of the will; it ‘regards the good universally, whether 
possessed or not’ (I.20.1 resp).  God is, moreover, the cause of all human love, and 
love is the cause of all other passions (I-II.25.3).  While Aquinas does reference 
Augustine’s definition of virtue as forms of ‘ordered love’ (I-II.62.2 obj 3, citing mor. 
15), he stresses the difference between the moral and theological virtues, maintaining 
that the moral virtues arise from love but are not themselves forms of love (I-II.62.2 
ad 3).
465
  Third is the relationship between grace and nature.  For Augustine, the 
question is how fallen (and sinful) humanity lives in fallen creation, battling against 
the city of men; the answer is that divine grace overcomes human nature.  For 
Aquinas, the question is how natural (yet resurrected) humanity lives, both naturally 
and by grace, within and as part of God’s creation; the answer is that grace perfects 
human nature.  For temperance, the virtue most closely associated with natural 
appetites, the choice of perfection instead of overcoming takes on special meaning. 
Additionally, their theological differences may be partially due to differences 
in their personalities and temperaments. Augustine and Aquinas certainly experienced 
quite different internal struggles with ‘the lusts of the flesh’.  These differences are 
often revealed in Aquinas’ tendency, arising from his personal preference for 
agreement over dispute, to criticize through silence and selection rather than rhetoric 
(another departure from Augustine).  For instance, Aquinas’s explicit return to the 
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classical, Aristotelian separation of temperance and continence may be his 
commitment to Aristotle’s classical categories.  However, it may also be an implicit 
rebuke of Augustine for his obsession with sexual desire and subsequent conflation of 
temperance and continence.
466
  It is curious that Augustine’s treatise On Continence 
receives no mention in Aquinas’ entire treatment of temperance and continence.  
Continence is simply not an operative category for Aquinas, but a classically 
understood sub-virtue.  
Overall, Aquinas’ treatment of temperance is positive, life-affirming, and 
realistic.  Rooted in grace and in the nature of God who desires to draw all things back 
to himself, the Christian moral life is not fully destroyed by the power of sin. 
In dealing with the cardinal virtues in particular, the Middle Ages established 
confidence in the human attempt to reach moral goodness under divine 
guidance – not by denying the cumbersome aspects of the human condition, 
but by offering a virtuous way out.  The idea that the human self can be 
brought to moral perfection through the combined efforts of man and his 
Creator is a medieval legacy.
467
 
 
Aquinas gave the Christian tradition a document that still forms the bedrock of a 
significant portion of its moral thought.  The endurance of the Summa ensures several 
things: the reinstatement of Aristotle in moral theology, the conveyance of the tetrad 
of cardinal virtues, and the legacy of theological eudaimonism. 
 
4.4 Conclusions on Patristic and Medieval Temperance 
This discussion has been framed by a central question: To what extent does the 
Christian context make a fundamental difference to the moral conversation?  The 
appearance of Christ changes the conversation in several ways. First, the nature of the 
human telos has changed – instead of a purely natural end, humanity is now 
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supernaturally oriented towards heaven and the contemplation of the divine presence.  
Second, humanity now follows a completely different moral exemplar; the grandiosity 
of the megalopsychoi has been replaced by the humility of the kenotic Christ.  The 
ancient admonition to ‘remember your mortality, remember you are not God’ takes on 
an entirely new meaning in light of Christ’s self-emptying in Philippians 2.  Third, the 
cardinal virtues are transcended by the theological virtues; love, rather than wisdom 
(whether theoretical or practical) is now the architectonic virtue.  Finally, the shift in 
moral categories from vice to sin fundamentally altered the virtue conversation – love 
may be architectonic, but human sinfulness limits the degree to which virtue may 
actually be realized.   
Where the vocabulary and systems do display continuity from the classical 
period, they have often received new origins and new consummations.  The 
development of temperance reflects these fundamental changes.  Temperance does 
retain some of its classical sense, particularly its function in restraining the appetites; 
however, it effectively loses its connection to sound-mindedness.  Moreover, 
temperance is also understood as purity, an outward effect of the inner sanctification 
of the believer.  In a sense, it is the essential Christian virtue, particularly in its 
manifestations as chastity.  Continence also assumes a large role, mostly as sexual 
renunciation that buttresses this understanding of temperance, but also as a modus 
operandi for the indwelling love of God in the Christian life.  Gone is the classical 
distinction between the internal ‘ease’ of temperance and the internal ‘struggle’ of 
continence, although Augustine and Aquinas differ in their views on the possibility of 
true temperance in this sinful life.  Gone also is the understanding of temperance as 
the preservation of rationality and wisdom in matters of choice.  Its connections with 
order and harmony have shifted into calls to holiness and purity.  
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Like Plato, and rather unlike Aristotle, Augustine resonates with the virtues of 
temperance and continence in a deeply personal way.  In a discussion of the fruits of 
the Spirit in Galatians, he declares: ‘Among the goods of which God made mention, 
he set Continence in the last place, and he willed that it should in an especial manner 
cleave to our minds’ (cont. 9).  His concluding sentence in De Moribus underscores 
his view of the importance of the topic, that ‘these remarks on temperance are few in 
proportion to the greatness of the theme’ (mor. 21.39).   Augustinian temperance and 
continence are neither a wholesale rejection of desire and cupiditas nor a rote 
continuation of a classical virtue; they are calls to conversion, means of grace in the 
midst of fallenness, and helpmeets on the journey towards sanctification and 
humanity’s ultimate happiness in God.  Aquinas, conversely, views temperance as a 
necessary but lesser virtue, required for the proper functioning of reason.  Temperance 
does retain its cardinal status but is not as laudable as such ‘outward’ virtues as justice 
or courage.  In a culmination of sorts, temperance is explicitly associated with 
humility as it is set against the most grievous of vices, pride.  Thus, temperance leaves 
the medieval period with both classical and Christian content – still regarded as a 
cardinal virtue, yet the only one that is simultaneously a fruit of the Spirit.  This 
double birthright accompanies temperance to the next chapter of Christian moral 
thought –that of the Protestant Reformation, with an altered approach to moral 
discourse and an ambivalent and unstable relationship to virtue. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Virtue During and After the Reformation:  
Temperance in Calvin and Wesley 
 
 
Augustine and Aquinas both contributed to the transmission of virtue in general, and 
temperance in particular, in the Christian tradition.  In their different ways, they 
maintained an explicit conversation between the classical idea of virtue and the 
particularities of Christian moral theology.  However, the Reformation decidedly 
changed the relationship between the Christian tradition and virtue, in both its 
philosophical and theological forms.  Chapter Five considers two different positions 
within this relationship: John Calvin, working during the formative days of the 
Reformation, and John Wesley, operating after the Reformation was firmly 
established.    
 
5.1 Virtue Ethics and the Reformation 
As stated, the church fathers and the scholastics preserved the institution of virtue 
thought within Christianity, notably the Catholic Church.  However, the Reformation 
expressly critiqued many aspects of Catholicism: its soteriology and ecclesiology; the 
perceived conflict between justification and religious works; and the translation of the 
Bible from the Latin.  One significant development for moral theology was the change 
in posture towards virtue and beatitude, which varied among theologians but always 
differed considerably from the Catholic position.
468
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5.1.1 Martin Luther and the ‘Honest Sinner’ 
Martin Luther was, like Augustine before him, less of a systematic theologian than a 
responder to situations, controversies, and conflicts.
469
  The content of his ‘relational 
theology’ appears in the form of ‘paradox’, elucidated within the connection and 
tension between two opposing terms or concepts.
470
   Against the medieval emphasis 
upon natural law, wherein the glory and mystery of God were fundamentally 
accessible to the believer who aspired to the beatitude of divine contemplation by 
participating in the natural moral order (ST I-II.3.1,8; I-II.5, a.7, ad.1), Luther 
proclaimed a strong Christology and the necessity of the Holy Spirit as the difference 
between ‘knowing there is a god’ and ‘knowing who God is’ (WA 19:207, 11; 1:362, 
15, 21).  Concerns about the emotional and works-oriented implications of ‘love’ 
resulted in his employing faith instead of love as a framing theological concept, as 
‘faith’ expressed the radically gracious nature of Christ’s salvific work.471 
Like his broader thought, Luther’s moral theology is characterized by a certain 
‘resonance’ between different parts of his theological grammar.472  Luther emphasized 
the moral centrality of the Decalogue, particularly the ‘First Commandment’, but he 
insisted upon a christological lens for its proper understanding; faith through Christ is 
the only way to fulfill this and every commandment.
473
  Thus, Luther emphasized 
humanity’s absolute dependence upon God’s grace and utterly rejected any concept of 
virtue as habitus, which he believed inevitably resulted in the entrenchment of 
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pride.
474
  Humanity has no legitimate option but to acknowledge its complete 
dependence on God’s grace, eschewing any claim to self-worth.   
The whole exodus of the people of Israel formerly symbolized that exodus 
which they interpret as one from faults to virtues.  But it would be better 
to understand it as an exodus from virtues to the grace of Christ, because 
virtues of that kind are often greater or worse faults the less they are 
accepted as such and the more powerfully they subordinate to themselves 
every human emotion at the expense of all other good qualities. (WA 
56:158) 
 
Even Luther’s ‘honest sinner’ is preferable to Calvin’s ‘hypocritical doer of the Law’ 
who ‘seeks to obtain righteousness by a mechanical performance of good works’ 
(Comm. Gal 3.10).
475
  Interestingly, Luther saw a non-causal difference between 
being saved and being holy, insisting that ‘even the godless may have much about 
them that is holy without thereby being saved’ (WA 50:643).  Thus, the only 
alternative to works righteousness is humbly allowing God to do what sinful humanity 
cannot: ‘The highest and first work of God in us and the best training is that we let our 
own works go and let our reason and will lie dormant, resting and commending 
ourselves to God in all things’ (WA 6:245).  He also scorned what he viewed as the 
superficial and hypocritical nature of mimetic virtue, even when this was based upon 
the idea of Christ as moral exemplar.
476
  This position assumes the ability to benefit 
from any exemplar, no matter how perfect, and Luther denies this as a possibility for 
fallen humanity.  Rather, believers must ‘marry’ themselves to Christ, so that his 
righteousness is imputed to the ‘honest’ sinner.477  This righteousness will manifest 
itself in what Luther called the vita passiva, or ‘living a receptive life’, in which all 
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works are considered ‘good’ when performed in faith and within the perfect 
justification of Christ.
478
  
Despite being instructed since childhood in both the doctrines and life of the 
Catholic Church and in the Humanist foundations of a liberal education, John Calvin 
consciously chose to align himself with the nascent theology and ecclesiology of the 
Reformation.  Calvin agreed with Luther on the inclination of humanity towards pride 
and pretense: ‘For, since we are all naturally prone to hypocrisy, any empty 
semblance of righteousness is quite enough to satisfy us instead of righteousness 
itself’ (Inst. I.1.2, cf. II.1.1-2).479  He also affirmed humanity’s utter reliance upon the 
grace of God: ‘remember that we have nothing of our own, but depend entirely on 
God, from whom we hold at pleasure whatever he has seen it meet to bestow’ (Inst. 
II.1.1).  However, Calvin was more deeply concerned with sanctification and moral 
order than was Luther, as this would lead to the gradual alignment of the saints, and 
the world, with the will of God as revealed in the scriptures.
480
  This concern resulted 
in an increased focus upon the topics of holiness and the exterior evidence of an 
interior faith (Inst. II.1.1).
481
   
 
5.1.2 Calvin’s ‘Christian Philosophy’ 
Given his concern to separate himself from the problems of the Catholic Church, is 
there any element of teleological or virtue thinking in Calvin’s writings?  Because he 
wrote while the Reformation was still somewhat fragile, he needed to distance himself 
from the theology of the Catholic Church, including its eudaimonism and virtue 
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theory.  However, he retains some of its language and concepts; although he does not 
align the two in a classical manner, his language of sanctification contains small 
reminders of the discourse of virtue. 
Calvin shared Augustine’s skepticism of pagan virtue.482  He disdained the 
‘frigid exhortations of the philosophers,’ declaring that the gospel message ‘ought to 
affect the whole man with a hundred times more energy’ (Inst. III.6.4).  Philosophers 
of old may have modeled virtue of a sort, but it is not to be confused with true 
godliness: ‘There have often appeared in unrenewed men remarkable instances of 
[virtue], but it is certain that all were but specious disguises’ (Comm. Gal. 5.23).  Like 
Luther, Calvin worried that the classical and scholastic conception of virtue inevitably 
fosters pride and false confidence in human moral abilities.  ‘The philosophers who 
have contended most strongly that virtue is to be desired on her own account’ he says, 
‘were so inflated with arrogance as to make it apparent that they sought virtue for no 
other reason than as a ground for indulging pride’ (Inst. III.7.2).  
In the place of pagan superbia, Calvin offered his idea of ‘Christian 
philosophy,’ which begins from an entirely different foundation: 
This transformation (which Paul calls the renewing of the mind, Rom. 
12:2; Eph. 4:23), though it is the first entrance to life, was unknown to all 
the philosophers. They give the government of man to reason alone, 
thinking that she alone is to be listened to; in short, they assign to her the 
sole direction of the conduct. But Christian philosophy bids her give 
place, and yield complete submission to the Holy Spirit, so that the man 
himself no longer lives, but Christ lives and reigns in him. (Inst. III.7.1) 
 
When human reason and ability is submitted to the Spirit, it can function as an 
effective servant, rather than as a corrupt master.  Calvin did not denigrate human 
reason per se, as it is a ‘noble quality’ and part of the inheritance of being created in 
the imago Dei (Inst. II.1.1).  What Calvin called ‘Christian philosophy’ involves 
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dethroning natural reason and submitting, instead, to the work of the Spirit in the 
‘transformation and renewal of our minds’ (Inst. III.7.1).  And while Calvin was not a 
full-fledged eudaemonist, he occasionally used the language of beatitude.  ‘There is 
no man who would not be pleased with eternal blessedness’ he says, ‘and yet, without 
the impulse of the Spirit, no man would aspire to it’ (Inst. II.2.26).  Again, this 
teleology arises from and is sustained by the Holy Spirit.   
 
5.1.3 Calvin’s Complicated Virtue 
Calvin’s use of the virtue paradigm is difficult to summarize.  On the one hand, 
Calvin does not hesitate to employ the term ‘virtue’ throughout his works.  Virtue, for 
Calvin, is nothing but the gift and grace of God, designed to help the believer to fulfill 
all godliness: ‘All virtues, all proper and well regulated affections proceed from the 
Spirit, that is, from the grace of God, and the renewed nature which we derive from 
Christ’ (Comm. Gal 5.23).483  God ‘adorns us with virtue,’ which he equates with 
‘good morals, wisdom, patience, and love’ (Comm. 2 Pet 1.4).  These are faith’s 
‘inseparable companions’ so that it will not be ‘naked or empty’; virtue is ‘a life 
honest and rightly formed’; knowledge is ‘what is needed for acting prudently’ 
(Comm. 2 Pet. 1.4).
 
 Virtue comes from God alone because only he possesses true 
virtue (Inst. I.1.1).  Possession and presentation of these virtues indicate a genuine 
‘knowledge of Christ’, and reveals His participation in the believer: ‘Then you will at 
length prove that Christ is really known by you, if ye be endued with virtue, 
temperance, and the other endowments.  For the knowledge of Christ is an efficacious 
thing and a living root, which brings forth fruit’ (Comm. 2 Pet. 1.8).  Moreover, it is 
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the work of the Spirit as well, which ‘is the author of love, chastity, sobriety, modesty, 
peace, moderation, and truth’ (Inst. III.3.14).      
However, like Augustine, Calvin never releases his concerns about pagan 
virtue.  One passage highlights both Calvin’s expressed view of virtue and the 
problems inherent in any discussion of virtue: ‘I take virtue to mean a life honest and 
rightly formed; for it is not here energeia, energy or courage, but aretē, virtue, moral 
goodness’ (Comm. 2 Pet 1.7).  Here, virtue contains several of its classical 
components, even beyond the use of the classical Greek aretē: it is not momentary but 
lifelong; it is formed, and formed honestly and ‘rightly’; it is moral; and it is good.  
However, he quickly distinguishes his position (or what he perceives to be Peter’s 
position) from the classical belief in the power of free will. 
When, therefore, the Apostle requires these things, he by no means asserts 
that they are in our power, but only shews what we ought to have, and 
what ought to be done. And as to the godly, when conscious of their own 
infirmity, they find themselves deficient in their duty, nothing remains for 
them but to flee to God for aid and help. (Comm. 2 Pet 1.7) 
 
This highlights a perennial issue for Calvin: the tension between the work of God and 
the will of man.  Calvin explicitly denies that growth in virtue negates man’s utter 
dependence on God: ‘For it plainly testifies, that right feelings are formed in us by 
God, and are rendered by him effectual.  It testifies also that all our progress and 
perseverance are from God.  Besides, it expressly declares that wisdom, love, 
patience, are the gifts of God and the Spirit’ (Inst. III.6.2).  The remedy was not to 
revel in human strength and striving, but to acknowledge our utter depravity and 
dependence on God.  ‘For he who has learned to look to God in everything he does, is 
at the same time diverted from all vain thoughts.  This is that self-denial which Christ 
so strongly enforces on his disciples from the very outset (Matt 16.24)’ (Inst. III.7.2).  
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He speaks more positively of the ‘much more beautiful arrangement’ in Scripture, 
‘which is in every way much more certain than that of philosophers’ (Inst. III.6.1). 
Nor does he consistently condemn pagan virtue: ‘Hence it follows, as we 
lately observed, that those virtues, or rather images of virtues, of whatever kind, are 
divine gifts, since there is nothing in any degree praiseworthy which proceeds not 
from him’ (Inst. III.14.2).  The pagan virtues serve an important civic function; they 
are the ‘instruments of God to preserve human society’ (Inst. III.14.3).  Yet Calvin 
cannot resist repeating that even these divine gifts may be polluted if they are 
undertaken by ‘strangers to the true God’ who seek only their own ambition (Inst. 
III.14.3).  Thus, Calvin displays what one commentator calls ‘fragments of a virtue 
system.’484  That is, when he speaks of ‘virtue’, ‘moderation’, and ‘nature’, he does 
not invoke the same presuppositions as did Aquinas or even Augustine.  Yet there is 
sufficient continuity to warrant the inclusion of his thought in this study, provided that 
this reading accounts for the differences in language and moral paradigm that arise, 
while simultaneously keeping watch for points of connection. 
 
5.2 Temperance in the Thought of Calvin 
At first glance, John Calvin is not a major player in the historical journey of 
temperance, as his commitments to Reformation theology and distrust of classical 
morality ran counter to the paradigms both of habituated and mimetic virtue.  
However, his concern for sanctification and moral order pervades his theology, his 
ecclesiology, and his civic policy, intersecting with the concepts of temperance and 
moderation in significant ways.  
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5.2.1 Foundations of Calvin’s Ethics 
Specific to the purpose of this study, Calvin’s theological and ethical thought arises 
directly from his understanding of the creation, corruption, and governance of the 
world.  These concepts permeate his thought and form the core of his theological 
work, both generally and regarding temperance. 
 
5.2.1.1 Creation as Order 
Calvin believed the world to be intentionally created by God, its design revealing 
God’s ‘wisdom, power, justice, and goodness’ (Inst. I.13.21).  During creation, 
everything receives its particular place in the general order of creation and is 
structured as one part within the whole. 
How great the Architect must be who framed and ordered the multitude of 
the starry host so admirably, that it is impossible to imagine a more 
glorious sight, so stationing some, and fixing them to particular spots that 
they cannot move; giving a freer course to others yet setting limits to their 
wanderings; so tempering the movement of the whole as to measure out 
day and night, months, years, and seasons, and at the same time so 
regulating the inequality of days as to prevent everything like confusion. 
(Inst. I.13.21) 
 
‘Framed and ordered’; ‘stationing’ and ‘fixing’; ‘setting limits’, ‘tempering’, 
‘measure out’, ‘regulating’ – such phrases reveal Calvin’s concern for the order of 
creation.  This order is displayed in nature, ‘nature being more properly the order 
which has been established by God’ (Inst. I.5.5).  It arises directly from God and 
cannot exist with him; in his absence, all is disorder and confusion (Comm. Ps 14.2; 
145.10; Comm. Gen 1.2).  A favorite term within Calvin’s thought is measure; God 
has ‘measured’ the earth ‘with such exact proportion’ for the purpose of ‘preserving 
order’ (Comm. Isa 48.13).  This order contains a cosmological model; the order 
instituted by God within the heavens descends naturally to the rest of creation, 
including humanity.  The higher elements rule the lower, with God governing the 
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entirety.  Humanity is similarly ordered, a ‘microcosm (miniature world)’ that 
displays ‘undoubted evidence of the heavenly grace by which he lives, and moves, 
and has his being’ (Inst. I.5.3, c.f. Comm. Gen 1.26).  The harmony of the created 
order is the rule and measure for the harmony of the human life; and God, as creator, 
shall be the measure of all things.   
However, Calvin’s cosmology does not restrict this order to the physical 
world; rather, it transcends it.  In classical philosophy, order and measure are like an 
inner law, something of a center of gravity arising in the cosmos.  For Calvin, 
however, order arises directly from God and is united with him.  Creation is 
constantly subjected to divine government, effected through moderation and for the 
purpose of realizing its predetermined destiny.  Calvin does not stop with a stagnant, 
unvarying idea of creation and order, nor does he subscribe to the Stoic idea of the 
divine subsumed within the cosmos.  While God’s order is unchanging, it is, for 
Calvin, simultaneously dynamic in nature.  ‘God is deemed omnipotent,’ writes 
Calvin, ‘not because he can act though he may cease or be idle, or because by a 
general instinct he continues the order of nature previously appointed; but because, 
governing heaven and earth by his providence, he so overrules all things that nothing 
happens without his counsel’ (Inst. I.16.3).  God does not lose interest in his creation 
but actively governs it, ‘regulating all things with fatherly kindness’ (Comm. Isa 
51.6).  Calvin’s preferred term for this is moderation; ‘according to his 
incomprehensible council,’ declares Calvin, ‘he moderates almost anything that 
happens to exists in the world’ (Inst. III.20.15).   
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5.2.1.2 Corruption and Disorder 
If God has given a measure to everything, if he moderates these same things over a 
period of time, how does one explain the disharmony, the immoderation now present 
in creation?  Calvin finds the cause in the presence of sin and evil, which resulted 
directly from the fall in Genesis 2.  Although God’s wisdom was infused into 
creation, the fall has corrupted this wisdom and goodness.  All of creation, including 
humanity, now suffers total depravity: ‘For our nature is not merely empty and 
destitute, but it is so fecund of every kind of evil that it cannot be inactive’ (Inst. 
II.1.9).  This corruption exhibits more than a lack of goodness; it is vigorous and 
active in its malevolence.   
Reason no longer leads humanity to any good end but is also entirely 
corrupted by Adam’s sin, so that ‘every part of man, from the understanding to the 
will, from the soul to the flesh, is defiled and altogether filled with that 
concupiscence’ (Inst. I.1.8).485   Sin has displaced humanity from its moral center of 
gravity, away from the divine order and into moral chaos.  Moreover, this corruption 
results in confusion and mayhem, where ‘the legitimate order which God originally 
established no longer shines forth’ (Comm. Ps 8.7-9).  The result of losing connection 
with measure and limit, it leads to ‘a perpetual disorder and excess’ (Inst. II.3.12).  
This chaos affects every area of life: the turmoil of the conflicted soul ‘results from 
the depravation of nature’ (Inst. I.15.6); the appetites will continually run towards 
excess (Inst. III.3.12).  Even the Catholic Church is described as a place ‘where, in 
short, all things are in such disorder as to present the appearance of Babylon rather 
than the holy city of God’ (Inst. IV.2.12). 
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The only hope is the interruption of the grace of God in the sinful life, 
whereby ‘God make us new creatures by his mysterious grace’ (Comm. Ps 14.3; see 
also Inst. II.1.7).  This is accomplished only by the justifying work of Christ on the 
cross (Comm. Jn 13.31).  As humble sinners accept this saving grace and receive the 
sacrament of baptism, they may participate in his holiness before God (Comm. Rom 
6.3-5).  Although the image of God has been destroyed by original sin, the restoration 
accomplished through supernatural grace provides a glimpse of what it might have 
been (Comm. Gen 1.26, cf. Inst. I.15.3).  However, this restoration is incomplete; 
humanity will continue in sinfulness until the eschaton.  
It hence follows, that as long as we are children of Adam, and nothing 
more than men, we are in bondage to sin, that we can do nothing else but 
sin; but that being grafted in Christ, we are delivered from this miserable 
thralldom; not that we immediately cease entirely to sin, but that we 
become at last victorious in the contest (Comm. Rom 6.6) 
 
In order to bring humanity as close as possible to its original (and simultaneously 
final) state of holiness, the sinful self must first be put to death.  This is the task of 
mortification.   
 
5.2.1.3 Mortification 
Mortification is the death of the sinful self or ‘old man’ of the Pauline epistles.  It is 
the natural outcome of being grafted into Christ: ‘The Apostle denies that any man 
truly has learned Christ who has not learned to put off “the old man, which is corrupt 
according to the deceitful lusts, and put on Christ”’ (Inst. III.6.4).486  It is 
accomplished through a twofold process of inner and outer mortification.  Inner 
mortification involves the self-denial of the corrupted nature (Inst. III.3.1-10; 7.1-10).  
‘We are not our own,’ states Calvin; ‘therefore, let us not make it our end to seek 
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what may be agreeable to our carnal nature. We are not our own; therefore, as far as 
possible, let us forget ourselves and the things that are ours’ (Inst. III.7.1).  This self-
denial is not its own end, but crushes all ‘vain thoughts,’ suppressing ‘pride, show, 
and ostentation; or, secondly, for avarice, lust, luxury, effeminacy, or other vices 
which are engendered by self-love’ (Inst. III.7.2).  Inner mortification acts to curb 
excess and preserve proper limits; God ‘may mortify, tame, and cauterize their flesh, 
which, if not curbed in this manner, would wanton and exult above measure’ (Inst. 
III.21.46).   
Outer mortification is the practice of suffering and carrying the cross (Inst. 
III.8.1-11).  When the faithful ‘are visited with sore anguish and very heavy 
afflictions,’ they realize that ‘God wishes to try their faith’ (Comm. Isa 26.18).  It is 
the natural outcome of being joined to Christ; when the sinful self ‘is fastened to the 
cross of Christ,’ it reveals that ‘that we cannot be otherwise put to death than by 
partaking of his death’ (Comm. Rom 6.6).  Keeping the eyes and heart fixed upon 
Christ brings comfort to the afflicted believers, who recognize that they ‘are holding 
fellowship with the sufferings of Christ’ (Inst. III.8.1).  Likewise, their sufferings 
afford them the opportunity to both increase and display godly virtue – namely, 
patience, fortitude, and moderation (Inst. III.8.8).  Peter Leithart notes that Calvin 
speaks of mortification and suffering ‘in almost sacramental terms,’ speaking of 
hardships as ‘seals of adoption,’ ‘evidence of our salvation,’ and ‘evidence of the 
grace of God’ (Comm. Phil 1.28).487   
Mortification is necessary because without it, there can be no vivification 
(vivificatio), what Calvin calls ‘quickening’ (Inst. III.3.3).  It is tied to the crucifixion 
of Christ, tied to ‘communion with the cross,’ just as vivification is tied to his 
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resurrection (Inst. II.16.13).  However, Karl Barth insightfully notes that Calvin tends 
towards ‘a curious over-emphasising [sic] of mortificatio at the expense of 
vivificatio’, which points to his larger tendency to favor the Old Testament in matters 
of morality.
488
  Indeed, Calvin’s view of mortification echoes few New Testament 
themes beyond that of the cross, relying instead on the Decalogue as a moral 
framework, although this ‘moral law’ finds its fulfillment in Christ, particularly as 
expressed in the Sermon on the Mount.
489
  Explicating the fourth commandment, 
Calvin connects sanctification with mortification and the resignation of internal will.  
Only then, he says, can a believer forego works righteousness for the ‘Sabbath rest’ 
promised in Hebrews: 
If our sanctification consists in the mortification of our own will, the 
analogy between the external sign and the thing signified is most 
appropriate. We must rest entirely, in order that God may work in us; we 
must resign our own will, yield up our heart, and abandon all the lusts of 
the flesh. (Inst. II.8.29) 
 
This command to ‘Sabbath rest’ is somewhat ironic, given the constant struggle of the 
elect to inward scrutiny and outward suffering.  For Calvin, the Christian life involves 
an ongoing battle against concupiscence and pride, although the Sabbath rest of 
Hebrews has been achieved, at least in theory.   
 As stated above, mortification does not exist for its own sake.  Calvin 
prescribes the rigors of mortification with a stated purpose: ‘These, I say, are the 
surest foundations of a well-regulated life’ (Inst. III.6.3).  Thus, mortification is the 
means of achieving one of Calvin’s most important objectives – moderation. 
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5.2.2 Moderation 
Moderation (moderatio) is the most distinct and recurring theme within Calvin’s 
moral appeal; its language saturates his work.
490
  Calvin’s paradigm of moderation is 
modeled on God, the divine Moderator, who created the world in order to moderate 
and govern it. 
After learning that there is a Creator, it must forthwith infer that he is also 
a Governor and Preserver, and that, not by producing a kind of general 
motion in the machine of the globe as well as in each of its parts, but by a 
special providence sustaining, cherishing, superintending, all the things 
which he has made. (Inst. I.16.1) 
 
This position stands against both the disinterested, uninvolved creator of the 
Epicureans and the Stoic divine logos that dissolves into nature.  The divine 
moderator, who orders and sets all things in place, attends both to the cosmos at large 
and to the microcosm of humanity: ‘Hence we maintain, that by his providence, not 
heaven and earth and inanimate creatures only, but also the counsels and wills of men 
are so governed as to move exactly in the course which he has destined’ (Inst. I.16.8).   
Throughout his writings, Calvin makes frequent use of a particular set of terms 
– restraint, bridle, control, curb, subdue, measure, limit, due limit, excess, order, 
disorder – that say much about the sphere, mode of action, and intended result of this 
moderation.
491
  Within Calvin’s moral theology, moderation has three primary 
components: measure, restraint, and restoration of order.  These correspond to three 
questions regarding moderation – the what, the how, and the why.  The natural 
beginning is with the first component: its primary characteristic – the what of 
moderation – is moral measure.   
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5.2.2.1 Measure – the What of Moderation 
For Calvin, the idea of moderation is closely tied to the idea of measure; indeed, one 
commentator, following Calvin, often employs the word ‘measure’ when referring to 
his concept of moderation, to the point of using the terms interchangeably.  In his 
commentary on Isaiah, Calvin draws attention to the embedding of the word for 
moderation within the word for measure (Comm. Isa 27.8).   Thus, to moderate 
something means to bring it into compliance with its God-given measure: ‘So also 
God is said to treat all things by weight and measure, since he does nothing with 
confusion, but uses moderation; and, according to ordinary language, nothing is more 
or less than it should be’ (Comm. Dan 5.25-28).  Measure is itself a highly meaningful 
term for Calvin.  Appearing over one hundred times in the Institutes alone, it 
represents the sizes, portions, and relationships that are established by divine order, 
the limits that maintain this order, and the capacities assigned by one’s place in it.   
Calvin applies these concepts to all areas of life.  God governs the heavens by 
‘tempering the movement of the whole as to measure out day and night, months, 
years, and seasons’ (Inst. I.14.21).492  God assigns each person ‘a measure of faith,’ a 
‘curb to keep us modest’ (Inst. III.2.4).  Superstition is merely religion exceeding ‘the 
measure which reason prescribes’ (Inst. I.12.1); in an interesting similarity to 
Aquinas’ warnings against curiosity, Calvin counsels those ‘who love soberness, and 
are contented with the measure of faith’ to ‘briefly receive what is useful to be 
known’ (Inst. I.13.20; cf. Inst. III.21.3).  Even marital sexuality should exhibit 
‘measure and modesty’ and avoid ‘the extreme of wantonness’ (Inst. II.9.44).  Calvin 
also connects the ideas of measure and restraint: ‘Where too much liberty is given to 
them, they break forth without measure or restraint’ (Inst. III.10.3).  These last two 
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connections reveal the second component of Calvin’s use of moderation: its primary 
mechanism – the how of moderation – is moral restraint.   
 
5.2.2.2 Restraint – the How of Moderation 
Calvin believes that most moral errors result from exceeding the divinely appointed 
measure; thus, moderation primarily connotes an exercise of control and restraint.  For 
mature believers, who are capable of governing themselves, moderation functions as 
self-discipline. However, most people are unable to recognize or fulfill the external 
commands of righteousness; for them, other things must function as arbitrators of 
divine moderation.
493
 This restraint is accomplished through various means: reason, 
religion, civic law, even love.  ‘The Law,’ writes Calvin, ‘is designed as a bridle to 
curb men, and prevent them from turning aside to spurious worship’ (Inst. I.2.1).  
Reason also participates in the office of moderatio, ‘as reason ought to govern men 
and to bridle their appetites’ (Comm. Jude 10). Yet reason itself requires control: ‘The 
liberty of the human mind,’ he says, ‘must be restrained and bridled, that it not be 
wise, apart from the doctrine of Christ’ (Comm. 2 Cor 10.5).  As a means of 
governance, love will prevent someone from ‘breaking into ferocity’ (Comm. 1 Cor 
13.4).  Yet due to their nature as passions, even love and religion (particularly 
religious zeal) must themselves be moderated, lest they exceed their appropriate limits 
(Comm. Ex 11.8).  Interestingly (and in another echo of Aquinas), it has a strong 
connection with clemency, regulating ecclesial, civic, and even divine discipline (Inst. 
IV.12.10).  Although God’s power is without limit (Comm. Ps 61.1), even he chooses 
to act with moderation in the chastisement of his people: ‘This term “cup” serves to 
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express the moderation of the divine judgment; that the Lord, though he punish his 
people severely, still observes a limit’ (Comm. Isa 51.17).   
The virtues associated with ‘moderation’ also enlighten its meaning.  Grouped 
with abstinence, sobriety, and frugality (Inst. III.10.5), it implies both ‘disciplined 
frugality and orderly restraint.’494  This facet of moderation is highlighted by Calvin’s 
related terminology.  ‘Bridle’ (frenum) is a common companion to moderatio (e.g. 
Comm. Dan 10.3; Inst. IV.12.1), as some people ‘have need of a bridle to restrain 
them from giving full scope to their passions, and thereby utterly losing all desire 
after righteousness’ (Inst. II.7.11).  Regarding the tongue, he says ‘that if it be modest 
and well regulated, it becomes a bridle to the whole life’ (Comm. Jas 3.5).  It is often 
paired with even stronger language; Calvin urges that desires be ‘curbed’ (e.g. Inst. 
I.4.12; I.12.1; III.2.23), ‘chained’ (Inst. II.2.8; III.4.13), ‘repressed’ (Inst. I.14.1; 
III.2.22; IV.4.12), and ‘beaten down’ (Inst. III.15.4).  The unregenerate choose to 
indulge their carnal appetites, instead of ‘curbing them with the bridle of the Holy 
Spirit’ (Inst. I.4.4).  Through the ‘bridle of modesty’ God can ‘train his people to 
humility’ (Inst. III.2.23).   
 Self-control and restraint underlie much of Calvin’s thought, and he often 
appears to valorize them. He acknowledges that it can be difficult to accustom oneself 
to such self-mastery, ‘but the more difficult it is, the more strenuous ought to be his 
efforts to attain it’ (Comm. Ps 69.4).  Yet Calvin’s continued insistence on restraint 
serves a larger purpose, which is the final component in Calvin’s use of moderation. 
Its primary purpose – the why of moderation – is restoration of moral order.495   
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5.2.2.3 Restoration of Order – the Why of Moderation 
The goal of moderation is the restoration of order, which is divinely appointed and 
originated in the rule God instituted at creation.
496
  Calvin is deeply concerned with 
the establishment and maintenance of order, seeking to impress upon the elect ‘how 
much God is pleased with regular government and the good order of society’ (Comm. 
Isa 24.2). He frames his theological, ecclesiological, and civic efforts in a positive 
light, reminding the elect ‘how great a privilege it is to have it preserved among us’ 
(Comm. Isa 24.2).  For Calvin, the only true restoration of order occurs in the 
justifying death and resurrection of Jesus the Christ: ‘There has been an astonishing 
change of things, the condemnation of all men has been manifested, sin has been 
blotted out, salvation has been restored to men; and, in short, the whole world has 
been renewed, and everything restored to good order’ (Comm. Jn. 13.31).  The elect 
(inasmuch as they are joined to Christ) can participate in this restoration and renewal, 
as, thereby confirming their adoption as the children of God (Inst. III.6.1).  However, 
the corruption of the present life means that the restoration is incomplete until the 
eschaton; hence the need for mortification.  Mortification and moderation have 
something of a cyclical, reinforcing relationship.  Mortification facilitates moderation 
by restraining immorality and wickedness, as when Calvin describes the various 
forms of self-denial in Titus 2.11-14 as various parts of ‘a well-ordered life’ (Inst. 
III.7.3).  Moderation, in turn, reinforces the prohibition of sin, as ‘when good is 
ordered, the evil which is opposed to it is forbidden’ (Inst. II.8.9).   
Moderation is an operative concept for Calvin, as it is the means by which this 
restoration is possible.  In fact, Calvin employs moderation in a manner similar to 
Augustine’s use of continence.   Through continence, Augustine is brought to 
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conversion and restored to God (conf. 8.11.27, 10.29.40); through moderation, Calvin 
will bring all the elect into concord and harmony with the righteousness of God (Inst. 
III.6.1).  Indeed, he sounds quite Augustinian as he describes God’s loving 
recollection of his people: ‘For when we were scattered abroad like lost sheep, 
wandering through the labyrinth of this world, he brought us back again to his own 
fold’ (Inst. III.6.2).497  There is also the analogy of healing present in both accounts.  
For Augustine, the goal of continence is ‘not to repress some evils by other evils, but 
to heal all evils by goods’ (cont. 28); similarly, Calvin speaks of God ‘curing the 
diseases’ of wicked and disordered desire (Inst. II.3.3).  This passage highlights 
Calvin’s differing views of the elect amongst the world: moderation heals in the elect 
those things which interfere with ‘the established order of things’, whereas in the 
unregenerate, they are merely restrained (Inst. II.3.3).   
Calvin implicitly follows Augustine in his moral thought, particularly 
regarding the life of the flesh.  Like Augustine, Calvin views concupiscence as the 
source of inner and outer corruption; and he appears to follow Augustine in the 
manner of the remedy as well.  That is, moderation functions in a similar manner for 
Calvin as continence does for Augustine, in that it is the mechanism by which the 
Christian life is enabled to resist against corruption and grow into all godliness.   
 
5.2.2.4 Conclusions on Moderation in Calvin 
Calvin treatment of moderation contains several classical echoes.  At times, Calvin’s 
moderation sounds quite like the Aristotelian mean: ‘We must therefore observe a 
mean, that we may use them with a pure conscience, whether for necessity or for 
pleasure’ (Inst. III.10.1).  Interestingly, Calvin also sounds somewhat Thomistic at 
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times; he recognizes the importance of meeting the needs of this life (Inst. III.10.2), 
and he acknowledges that ‘special propriety’ which belongs to ‘the part that nature 
has assigned to him’ (Comm. 1 Cor 7.36.).  Finally, Calvin commends moderation 
instead of the ‘hardened stupidity’ of Stoic apatheia, and does so by citing the 
example of Christ (Comm. Jn 11.33).
498
   
Calvin lived during a time of genuine chaos and sought to reestablish some 
sort of order on earth that mirrored the cosmic order instituted and sustained by the 
active work of God.  In this reading, moderation tends to the somewhat pessimistic 
conception of order as a fear of losing control of an out-of-control world.  This is not 
a negative in itself, as order originates from God and is a part of all civil society; 
however, it does not contain the fullness of the positive conception of order as balance 
and harmony.
499
  Other readings are more positive.  For Raymond Anderson, 
moderation, which begins as ‘one of Calvin’s most problematic concepts’, is actually 
the link between his ideas of the ‘reflective address’ and the ‘active expressional’ 
components of the believer’s life, between internal devotion and external 
righteousness.  Neither a mean between extremes nor an ironclad system of control, 
moderation serves as a system of guidance, ‘an ordering process through which our 
actions are kept relevant and efficient in terms of their use.’500  He employs the 
illustration of a court moderator, overseeing the business at hand.  Ultimately, 
moderation (like most of Calvin’s moral theory) relies primarily upon God.  ‘Nothing 
is more useful for preserving our moderation,’ he says, ‘than to depend upon God’s 
help, and having the testimony of a good conscience, to rely upon his judgment’ 
                                                 
498
 Leithart, ‘Moderation’, notes the non-biblical sources for much of Calvin’s conception of 
moderation, particularly when associated with tranquility of mind (69-74). 
499
 Hopfl, 54. 
500
 Anderson, 319-20. 
221 
 
(Comm. Ps 34.16).  The next and final step is considering the relationship between 
moderation and temperance in Calvin’s moral thought. 
 
5.2.3. Temperance 
As with those considered so far in this thesis, Calvin uses the term ‘temperance’ in 
both a narrow and a comprehensive sense, and with regard to both particular objects 
and to a more general lifestyle.  As a rule, Calvin employs temperance in a secondary 
capacity, subsuming it within the larger categories of mortification and moderation.  
However, it remains a significant moral concept, retaining facets from its depiction 
within both the classical and Christian traditions. 
  
5.2.3.1 The Narrow Sense of Temperance 
In practical matters, and regarding the traditional objects of temperance and 
moderation, Calvin takes a fairly central position.  Regarding the use of created 
goods, Calvin moves between natural use, ‘common sense’ principles and interjected 
scriptural norms (Inst. III.10.1-3).  He recognizes both the necessity and the 
attractiveness of these goods: ‘For if we are to live, we must use the necessary 
supports of life; nor can we even shun those things which seem more subservient to 
delight than to necessity’ (Inst. III.10.1).  Again, Calvin almost echoes Aquinas in his 
view on the ‘natural use of created goods’ (Inst. III.10.1).501  The point common to 
both his rationales is that moderation enables believers to use created goods ‘only in 
so far as they assist our progress, rather than retard it’ (Inst. III.10.1).  Again sounding 
almost strikingly Aristotelian, he admits the difficulty of not falling into excess, either 
in indulgence or austerity, and cites Paul’s advice to ‘use the world without abusing 
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it’ (1 Cor. 7.30-1).  Yet he clearly distinguishes between the occasion of fasting and 
the lifestyle of temperance, ‘for the children of God, we know, ought through their 
whole life to be sober and temperate in their habits’ (Comm. Joel 2.15-17; cf. Comm. 
Dan 10.2-3; Comm. Matt 4:1-4; Mark 1:12-13; Lk 4:1-4).  He has little patience for 
the overly austere, ‘inhuman philosophy’ that ‘not only maliciously deprives us of the 
lawful fruit of the divine beneficence, but cannot be realised without depriving man of 
all his senses, and reducing him to a block’ (Inst. III.10.3).  Despite his rhetoric of 
restraint, Calvin does appreciate the good gifts of creation; ‘we hold that the object of 
creating all things,’ he says, ‘was to teach us to know their author, and feel grateful 
for his indulgence’ (Inst. III.10.3).  In another curiously Thomistic echo, Calvin 
exhibits something of an exitus-reditus structure in his thought on created goods: all 
things come from God, and the use of them should direct us, with gratitude, back to 
their Creator.  
 
5.2.3.2 Sexuality and Continence 
This commonsensical approach to creation is perhaps most clearly seen in his thought 
on sexuality.  While still retaining some of the deep-seated unease it evokes in 
Augustine, Calvin accepts the reality of sexual desire in a far more realistic manner 
than did Augustine or the early church fathers.  This, combined with the Reformation 
distrust of all things Catholic, forms his thought on sexual practice.  Unlike 
Augustine, he did not encourage or valorize the practice of sexual continence; in fact, 
he castigates those persons ‘who grant no pardon when any one proves unequal to the 
performance of his vow’ (Inst. IV.13.17).  Celibacy is ‘a special grace which the Lord 
bestows only on certain individuals, in order that they may be less encumbered in his 
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service’ (Inst. II.8.43).  Particular decisions regarding sexuality should arise directly 
from each individual’s ability and gifting. 
Do we not oppose God, and nature as constituted by him, if we do not 
accommodate our mode of life to the measure of our ability? The Lord 
prohibits fornication, therefore he requires purity and chastity. The only 
method which each has of preserving it is to measure himself by his 
capacity. (Inst. II.8.43) 
 
To attempt total continence is to oppose God and the design of his creation.  The 
important point, for Calvin, is that the Lord prohibits fornication and requires chastity.  
The ‘mode of life’ is therefore to be determined by each person’s capacity for sexual 
renunciation, determined by self-measure.  Accurate self-knowledge is what sets the 
course of each person’s sexual life; self-control is required merely to maintain a pure 
and chaste life within these bounds.  Marital sexual chastity is therefore perfectly 
acceptable, what he calls ‘an equitable course’ (Inst. IV.13.17).   
However, even this should observe the measure of creation.  Husbands and 
wives should maintain ‘sobriety of behavior’ to honor ‘the dignity and temperance of 
married life’ (Inst. II.8.44).  Marriage among the believers should display ‘measure 
and modesty’ and ‘not run to the extreme of wantonness,’ which Ambrose calls 
‘committing adultery with one’s wife’ (Inst. II.8.44).  This moderation beyond the 
sexual act, as the Lord ‘is entitled to possess us entirely, requires integrity of body, 
soul, and spirit’ (Inst. II.8.44).  One should avoid ‘lascivious attire, obscene gestures, 
and impure conversation’ and not ‘lay snares for our neighbor’s chastity’ (Inst. 
II.8.44).  The central point, as with all created goods, is to remember their origin in 
God.  ‘When spouses are made aware that their union is blessed by the Lord,’ he says, 
‘they are thereby reminded that they must not give way to intemperate and 
unrestrained indulgence. For though honourable wedlock veils the turpitude of 
incontinence, it does not follow that it ought forthwith to become a stimulus to it’ 
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(Inst. II.8.44).  Even within the bounds of marital fidelity, sexuality should display 
restraint and moderation. 
 
5.2.3.3 The Comprehensive Sense of Temperance 
The moderation of marital sexuality within the ‘measure of creation’ reveals a fuller, 
broader sense of temperance than these particular accounts might indicate.  Running 
alongside these more specific applications more of temperance are more ‘classical’ 
themes of self-governance, preservation of piety and righteousness, and sober living.  
The fullest treatment of temperance occurs in the commentary on Titus.  
But as the exercises of godliness may be regarded as appendages to the 
first table, so ‘temperance,’ which Paul mentions in this passage, aims at 
nothing else than keeping the law, and, as I said before about patience, is 
added to the former as a seasoning. Nor does the Apostle contradict 
himself, when at one time he describes patience, and at another time 
temperance, as the perfection of a holy life; for they are not distinct 
virtues, since sōphrosynē (here translated temperance) includes patience 
under it. (Comm. Titus 2.12)
502
 
 
Temperance appears here, not merely as the virtue of eating and drinking, but in the 
larger sense of the well-ordered life.  Its stated goal is ‘keeping the law’, which means 
the maintenance of external righteousness, an enormously important theme for 
Calvin.
503
  Temperance ‘seasons’ the presence of piety and righteousness, in the 
preservative sense; through temperance, piety and righteousness are preserved. It is 
therefore no surprise that he calls it ‘the perfection of a holy life.’  The comparison of 
temperance and patience (both of which operate through self-denial to reinforce 
righteousness) recalls the similar parallel between Calvin’s moderation and 
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Augustine’s continence, and the fact that Augustine’s On Continence and On Patience 
display similar styles of argument reinforces Calvin’s placing them in parallel.504 
This comprehensive sense of temperance extends throughout his commentary 
on Titus.  Children should be ‘educated to temperance and frugality’ (Comm. Titus 
1.6).  Young women should be instructed in temperance by the elder women, leading 
‘chaste and decent lives’ (Comm. Titus 2.4).   
In short, he wishes women to be restrained, by conjugal love and 
affection for their children, from giving themselves up to 
licentious attachments, he wishes them to rule their own house in a sober 
and orderly manner, forbids them to wander about in public places, 
bids them be chaste, and at the same time modest, so as to be subject to 
the dominion of their husbands. (Comm. Titus 2.4) 
 
Here, temperance bespeaks chastity, modesty, and overall self-rule.  This passage 
contains some interesting classical echoes.  Calvin approvingly cites Socrates and 
Pericles calling sōphrosynē the primary virtue for women (Comm. Titus 2.1-5, n.240).  
He also cites Plato, who he says regarded temperance as that which ‘cures the whole 
understanding of man’ (Comm. Titus 2.6).  He then equates this with being 
‘well regulated and obedient to reason’ (Comm. Titus 2.6).  Temperance facilitates the 
gaining of knowledge (Comm. 2 Pet 1.8), which sounds similar to the function of 
Aristotelian sōphrosynē as ‘saving phronēsis’ (Eth.Nic. 1140b11-12).  Calvin also 
approvingly notes Aristotle’s distinction between incontinence and intemperance, 
noting that in the incontinent person, ‘when the passion is over, repentance 
immediately succeeds’ but the intemperate person does not respond to ‘a sense of sin’ 
(Inst. II.2.23).  Temperance, therefore, is implicitly connected with having one’s 
actions and one’s intentions in alignment. 
As with moderation, temperance is often grouped with terms that enlighten its 
meaning.  Both temperance and chastity are grouped under ‘sobriety’, which Calvin 
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describes as ‘the pure and frugal use of temporal goods, and patient endurance in 
want’ (Inst. III.7.3; cf. Comm. Luke 16.1-15).  While the temperate man does not 
indulge in excessive eating or drinking, this does not express ‘the whole of 
temperance’ (Comm. Jas 1.27).  The whole of temperance, rather, is ‘spiritual 
sobriety, when all our thoughts and affections are so kept as not to be inebriated with 
the allurements of this world’ (Comm. 1 Pet 1.13).    Thus, temperance is not as large 
or operative a category as moderation, but it is certainly more expansive than mere 
regulation of the physical appetites. 
 
5.2.4 Conclusions on Temperance and Moderation in Calvin 
As noted earlier, Calvin is not generally regarded as the go-to source for an 
examination of temperance per se; for despite sharing terminology and moral arena 
with classical and Catholic virtue, Calvin’s treatment of temperance and moderation 
diverge in several important areas.  Nevertheless, several valuable insights have 
emerged.  First, moderation is clearly a central concept for Calvin.  Its negative 
connotations include restraint, repression, and control; however, they are balanced by 
the positive nuances of governance, order, measure, and model.  It has both positive 
and negative glosses; it both connects and restrains. As a rule, Calvin’s moderation is 
more operative than descriptive, more active than passive, more explicitly tied to 
structure than to amount than its traditional understanding.  The concept of 
‘moderation-in-all-things’ is not completely overturned, but it yields to a model that is 
noticeably more dynamic, despite its negative overtones.  Calvin’s moderation can 
provide an alternative to a stagnant deontology; instead of ‘a tense and static balance 
between warring principles,’ it is ‘a responsive process, which steers the whole 
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man.’505  At times, Calvin almost seems to view moderation as an end in itself, as 
when he says, ‘We must so cherish moderation that we do not try to make God render 
account to us, but so reverence his secret judgments as to consider his will the truly 
just cause of all things’ (Inst. I.17.1).  It is critical to remember that moderation, like 
all things in God’s kingdom, only functions well when it serves a larger and proper 
end.  Calvin considers those ends to be the restoration of the order instituted by God, 
both provisionally and in the eschatological sense. 
Temperance, on the other hand, appears to share more similarities with its 
classical counterpart; and it contains both a practical and a systematic sense.  Not 
surprisingly, its focus in concrete matters is largely upon restraint and control in the 
carnal life.  In this, it promotes a middle, way, an ‘equitable course’ between 
extravagance and deprivation.  It allows humanity to employ the natural things of this 
life, using and enjoying all created goods in a manner that reflects and reinforces 
God’s created order.  Marital sexuality should be measured and modest.  Even in its 
more practical sense, Calvin carefully distinguishes between occasional actions and a 
truly temperate lifestyle.  This lifestyle of true temperance exhibits the larger, more 
comprehensive sense of temperance as chastity, modesty, and overall self-rule.  
Temperance brings a sober reflection and examen to human desire and reason; by 
enabling mortification, it empowers the continued pursuit of holy living via the 
keeping of the law (both moral and civil).  These broader treatments of temperance 
also contain the strongest classical echoes in Calvin’s work on temperance, which 
reinforces the comprehensive aspect of its nature as a moral good. 
Calvin’s treatment of temperance reflects the distinctive changes in his overall 
moral thought as a result of the Reformation.  As a virtue (and generally as a moral 
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potency), temperance is, for two reasons, rather demoted in status.  First, because the 
larger ethical framework of classical and Catholic thought has been abandoned, 
Calvin does not recognize the ‘cardinality’ of the four cardinal virtues.  In this 
practical sense, temperance appears as part of the larger category of mortification and 
restraint, the reverse of the classical position wherein self-control was the imperfect 
version of the fully-realized virtue of temperance.  Thus temperance does not exist 
qua virtue in the manner sustained, in some way, throughout classical and Catholic 
moral thought.  Second, what does remain of the virtue of temperance is incorporated 
somewhat under the larger moral category of moderation.  That is, the practice of 
temperance in a sense enables mortification, which enables moderation, which in turn 
reestablishes the natural order lost after the fall.  Temperance and moderation, in 
different ways, both appear in an overall, comprehensive sense, although moderation 
is more operative and temperance more practical, less wide-ranging.   
In Book III of the Institutes, Calvin admits the seeming impossibility of 
human attempts to pursue righteousness and avoid the pollution of sin. 
I insist not so strictly on evangelical perfection, as to refuse to 
acknowledge as a Christian any man who has not attained it.  In this way 
all would be excluded from the Church, since there is no man who is not 
far removed from this perfection, while many, who have made but little 
progress, would be undeservedly dejected. (Inst. III.6.5) 
 
‘What then?’ he asks, as if to forestall the questions he knows to be coming.  His 
answer reflects the teleology (although often implicit) he perceives within the 
Christian life.   
Let us set this before our eye as the end at which we ought constantly to 
aim.  Let it be regarded as the goal towards which we are to run… If 
during the whole course of our life we seek and follow, we shall at length 
attain it, when relieved from the infirmity of the flesh we are admitted to 
full fellowship with God. (Inst. III.6.5) 
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Calvin may not be overly optimistic about humanity’s progress, even the elect; but he 
keeps his eyes on the promised reward of heaven.  ‘Let every one of us go as far as his 
humble ability enables him …No one will travel so badly as not to make some degree 
of progress’ (Inst. III.6.5).  While encouraging each believer in their journey (and 
despite the strictness of his ecclesiastical and civic expectations) Calvin was generally 
pessimistic regarding significant growth in sanctification.  In stark contrast to this 
position stands the author of ‘A Plain Account of Christian Perfection,’ John Wesley. 
 
5.3 Wesleyan Temperance 
As noted above, John Calvin engaged virtue when the state of the Reformation was 
still tenuous, so any interaction with virtue risked strengthening the scholastic moral 
theology of the Catholic Church.  John Wesley, however, wrote within the context of 
a firmly established Reformation; that is, there was a viable, credible religious system 
outside of Catholicism, recognized and established in a multitude of countries and 
contexts.  Moreover, John Wesley maintained his allegiance to the Church of 
England, which combined elements of both Catholicism and Protestantism.
506
  
Therefore, classical and medieval moral theory could be engaged with less anxiety 
and more vigor.   
 
5.3.1 Theological Foundations 
Wesley was in agreement with the early Reformers on original sin and the total 
depravity of man, and on the consequent lack of any internal resources for either 
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holiness or true happiness.  Humanity is now ‘dead in spirit, dead to God, dead in sin’ 
(Serm. 5.I.5).
507
   
[This depravity is] the condition wherein all men are since the Fall.  We are 
all now ‘shapen in wickedness, and in sin did our mother conceive us.’  Our 
nature is altogether corrupt, in every power and faculty. And our will, 
depraved equally with the rest, is wholly bent to indulge our natural 
corruption. (Serm. 48.I.3) 
 
While ‘vestiges’ of the good man remain, they are damaged and in need of saving 
grace.  Following from this was the doctrine, shared by Calvin and Luther, that 
justification was not by works but by grace.   
 
5.3.1.1 A ‘Hair’s Breadth from Calvinism’ 
While agreeing with Calvin on the centrality of grace, Wesley did allow that a shadow 
of the image and likeness of God could remain, through which one could apprehend 
his fallen state.  He maintains that the faith by which one accepts Christ is itself a gift 
of divine grace, proceeding from God the Father via the urging of the Holy Spirit 
(Serm. 5.IV.5).  While human nature is fully depraved, grace does not destroy or 
suppress it, but rather perfects it (Serm. 29, II.5.12).  Wesley never preached sola fide, 
as he saw and preached the role of works as the fruit of a life redeemed.
508
  Wesley 
believed that God’s grace could both justify and sanctify, that it could both acquit and 
transform the believer.  Moreover, his emphasis upon ‘entire sanctification’ and 
‘Christian perfection’ stood in contrast to Calvin’s pessimism about the possibilities 
of human ‘perfection’ (Inst. III.6.5).509  This emphasis on sanctification reveals his 
firm commitment to holiness.  For Wesley, this ‘Christian perfection is not a state of 
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sinlessness, but neither is it a perpetual struggle.
510
 It is, he says in almost Platonic 
language, ‘a peace and harmony, not a mixture of contrary affections’ (Serm. 83.10).   
 
5.3.1.2 Happiness and Holiness  
Moreover, Wesley frames his moral theology in a substantially teleological way.
511
  In 
‘The Unity of the Divine Being,’ Wesley answers the question ‘For what end did God 
create man?’ with ‘to glorify and enjoy him forever.’  He then continues: ‘You are 
made to be happy in God.’  ‘He made you,’ Wesley states, ‘and he made you to be 
happy in him, and nothing else can make you happy’ (Serm. 114.10).512  Thus, his 
idea of holiness was eventually to be aligned with happiness.
513
  While Calvin made 
the occasional nod to teleology, Wesley’s exhortations to entire sanctification suggest 
both journey and telos, as the believer strives to live into the fullness of his 
justification.  This is revealed in his commonly referring to the Christian life as a via 
salutis, a ‘way of salvation.’   Additionally, his extended treatment of the Beatitudes, 
a centerpiece of his moral thought, is full of the language of blessedness.
514
  
Furthermore, this happiness will increase as we ‘grow up into the measure of 
the stature of the fullness of Christ’ (Serm. 40.II.1).  Wesley’s conception of 
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happiness is not classical, but lies firmly in the Augustinian tradition.  In response to 
the question ‘what is religion then?’ he answers: ‘It is neither more nor less than love; 
it is love which “is the fulfilling of the law, the end of the commandment”’ (Serm. 
8.III.2).  In Augustinian terms, Wesley exhorts believers to ‘this love ruling the whole 
life, animating all our tempers and passions, directing all our thoughts, words, and 
actions’ (Serm. 84.III.2).515  It is, he says, ‘the essence, the spirit, the life of all virtue’ 
(Serm. 17.I.11).  The phrase he coined to encompass this rule of love, one of his most 
signature doctrines, was ‘Christian perfection’. 
 
5.3.1.3 Christian Perfection 
Wesley outlines his doctrine of Christian perfection in Standard Sermon 40, 
‘Thoughts on Christian Perfection’ (based on Phil 3.12), and later in the treatise A 
Plain Account of Christian Perfection.  For Wesley, ‘perfection’ is not a translation of 
the Latin perfectio/perfectus (‘faultless’, ‘unimprovable’), but rather of the Greek 
teleōisis (‘mature, complete’) which he received indirectly through the Fathers, and 
directly through Jeremy Taylor, Thomas á Kempis’ The Imitation of Christ, and 
William Law’s A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life.516  It is a ‘dynamic process’ 
of devotio, giving one’s whole life to God in a disciplined and aspiring manner.  Both 
the goal and foundation of Christian faith, it has been described as a telos in 
holiness.
517
   
Wesley’s talk of perfection reflects the influence of the virtue tradition.  In ‘A 
Plain Account of Christian Perfection’, Wesley sounds much like On the Morals of 
the Catholic Church when he defines being a ‘perfect Christian as ‘loving God with 
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all our heart, and mind, and soul’ (Acct. 17).  Although it will certainly affect the 
believer’s actions, perfection is chiefly concerned with the holy tempers; it is ‘a 
habitual disposition of the soul’ (Serm. 17.I.1).  Indeed, perfection means ‘the humble, 
gentle, patient love of God ruling all the tempers, moods, and action, the whole heart, 
by the whole life.’518  Christian perfection thus means embodying ‘these virtues of 
Christ,’ the imitatio Christi.519  Yet mere imitation is not enough; the way of perfected 
love is nothing less than theosis, the participation in the divine life through knowledge 
of Christ and the work of the Spirit.  This renewal into the image of God, possible 
only through the righteousness of Christ, is the believer’s true telos.520   
A proper understanding of Wesley’s eudaimonism sheds light on his concept 
of perfection, particularly the confusion between its instantaneous and progressive 
conceptions.  As opposed to the idea of perfection as an immediate and completed 
occurrence (like the immediate nature of justification), Wesley’s perfection was an 
important part of the via salutis.  It is perfection in love, rooted in Christ who loved us 
and who we are called to imitate (Eph 5.1-2).  In point of fact, ‘A Plain Account’ was 
a reaction to the ‘entire sanctification’ movement in the American colonies, who 
preached a doctrine of instant, sinless perfection that Wesley feared would lead to 
self-righteousness.
521
   While a source of disagreement with the Calvinists, Christian 
perfection aligned quite naturally with the categories of holiness and happiness.  
However, Wesley’s emphasis upon happiness is balanced by a doctrine explicitly 
shared with Calvin – his consistent emphasis on self-denial.   
                                                 
518
 The Letters of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M., John Telford, ed. (London: Epworth Press, 1931), 5:38 
(letter to Charles Wesley dated Jan 27, 1767). 
519
 A good discussion of Wesley’s use of imitatio Christi is Richard Heitzenrater, ‘The Imitatio Christ 
and the Great Commandment: Virtue and Obligation in Wesley’s Ministry with the Poor’, in The 
Portion of the Poor: Good News to the Poor in the Wesleyan Tradition, M. Douglas Meeks, ed. 
(Nashville TN: Kingwood Books, 1995). 
520
 Long, Moral Theology, 175-6. 
521
 See Outler, John Wesley, 251 and 299. 
234 
 
5.3.1.4 Self-Denial 
For Wesley, as for Calvin, self-denial is a core component of the moral life; indeed, 
he calls it ‘this grand doctrine of Christianity’ (Serm. 48.I.1).  The burden of corrupt 
human nature requires ‘that we resist and counteract that corruption, not at some 
times, or in some things only, but at all times and in all things. Here, therefore, is a 
farther ground for constant and universal self-denial’ (Serm. 48.I.3).  Like Calvin, 
Wesley divides self-denial into two portions.  The first is denying oneself, which he 
calls ‘the denying or refusing to follow our own will, from a conviction that the will 
of God is the only rule of action to us’ (Serm. 48.I.2).  This denial is not arbitrary, but 
refers to ‘any pleasure which does not spring from, and lead to, God’ (Serm. 48.I.6).  
Avoiding such self-denial is pleasurable in the moment, but the consequences are dire, 
‘strengthening the perverseness of our will’ and ‘increasing the corruption of our 
nature’ (Serm. 48.I.5).  The second component is taking up the cross, which Wesley 
defines as ‘anything contrary to our will, anything displeasing to our nature,’ which 
‘goes a little farther than denying ourselves; it rises a little higher, and is a more 
difficult task to flesh and blood; – it being more easy to forego pleasure, than to 
endure pain’ (Serm. 48.I.7). 
The importance of self-denial to Wesley’s moral and social thought is difficult 
to overstate.  All varieties of ‘hindrances of our attaining grace or growing therein’ 
fall under these two categories: ‘either we do not deny ourselves, or we do not take up 
our cross’ (Serm. 48.4).  He makes the connection explicit in ‘Causes of the Inefficacy 
of Christianity’: 
Why has Christianity done so little good, even among us? …Plainly, 
because we have forgot, or at least not duly attended to, those solemn 
words of our Lord, ‘If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, 
and take up his cross daily, and follow me.’ It was the remark of a holy 
man, several years ago, ‘Never was there before a people in the Christian 
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Church, who had so much of the power of God among them, with so little 
self-denial.’ (Serm. 116.13) 
 
Not only is one’s salvation endangered by lack of self-denial, the efficacy of the 
Church is imperiled as well.  Wesley exhorts his followers to a level of actual holiness 
far beyond that urged by Calvin, perhaps because Calvin does not believe it possible 
in humanity’s corrupted state. Wesley’s emphasis on the journey of holiness and the 
fruits of the Christian life lead naturally into the topic of virtue; for, as we have seen, 
this is a significant part of the language he used for holiness. 
 
5.3.2 Virtue in Wesley 
While Calvin occasionally uses the word ‘virtue’ and occasionally employs it in a 
semi-classical light, Wesley moves much closer to the classical usage of virtue, both 
the word and the larger moral system.  However, Wesley’s concept of virtue, like 
happiness, is rooted more deeply in scripture than in classical thought.  For Wesley, 
virtue follows two categories: those possessed before the saving event, and those 
acquired afterwards.  Unlike Luther, Wesley did not despise the ‘pagan’ virtues of the 
ancients.
522
  Rather, he called them ‘natural virtues’ of an ‘obligatory nature;’ this, he 
says, is ‘barely the faith of a heathen’ (Serm. 1.1.1).523  Without the propitiation of 
Christ and the renewal of the Spirit, they are empty. Thus they bring nothing to the 
saving encounter (Serm. 5.4.4; 4.8).
524
  Moreover, the virtues are insecure ‘without 
constant self-denial’ (Serm. 17.II.8).   
After the saving encounter, there are new options in the moral toolbox.  The 
knowledge of Christ and the power of the Spirit work, as noted above, to bring the 
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believer more and more fully into participation in the divine nature.  Can this new 
work properly be called virtue?  Wesley says yes, although he imbues the term with 
fresh meaning.  It is related to righteousness and ‘true holiness’ (Serm. 59.1).  The law 
of God is ‘all virtues in one’; law is ‘divine virtue and wisdom in visible form’ (Serm. 
32.2.4).  Wesley calls it ‘godly sincerity’ in order to point to its end in God and thus 
distinguish it from the sincerity of the heathens (Serm. 12.13).  Second Peter 1.3-4 
says that Christian virtue is the means by which ‘we may obtain all that He has 
promised’ (Expl. 2 Pet. 1.4).525  In anticipation of the eschaton, virtue acts now to 
refine the heart and make us cheerful and lively (Serm. 137.2.2).  And as noted above, 
virtue is characterized by love, which is its ‘intrinsic excellence,’ and from which 
flow actions that are beautiful (Serm. 17.2.3). 
 
5.3.2.1 The Role of Reason 
Wesley does not locate true virtue in the pure function of rationality.  In ‘The Case of 
Reason Impartially Considered,’ he defines reason as neither ‘carnal reason’ nor as 
‘the highest gift of God,’ looking instead for a ‘medium between these extremes’ 
(Serm. 70.5).
526
  For Wesley, reason is best described as understanding: ‘It means a 
faculty of the human soul; that faculty which exerts itself in three ways; – by simple 
apprehension, by judgement, and by discourse’ (Serm. 70.1.2).  It is God-given and 
‘of unspeakable use’ in ‘even a moderate share of reason in all our worldly 
employments’ (Serm. 70.II.10).  However, he is careful to distinguish between what 
reason can and cannot do.  Notably, it cannot produce the theological virtues of faith, 
hope, and love:  
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Let reason do all that reason can: Employ it as far as it will go. But, at the 
same time, acknowledge it is utterly incapable of giving either faith, or 
hope, or love; and, consequently, of producing either real virtue, or 
substantial happiness. Expect these from a higher source, even from the 
Father of the spirits of all flesh. (Serm. 70.II.10) 
 
Thus, any true happiness must come from God as divine gift (Serm. 70.II.10).
527
 
 
5.3.2.2 Virtue as ‘Holy Tempers’ 
Having dispensed with the classical ‘intellectual virtues’, the question becomes: Are 
the ‘theological virtues’ of Aquinas still virtues for Wesley?  How does Wesley’s 
concept of virtue relate to faith, hope, and love?  In ‘The Circumcision of the Heart,’ 
Wesley identifies these concepts with holiness.  Circumcision of the heart is ‘that 
habitual disposition of the heart… which is termed holiness’ (Serm. 17.I.1).  This 
implies the cleansing of the self from sin, and receiving the virtues of Christ Jesus, 
which are humility, faith, hope, and love.  So the theological virtues are present, and 
arise directly from the believer’s sanctification. 
This passage brings out an important point on language, which Wesley 
employs with a conflation somewhat like Augustine.  While Wesley does use the 
word ‘virtue’, he more commonly uses ‘disposition’ and ‘temper’ in reference to the 
habituated, fixed state of being.
528
  Moreover, these dispositions are not natural (or 
even rational) in the classical sense; they are akin to the fruits of the Spirit and thus 
must be inculcated by the Holy Spirit.  They are ‘holy tempers.’  Wesley also uses the 
term ‘affections’ which, like their stronger counterparts the ‘passions,’ resemble the 
tempers in that they are also dispositions of the heart.  However, they are more 
‘transient,’ not as deeply established or stabilized as the tempers.  Wesley describes 
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 Note that Wesley does not use the phrase ‘theological virtues.’ 
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 Kenneth J. Collins, ‘John Wesley’s Topography of the Heart: Dispositions, Tempers, and 
Affections’, Methodist History 36:3 (1998), 162-75 (165), and Randy L. Maddox , Responsible Grace: 
John Wesley’s Practical Theology (Nashville TN: Abingdon Press, 1994), 69, both note that 
‘disposition’ and ‘temper’ are virtually interchangeable in Wesley’s writings. 
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them as ‘the will exerting itself [in] various ways’ (Serm. 62.I.4).  In other words, they 
are the expression of the will, the particular actualizations of an undergirding reality.      
In his sermon ‘On Zeal,’ Wesley paints a vivid picture of the relationship 
between the components of the holy life, a picture which underscores the vital 
importance of the tempers.   
In a Christian believer love sits upon the throne which is erected in the 
inmost soul; namely, love of God and man, which fills the whole heart, 
and reigns without a rival. In a circle near the throne are all holy tempers; 
- longsuffering, gentleness, meekness, fidelity, temperance; and if any 
other were comprised in ‘the mind which was in Christ Jesus.’ In an 
exterior circle are all the works of mercy, whether to the souls or bodies of 
men. By these we exercise all holy tempers- by these we continually 
improve them, so that all these are real means of grace, although this is 
not commonly adverted to. Next to these are those that are usually 
termed works of piety - reading and hearing the word, public, family, 
private prayer, receiving the Lord's supper, fasting or abstinence. Lastly, 
that his followers may the more effectually provoke one another to love, 
holy tempers, and good works, our blessed Lord has united them together 
in one body, the church, dispersed all over the earth - a little emblem of 
which, of the church universal, we have in every particular Christian 
congregation. (Serm. 92.II.5) 
As they sit closest to the throne of love, these ‘holy tempers’ are ‘the only means of 
being truly alive to God’ and are therefore more central to Wesley’s moral thought 
than works of piety or mercy, or the gathering of the believers (Serm. 92.II.10).  All 
works of righteousness are empty and void ‘unless they spring from holy tempers’ 
(Serm. 92.III.10).  ‘Orthodoxy’ (or ‘right opinions’) and the holy tempers also have a 
causal connection, as Wesley states that ‘wrong opinions in religion naturally lead to 
wrong tempers’ (Serm. 120.15).529  The discussion turns now to temperance, one of 
Wesley’s holy tempers.   
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 Wesley then maintains that wrong doctrine leads, not just to wrong tempers, but also to ‘wrong 
practices’ (Serm. 120.15).  This concern also appears in Sermon 116, ‘Causes of the Inefficacy of 
Christianity’, wherein lack of proper doctrine is one step leading to an ineffective faith; see 
Serm.116.7,8,13. 
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5.3.3 Wesleyan Temperance 
While not foremost among Wesley’s virtues, temperance does appear in his catalog.  
As with Calvin (and Augustine, and Aristotle), temperance appears in both a practical 
and a comprehensive sense.  And like Calvin, Wesley often appends temperance to 
larger moral concepts such as self-denial and holiness.  Its objects and meaning vary 
with the topic at hand, but some recurrent threads can be discerned.   
 
5.3.3.1 Practical Treatments of Temperance 
Wesley employs temperance in a practical manner across the range of his works.  In 
this, much of his usage displays a strong connection to self-control.  Wesley 
recommends ‘universal self-denial, temperance in all things, a firm resolve to take up 
the cross daily’ (Serm. 93.III.7), which will enable believers ‘to crucify the flesh, with 
its affections and lusts, its passions and desires, and, in consequence of that inward 
change, to fulfill all outward righteousness’ (Serm. 4.4).  Temperance aids in the 
promulgation of holiness, as virtues ‘without constant self-denial’ are inconstant and 
fickle (Serm. 17.2.8).  Abstinence from food he calls ‘no other than Christian 
temperance’ (Serm. 27.3.6), and he recommends fasting and temperance to bring 
bodies into subjection (Prin. 12.2).  The audience of Second Peter received this stern 
imperative: ‘Bear and forbear; sustain and abstain; deny yourself and take up your 
cross daily’ (Expl. 2 Pet. 1.6).  As one of the fruits of the Spirit, temperance partners 
with meekness to ‘crucify the flesh’ in order to ‘walk as Christ also walked’ (Serm. 
4.4).  It is connected with those persons who ‘contend’ by ‘using the most rigorous 
self-denial in food, sleep, and every other sensual indulgence’ (Expl. 1 Cor. 9.25).  
These forms of intemperance can be subtle, but are no less dangerous for their lack of 
vulgarity. 
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Perhaps they do not gratify this desire in a gross manner, so as to incur the 
imputation of intemperance; much less so as to violate health or impair 
their understanding by gluttony or drunkenness. But they live in a genteel, 
regular sensuality; in an elegant epicurism, which does not hurt the body, 
but only destroys the soul, keeping it at a distance from all true religion. 
(Serm. 78.I.5)   
 
Indeed, in light of Wesley’s concerns with luxury and the lack of self-denial, this 
‘elegant epicurism’ is as problematic as the coarsest excesses, as it prevents the 
believer from surrendering oneself to God’s salvific grace and prevents that ‘poverty 
of spirit’ which prepares the ground for the cultivation of the holy tempers.530  Wesley 
also counts unhealthful eating – wrong types, wrong amounts, wrong hours – to this 
genteel gluttony, using ‘neither fasting nor abstinence’ (Acct. 25.27).  These types of 
intemperance in food echo Aquinas’s ‘species of gluttony’ (II-II.148.4).531  And in an 
original move, Wesley connects temperance to the self-indulgence of poor sleep 
habits: the intemperate ‘do not rigorously adhere to what is best both for body and 
mind; otherwise they would constantly go to bed and rise early, and at a fixed hour’ 
(Acct. 25.27).  Redeeming the time from sleep is an ‘important branch’ of Christian 
temperance, whereas oversleep is a ‘fashionable intemperance’ that leads to other sins 
and to dullness (Serm. 93.II.8).   
 
5.3.3.2 The Comprehensive Sense of Temperance 
Like Calvin, Wesley appears to place ‘practical’ temperance under the larger category 
of self-denial – the reverse of the classical position.  Yet – again like Calvin, Wesley 
supplements his more functional interpretations with a comprehensive model of 
                                                 
530
 This concern found its way into the literature of the temperance movement.  Monohan advises 
housekeepers to cook ‘rationally and with a view to satisfy normal hunger and appetite, not to stimulate 
jaded palates or gorge extended stomachs’ (150).  This echoes the counsel of both Wesley and Aquinas 
against the cultivation of delicate appetites; see also 4.3.3.2 (B) above. 
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 Aquinas follows Gregory here (Moral. xxx.8). 
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temperance that recalls many of its classical themes.  Wesley’s explicit definition of 
temperance is found in his Explanatory Notes on Second Peter. 
But see that your knowledge be attended with temperance. (a) Christian 
temperance implies the voluntary abstaining from all pleasure which does 
not lead to God.   (b) It extends to all things inward and outward: the due 
government of every thought, as well as affection.  (c) “It is using the 
world,” so to use all outward, and so to restrain all inward things, (d) that 
they may become a means of what is spiritual; a scaling-ladder to ascend 
to what is above.  (e) Intemperance is to abuse the world.  He that uses 
anything below, looking no higher, and getting no further, is intemperate.  
(f) He that uses the creature only to attain to more of the Creator, is alone 
temperate, and walks as Christ himself walked. (Expl. 2 Pet 1.6)
532
 
 
Several points of importance emerge here.  First, temperance is ‘voluntary’; it cannot 
be coerced and retain its essential nature.  This implies a conscious choice to avoid 
those pleasures which are problematic for the via salutis.  Second, it is quite broad in 
scope, extending to ‘all things’ both ‘inward and outward.’  Wesley follows both 
Augustine and Aquinas here, expanding the role of temperance beyond the merely 
physical to include thoughts and affections.  Third, temperance has different roles for 
the ‘inward’ and outward’ things.  The rule for the outer things is utility; they are to be 
servants and not masters.  Thus, intemperance is abuse rather than use of these things, 
another Augustinian echo.
533
  The rule for the inward things is control; they 
(presumably, the affections, desires, and appetites) are to be held in check.  This 
utility and restraint implies that the inner and outer things are means to an end, 
implements by which the believer continues the journey of theosis.  The temperate 
person will recognize the opportunity, and the responsibility, to use the world to grow 
in holiness.  They will model their conduct after that of Christ.   
Temperance, therefore, is more than mere control, important though that may 
be.  It is a disposition that is ‘holy, heavenly, and divine’ (Serm. 69).  It is not narrow 
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 Wesley follows the standard translation of temperance in the Authorized Version of the New 
Testament; that is, he translates ‘temperance’ from enkrateia.   
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 See 4.2.2.1 above. 
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in its sphere, but concerns itself with ‘all intemperate or immoderate desires, whether 
of honour, gain, or sensual pleasure’ (Expl. Matt 23.25); it ‘flows from love, peace, 
and joy’ (Serm. 7.2.12).  It remains, fundamentally, a holy temper.  As such, it stands 
‘around the throne of love’ with several other tempers, whose company enhances and 
illuminates its nature.  Notable among these are sobriety, meekness, and humility. 
 
5.3.4 Associated Virtues 
Wesley has given some important jobs to temperance.  It is surprising, therefore, that 
it does not make a larger impact on Wesley’s moral theology.  One reason might be 
that Wesley, like so many good orators, was concerned with bringing a powerful 
message into each sermon, and the magnitude of his words on temperance were just 
so much rhetorical flourish.  Equally likely, however, is that Wesley indicates the 
importance of temperance in the virtues with which it tends to appear.  The most 
relevant of these are humility and sobriety.   
 
5.3.4.1 Humility 
Humility, which Wesley often identifies as ‘poverty of spirit,’ refers to ‘they who 
know themselves; who are convinced of sin; those to whom God hath given that first 
repentance, which is previous to faith in Christ’ (Serm. 21.I.4).  Linked with 
temperance in 2 Pet 1.4-6, humility places knowledge in right relationship with the 
entire person: ‘The more knowledge you have, the more renounce your own will; 
indulge yourself the less. ‘Knowledge puffeth up,’ and the great boasters of 
knowledge (the Gnostics) were those that ‘turned the grace of God into wantonness.  
But see that your knowledge be attended with temperance’ (Expl. 2 Pet 1.4-6).  When 
knowledge is attained and utilized temperately, the result is humility; it avoids that 
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knowledge that ‘puffeth up’ while simultaneously promoting self-denial.  It is a ‘right 
judgment of ourselves’ that ‘cleanses our minds from those high conceits of our own 
perfection from that undue opinion of our own abilities and attainments, which are the 
genuine fruit of a corrupted nature’ (Serm. 17.I.2).  It fosters an awareness of internal 
and external sin and its consequences (Serm. 21.I.7).  Thus, Wesleyan humility is a 
truthful self-knowledge that induces the believer to repentance, obedience and 
renunciation, echoing Augustine’s connection of humility to an awareness of human 
mortality and dependence upon God.
534
  And in a cycle of reinforcement (perhaps a 
‘virtuous circle’?), the pardoning of sin then yields ‘a deeper humility in the heart, and 
a stricter regulation in our words, in our actions, and in our sufferings’ (Acct. 11.2).   
 It is important to note that the status of humility as a ‘virtue’ is a matter of 
some debate.
535
  Wesley himself seems not to regard humility as a virtue, lest the 
believer grow proud in its acquisition: ‘This some have monstrously styled, ‘the virtue 
of humility’; thus teaching us to be proud of knowing we deserve damnation!’ (Serm. 
21.I.7).  The concept of taking pride in acknowledging one’s sinfulness is abhorrent to 
Wesley.  Instead, Wesley describes ‘true humility’ as ‘a kind of self-annihilation’, 
where one’s ego is minimized and God’s power is maximized (Acct. 11.2).  Stephen 
Long describes Wesley’s view of humility as ‘emptiness.’536  This makes any 
assessment of humility as a meta-virtue quite problematic, as ‘to make it the form of 
the virtues would be to welcome nihilism as the heart of the moral life.’537  Yet 
Wesley himself designates humility ‘the centre of all virtues’ (Acct. 11.2). However, 
he intends a different meaning than Augustine’s centralizing of humility.  Whereas for 
Augustine humility unites and indwells all the other virtues, Wesley sees it merely as 
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 Long, Moral Theology, 220. 
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‘the first step we take in running the race which is set before us’ (Serm. 21.I.7).  
Instead of a virtue per se, Wesleyan humility is ‘at most an entrance into virtue’, 
providing access for the believer yearning for sanctification.
538
   
 
5.3.4.2 Sobriety 
Although meekness and humility feature more prominently than sobriety or 
temperance in Wesley’s moral thought, the latter two concepts are still quite central.  
Sobriety is not, for Wesley, the virtue opposed to drunkenness; rather, it is primarily 
an intellectual, rational state of being.  In Acts 26.25, Paul is not mad with too much 
learning, but he ‘utters the words of truth and sobriety.’  Wesley says this sobriety is 
‘the very reverse of madness… which remains even when the men of God act with the 
utmost vehemence’ (Expl. Acts 26.25).  In ‘The Nature of Enthusiasm,’ religion is 
connected with a ‘sound mind’ and thus ‘stands in direct opposition to madness of 
every kind’ (Serm. 37.12).  Sobriety, then, ‘governs our whole life according to true 
wisdom’ (Expl. 1 Tim.2.9).  Indeed, in the Confession in the Book of Common 
Prayer, which Wesley would have known by heart, prays ‘that we may hereafter live a 
godly, righteous, and sober life, to the glory of thy holy name.’  Thus, sobriety is 
comparable in significance to godliness and righteousness, an association indicative 
of its importance.
539
 
The connection between temperance and sobriety is highlighted by the fact 
that ‘sobriety’ is Wesley’s preferred translation of the New Testament occurrences of 
sōphrosynē, as the instances above.  However, its fullest definition appearing in his 
commentary on Titus: 
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Sobriety, in the scripture sense, is rather the whole temper of a man, than 
a single virtue in him.  It comprehends all that is opposite to the 
drowsiness of sin, the folly of ignorance, the unholiness of disordered 
passions.  Sobriety is no less than all the powers of the soul being 
consistently and constantly awake, duly governed by heavenly prudence, 
and entirely conformable to holy affections. (Expl. Titus 2.12) 
 
Sōphrosynē is, for Wesley, ‘the whole temper of a man’, serving in an architectonic 
sense that echoes continence in Augustine and moderation in Calvin (and, in a lesser 
sense, temperance for Socrates and Plato).  It denotes an awareness and 
comprehension that can only come from sanctification, opposed as it is to sin, 
ignorance, and disordered passions.  Interestingly, this is the same passage (Tit. 2.12) 
from which Calvin draws his comprehensive definition of temperance, further 
strengthening the connection between the two concepts.   
 
5.3.5 Conclusions on Wesleyan Temperance 
Although Wesley does not embrace the virtue tradition in the manner of Aquinas or 
Augustine, neither does he hold the fears about virtue harbored by Luther or (to a 
lesser extent) by Calvin.  He speaks freely of ‘virtue’ and ‘happiness’, yet the 
categories are more scriptural than classical:  the Aristotelian ‘dispositions’ have 
become holy tempers; happiness is inextricably paired with holiness; and humility and 
meekness are vanguards of his moral thought.  He does not follow a strictly Platonic, 
Aristotelian, or Thomistic system or vocabulary; yet their disparate influences appear 
throughout his works.  Moreover, his belief in the imitatio Christi and the Moravian 
admonition to ‘preach faith until you have it’ sound quite like the habituation of 
mimetic virtue. 
Wesley does not prioritize temperance as a central virtue, as he does humility 
or meekness.  Practically, it generally appears as a means to the end of self-denial that 
Wesley prizes so highly.  As such, Wesley often expands the scope of the virtue to 
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various things that might prevent the believer from going on to perfection; 
drunkenness, gluttony and luxury, and sleep all fall in the sphere of temperance.  It is, 
for Wesley, one of the tools in the toolkit of universal self-denial that Wesley finds so 
essential to the effective Christian life, in much the same way that it effects 
mortification for Calvin.  It is this context that, as seen with continence for Augustine 
and with moderation for Calvin, temperance becomes something larger than the mere 
regulator of food, drink, and sex, and becomes ‘the due government of every thought, 
as well as affection’ (Expl. 2 Pet 1.6).  Ultimately, temperance is more than a practical 
manner; it is, first and foremost, one of the holy tempers.  As such, it is more 
important than works of piety or mercy, or even the gathering of the Church.  This is a 
striking claim, given the strict, methodological importance Wesley assigned to these 
categories.  Although he never makes mention of the shared etymology between 
temperance and the holy ‘tempers’, Wesley’s use of ‘tempers’ underscores two lesser-
known glosses of temperance.  The first is ‘temper’ as a state of mind in the sense of a 
disposition; the second is ‘tempering’ in the sense of something that strengthens or 
hardens the treated material.  Taken together, and considering its close association 
with sobriety, these glosses echo the soundness of mind associated with the Greek 
sōphrosynē (with its translation as ‘sobriety’).  His emphasis upon ‘heart religion’ and 
the heart as the seat of love might cause Wesley to replace ‘soundness of mind’ with 
holiness of heart’, but the connection remains. 
 
5.4 Conclusions on Temperance During and After the Reformation 
Calvin and Wesley’s treatment of temperance reflects the significant changes in the 
status and employment of virtue in the language and theory of the post-Reformation 
Christian tradition.  Like virtue more generally, temperance is both preserved and 
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transformed by its journey through and past the Reformation.  Temperance retains its 
clear connection to the regulation of food, drink, and sexual activity, although Wesley 
adds sleep and clothing to the list of particulars.  This regulation is generally framed 
negatively, as restraint, mortification, and self-denial.  Yet both Calvin and Wesley 
bring more positive content to the practical functions of temperance as they utilize the 
philosophical and theological category of the ‘needs of this life’ and ‘the natural use 
of created goods, viewing them as things to be used but not abused.  In these practical 
treatments, temperance closely resembles temperance throughout history, though 
without the positive content of pleasure exercise required by Aristotelian and 
Thomistic temperance.   
More comprehensive themes also remain, although slightly altered in form.  In 
a sense, the Reformation baptized some of the classical concepts attached to 
temperance.  There are significant reflections of the classical theme of soundness of 
mind in both Calvin and Wesley.  Responsible for ‘the due government of every 
thought’, temperance is again connected to the Socratic idea of ‘soundness of mind’.  
The association of sobriety with mindfulness and spiritual sentience in Wesley’s 
engagement with Titus 2.12 connects sobriety, via sōphrosynē, to this theme as well.  
This is reinforced by sobriety’s description as true wisdom, the opposite of folly, and 
even as a ‘sound mind’ itself.  Calvin also recalls this classical understanding of 
temperance when he assigns it the function of ‘curing the whole understanding of 
man.’  Calvin also evokes the Aristotelian concept of temperance as ‘saving 
phronēsis’ when temperance preserves and ‘seasons’ the piety and righteousness of 
the believer.
540
  These themes are somewhat altered from their classical constructions, 
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as for both Calvin and Wesley, reason as classically understood is present but 
dethroned; thus, religious values supplant the role of practical wisdom.   
There are, however, two significant modifications to temperance qua virtue, 
the first being the relationship between temperance and several formerly secondary 
moral concepts.  Whereas self-control used to be seconded to temperance as an 
inferior virtue, temperance is now seconded to such formerly lesser virtues as self-
denial and mortification in service to them.  Thus, temperance gradually assumes 
more of a utility role, functioning as the means to larger (as perceived) moral ends.  
The explicit status of temperance as a primary, ‘cardinal’ virtue has been lost, at least 
outside the Catholic Church.  This relates directly to the second major modification of 
the virtue of temperance, which is the loss of the tetrad of cardinal virtues.  The 
concept – even the virtue – of temperance has certainly not disappeared; it is still 
considered important in both practical and comprehensive ways.  However, it is no 
longer cardinal; and it must reestablish itself within a changing moral system.  In a 
sense, this loss of cardinality opens the door for temperance – for all its enduring 
comprehensive content – to be relegated to more functional concerns.  As a rule, its 
focus is more practical and pragmatic than in previous treatments, which likely 
participates in the appropriation of temperance by the ‘temperance movements’ and 
the continued deterioration of its nature as a cardinal virtue. 
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Chapter Six  
 
An Interpretation of  
the Virtue of Temperance 
 
 
This study has devoted four chapters to the journey of temperance.  Is it possible, or 
advisable, to attempt another chapter?  The remainder of this thesis offers an 
affirmative answer to this question.  Chapter Six undertakes an analysis and 
interpretation of five components found in the historical study, with an eye to 
constructing a new understanding of the virtue of temperance; it then examines 
several issues particular to this understanding.  Chapter Seven applies this new 
interpretation of temperance to the contemporary issue of consumption and suggests 
some implications of this application.  The breadth of material covered in the previous 
four chapters necessitates an overview, highlighting the study’s central insights. 
 
6.1 A Summary of the Present Understanding of Temperance 
Chapter Two examines the concept of temperance in the works of Plato. Platonic 
temperance possesses two primary levels of meaning, intellectual and moral.  As an 
intellectual virtue, it represents the self-knowledge recommended by the oracle at 
Delphi.  This self-knowledge is associated with an awareness of one’s particular place 
in the polis, ideally resulting in behavior appropriate to one’s social station.  As a 
moral virtue, temperance connotes the restraint necessary to honorably uphold one’s 
political station, eschewing all behavior which might bring aidos (shame) upon 
oneself.  This self-restraint echoes the second Delphic maxim ‘nothing in excess.’  
Thus, the primary moral significance of temperance is self-control.  There is a third 
set of meanings embodied by temperance in the Platonic corpus, kosmos (order) and 
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harmonia (harmony), which displays an interesting blend of the first two domains.  
Where there is self-control informed by accurate self-knowledge, an internal order 
will exist in the body and the soul.  Ideally, this order will present itself as a positive 
and pleasing harmony, like a beautiful piece of music. This harmony is constituted by 
the presence of the proper mixture of all components, observing a rational limit as 
determined by their due measure.  This harmony also goes beyond the individual, as temperance is the 
virtue of the polis when all its members function with one harmonious accord. 
Chapter Three examines temperance in the writings of Aristotle and the Stoics.  
Under Aristotle, temperance undergoes several significant changes that indicate both 
expansion and restriction of the virtue.  First, it is demoted from ‘cardinal’ status by 
Aristotle’s dissolution of the Platonic tetrad, becoming another virtue alongside 
courage, generosity, megalopsychia, and others.  However, it is expanded (albeit 
implicitly) through its inherent connection with the doctrine of the mean.  Second, it 
loses the intellectual status it possessed under Plato when it is virtually limited to the 
physical pleasures of touch as embodied solely in food, drink, and sex.  However, it is 
the virtue that ‘saves’ practical wisdom from the assaults of passion.  Third, it is 
distinguished from continence (or self-control) in two complementary ways.  
Implicitly, it is characterized by pleasure attendant to the proper use of virtue; 
explicitly, it is differentiated from continence through the correlation of decision and 
desire.  Lastly, as the ‘unnamed virtue’ related to megalopsychia and honor, it is 
implicitly connected with humility. 
Under the Stoics, temperance regains its ‘cardinal’ status with the 
reinstatement of the tetrad.  It is connected with the moral element of choice and is 
implicitly emphasized when self-control (enkrateia) enters the tetrad after practical 
wisdom is elevated to a meta-virtue.  More importantly, it is the virtue more 
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responsible for attainment of the Stoic ideal of apatheia.  It is connected with self-
control and orderliness, although on a smaller scale than in Plato.  It is associated with 
propriety, decorum, and usefulness through its connection with the key Stoic concepts 
of decorum and frugalitas.  Its translations as moderation (moderatio) and modesty 
(modestia) highlight its correlation to the concept of mode (modus), which is related 
to the mean.
541
  Finally, its various interpretations as temperantia, moderatio, 
modestia, continentia, abstinentia, sobrietas and castitas reveal both the breadth of its 
Greek heritage, the difficulty of rendering these meanings in a new language and 
culture, and the directions in which it was pointed as it was sent out into the Roman 
(and Christian) world. 
Chapter Four examines the journey of temperance in the writings of Augustine 
and Aquinas, when Christian moral theology was more explicitly in conversation with 
classical philosophy.  Under Augustine, temperance retains its classical connections to 
restraint, measure, mode, and limit, but it receives entirely fresh content when virtue 
is defined as perfect love for God.  In this paradigm, temperance is love keeping itself 
whole and incorrupt, given wholly over to the object of its love.  This is accomplished 
by restraining corrupt desires and bringing them into accord with reason.  Continence, 
an associated virtue, retains its meaning as sexual abstinence; but its function expands 
dramatically, as it serves both as the conversional pivot of the Confessions and as the 
operative mode of Augustinian love.  Augustine makes no evident distinction between 
the terms, although temperantia tends to appear in his more philosophical discussions. 
For Aquinas, temperance serves the threefold function of restraining the 
passions when they exceed the bounds of reason, aligning with the needs (both 
physical and social) of this present life, and securing tranquility of the soul.  However, 
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it is considered a ‘lesser’ virtue, as it deals with the ‘lowest’ human concerns of 
physical self-preservation.  In its explicit connections with meekness, clemency, 
modesty, and studiousness, its scope is broader than the Aristotelian account.  
However, it lacks the overall ‘operative’ function it possesses for Augustine, perhaps 
because Aquinas did not struggle with the sexual objects of temperance in the same 
manner.  It is differentiated from self-control per se, as Aquinas retains the 
Aristotelian distinction between temperance and continence.  Finally, it is explicitly 
connected to humility, as it restrains the movement of hope towards immoderate 
things.   
Chapter Five considers temperance and related concepts in the works of John 
Calvin and John Wesley.  Under Calvin, temperance stands in a curious place, central 
to his moral concerns yet overshadowed by its colleague, moderation.  Temperance as 
such is limited in scope, connected with sobriety and the restraint of all physical 
desires.  In this, it is essential to inner self-denial and bearing the cross, the dual 
commands of mortification.  Moderation, however, is the goal of mortification and is 
the means of ‘restoring order’ in disordered humanity in a disordered world.  It 
functions as a central concept in Calvin’s moral thought, much like continence 
functions for Augustine; however, it lacks the positive connotation of healing found in 
Augustine with the negative connotation of restraint.  Temperance is thus implicitly 
responsible for the moderation Calvin so often commands, as it enables this 
moderation and restores order.   
For Wesley, temperance remains somewhat constricted in meaning, largely 
connected with sobriety and self-control in physical pleasures.  However, as with 
Calvin, its connection with self-denial ties it to one of Wesley’s largest moral 
concerns.  More broadly, it is associated with meekness, humility and sobriety, central 
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concepts of Wesley’s moral theology.  This is an inverse echo of Aquinas, for whom 
temperance is the primary virtue and meekness and humility the subsidiaries.  
Temperance also continues to be associated with abstinence from alcohol.   
This study now returns to its point of origin: temperance and its relationship to 
the temperance movements.  As I will discuss more fully later in this chapter, 
temperance experienced two significant and lasting changes within the temperance 
movement: it was defined, for all intents and purposes, as abstinence from alcohol, 
and it was transformed from a virtue into a practice and a movement.
542
  The concept 
of temperance as moderation in drinking is present but belongs to a dissenting 
minority voice.  Its classical roots are appropriated in the debates, but rarely in a 
contextually correct fashion.  ‘Moderation in all things,’ an unexciting connotation at 
best, now appears as the liberal, morally generous position.  The journey of 
temperance comes to a rather screeching halt, as temperance becomes almost 
universally understood merely as abstinence from alcohol.  The dynamic nature of the 
virtue of temperance is submerged beneath an outdated debate on alcohol 
consumption. 
 
6.2  A Fresh Interpretation of the Virtue of Temperance 
Thus, the prevalent contemporary concept of temperance is drastically impoverished, 
confined largely to a general association with the Temperance Movement.  Although 
there is a new interest in the virtue and several recent examinations of its importance 
and value,
543
 temperance is still primarily understood as abstinence from alcohol (the 
narrow conception) and ‘moderation-in-all-things’ (the broad conception); and while 
the latter implies a broader range of application, it retains a decidedly negative or 
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milquetoast connotation.  The most common definitions for temperance remain ‘self-
control’ and ‘moderation.’  ‘Self-control’ is an often explicit definition of temperance, 
particularly regarding the physical appetites; whereas ‘moderation-in-all-things’ is 
perhaps the more common, implicit understanding of temperance, especially as 
derived from the common conflation of the terms ‘temperance’ and ‘moderation.’   
Both of these understandings contain elements of truth.  Left to themselves, 
however, they rob the virtue of potential depth and fruitfulness.  The vibrancy once 
attributed to temperance now resides in such virtues as humility or justice.  Yet 
despite its tepid moral inheritance, there are hints of richer possibilities.  The 
historical survey has uncovered several recurring shades of meaning: self-knowledge, 
self-control, moderation, restraint, mean, measure, limit, humility, order, and 
harmony.  Such a variety of meanings is itself somewhat problematic; even as early as 
the Charmides, Socrates struggles with cohering a multiplicity of meanings for 
temperance which, while  associated with temperance in one way or another, are 
ultimately discarded ‘as not touching the core of the matter.’544  Ultimately, Plato’s 
concern is that this wealth of criteria for (and presentations of) the virtue of 
temperance indicate that what we have is not just one, but several different virtues.
545
  
Is it possible to discover within these concepts a fresh and cohesive approach to the 
virtue of temperance?  Having undertaken a diachronic account of the virtue of 
temperance, this study now proposes an analytic account of the elements uncovered in 
the journey.  Can these different elements, when considered together, yield a new and 
normative account of temperance, with the potential to serve as a lens into 
contemporary moral discourse?   
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As stated earlier, one commentator noted the difficulty of tracing the 
continuities of ideas within Augustine’s thought, owing to imprecise boundaries and 
shifting landmarks.
546
  This also applies to temperance.  The concept of this virtue 
undergoes many changes; the words themselves shift and are sometimes conflated.  
Moreover, the existing maps no longer seem adequate, as key components are often 
missing.  Therefore, any new interpretation will need a new set of directions, a revised 
cartography, so to speak.  This chapter will outline the need for this new cartography, 
identify the various elements present in the legend, and trace their interactions 
through a schematic that will display their interactions and respective relationships.   
Throughout the tradition, people have identified various elements essential to 
the virtue of temperance, drawing their maps in ways that reflect their own moral 
priorities.  Often, the results have been heavily weighted towards one or two 
particular components.  The historical survey identified several central components of 
temperance, which may be grouped under the following categories: self-control, 
knowledge, mode, humility, and harmonious order.  Each of these components 
contains elements of truth; each one has expressed, in some fundamental way, 
something of the heart of temperance, even if it fails to demonstrate its fullest 
meaning.  This chapter proposes a fresh interpretation of the virtue of temperance as 
harmonious order as constituted by the presence and interactions of self-control, 
knowledge, mode, and humility.  Each component will be considered in light of the 
following questions:  What is this component of temperance?  How is it morally 
formative?  How is it associated with temperance?  Are there significant biblical or 
theological considerations?  Why is it incomplete on its own?  How does it relate to 
the other components of temperance? 
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In this examination of the virtue of temperance, a logical place to begin is with 
the definitions of virtue acquired through the historical survey.  This cartography 
therefore begins with self-control, as it is one of the elements most commonly 
associated with the word ‘temperance.’   
 
6.2.1 Self-Control 
Associated with temperance since Plato, self-control is traditionally understood as the 
control of the appetites and desires that fight for continuous satisfaction and war 
against the dictates of reason.  In his book Reclaiming Virtue, John Bradshaw 
describes something of a regulatory feedback loop between self-control and 
temperance, declaring that temperance ‘enhances our willpower’547 but also that 
‘willpower is the root of temperance.’548  Thus, any attempt to discuss temperance and 
self-control with precision requires attending to their similarities and differences.   
 
6.2.1.1 The Moral Muscle 
Self-control is essential to a temperate life because, quite frankly, it is difficult for 
human beings to perfectly integrate their appetites and desires.  One study declares 
that ‘improving willpower is the surest way to a better life’ and that ‘most major 
problems, personal and social, center on failure of self-control.’549  Characterized by 
another as ‘the moral muscle’, self-control provides persons with ‘a robust capacity to 
do what it takes so to conduct themselves in the face of (actual or anticipated) 
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competing motivation.’550  The concept of competing motivations is informative, as 
the exercise of reason might ensure a happy and flourishing life if humanity was 
purely rational.  However, human beings are creatures of appetite – physical appetites, 
emotional appetites, intellectual appetites.  Generation and consumption are the two 
activities most central to the maintenance of human life; their drives are 
understandably strong.  Moreover, within a Christian anthropology, these appetites 
and desires (while God-given and tov, ‘good’) are nevertheless part of humanity’s 
fallen and sinful nature.  These appetites need not be depicted as base or harmful to be 
recognized as in need of guidance – and when guidance fails, in need of occasional 
control.   
This ‘reading’ of temperance as strict self-control has not fallen out of favor; 
Western culture in general (and American culture in particular) tends to valorize effort 
and struggle in matters of morality.
551
  Yet the possession of notable self-control is 
not necessarily related to the other elements of temperance.  Aristotle’s discussion of 
self-control and resistance reveals that there are some persons who are naturally gifted 
at holding out against adverse pleasures; they are more ‘resistant’ to the ‘pain’ of 
unfulfilled desires than the average person.  This is associated not with the cultivation 
of any moral virtue, but is simply a result of one’s particular personality and nature: 
some persons are more physically muscular than others, some are more emotionally 
controlled.  This ‘resistance’, while certainly helpful in many aspects of life, is not 
necessarily commendable in itself.  Alfred Mele’s account of ‘brute resistance’, or the 
use of ‘sheer force of will’ to resist temptation, parallels the function of pure physical 
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strength.
552
   This resembles Aristotle’s resistance, both literally and figuratively.  
Additionally, Aristotle understood that people who were excessively self-controlled 
were not virtuous; they were merely stubborn.  In calling them opinionated and 
uneducated, he highlights the failure of isolated, excessive self-control to act in 
accordance with a responsive, pliable self.  Self-control is necessary, but not 
sufficient, for a flourishing moral life. 
Thus, the idolatry of self-control is as unattractive as it is inadequate, resulting 
in such imbalanced accounts of temperance as its reduction to total abstinence from 
alcohol and the denigration of pleasures in totality.  The New Temperance explicitly 
equates temperance with sobriety, Puritanism, and ‘warnings about life’s many risks 
and dangers.’553  Moreover, the sheer and unaided exercise of self-control is not 
particularly effective.  A 2010 study in Psychological Science studied the impact of 
discrete acts of self-control upon their subsequent ability to accomplish demanding 
tasks.
554
  The first half of the dogs were required to hold a ‘sit and stay’ position in 
isolation for ten minutes, while the second half (the control set) were placed in a cage 
and left alone for ten minutes.  Thus, while both sets of dogs remained stationary, 
only the first set did so as an act of self-control.  After being released, both sets were 
given an unsolvable task and their persistence was measured.  Those in the control set 
persisted almost three times as long as the self-control set.  Not surprisingly, the study 
concluded that alongside its many benefits, exercising self-control ‘involves 
substantial costs.’555  It can even be dangerous, as the apostle Paul noted in his 
instructions to the Corinthians to moderate their periods of celibacy lest they be 
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caught unawares and vulnerable to temptation (1 Cor. 7:5).  Paul reminds the church 
in Corinth that their practice of sexual abstinence is not for its own sake, but for 
devotion to prayer.  Their continence gains proper meaning only when connected to 
its immediate purpose, and within the context of its larger purpose, the holistic 
Christian life. 
Finally, a sole reliance upon self-control does not yield a particularly fulfilling 
or happy life.  Aristotle’s definition of self-control as internal struggle is no doubt 
accurate and applicable to everyone from time to time, but it is neither enjoyable nor 
sustainable as a state of being.  Self-control, although necessary, is not designed as an 
end in itself, and unmitigated use of it is not appropriate to the human telos.  The 
point is not to work as hard as you can or be as miserable as possible; the point is to 
live the good and blessed life that reflects the goodness and blessedness of the creator 
God.  Moreover, our appetites need not be, as they were for the Greeks, of a lower 
nature than our reason.  Appetites are important; they were implanted in us to 
recognize the need for that which sustains and fulfills us, to alert us to the presence of 
these needs, and to encourage us to address their fulfillment.  This is a healthy, 
wholesome, God-ordained state of affairs, and self-control does not seek to change 
this situation in any fundamental way.  It merely acts in a supportive capacity when 
desire threatens to overwhelm practical reason.  Rather than an authoritarian and 
tyrannical regime, self-control is part of a concerted effort to live according to the 
dictates of temperance. 
 
6.2.1.2 The ‘Tempering’ of Self-Control 
If self-control is inadequate on its own, what are its necessary complements?  As 
noted above, self-control is the ‘muscle’ by which the decisions of the self are 
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actualized.  When knowledge informs me that such-and-such a situation is not helpful 
to me in the long run, self-control helps me to stick to that decision.  Thus, self-
control both shapes and reflects the knowledge component of temperance.  Self-
control may also be the mechanism for greater growth in knowledge.  One example of 
this is the tendency of alcoholism and other addictions to arrest emotional 
development at the point when addiction begins, as the soporific effects halt the 
addict’s level of internal awareness.556  The journey of recovery is simultaneously a 
journey of self-discovery and internal growth.   
Knowledge and the emotions it generates are powerful motivators for the 
practice of self-control.  In 2005, I toured an area of eastern Kentucky that had been 
ravaged by the side effects of mountaintop removal coal mining.  Seeing the scarred 
mountainsides, watching residents haul water for washing and drinking from miles 
away – receiving this knowledge and meditating upon it has given me a strong 
reminder of the reason to be frugal with electricity.  To see firsthand the effects of 
energy consumption is to receive a powerful motivation to exercise phronetic self-
control.  Moreover, this emotional motivation actually eases the internal ‘cost’ of 
exercising restraint, as does the exercise of personal choice.
557
  When people ‘are 
treated like cogs, rather than people’, they are emotionally disinclined to exercise 
restraint.
558
  However, the internalization and personalization of the motivations for 
self-control do not argue against the necessity of its habituation; quite the opposite.  
Habituation is one of the most effective components of self-control, because it makes 
the desired actions almost automatic and thus reduces the internal stress that 
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accompanies the internal ‘control’.559  This should not be surprising, as the 
phenomenon he describes is what Aristotle would label the mature virtue of 
temperance (Eth.Nic. 1148a14-17,1152a1).
560
 
The presence of humility can ‘temper’ the striving of the self-controlled.  As 
noted above, the development and possession of self-control is both under one’s 
control and also a product of one’s individual makeup, as certain persons can and do 
excel in exercising restraint of all kinds.  This component of temperance may also be 
more obviously manifest in certain lives and vocations.  The professional dancer will 
need to practice considerably more discipline in her diet and exercise than the college 
professor.  The professional counselor will need to moderate her emotions in response 
to her clients; the policeman and the soldier will need to control their tempers and 
their powers.  These are all powerful examples of the effect of focused self-regulation.  
However, such discipline can easily run to improper pride and hubristic vanity.  
Baumeister and Tierney begin their ‘Willpower 101’ with “Know Your Limits.’561  
Personal limits – and our personal knowledge of them – not only inform where self-
control should begin; they also point to the boundaries of the role of self-control.  We 
require self-control because we are not fully integrated beings; yet we cannot rely 
fully on self-control because our strength is finite and our willpower often unreliable.  
Our need for control points to our humanity, and our humanity reveals the inadequacy 
of our control.  Therefore, self-control both requires and generates humility.   
When self-control exists within a network of interrelated qualities (such as 
knowledge, humility, and modal limits), it blossoms into its intended and mature role, 
aiding and assisting the human person in their commitment to an intentional and 
integrated life.  And yet, the central function point of self-control is not to render its 
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possessor more ‘productive.’562  Rather, it enables us to enjoy life in a holy and 
holistic manner.  Mele insists that the essence of this ‘moral muscle’ is not simply a 
‘mental analogue of brute physical strength.’  Deliberation, recognition of future 
rewards, and a phronetic ability to discern the particulars of a situation all play a role 
in the successful use of self-control.
563
  As stated earlier, this sounds like temperance, 
not self-control.  For the moral agent to travel from self-control to true temperance, 
other factors must be included; and the reliance of self-control upon deliberation and 
phronetic ability indicate that the next component of temperance is knowledge. 
 
6.2.2 Knowledge 
Some thinkers, such as Aristotle and Aquinas, associate temperance with the appetites 
humanity shares with other animals.
564
  In contrast, the categories of knowledge in 
classical thought – technē, epistēmē, sophia, and phronesis – represented the quality 
that elevates humanity above the animals and expressed the particular human 
capacities.  However, this study has demonstrated the deep connections between the 
two concepts.  In Plato’s Charmides, temperance is understood precisely as various 
types of (self-)knowledge.  For Aristotle, temperance sustains our ability to choose 
well, ‘saving phronēsis’ from the assaults of appetite and passion.  The early Stoics 
defined temperance as ‘phronēsis in choosing’, the practical ability to make the right 
choice.  Augustine and Aquinas relate accurate self-knowledge to humility and duly 
proportioned living, while Calvin states that holy and appropriate sexual control is 
only possible through accurate self-knowledge.  Finally, Wesley recommends 
temperance as a necessary partner to knowledge, fostering humility and preventing 
hubris.  Thus, their somewhat reciprocal relationship falls primarily into two 
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categories: temperance as self-knowledge and the role of temperance in making 
phronetic choices.   
 
6.2.2.1 Self-Knowledge 
The Charmides, Plato’s most focused treatise on temperance, opens with a reference 
to the Delphic maxim ‘Know thyself’ (and names Socrates as its exemplar).  The 
nature of this self-knowledge is dynamic and voluntary, a habitus wherein one’s 
actions reveal one’s sense of themselves.  It functions something like, ‘Recognize 
oneself, and act accordingly.’  Socrates also emphasizes that true self-knowledge 
should yield moral insight; if someone possesses a virtue, they should realize it and be 
able to explain it.   
Temperate self-knowledge also presupposes insight, not only into the presence 
or absence of some particular virtue, but insight into the moral life itself.  Socrates, 
upon first hearing of the beautiful Charmides, asks who he is and to whom he 
belongs.  Attention is now focused upon the issues of self-identity, one’s particular 
position – who one is and who one is becoming.  Moreover, this self-knowledge goes 
beyond the ‘self.’  Socrates’ questions about the identity of Charmides concern more 
than his individual person; they highlight the nature of his existence as imbedded 
within the social networks and mores of his time.  His identity and his moral journey 
occur within a particular context. 
This framework is also present in scripture, with its questions ‘who is the 
believer?’ and ‘to whom do they belong?’  The biblical narrative is arguably one long 
story about a group of tribes learning how to be the people of God.  Yet they are not 
just any people; they are creations of the living God, redeemed and gathered by him 
and called to reveal his character in their lives.  The Israelites are constantly reminded 
264 
 
of the nature of the God whom they follow; the Pentateuch is replete with reminders 
that they follow the Lord God, ‘who brought you out of Egypt’.  In the New 
Testament, the epistles preface their moral exhortations with accounts of God’s saving 
work in Christ Jesus and the saints’ relationship to him.  Accurate self-knowledge 
comes not solely from introspection or dialogue, not even from a shared life, but from 
a relationship – and the knowledge of it – with the living God.  Augustine recognized 
the importance of this particular self-knowledge.  Indeed, the central point of the 
Confessions is that God actually does know Augustine, but Augustine does not know 
himself.  Moreover, he will not know himself, truly, until he sees himself in 
relationship with God.
565
   
Transitioning into the Christian tradition, it is important to note the shift in 
terminology and category.  Instead of phronesis and sophia, the concept most 
frequently employed by New Testament authors is epignōsis, which connotes a 
concrete, ‘decisive’ knowledge that implies a necessary or inevitable confrontation 
with the change necessitated by an encounter with that knowledge.  Thus, ‘knowing’ 
in the Judeo-Christian tradition primarily means knowing that you are not God, a 
connotation present but not always emphasized in the classical position.  Knowledge 
is not a personal advantage, indicative of merit; it is an awareness of the decidedly 
tenuous nature of one’s spiritual situation.  The knowledge appropriate to temperance 
will be provisional and imperfect.  Moreover, it cannot be possessed or manipulated.  
We do not grasp the Whole; we are grasped by it.  We do not possess full knowledge; 
we are possessed by the One in whom and from whom knowledge receives its context 
and meaning. 
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What other things are encompassed within self-knowledge?  In order to 
choose well, we need accurate knowledge of our particular needs.  Aristotle’s Milo 
the wrestler needs more food than someone who is sedentary, and a Montana farmer 
has an actual need for a four-wheel drive vehicle, as opposed to someone in Florida 
who just likes the prestige of driving one.  One could reasonably ask at this point, 
‘What exactly are someone’s needs?’  It is helpful here to remember Aquinas’ 
criterion of ‘the needs of this life’, which encompass both the actual physical needs 
and those suitable to one’s station in life.  Although this may smack of hierarchical, 
class-related luxuries being ‘baptized’ into appropriateness, there are other ways to 
read Aquinas on this matter.  Persons who are committed to an active ministry of 
hospitality may legitimately need a house with an extra bedroom or a spacious living 
area in which to entertain neighborhood children.   
This dovetails with the knowledge of our particular strengths and abilities.  
For Calvin, human self-knowledge is tied to our knowledge of the divine, as revealed 
in the Torah (particularly the Decalogue), the gospels, and the epistles.  Yet there is 
also an element of almost ‘phronetic’ awareness, ‘a general appropriateness that 
philosophers look upon as an aspect of moderation.’  He continues, ‘But there is also 
an individual appropriateness, because what is suitable for one person may be quite 
unsuitable for another.  Therefore every individual ought to know what kind of 
character God has given him’ (Inst. III.10.7).  Implied herein is the knowledge of 
one’s particular limits.  An important aspect of choosing well is an awareness of 
when one has had enough.  One person may handle a few drinks with ease, whereas 
others must be cautious with a small glass of wine.  This type of awareness is not only 
rational in the classical sense.  Coupled to any cognitive speculation is a variety of 
somatic information acquired through physical experience. 
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6.2.2.2 Bodily Knowledge – Desire as Information 
Although the traditions are strong in their view of desires, particularly physical 
desires, as inflammatory and destructive, this need not be the case.  Physical desire 
can act as a purveyor and conductor of information, particularly when partnered with 
other kinds of knowledge.  Physical sensation is part of created human nature and 
should not be eschewed.  Paul Brand, the surgeon who pioneered reparative hand 
surgery among sufferers of Hansen’s disease in India, stressed the important and 
protective role of pain in daily life.
566
   
What has been lost in contemporary culture is the idea of desire, appetite, and 
sensation as natural information.  Hunger is supposed to tell us when to eat; no more, 
no less.  It is an organic, integrated reminder of the reality of our limits and our needs.  
People must eat, but they should not eat too much; both starvation and gluttony 
produce discomfort and indicate that something is amiss.  Taking a position somewhat 
counter to classical philosophy and theology, André Comte-Sponville astutely notes,  
It is not the body that is insatiable.  The limitlessness of desire, which 
condemns us to neediness, dissatisfaction, or unhappiness, is a disease of 
the imagination.  We have dreams that are greater than our stomachs, and 
foolishly we reproach our stomachs for being small!
567
 
 
Allowing one’s physical body to return and explore their states of hunger provides 
valuable information on the healthy, temperate enjoyment of God’s created goodness.  
Moreover, all knowledge must be integrated to be useful.   
The man or woman who knows what is good can only be one whose 
character has taken on the pattern of the virtues.  We may depend upon 
such a person to enact the good he or she sees precisely because this 
seeing has not from the outset been a purely intellectual undertaking.  
Only those whose desires, passions, and emotions have been properly 
molded can see.
568
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This knowledge is neither disconnected nor intellectual; it is truly phronetic, with 
profoundly practical implications.   
 
6.2.2.3 Knowledge in the Balance 
Like self-control, knowledge functions best when interactive with the other 
components of temperance.  Knowledge of all types is informative.  Through it, one 
gains information about oneself, others, the world, and God.  This knowledge helps us 
to both recognize the importance of limits and to make good assessments regarding 
our limits and the world’s limits of the rest of the created order.   There is thus a 
causal connection between knowledge and a measured mode, as knowledge helps 
provide the information necessary to discern the proper measure or method of our 
appetites and choices.  Conversely, in his commentary on Romans 12.3, Brendan 
Byrne notes that the phrase emerisen metron (literally ‘allots a measure’) is ‘the true 
basis for self-judgment.’569 
Moreover, accurate self-knowledge – an awareness and acceptance of our own 
frailties and failures – leads to a posture of humility: the knowledge of what one does 
and does not know and the recognition that one does and does not know.  Knowledge 
of one’s limits and the corresponding necessary measure reveals the need to practice 
self-control, which both requires and generates humility. Humility bids us remember 
that the knowledge appropriate to temperance will always be provisional and 
imperfect.  Finally, the very difficulty of developing virtue engenders humility in 
those who truly understand themselves.  Moral philosopher Iris Murdoch, who ranked 
humility as one of the most important human goods, acknowledges the active and 
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arduous nature of opening oneself to reality; it is, she states, ‘a task to come to see the 
world as it is.’570 
With self-control and self-knowledge, the virtuous and temperate person 
should have the ability to formulate a virtuous and temperate manner of life, or as 
Aristotle would say, ‘the metrios as the phronimos would determine it’ 
(Eth.Nic.1107a1-2).  How such a life would actually look is the subject of the next 
component of temperance, the mode. 
 
6.2.3 Mode 
From Aristotle we have: ‘Virtue, then,’ he says, ‘is a disposition issuing in decisions, 
depending on intermediacy of the kind relative to us, this being determined by rational 
prescription and in the way in which the wise person would determine it’ 
(Eth.Nic.1106b36-1107a2).  He later shortens this definition, saying, ‘Virtue is a kind 
of mean, as it aims at what is intermediate’ (Eth.Nic.1103b21), a position shared by 
Aquinas (I-II.59.1).  Thus, a general assumption is that all virtue, temperance 
included, is some form of a mean.  Yet does this assumption hold true? 
 
6.2.3.1 The Difficulty with the Mean 
As discussed above, the well-known ‘doctrine of the mean’ has received much 
discussion in philosophical commentary.  However, this study has called its efficacy 
into question, wondering if the doctrine of the mean is not, in fact, unhelpful on 
several levels.
571
  To my reading, the doctrine of the mean is problematic in that it is 
ambiguous and misleading.   
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First, it is ambiguous on several levels.  For example, the standard reading of 
the doctrine of the mean as a mean disposition towards feelings, as opposed to a 
disposition to feeling moderately, is difficult to interpret practically.  One 
commentator admits, ‘How to utilize the doctrine of the mean is not obvious.  The 
doctrine certainly does not state, “Be moderately afraid, moderately angry, etc. all of 
the time, and act that way”.’572  This interpretation does not improve our 
understanding of the virtuous life; it appears merely to substitute one imprecise idea 
for another.  Faced with the problems named above, this commentator offers a ‘more 
plausible suggestion,’ wherein the doctrine of the mean means ‘triangulating in on the 
right choice’:  ‘In scary situations, first determine the range of possible fear.  Then 
arrange to feel medial fear for that range.  Then act accordingly.’573  This is a tiresome 
process and, again, one wonders whether the decision to ‘feel medial fear’ is any more 
accurate than ‘be moderately afraid.’   
Second, and more problematic, the concept of the mean is misleading in its 
single clear connotation, which is a strong connection to the idea of numerical 
moderation.  This connection engenders the awkward (and illogical) position of 
having merely moderate feelings and reactions.  This association leads to platitudes 
such as ‘always respond moderately’ and ‘everything in moderation’, which in 
actuality do little to facilitate moral reasoning.  Thus, the doctrine of the mean is well-
intentioned, but largely unhelpful.  Despite its prominence, it may actually create 
more confusion than it resolves.   
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6.2.3.2 Mean, Median, Mode 
The definitions of the relevant terms also shed light into the potential difficulties of 
imprecise terminology.  As discussed, mean is the term most commonly associated 
both with virtue in general and temperance in particular; however, its precise 
definitions shed considerable light on its problematic nature for this discussion (RW).  
It is defined as an ‘average’; a ‘quotient of a sum of several quantities and their 
number’; ‘a quality, condition, or course of action equally removed from two opposite 
(usually unsatisfactory) extremes.’  Another particular problem is the conflation, 
common in discussions of the doctrine of the mean, of the terms mean and medial 
(from the Latin medius, ‘middle of’).  While they are often used interchangeably,574 
these terms represent distinctly different mathematical concepts; whereas the mean of 
a mathematical sample is its average, the median is the value residing mathematically 
at the midpoint of that sample.  However, as both terms connote the ‘middleness’ of 
the choice, they are equally unhelpful.  Fortunately, one helpful option is available, 
the mode.   
From the Latin modus, meaning ‘measure’, mode contains a variety of 
meanings which illuminate our discussion.  Mode is defined as ‘a way or manner in 
which something occurs or is experienced, expressed, or done.’  The mode signifies 
the way something most expressly is, something about the essence of its nature.  
Interestingly, this understanding of mode is enhanced by its mathematical definition, 
‘the value that occurs most frequently in a given set of data.’  This gives a similar but 
much more illuminating insight into the action of the mode; whereas the mean is an 
average of all actions in a set, whether large or small, timid or grandiose, the mode is 
the most frequent result, revealed in a manner that highlights its frequency (and thus 
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its significance) yet also retains the radical nature of the extreme, outlying responses.  
These extremes are present and acknowledged, but quite clearly do not dominate the 
set as does the mode.  The mode is the most commonly performed action, the most 
standard manner of response to a given situation.  Thus, the third component of 
temperance is better understood as mode than as mean.   
 
6.2.3.3 The Fourfold Significance of the Mode 
The semantic family modus is present within the journey of temperance, even without 
the prioritization of the concept of the mode.
575
  However, it has been difficult to 
elucidate its etymological richness.  In his recent work on the causes of virtue in 
Aquinas, Nick Austin discerns an excellent fourfold categorization for the Thomistic 
concept of mode.  Following Austin, the mode may be understood as measure, 
method, limit, and proportion to the end.
576
  Furthermore, they may be extrapolated 
beyond a Thomistic application and applied across the larger history of temperance.  
The first connotation of mode is mode as measure. 
 
A) Measure 
Measure (metron/mensura) is a term of rich meaning both in classical, biblical, and 
theological thought.  In addition to ‘measure’, ‘proportion’, ‘order’, the Theological 
Dictionary of the New Testament defines metron primarily as ‘a criterion or standard’ 
and ‘the resulting due measure.’577  Measure expresses the diversity and manifoldness 
of the gifts of grace allotted to each person within the body of Christ (Eph 4.7, 16; 
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Rom 12.3).  The language of measure appears three times in Romans 12.3 alone, 
where it indicates the particular and proper function of each member of the body of 
believers: ‘as each part is working properly… according to the working in the 
measure of each single part… according to the powers which correspond to the 
measure of each part.’  Within the body of Christ, this measure of faith is given by 
God, who himself determines and assigns the metron.  This highlights the second 
significance of biblical measure: the ultimate source of proper measure is God.  
Humanity is not to judge and set its own measure (Matt 7.2) because this measure is 
established by God himself (Rom 12. 3; cf. 2 Cor 10.13).   
This connection is also found throughout classical philosophy and theology.  
Plato declared that the wisdom of the few will measure and direct the desires of the 
many (Rep. 431e).  He later calls the soul ‘a mixture and harmony of those things, 
when they are mixed with each other rightly and in due measure (metron)’ (Phdo. 
86c).  He also stated that an absolute measure is found only in God (Leg. IV, 716c) 
who is the measure of all things (Laws 716c-d).  Indeed, Aristotle’s broad position 
that virtue is normed by the actions of virtuous moral agents has been called ‘his 
virtue-is-the-measure doctrine.’578  Augustine describes virtue as synonymous with 
moderation and a ‘just measure of the soul’ (beata u. 4.33).  Moreover, temperance 
has been called ‘a kind of moral measure, designed to stabilize the harmony of a 
healthy life’ which ‘served to keep the parts adjusted to each other.’579  Thus, measure 
particularly expresses that aspect of temperance that is concerned with order, 
proportionality, and cooperative functioning.    
Because human beings are both animal and rational, it can be difficult to 
discern the ‘rule and standard’ for human life, the prototype for human existence and 
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living.  The concept of measure helps connect humanity with this rule and standard 
for both its giftings and its very existence.  The measure is established by God and 
should be respected; thus, the believers are contrasted those who go ‘beyond measure’ 
(Rom 12.3).  This points to the second connotation of mode, the mode as limit. 
 
B) Limit 
If something is designed to measure, then there is a point beyond which it should not 
go; it implicitly (or explicitly) involves a limit, a regulating factor.  Illustrated in the 
phrases ‘in due measure’ and ‘beyond due measure,’ limit is a reflection of the 
boundaries of the rule or standard.  Limits both keep us from the dangers of excess 
and create an atmosphere of safety and trust.  Roadways are assigned speed limits, 
designed to prevent accidents; elevators display a weight limit, beyond which the 
supporting cables lose their integrity.  Such limits are not arbitrary; speed limits are 
determined by several factors such as the presence of pedestrians and the isolation of 
the road.  They exist to provide a safe space in which life may occur.  Indeed, creation 
by design is limited.  The waters are separated from the earth, the heavens separated 
from the earth; the waters are separated from dry land.  Days and nights follow a set 
time, as do the seasons.  In addition to establishing a measure for our lives, God has 
established limits upon them.  God limits our lifespans (Gen 6.3); he limits the 
endeavors at Babel by limiting those with whom they could communicate (Gen 11.5-
9).  Even within the New Testament catalogues of spiritual giftings, all the gifts have 
a measure and a limit (Rom. 12.3-6).
580
 
Even in the Garden of Eden, man and woman received instructions on their 
limits; indeed, it can be argued that the original sin was nothing more than a 
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transgression of physical and metaphysical limits.  In pre-Platonic epics, temperance 
stood against the forsaking of limits and the increase of hubris.
581
    Furthermore, 
limits do not exist merely for their own sake.  Speed limits serve the larger purpose of 
public safety and trust; similarly, human limits are designed to reorient humanity 
towards its proper end.  Knowing the mode of our lives, knowing the particular 
manner in which we are to live, knowing that we are not God, helps humanity to 
recognize its boundaries and its purpose.  Thus, the recognition of limits signals the 
third connotation of mode, the mode as proportion to the end.   
 
C) Proportion to the End 
Things possessing measure and limit do so because they are oriented to something 
beyond themselves.  The spiritual gifts in Romans are given, not for their own 
possession, but for the greater glory of God and the increase of love and unity within 
the church.  Therefore, to fulfill one’s purpose, to work within the mode of humanity 
is to align oneself proportionately to one’s final end. 
The question may be asked: what is the purpose of humanity, its ultimate end?  
The Westminster Confession of Faith, and John Wesley, identify humanity’s ultimate 
goal as the happiness and holiness of God.  Therefore, the mode of human life is 
fashioned – is measured, if you will – upon the requirements of this ultimate end.  If it 
does not serve the end, it does not align with the mode of humanity.  However, 
Aquinas insightfully distinguishes between the proximate and final ends of humanity, 
so that we may orient ourselves accordingly.   
The mode of humanity now contains measure, limit, and proportion to the end.  
The final step is to bring these components together into a cohesive and functioning 
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whole.  This cohesive whole, and the manner in which it functions, may be described 
as a method.  Therefore, the fourth connotation of mode is mode as method.   
 
D) Method 
When oriented to the active moral life, the mode functions as a means of operation, as 
in the phrase modus operandi.
582
  This is not unique to temperance, as all the virtues 
serve to accomplish larger moral objectives.  However, this point is particularly 
significant for temperance, as it is often the manner in which comprehensive moral 
goals are realized.  Plato conflates temperance with his two ‘architectonic’ virtues, 
justice (Rep. 431, 440) and wisdom (Prot. 333b, Laws 689d), indicating that, at times, 
it operates in a more universal manner than mere restraint of appetites.
583
  Aristotle 
also employs temperance in a somewhat architectonic manner, as it underlies the 
doctrine of the mean.
584
  To the Stoics, temperance is vital to the eradication of 
passions necessary in the journey to becoming a sage.  For Augustine, continence (a 
close relative of temperance) is central both to conversion and to faithful Christian 
living; it is the ‘operative mode’ of Christian love.585  For Calvin, moderation (another 
close relative of temperance) is one of the primary means of reestablishing means of 
living the Christian life.  With its emphases upon the rule of life, the acceptance of 
limits, and a relationship to a telos, temperance aligns, closely and consistently, with 
the operations of the moral life.  Whereas the mean is representative of a virtue by 
way of averages, the mode indicates virtue’s core tendencies.  The centrality of the 
mean is quantitative; the centrality of the mode is qualitative.  
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6.2.3.4 The Mode in the Balance 
The mode is deeply shaped by the other components of temperance.  Knowledge 
plays an especially pivotal role, as discerning the mode is much more phronetic than 
discerning the mean.  While the mean lacks any clear or decisive content, arising from 
a somewhat ‘lazy’ knowledge, the mode relies upon a wider variety of knowledge 
than does the mean.  Indeed, in one sense the mode is nothing less than applied 
practical reason.  Moreover, the creation of measure and its limits requires good 
knowledge.  Self-control is implicit in the various facets of the mode, particularly its 
function as limit.  Conforming to a rule of life requires both humility and self-control.  
When the moral agent acknowledges the boundaries of limits, humility is required.  
Moreover, acting with proportion to a telos recognizes that the self is not the center of 
one’s moral universe, which fights against hubris.   
As stated above, temperance is very often the manner in which comprehensive 
moral goals are realized, coordinating the actions of knowledge and self-control into a 
method of living into the moral life.  However, to properly utilize the previous three 
components of temperance, one thing more must be considered, and that is humility. 
 
6.2.4 Humility 
Humility is the fourth component of the virtue of temperance, and perhaps the most 
ambiguous.  Is it a natural or a special virtue?  Is it virtuous or vicious? 
586
   
 
6.2.4.1 A Somewhat Ambiguous Virtue 
Accepted opinion within classical philosophy views humility as vicious; however, a 
deeper examination reveals a more nuanced position.
587
  The meekness and openness 
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to direction recommended in the Laws are positively connected to humility.  Aristotle 
identifies humility with human lowliness which prevents man from achieving his 
potential, and views it as blameworthy and vicious; thus Aristotle’s opposing humility 
to megalopsychia prevents his approval of the Christian construction of the virtue.  
Yet his description of a particular combination of being and mindset, which opposes 
hubris and excessive pride, suggests some version of humility, the ‘unnamed virtue’ 
which he calls temperance.  Both Plato and Aristotle link temperance with a mindset 
that involves knowing one’s social position, possessing an appropriate love of honor, 
and the recognition of man’s mortal nature.  Thus, while humility per se is never 
valorized in classical philosophy, it overlaps significantly with other ‘virtuous’ traits.   
The Christian tradition has generally viewed humility as a virtue, though with 
varying particulars.  For Augustine, humility is the ‘first, second, and third way’ of 
the Christian life (ep. 118.22), an awareness of humanity’s need for God’s grace (s. 
137.4, 44) and a response to the very humility of Christ (en. Ps. 31.2.18).
588
  Thus, 
Augustinian humility is something of a meta- or supernatural virtue, necessary for 
even the smallest advance in virtue and godliness.  In contrast, Wesley, who 
consistently links temperance to humility, sees humility as a proto- or sub-virtue, an 
emptiness that exists prior to acquiring the virtues themselves, ‘the first step we take 
in running the race which is set before us’ (SS 21.I.7).  Aquinas also sees humility as 
humanity’s necessary subjection to God and natural consequence of its sinfulness (II-
II.161.1).  However, he then names humility as one of the potential parts of 
temperance, where it ‘tempers’ the natural appetite for honor (II-II.162).  Thus, 
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humility is simultaneously meta-virtue and secondary-virtue, a confusing place to 
inhabit.   
Humility may be considered a practice as well as a virtue.  Benedict of Nursia 
describes the ‘ladder to humility’ with twelve degrees of ascension, which begin 
internally and proceed externally.
589
  Although it begins by cultivating the internal 
realities of reverence, submission, endurance, and repentance, it presumes these 
realities are both shaped and reflected by external actions, wherein one is humble ‘not 
only in his heart, but also in his very outward appearance.’590  In strikingly 
Aristotelian language, Benedict states that ascending this ladder of humility will 
change the monastic life from fearful obligation to joyful endeavor, now lived 
‘naturally and by habit …no longer through fear of hell, but the love of Christ and out 
of holy custom and delight in virtue.’591  Whether sub- or meta-virtue, internal 
inclination or external practice, humility has consistently been regarded as central to 
the moral life.  John Chrysostom, ‘For as pride is the fountain of all wickedness, so is 
humility the principle of all self-command’ (Homily XV.3).592  Humility was a central 
virtue in rabbinic literature, the ‘head and front’ and ‘ingredient of all the virtues.’593  
C.S. Lewis considered humility ‘the centre of Christian morals’, opposed as it is to the 
principal sin of pride, and located in our self-knowledge as nothing before God.
594
  
Even modern moral philosophers have come to value this ‘humble’ trait; Iris Murdoch 
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calls humility a ‘selfless respect for reality and one of the most difficult and central of 
all the virtues.’595  
In light of this array of accounts, it may seem redundant to ask: What is 
humility?  Yet, despite its foundation within the different traditions, embodying this 
virtue is anything but simple.  One helpful approach works from the connected 
Aristotelian categories of mindset and being. 
 
6.2.4.2 The Nature of Humility – Mindset and Being 
In his discussion of megalopsychia and mikropsychia, Aristotle states that the 
‘unnamed virtue’ (which makes someone sōphron) is present in persons who are 
worthy of small (mikrōn) things and believe themselves worthy of them (1123b5-6).  
Thus, they align themselves with moderate, measured things in both being and 
mindset, categories which will guide this discussion of humility. 
 
(A) The Mindset of Humility: Self-Aware and Other-Centered 
The mindset of humility often appears wholly negative, such as its association with 
‘humiliation’.  This has its roots in the Hellenic connotations of tapeinosis, as well as 
certain examples of Christian thought; Anselm, for example, locates the entirety of 
humility in human contemptibility (De Simil. ci, seqq).
596
  However, humility is better 
understood not as self-hatred, but as true self-understanding.  Augustine exhorts his 
congregation: ‘You are not being told, “Be something less than you are.” But 
“understand what you are.  Understand that you’re weak, understand that you are 
merely human, understand that you are a sinner’ (s. 137.4).  Instead of a gloomy 
humiliation, this is an acceptance of humanity’s fallen state and complete reliance 
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upon the grace of God.  This nuance of humility expresses some of the meaning of the 
Greek sōphrosynē: accepting human frailty and mortality, respecting limits, and 
avoiding hubris.  Writing during ‘the most difficult period of his life’, Henri Nouwen 
managed to see the complex, interwoven nature of the way of humility in these 
disparate topics: ‘Acknowledge your powerlessness’, ‘See yourself truthfully’, 
‘Accept your identity as a child of God’, ‘Know yourself as truly loved’, ‘Avoid all 
forms of self-rejection’, and ‘Say often, “Lord, have mercy.”’597 
Because it is so easy to slide into the abyss of ‘humiliation’, genuine humility 
must arise from the right intentions.  Dorothy Day maintained that unless humility is 
divinely motivated, it is only ‘a debasing and repulsive attitude.’598  When divinely 
motivated, however, it is a basic attitude of heart that generates a quiet and 
unassuming joyfulness.  
Do not imagine that if you meet a really humble man he will be what most 
people call ‘humble’ nowadays: he will not be a sort of greasy, smarmy 
person, who is always telling you that, of course, he is nobody …He will 
not be thinking about humility: he will not be thinking about himself at 
all.
599
 
 
The concluding phrase reveals the deeper reality of the mindset of humility.  Beyond 
the work of a true self-understanding, humility moves our vision outward.  The 
mindset of humility is a shift from self-regard, whether positive or negative, to a 
primary regard for others.  Instead of promoting more self-reflection and narcissism, 
humility de-centers the self, facilitating an ‘other-centeredness’ that arises from true 
self-knowledge.
600
  Indeed, humility is part of the recommended triad of acting justly 
and loving mercy, both of which focus upon our behavior towards others (Micah 6:8). 
  
                                                 
597
 Henri Nouwen, The Inner Voice of Love (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 2006) 
598
 Dorothy Day, House of Hospitality (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939), 97. 
599
 Lewis, Mere Christianity, 128. 
600
 See Fullam. 
281 
 
Thus, humility is a virtue that refines and reorients vision; it affects not only 
how we see ourselves, but how we see – opening the eyes to the larger realities of the 
world.  Murdoch maintains that humility ‘is not a peculiar habit of self-effacement’ 
but has far deeper significance; it is the ‘moral side-effect of being closer to the 
truth.’601  This truth that is the second aspect of genuine humility: an acceptance of 
our particular state of being.   
 
(B) The Being of Humility: Humus and Hubris 
Interestingly, the word humility is derived from humus (Latin for ‘ground’), the layer 
of topsoil that provides both fertility and stability to the soil system it overlays.  True 
humility, therefore, is literally a state of being grounded, not ground down.  It is an 
earthiness that roots us in the commonplace, keeping ‘our feet on the ground.’  One 
example of this ‘grounding’ is King Uzziah, described as righteous before the Lord, 
who tempered his military and civic achievements with a ‘love for the soil’ (2 Chr. 
26.10).  He sought the Lord and ‘was marvelously helped until he became strong’, 
whereupon ‘he grew proud, to his destruction’ (2 Chr. 26.15-16).   He literally moved 
from humus to hubris.  For his arrogance, he was stricken with leprosy and banished 
from the house of the Lord, a truly deep humiliation for the former king (2 Chr. 
26.21).  This arrogance is all too common today, as ‘the collective hubris of the West 
has allowed many humans to ignore their rootedness to the planet even as it has given 
them an arrogant sense of the power they wield over their own lives and the lives of 
other species.’602  We forget the very things from which we derive our sustenance and 
strength, be it God or creation. 
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As Augustine noted, humility rightly orders us to God (s. 137.44).  When we 
accept that we are creatures and not the Creator, we can embrace our limitations as 
finite beings.  ‘There is no task more difficult,’ states Norman Wirzba, ‘than to be 
faithful and true to our creaturely condition and need,’ and failure to do so signals a 
‘rebellion against humility.’603   Humility is tenacious, reminding us that small, 
everyday efforts are not to be despised: it ‘does not mind if it looks silly; it does what 
it can.’604  Instead of expressing docility or folly, it possesses a toughness and realism 
unexpected in our modern rendering of ‘humiliation.’605  This realism and durable 
meekness are evidenced in the humility of the kenotic action of Christ:   
Let the same mind be in you, that was in Christ Jesus, who, though he was 
in the form of God, did not regard equality with God as something to be 
exploited, but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in 
human likeness. (Phil. 2.3-6) 
 
This humility is in stark contrast to the honor of Aristotle’s megalopsychoi.  While 
Aquinas connects the virtues of humility and magnanimity, humility can also provide 
an alternative to the myth of heroic virtue, guarding against the discouragement of 
‘failing at “heroic” tasks.’606  Thus, humility serves well as a weapon against despair.  
This is especially true as we live alongside the ‘creation myths’ of our faith story, 
whose example we may despair of ever matching.   
Moreover, humanity, like all creation, lives in a post-lapsarian state in the 
midst of a process of redemption.  At its core, humility is the embodied 
acknowledgement that both creatureliness and failure are part of the present human 
condition.  However, this does not lead to a passive acceptance of our sinful nature; 
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rather, it makes space for the possibility of transformation.  Humility enables the 
recognition and acceptance of human frailty.   
 
6.2.4.3  Humility in the Balance 
Because self-control, knowledge, and mode are by their nature susceptible to 
perfecting and over-achievement, humility plays a grounding role in the virtue of 
temperance itself.  The amount of knowledge available today is staggering; there is 
virtually no end to how much can be known.  Humility keeps knowledge from 
becoming prideful, aware of its provisional nature and of its limitations in producing a 
moral life.
607
  Humility also balances our efforts at self-control.  When self-control is 
idolized and elevated above its proper position, it can become a source of prideful 
comparison.  Rather than an essential tool in the task of edification, it becomes a 
measuring stick, assessing one’s moral effort and soon their moral worth.  The 
presence of humility as a component of temperance mitigates the tendency of self-
control to breed pride and division.  Moreover, the practice of self-control can fortify 
our humility; because we are fallen, we need self-control.  Acknowledging the 
incomplete nature of our still-divided selves and the reality of the messages of 
consumption that surround us reveals our continuing need for self-control, which 
demonstrates our continuing imperfection along the road of the virtuous life.  Thus, 
humility guards against pridefulness in our own efforts.   
Yet humility does not always guard against pride; it can easily transform itself 
into pride, particularly when restraint and control are emphasized.  A problem 
common to virtue ethics is that the acts generated by a particular virtue are often 
mistaken for the virtue itself.  Nowhere is it more apparent than with humility; it is 
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often worshipped for its own sake and viewed as the sole component of acceptable 
moral action.  Like the components of temperance that it grounds, humility must itself 
be grounded by other aspects of virtue in a deep and holistic understanding of the 
virtuous life.  In this sense, humility makes sense in its location within Thomistic-
Aristotelian temperance: like temperance, which only is temperance when its actions 
are subtle and unrecognized, true humility is present when it vanishes in use.   
So, these four components – self-control, knowledge, mode, and humility – 
together characterize the essentials of the virtue of temperance.  What remains to 
consider is the appearance or characterization of this virtue’s being and action when it 
is fully present.  The fullest, most complete description of this is the presence of 
harmonious order.   
 
6.2.5 Harmonious Order 
Harmonious order is the fullest expression of the virtue of temperance; manifested 
both internally and externally, it exemplifies the coordination and cooperation of the 
various parts of the human person.  This section will consider the nature of moral 
order as primary, creative, and divine; the location of harmonious order within the 
continuum from repression to flourishing; and the important difference between order 
as kosmos and order as decorum.   
 
6.2.5.1 Order as Primary, Created, and Divine 
The first step is considering the broader nature of moral order, which is foundational 
to any society.
608
  One of the primary benefits of social life is bringing control to an 
out-of-control world.  Yet the order of temperance is more than a state of strict and 
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continuous control; it is more enduring, more stable, and more reliable.  Separate and 
distinct elements are gathered and brought into a larger structure; what was isolated is 
now a unified, purposeful whole.  Plato connects order to the higher moral life and 
calls the person who attains philosophical virtue ‘as divine and ordered as a human 
being can be’ (Rep. 500c7-d1).609   
Indeed, order is often viewed as divine in origin.  Order is instituted and 
blessed by God, who repeatedly calls the ordering of creation tōv, ‘good’ (Gen. 1).  
Moral order is present in the fabric of creation; indeed, the two terms are often viewed 
synonymously.
610
  Both Augustine and Calvin use order as a foundational theological 
and moral category.
611
  Augustine sees order as divine in origin (conf. 5.11) and states 
that ‘the peace of all things is the tranquility of order’ (ciu. 19.13).  For Calvin, order 
is unchanging, intentional, and dynamic, instituted and moderated by God (Inst. 
I.13.21, I.16.3).  Thus, humanity is located within the created order, which makes 
particular moral claims upon it.  However, this runs counter to fallen self-will, as sin 
means that ‘we find this order of things a problem and are rebelliously disposed 
towards it.’612  Moral theologian Josef Pieper correctly notes that human internal 
order ‘is not a simply given and self-evident reality, but rather that the same forces 
from which human existence derives its being can upset that inner order to the point 
of destroying the spiritual and moral person.’613  Thus, moral order is found not only 
in creation’s origins but also in its culmination.  The exitus-reditus structure of the 
Summa shows Aquinas’s location of the human moral life as originating from divine 
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order and concluding in divine beatitude.  What Oliver O’Donovan calls the ‘Easter 
principle’ reveals how the resurrection of Jesus ‘restored and fulfilled the intelligible 
order of creation.’614  This is, however, inherently hopeful, as the gospel is ‘good 
news’ not because we must live within this moral order, but precisely because it is 
possible to live within it.
615
   
As stated earlier, order as control is one of the primary goods of any society.  
Yet order, on its own, is too static and ‘flat’ a category to fully contain the possible 
internal concord – the ‘good news’ – of temperance.  Rather, it will (ideally) evolve 
into the more positive and attractive alternative of harmony. 
 
6.2.5.2 From Order to Harmony 
As the moral agent grows in the virtue of temperance, internal and external ‘order’ 
matures into a beautiful and symphonic harmony.  Understood as consonance and 
congruence, this harmony is stable without being static; it is dynamic without being 
disordered.  Order still has a large measure of self-control, whereas moving towards 
harmony leads you towards the fullness of ‘happiness’ and human flourishing.  The 
figures in this study are themselves located at different points on the spectrum.  
Whereas Calvin’s conception of order is more restrictive and more concerned with 
control (Inst. I.13.21), Augustine echoes Plato by connecting order and harmony (ciu. 
19.13).  The presence of either order or harmony is influenced by the relative 
strengths of the various components of temperance.  When self-control is the most 
active component of the virtue of temperance, the result will be a more strictly 
structured order.  However, when control is ‘tempered’, so to speak, by the presence 
of knowledge, mode, and humility, order in its strict sense is transformed into 
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harmony, in which order is employed for the larger purpose of bringing discrete 
elements into an ordered relationship which creates something both beautiful and 
larger than themselves – greater than the sum of their parts.  Order is certainly a result 
of the four components, but it is an imperfect relationship, a shadowy sketch (or 
should we say, a rigid, black and white outline) of the true fruit of temperance as 
temperies (‘harmonious balance’).616 
The harmony it engenders is musical in nature, with limiting notes as in a 
scale or a musical chord.  It is defined as symphony and concord, and is opposed to 
disaccord.  Plato employs this musical illustration in his connection of kosmos and 
harmonia, order and harmony.   
He [the sōphron man] puts himself in order, is his own friend, and 
harmonizes the three parts of himself like three limiting notes on a 
musical scale – high, low, and middle.  He binds together those parts and 
any others there may be in between, and from having been many things he 
becomes entirely one, moderate and harmonious. (Rep. 443d) 
 
This also engages the third definition of mode, ‘a set of musical notes forming a scale 
and from which melodies and harmonies are constructed.’ This recalls the definition 
of temperance as attunement, ‘to put in tune with; to adjust the pitch of a note, chord, 
instrument.’617  The very harmony of beautiful music ‘lies between the fatal extremes 
of mechanism and chaos’, with tyrannical order on the one side and cacophonous 
noise on the other.
618
  Moreover, greater mastery of the material provides an increased 
capacity for creativity and expression.
619
  Such phenomena as musical jam sessions, 
jazz scat vocals, and comedy improvisation are fresh and dynamic, yet grounded in an 
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established structure that is required for true harmony of expression.
620
  Stanley 
Hauerwas states that while improvisation ‘allows and indeed encourages the virtuoso 
to stray, wander, explore, it nonetheless demands that she remains close to home.’621  
It is mastery of the material that gives the moral agent the comfort and competence 
needed to convert order into harmony. 
 
6.2.5.3 Harmonious Order and Human Flourishing 
The intended and natural outcome of the virtue of temperance is human flourishing, 
characterized by beauty and happiness.  Whether described as eudaimonia, beatitude, 
blessedness, or the well-lived life, it is the end and purpose of human existence.  John 
Wesley admonished the parents in his congregation: “Even when a child first begins 
to speak or to run alone, a good parent follows behind saying, many times each day, 
‘He made you; and he made you to be happy in him; and nothing else can make you 
happy’ (SS 114.10).  This happiness Aquinas calls beatitude, much like the ‘beatitudes 
of blessedness’ spoken in the Sermon on the Mount.   
Throughout history, scholars of eudaimonistic flourishing have considered the 
questions, ‘What is the point of being human?  What is the end towards which we 
journey?’  This flourishing can take different forms depending on one’s ethical 
orientation. Oliver O’Donovan favors the Aristotelian ‘ordered-to-flourish’ over the 
Platonic ‘ordered-to-serve’, as it allows questions of human flourishing to stand on 
their own, within the realm of nature and creation, and without the attendant 
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cosmological and soteriological concerns.
622
  These concerns are valid in themselves, 
but they beg the question of the larger moral context.  Much like the ‘natural end’ for 
an acorn may legitimately be either an oak tree or food for a pig, human flourishing is 
concerned with both natural and supernatural ends.
623
  Temperance is markedly 
relevant to these teleological questions, particularly within its sphere of action 
regarding the natural ends of humanity (e.g. ST II-II.141.7).   
Temperance also has a special relationship to the grace and beauty of human 
flourishing.  Plato sees beauty and virtue as arising from measure and proportion (Phil 
64e) and states that the life of the sōphron man will ‘be gentle in all respects… more 
pleasant’ than a life of licentiousness (Laws 734a-b).  In the Charmides, he declares 
that temperance is beneficial and truly a blessing (Char. 169b, Char. 176a).  Even 
Aquinas does not restrict himself to concerns about the needs of life, but 
acknowledges the beauty and tranquility of soul that is attendant to temperance (II-
II.141.2 ad 3).  Commenting on this, Pieper calls the serenity of spirit generated by 
temperance ‘the seal and fruit of order’, which is ‘the purpose and goal of 
temperantia.’624  This may be somewhat counter-intuitive, as Craiutu notes that while 
temperance appears beautiful to itself, it unknowingly ‘appears black and sober, and 
consequently ugly-looking’ to the self-indulgent.625  The beauty of the temperate life 
may be like the message of the cross, the power of God for believers but foolishness 
to those who are perishing (1 Cor. 1.18). 
Yet what if we ‘appear beautiful’ to others but are deceiving ourselves?  Put 
another way, is it possible for one’s internal assurance to be misguided, to appear 
beautiful but actually possess an ‘agreement’ other than the internal harmony of 
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temperance?  What other manifestations of harmony and order might account for this?  
There is one final issue that bears examining – the difference between order as kosmos 
and order as decorum. 
 
6.2.5.4 Kosmos and Decorum 
In his book Pagan Virtue, John Casey reflects on the beauty that is attendant to 
temperance: 
We find in grace of comportment something in the spirit of people that we 
might want to call ‘harmonious’.  And gracelessness in manner and 
comportment often goes with those defects of character that suggest lack 
of temperance.  Willfulness, childishness, uncontrolled passion very often 
show themselves in graceless behaviour, and even in sheer ugliness of 
physical gesture.
626
 
 
Casey’s comments call attention to an interesting aspect of the order and harmony of 
temperance – namely, that graciousness and beauty display themselves in such 
outward manifestations as ‘behaviour, manner, and comportment.’627  This reveals 
less a concern for the internal harmony of the truly virtuous than a desire for the 
outward, aesthetic indications of a decorous and ‘ordered’ life.   
This highlights an insight from the previous section; namely, that a difference 
in moral context affects the construction and sphere of ‘harmony’ and ‘order’.  While 
Platonic kosmos conveys an internal consonance, and the early Stoic cosmology 
stresses a moral alignment to nature, the Roman decorum (Gk. to prepon) emphasizes 
a social credibility and respectability.
628
  ‘Order’ is now determined, not by 
conformance to cosmic or religious forms, but rather by the social expectations 
arising from ‘civil’ society; and morality is now subordinated to aesthetics, with the 
Roman virtue of approbation being of first concern (Off. 1.28.98).  Moreover, the 
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Aristotelian concern for internal and external congruence is rendered superfluous as 
the external demands of decorum take center moral stage.  ‘Harmony’ is no longer 
internal but the harmonious interactions of people conducting themselves 
appropriately and conforming to a socially mediated standard of behavior.   
The harmonious ordering of temperance, therefore, may reflect two very 
different conceptions of ‘order’, each with a different practical outcome.  The 
significance of this distinction is easily understated and overlooked.  The actions 
deemed ‘virtuous’ by someone concerned with social approbation will be quite 
different from those of someone concerned with authentic knowledge, measured 
human limit, and genuine humility.  The external ordering of decorum locates its telos 
in the values of the day, taking its cues from the larger society.  The internal ordering 
of kosmos, however, is ideally oriented to a virtuous telos.  Thus, the pursuit of 
individual virtue may place one at cross purposes to society but rightly aligned to the 
pursuit of authentic human flourishing.  Societal order may find itself at odds with the 
internal order of temperance, thus begging the question of which order one chooses to 
prioritize.  It is certainly possible that both conceptions of order may be 
simultaneously fulfilled, but it is neither required nor expected.   
Temperance has revealed itself as a remarkably rich and complex trait that 
engages the human person at both the ‘lowest’ and ‘highest’ levels.  Far from the 
humdrum, mediocre quality of recent accounts, it is a vital and dynamic attribute that 
enables human animals to fully embody both their animality and their rationality.  
However, any retrieval of a classic virtue raises questions of a more systematic nature, 
three of which will be considered in the following, final section of this chapter. 
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6.3 Particularities of the Virtue of Temperance 
This new account of temperance raises several questions: how the account functions 
internally, what makes it different from its predecessors, and whether it is the same 
virtue under discussion.  The first question examines the relationship between the 
various components of temperance and the virtue at large; the second compares this 
new account of temperance and past accounts; and the third considers whether there 
exists one single and coherent virtue of ‘temperance’ present across the different 
cultures and philosophies considered in this thesis. 
 
6.3.1 The Components and the Whole 
Chapters two through five of this study reveal that the historical witnesses do not 
always express each component of temperance.  This begs the question: Are we still 
justifiably talking about ‘temperance’?  How important are the various components?  
Does a person need to possess and demonstrate each component to be temperate? 
 
6.3.1.1 Potential and Actual Temperance 
The lengthy examination of these various components may beg the question: Does 
each component need to be present for ‘temperance’ to be present?  This dilemma 
seems endemic to the examination of temperance, as Socrates’ discussion in the 
Charmides considers and rejects several definitions of temperance which appear to be 
incomplete (as opposed to incorrect).
629
  Without being overly simplistic or highly 
legalistic, it is helpful to consider the Aristotelian and Thomistic distinctions between 
temperance and continence; that is, the difference between a ‘true’ virtue and a ‘sub-
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‘or ‘potential’ virtue.630  Aquinas calls continence a potential part of temperance, and 
his choice of words is informative, as ‘potential’ signifies some currently unrealized 
possibility.
631
  Whereas for Aquinas, potential virtues share in the power of the 
primary virtue to a lesser degree and towards a secondary matter, my understanding of 
‘potential’ as ‘having or showing the capacity to become or develop into something’ 
arises in part from Aristotle’s dichotomy of potentiality (dunamis) and actuality 
(energeia or entelexeia), where actuality is the state of being fully realized (e.g. de an. 
III.5, Meta. XII.7-10).  And whereas Aquinas assigned the ‘potential parts’ of 
temperance to objects of lesser desire, I contend that true temperance applies to all of 
the objects of temperance, but that this may happen in varying degrees of 
actualization.
632
 
Thus, temperance will reach its fullest potential – that is, it will be fully 
actualized as a virtue – when all four components are both present and active.  
Temperance will not be ‘absent’ when one or more the components are absent; rather, 
temperance will not be fully realized and will not bring its fullest transformative 
power to the situation and to one’s character without all four components interacting 
to produce the harmonious order that characterizes fully actualized temperance.
633
  
Self-control, knowledge, mode, and humility – these are all notes in the scale of 
temperance, displaying the essence of Plato’s harmonia.634  Individually they may 
ring clear and true, but when brought together in the intentional and related manner of 
a musical chord, the effect is qualitatively different, and altogether more powerful.   
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In some ways, this resembles the anthropological and missiological bounded- 
set/centered-set discussion, where one’s sense of ‘belonging’ to a particular set is 
understand less as a function of whether one is within the boundary of acceptable 
behavior and more upon the degree to which one approaches the core or center which 
exemplifies the nature (one could say mode?) of the set.
635
  While the categories do 
have some overlap, considering temperance from a centered-set viewpoint enables the 
moral agent to engage the process of acquiring virtue more teleologically, as they 
have the center of the set as their telos. 
 
6.3.1.2 Temperare: Temperance as Mixture 
As noted above, the concepts of modulation and mode brings a more active and 
dynamic element than the concepts of moderation and the mean.  In a similar manner, 
[the presence of] the ‘mixing’ connotation of temperare may be said to oversee and 
regulate the various components of temperance.  When the Greek term sōphrosynē 
was primarily associated with moderatio and temperantiae, it received from the root 
tempus the semantic connotations of mixing, measuring, hardening or softening, and 
compounding properly.
636
  It is the sense of mixture and measured compounds that the 
root concept of temperare informs the discussion of temperance in an overarching, 
comprehensive manner.  In the same way that temperance oversees, regulates, 
coordinates, and orchestrates the workings of the various parts of ourselves, so the 
temperare function of temperance will act to oversee and orchestrate the various 
components of temperance.  The actions and contributions of each component will 
change according to the situation and the related requirements. 
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In this manner, the temperare aspect serves as the mode of the virtue, both 
within the components of the virtue itself and in its harmonizing function for the 
various parts of the human person.  This feature also highlights the importance of 
‘phronetic’ assessment of each component of temperance, an informed recognition of 
the role each element is to play in each particular situation.  This concept of ‘mixing’ 
is dynamic and responsive, addressing each situation in its particularities.
637
  Thus, it 
is similar in function and concept to the Aristotelian mean in its ideal conception (i.e. 
Eth.Nic.1109a27-29), while avoiding some of the problems that notions of 
intermediacy and quantitative moderation invariably generate.   
 
6.3.1.3 The Social and Communal Nature of Temperance 
However, while all the components of temperance should ideally be present, it is 
unlikely that individual persons will always embody each component to its fullest 
extent, or even to the same degree.  This particularity of temperance considers 
presence over absence and relates to one’s particular approach to the ethical 
enterprise.  Based on theological or philosophical commitments, sociocultural 
particulars or simply one’s personality, each person may find themselves prioritizing 
one particular aspect of temperance.  These commitments, which both shape and 
reflect one’s approach to moral formation more fundamentally, influences one’s 
approach to the work of temperance and through which temperance manifests itself in 
their moral life.  Aristotle notes the distinction between the self-controlled and the 
resistant, those persons who by their nature find it easier to withstand the temptations 
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of appetite and desire.
638
  Some persons are more inclined and adept at self-control; 
other work more naturally within the categories of knowledge or model.  Therefore, 
while temperance has traditionally been understood as an ‘individual’ virtue, it 
actually may be best embodied within a community of persons, with each element 
present in a strong form, albeit in different people.  Moreover, there is an essentially 
communal nature to temperance which, while possibly present in all virtues, is 
particularly connected to temperance due to its essential nature as the harmonious 
order of disparate parts.  Those persons whose gift is knowledge will serve to inform 
and educate.  Those who are disciplined will exhort the community to embody their 
ideals and stand firm in their commitment.  And those with deep humility will ground 
the community in their creatureliness and frailties.  These gifts and capacities will 
work together to create a full and harmonious whole. 
In his exploration of Plato’s theory of the unity of the virtues in Prot. 349-350, 
Oliver O’Donovan discusses the different ways virtues manifest in different people, 
displaying ‘different salient features …[all of which can] be called good.’639  He 
contrasts three women – a dedicated social worker, a devoted mother, and a 
disciplined intellectual – and says that they may admire and even imitate each other, 
‘but insofar as each woman’s life has been shaped by one virtue, rather than others, it 
does not have room to accommodate the specialized excellences of the others.’640  
Neither would the ‘well-balanced’ woman, whose life incorporates all these virtues to 
the same moderate degree, be considered morally superior.  Thus, we have ‘moral 
pluralism challenging the homogeneity of virtue.’641  However, plurality does not 
equal relativism, as O’Donovan attributes this diversity not to moral relativism but to 
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a heterogeneity of virtue.
642
  These differences in character are inherently positive 
because ‘they are true interpretations, each within a unique vocational matrix, of the 
one moral life… the one life-task which is differentiated particularly in the uniqueness 
of individual vocations.’643   
This insight brings clarity to a phenomenon I have observed over years of 
living in faith-based community.  When we have addressed problems or discussed 
discipleship, there have been persons who have consistently advocated for one 
particular approach or posture to the problem.  One person usually recommends 
learning more about the problem, creating and revising our theology and our position, 
studying more and more until we have a better grasp of the issue at hand.  Another 
person constantly wants to divest the community of its material goods and scale back 
its appetites.  All solutions involved becoming one-car families, shopping exclusively 
at thrift stores, and eating only beans and rice.  Yet another person always wants to 
step back from making a decision or taking a position.  Citing the need for humility, 
he says, ‘How can we think we have anything to offer the world?  All we can do is 
offer our small, imperfect attempts, failures though they may be.’  As a community 
member, I have always been puzzled by my aggravation with this set of responses, 
none of which is demonstrably ‘false’.  Each seems to contain some truth, or at least 
some vital aspect of it.  Yet when declared to be the singular answer for a dilemma, 
they feel not so much incorrect as inadequate.  Although they do convey part of the 
truth of a situation, they need the other elements to be part of a rich, balanced, 
holistic, temperate response.  Again, this is not a discussion of the ‘ordinal’ nature of 
temperance – ‘am I temperate or not?’ – so much as an exploration of the fullness of 
the virtue and how it may be achieved in its fullness.   
                                                 
642
 O’Donovan, Moral Order, 220.  He translates this theologically as ‘vocation’ or ‘gift.’ 
643
 Ibid., 223. 
298 
 
Finally, as temperance is constituted by community, it is present for 
community.  As Paul declares, ‘If we are beside ourselves, it is for God; if we are in 
our right mind (sōphronoumen), it is for you’ (2 Cor. 5.13).  While we may be 
allowed to be out of our minds for God, we must be in our right minds – sōphron – to 
be present and beneficial for each other.  Even when ecstatic existence may be the 
path to God, sōphron living is the path to one another.  This controverts the notion 
that temperance is solely an individual virtue; rather, it has profound implications for 
the external, communal moral life.  To be temperate, we must have each other; to be 
of any use to each other, we must be temperate.  This is circular in the best sense of 
the word, continuously reinforcing our growth in virtue and in community. 
So, this account of temperance makes space for both potential and actual 
virtue; it is characterized by a phronetic mixing of its various components; and it is 
most fully realized when these components are present within a community of 
virtuous persons.  The second particularity of temperance compares this new account 
of temperance to its predecessors. 
 
6.3.2 Comparisons with Other Accounts of Temperance 
This new account of the virtue of temperance does not emerge from a vacuum, nor 
does it break completely from previous accounts.  At present, it stands alongside the 
familiar understandings of temperance as abstinence from alcohol and moderation-in-
all-things.  How does it compare with these accounts?  Is there any continuity?  What 
is the importance of the differences?  This section will consider the abstinence 
position of the Temperance Movement, the prevailing interpretation of temperance as 
moderation, and the possibility of expanding the sphere of temperance beyond the 
paradigmatic objects of food, alcohol, and sexual activity.   
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6.3.2.1 Beyond the Temperance Movement 
As noted earlier, both the abstinence and moderation positions of the Temperance 
Movement, in addition to claiming biblical and ecclesiastical support, viewed 
themselves as residing within the moral tradition of the virtue of temperance.
644
  
However, this study has demonstrated that the ‘temperance’ of the Temperance 
Movement is a stale and brittle image of a once-cardinal virtue.  It does not enable 
wise choices, channel the most powerful internal urges, or restore fractured humanity 
to oneness in Christ; it merely symbolizes a largely failed social movement and the 
extremes it promoted.  Thus, it differs significantly, in three primary ways, from the 
temperance discerned in this study.  
First, the Temperance Movement was, by and large, not about temperance 
simpliciter, nor was it actually about the virtue itself, in any form.  With the exception 
of a few instances, temperance was invoked as a response to particularly distressing 
social issues.  This was not unprecedented; temperance has often been defined 
primarily contra a particular vice (EN III.10), and it has often been understood as 
pertaining almost exclusively to one particular paradigm, as with the patristic 
emphasis on sexual continence.
645
  Moreover, the focus upon alcohol to the exclusion 
of other subjects of temperance, when examined within its historical journey, reflects 
more about situational moral concerns than about the virtue itself.  Whereas the 
Church Fathers chose – for moral and theological reasons – to focus their attention on 
issues of sexuality, the late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century viewed alcohol 
as by far the more pressing issue.  Thus, temperance became associated almost 
exclusively with the debate surrounding alcohol consumption.   
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Second, the virtue of temperance became displaced by (or conflated with) the 
rhetoric and practice of abstinence.  This historically nuanced trait of character was 
transformed into a lifestyle decision, an ecumenical movement, and a political issue; 
and it reinforced the transformation of temperance from an active, engaged 
disposition to a series of discrete, isolated actions.  Also, in the shift from temperance-
as-virtue to abstinence-as-practice, the language of virtue is gradually replaced with 
the language of pragmatism (in talk of ‘expediency’) and obligation (in talk of 
‘duty’).  This unfortunately reorients the focus of Christian morality from the 
formation of a wholly integrated character to an ethic of disconnected actions.  Thus, 
the title ‘Temperance Movement’ went from ‘appropriate’ to ‘retained, though now 
only in part applicable’, to ‘altogether misapplied’ (R&D, 205).   
Third, the association of ‘temperance’ with a lifestyle of total abstinence had 
the unintended effect of making ‘moderation’ appear to be the liberal, nonmoralistic 
approach to alcohol in particular and sensual indulgence in general.  While certainly 
preferable to the legalistic alternative, the shifting attitude towards moderation 
strengthened either the rigid or moderative aspects of temperance, while 
marginalizing those which are dynamic and responsive.  Thus, moderation survived as 
the ‘middle’ response to questions of appetite and indulgence. 
 
6.3.2.2 Modulation, Not Moderation 
As discussed earlier, temperance has acquired the connotation of ‘everything in 
moderation’ or ‘moderation in all things.’646  This understanding of temperance is less 
easily caricatured than that of the Temperance Movement, as it appears to lie closer to 
the central themes of temperance, particularly the Aristotelian mean, Stoic apatheia, 
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and the Reformation emphasis on self-restraint.  And to be fair, some accounts of 
moderation sound quite similar to the temperance advanced in this chapter; Harry 
Clor defines moderation as ‘balance or proportionality, recognition of limits, [and] 
some capacity for disinterestedness.’647   
However, as the saying goes, the enemy of the best is often the good.  
Whereas Nietzsche unhelpfully conflated moderation and mediocrity (and thus 
condemned the former) under ‘the Aristotelianism of morals’, his concerns about a 
‘harmless, apathetic mean’ are well-placed.648  As noted earlier, ‘moderation’ tends 
towards the average, static conception of finding the middle ground, doing a bit of 
everything and not too much of anything.
649
  Again, this is not a logical or 
philosophical necessity; in his work on the importance of rationality (orthos logos) for 
Aristotelian virtue, Curzer states that the question ‘Am I being moderate about this?’ 
is ‘a more targeted way of asking, ‘Am I being reasonable about this?”’650  Yet unless 
the target approximates a mathematical average, the comparison is still not very 
helpful. 
Yet possibilities exist within the word’s linguistic cousin, modulation.  Within 
the semantic domain of modus, there are notable differences between the concepts of 
moderation and modulation.  The primary definitions of moderate, from the Latin 
moderatus (‘reduced, controlled’) include ‘average in some particular’ and ‘to make 
or become less extreme.’  This in turn reflects the common understandings of 
moderation, from the Latin moderare (‘to control’), as ‘avoidance of extremes’ or 
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‘within reasonable limits.’651  Compare this with modulate, from the Latin modulatus 
(‘make melody’, in turn from modulor, ‘measure’).  Its primary definitions include ‘to 
exert a modifying or controlling influence’; ‘to vary the strength, tone, or pitch of 
something’; ‘alter the amplitude or frequency, in accordance with the variations of a 
second signal’; ‘to change from one key to the next’; and ‘to change from one form or 
condition to another.’652  Initially, modulation may appear more ambiguous than 
moderation, as it is less commonly used and thus perhaps less well-known.  However, 
its semantic domains contain a dynamism that suggests possibilities beyond the 
subduing, dilutive associations of moderation.  Modulation allows for a variety of 
effects – strengthening, softening, altering, and coordinating various components into 
one coherent harmony.  And because it promotes harmony over average, modulation 
may also be more phronetic than moderation, as it encompasses the entire spectrum of 
experience and does not marginalize the outliers of a given set. 
Remembering the horses that symbolize temperance in Plato’s Phaedrus, 
consider an equestrian example: the difference between the ‘jog trot’ of the Western 
style of horseback riding and the ‘collected trot’ of English dressage.  While both 
gaits travel at approximately the same pace, they differ greatly in characteristic and 
function.  Intended to cover the long distances of a cattle drive, the slow and gentle 
jog trot maximizes rider comfort and minimizes the expenditure of the horse’s energy.  
Its shuffling style is a calculated mediocrity, designed for evenness and uniformity.  
Compare this to the collected trot of dressage, which moves at the same slower pace 
as the jog trot but with much more potential energy.  It contains the same inherent 
power as the working or extended trot, but in a light, mobile, compressed frame.  At 
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any moment, the power harnessed in the collected trot may be converted into a 
different movement, something impossible for the lackadaisical jog trot.  This is not 
to say that moderation is categorically vicious, or even problematic.  However, it is 
difficult to envision a vibrant and compelling moral life based upon a gait that is 
designed to minimize discomfort and maximize homogeneity.   
One final area of possibility, which aligns closely with the discoveries of this 
thesis, arises from the musical aspects of modulation.
653
  In her reading of temperance 
as ‘attunement’, environmental ethicist Louke van Wensveen cites Mary Daly, who 
defines ‘to temper’ as ‘to put in tune with…to adjust the pitch of [something]’.654  
However, the metaphor of attunement is helpful only if one has both a working tuning 
fork and a good ear.  A ‘good ear’ is one’s increasingly developed phronetic abilities; 
the tuning fork is the presence of a clear telos and the ability to align oneself with it – 
to attune oneself to it.   
The phronetic ‘ear’ of temperance should be attuned both to the possibilities 
for temperance within current compositions; it may also discern new melodies as they 
appear.  Accepted ethical opinion restricts temperance primarily, even exclusively, to 
the physical appetites of food, drink, and sex.  These appetites are legitimate objects 
of temperance, as the acts of consumption and generation are two universals of human 
existence.  Recognizing their place within the sphere of temperance is both warranted 
and beneficial.  Yet there may be other, fresher possibilities to explore, as 
‘consumption’ and ‘generation’ have larger domains of consequence than the physical 
appetites.  Are there grounds to expand the sphere of temperance to include non-
nutritive forms of consumption and nonsexual forms of generation?   
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6.3.2.3 Expansion of the Sphere of Temperance  
The primary texts contain some precedents for enlargement of the virtue’s scope.  
Plato frequently contrasts temperance to arrogance, hubris, and tyrannical desires of 
all kinds, which address the appetites for power, honor, and immortality.  While 
Aristotle painstakingly restricts the sphere of temperance to food, drink, and sex, there 
are spirited critiques of Aristotle’s limiting the virtue’s range of objects.  In this view, 
food, drink, and sex represent only the ‘paradigm cases’ of the Aristotelian version of 
temperance.
 655
  Understanding temperance as wisdom in choosing, the early Stoics 
bring all choices under the virtue’s purview, while the Roman Stoa emphasize its 
connections with frugality, social decorum, and a more general self-control.  
Moreover, the Stoics emphasize the role of temperance in stabilizing the emotions, 
which opens the door for the virtue to impact all aspects of the moral life.  Augustine 
applies temperance applies to ‘popular renown’ and ‘the knowledge of things’, as well 
as the triad of ‘carnality, curiosity, and conceit’ (trin. 12).  Aquinas, while not 
explicitly expanding the sphere of temperance, includes the desire for money and 
honor among the ‘objects of desire’ that may oppose reason (II.II 129.2).656  Although 
Calvin employs temperance and its synonyms in the narrow sense, he also reads them 
as maintaining order across the whole of the moral life.  Finally, Wesley defines 
temperance as using and not abusing the goods of this world, a voluntary abstinence 
from all pleasures which distract us from God. 
Thus, there is clearly some latitude in the primary texts for expanding the 
sphere of temperance, and the possibilities are numerous.  Temperance may 
reasonably be applied to drugs, video games, and gambling, as their abuse reveals the 
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same errors in judgment and lifestyle as the traditional objects of temperance.
657
  One 
recent conference saw contributions on the temperance’s importance for such diverse 
issues as the balance of contemplation and activism, media usage, simplicity in 
physical living spaces, environmentalism, academic ethics, and monetary greed.
658
  
Clearly, many scholars are intuiting new areas of significance.  Temperance has been 
connected to the emotional component of clinical medical deliberation and the posture 
of emotional imperturbability.
659
  It may have import for the growing philosophical 
and technological movement of transhumanism.
660
  Other recent work has applied 
temperance to environmental ethics, highlighting the impact of consumptive patterns 
on the physical world and the restraint necessary for ecological health.
661
  Thus, there 
appears to be both historical precedent and contemporary requirement for expanding 
the sphere of temperance beyond its paradigmatic boundaries. 
 Having considered the various components of temperance, the manner in 
which they interact internally, and how this new account diverges from the most 
common interpretations of ‘temperance’, one might wonder whether ‘temperance’ can 
actually be discussed in any sort of coherent manner.   
 
6.3.3 A Tao of Temperance? 
The third particularity of a fresh interpretation of temperance assesses whether there 
exists one single and coherent virtue of ‘temperance’ present across the different 
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cultures and philosophies considered in this study.  The question will be framed 
within the differing perspectives of C.S. Lewis’s The Abolition of Man and Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s A Short History of Ethics.   
 
6.3.3.1 Universal versus Contextual Morality 
In The Abolition of Man, Lewis engages a variety of moral systems in search of a 
shared conception of morality, an overarching, ordinate, and transcendent system 
from which all existing morality is derived.
662
  This he calls the Tao, which ‘is not one 
among a series of possible systems of value’; rather, ‘it is the sole source of all value 
judgements.’  Rejection of the Tao necessarily means rejection of all objective 
morality; one cannot embrace true moral reality outside the Tao.
663
 
Lewis roots within the Tao the universal applicability of the moral law, which 
encompasses and surpasses both ‘rules and ruled alike.’  By accepting the objective 
nature of the morality of the Tao, human moral conduct is guided by something larger 
than human whims and constructs and thus becomes a gift instead of a burden, ‘a rule 
which is not tyranny [and] an obedience which is not slavery.’664  Furthermore, Lewis 
argues that all ‘new’ ethical conceptions and philosophies are at best trendy 
repackaging of the Tao and at worst willfully emotive human fabrications.  All true 
morality, he argues, flows within the stream of the Tao as it travels through human 
history.   
There never has been, and never will be, a radically new judgement of 
value in the history of the world.  What purport to be new systems or (as 
they now call them) ‘ideologies,’ all consist of fragments from the Tao 
itself, arbitrarily wrenched from their context in the whole and then 
swollen to madness in their isolation.
665
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Thus, Lewis argues for the existence of absolute moral norms, from which all true 
‘virtues’ arise. 
Lewis’s belief in a universal morality is not isolated or exceptional.666  Oliver 
O’Donovan states: ‘The order of things that God has made is there.  It is objective, 
and mankind has a place within it.  Christian ethics, therefore, has an objective 
reference because it is concerned with man’s life in accordance with this order.’667  
Sissela Bok argues for a ‘shared morality’ with ‘a limited set of values so down-to-
earth and so commonplace as to be most easily recognized across societal and other 
boundaries.’668  Andre Comte-Sponville, while acknowledging his own contributions 
to the discussion, maintains that he relies upon ‘what the tradition offered [him]’ and 
which he has ‘merely taken up anew.’669   
And when psychologists Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman 
encountered significant concerns about the contextuality of morality at the start of 
their project, they searched ‘empirically’ within an interdisciplinary and cross-cultural 
framework for the presence of common and recurring values.
670
   
There is a strong convergence across time, place, and intellectual tradition 
about certain core virtues. As one tradition bled into another, as one 
catalog infused and then gave way to the next, particular virtues recurred 
with pleasant tenacity. Although others may appear on some lists and then 
be lost again, certain virtues, either explicitly or thematically, had real 
staying power.
671
 
 
The persistence of these core virtues, they claim, ‘suggests the possibility of 
universality’ of human morality.672 
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Against this view of the universalizability of moral norms stands A Short 
History of Ethics, wherein Alasdair MacIntyre argues for the inevitable contextuality 
of human moral concepts.  MacIntyre maintains that attempting to understand 
historical moral concepts apart from their history is impossible, as such concepts both 
arise from and shape the social contexts in which they reside.  MacIntyre, like Lewis, 
acknowledges moral discourse has ‘the inheritance of not only one, but of a number 
of well-integrated moralities.’673  And, like Lewis, MacIntyre admits the existence of 
numerous systems of moral thought.  However, MacIntyre sees this multiplicity of 
moralities as representing discrete streams of moral thought.  Their structures may be 
similar, inasmuch as each contains moral goals, rules, and virtues of some sort. 
These, however, vary widely from culture to culture and from system to 
system.
674
  Moral concepts, he argues, are not ‘a timeless, limited, unchanging, 
determinate species of concept, necessarily having the same features throughout their 
history.’675  He is suspicious of historians who purport to study concepts ‘historically’ 
but actually ‘subtly assimilate different moral concepts’, erroneously affirming the 
universal nature of what is considered ‘right’ and ‘good.’676  As an example, 
MacIntyre considers the moral concept of ‘justice’, which, although present as a 
moral category throughout history, displays such wide differences across its different 
historical conceptions that it may scarcely be called the same virtue, differences 
which arise from distinctive forms of social life.
677
  He concludes with a qualified 
endorsement of a ‘traditional moral vocabulary’, which may be used alongside an 
acknowledgement that ‘a shared interpretation of this vocabulary’ is unlikely to occur.  
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Therefore, promoting a singular moral vocabulary is unrealistic, if not patently 
disingenuous.
678
  This mindset does not allow for the ‘complexity of history’, a 
complexity which is compounded by intellectual study: 
It is not that we have first a straightforward history of moral concepts and 
then a separate and secondary history of philosophical comment.  For to 
analyze a concept philosophically may often be to assist in its 
transformation by suggesting that it needs revision, or that it is discredited 
in some way, or that it has a certain kind of prestige.  Philosophy leaves 
everything as it is – except concepts.679 
 
Lest this be dismissed merely as MacIntyre’s premature position, he maintains in the 
prologue to the third edition of After Virtue (published forty-one years after A Short 
History), ‘What historical enquiry discloses is the situatedness of all enquiry, the 
extent to which what are taken to be the standards of truth and of rational justification 
in the contexts of practice vary from one time and place to another.’680 
Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches’ Christians Among the Virtues reveals 
the influence of MacIntyre’s position on the contextuality of moral norms.  As they 
argue for the distinctiveness of the Christian life, the authors deny any straightforward 
or facile knowledge of ‘virtues.’681  ‘We cannot presume that all accounts of the 
virtues will come to the same thing,’ they maintain, ‘for the “we” who are giving the 
account make all the difference.’682  In a warning with particular import for this study, 
they caution against ‘appropriating pagan virtues from their pagan contexts – 
particularly whole patterns of virtue such as the “cardinal virtues”.’683  They maintain 
that these contrasts do not poison or preclude meaningful conversation about virtue 
between different narratives; rather, they both invigorate and necessitate it.
684
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However, the differences in context and telos must be acknowledged.  James Keenan 
also states that any current account of the cardinal virtues must account for the 
influence of culture and context.
685
 
In fairness, these positions are not wholly incompatible.  Lewis allows for the 
possibility –even the inevitability – of moral progress, but only as ‘development from 
within.’  Any moral advance made that diverges radically from the Tao is ‘mere 
innovation’, not a ‘real moral advance.’686  Conversely, a cavalier acceptance of some 
‘universal morality’ is legitimately disquieting, as it may conceal naiveté at best and 
coercive intentions at worst.
687
  Interestingly, while both MacIntyre and Lewis argue 
against moral emotivism, Lewis sees the answer to such emotivism in the recognition 
of the Tao, while MacIntyre believes that such emotivism occurs precisely because 
the modern, Enlightenment attempt to identify objective moral concepts has failed.   
 
6.3.3.2 A Qualified Yes 
So, the question at hand is whether, after all the centuries of speculation and the 
chapters of academic treatment, there actually a single virtue of ‘temperance’.  Has 
the study successfully traced the journey of one specific and coherent virtue, or has it 
revealed a series of related but ultimately different virtues, each so dependent upon 
their context as to make them useless outside of it?   
In one sense, both the format and conclusions of chapters two through five 
suggest that MacIntyre is correct.  There is not one unchanging ‘virtue of 
temperance’, fixed and invariable, unchanged through the centuries in its meaning and 
import.  The etymological transitions alone – from sōphrosynē to temperantia to 
temperance – complicate the mapping of this virtue; Carr reveals this in his 
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identification of the broad conceptions of temperance, where sōphrosynē, moderation, 
temperantia as mixture, and decorum are equally legitimate characterizations of 
temperance at various points in time.
688
  The changes in object and sphere also 
complicate the matter.  Aristotle limited temperance to food, drink, and sexual 
activity; the Stoics applied it to choice writ large.  Whereas Augustine (both from 
historical location and personal inclination) saw sexual desire as the most pernicious 
object of desire, the rampant alcohol abuse witnessed by the reformers of the 
Temperance Movements took priority.  Wesley preached temperance in dress and 
diet, and warned against gluttonous patterns of sleep; Socrates responded to the hubris 
of the Thirty Tyrants by advocating temperance as prudent self-knowledge.  
Moreover, answering this question is complicated by the occasional untethering of 
word and concept.  North traces both the word and the concept throughout Greek 
literature; Peterson and Seligman searched for convergences of virtues ‘either 
explicitly or thematically.’689  Similarly, this study has examined both the usage and 
appearances of ‘temperance’ – be it sōphrosynē, temperantia, or temperance – along 
with related ideas such as continence and moderation.  It has been difficult to 
determine where the boundaries lie, where one concept ends and another begins.  Has 
temperance has not unraveled beyond reconstruction? 
What is evident is that temperance has never faded away entirely from the 
moral landscape.  Each theorist in this study possesses a moral concept concerned 
with the regulation of physical and mental desire; in some form, both the word and the 
concept are present.  It could be argued, as MacIntyre does in his discussion of justice, 
that the continuing presence of the word does not guarantee the presence of any 
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legitimately related concept.
690
  And the point is well made; it would be irresponsible 
to insist upon – or willfully impose – an artificial ‘one-to-one mapping of a virtue 
across cultures.’691  Yet, there is something about this virtue that transcends 
philosophical, theological, and sociocultural boundaries and impresses itself upon 
some of the greatest minds of the age.  Despite the fact that temperance is 
marginalized within the contemporary moral lexicon, scholars from before Plato to 
after the Temperance Movement have judged it worthy of retention.  Beyond its status 
as a cardinal virtue (as it is valued by figures who work outside this system), 
temperance continues to impress itself upon the moral imagination [of the day].
692
  
The objects of temperance may vary with the spirit of the age, and with the 
particularities of the philosopher or theologian.  Understanding temperance as the 
harmonious ordering of the whole person—informed by and reflecting self-control, 
knowledge, mode, and humility – allows for a wide range of objects of temperance 
while retaining the virtue’s internal integrity and cohesion. 
So in the final analysis, the answer to the question, ‘Is there one virtue that 
exists which we may call temperance?’ is a qualified and epistemologically humble 
‘yes’.  MacIntyre is correct that moral concepts are not ‘timeless and unhistorical.’693  
The history and journey of the virtue of temperance should be acknowledged and 
celebrated.  Moreover, Comte-Sponville expresses a wonderful gratitude for the 
vibrant heritage received from those who came before: 
It would be ridiculous for a treatise on virtues to strive for originality or 
novelty.  Besides, it is braver and more honorable to confront the masters 
on their own ground than to avoid any comparison with them by 
somehow insisting on being original.  For the last 2,500 years, if not 
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more, the greatest minds have thought about the virtues; my desire was to 
continue their efforts, in my own way and with the means available to me, 
using their ideas to formulate my own.
694
 
 
This formulation of temperance may be ‘new’, but it stands on the shoulders of giants.  
Without their foundation, the richness of any retrieval is revealed as transitory and 
fleeting, however trendy it may become.  Those who dare to speak of ‘temperance’ in 
the twenty-first century have the courage and ability to do so only because others have 
already spoken, feeding the river of moral tradition that flows in and out of cultures, 
systems of thought, and the centuries themselves. 
 
6.4 Summary of the Interpretation of the Virtue of Temperance 
This chapter has considered a fresh interpretation of the virtue of temperance as 
harmonious order within the whole person as constituted by the presence and 
interactions of self-control, knowledge, mode, and humility.  These components are 
present, at various times and to varying degrees, throughout the history of the virtue.  
Temperance is most fully actualized when all components are present and engaged, 
and it exists in a more potential form when one or more are missing or inactive.  It is 
dynamic and phronetic in that it is not a ‘mean’ in the sense of a mathematical 
average; nor is it a predetermined figure that allows a formulaic application. It is most 
fully present and instantiated when it is socially constituted.  It differs from both 
common conceptions of temperance – abstinence from alcohol and ‘everything in 
moderation’.  Lastly, temperance is, in both word and concept, both a continuation 
and an innovation of the historical virtue of temperance.  What remains is to apply 
this new formulation of temperance to one of the most morally significant issues of 
today – consumerism – and its relationship to the act of consumption. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
A Virtue of Revolutionaries:  
Temperance and Consumerism 
 
 
This thesis has proposed a new interpretation of temperance, generated from within 
the historical development of the virtue across seven primary schools of thought.  
Temperance is not complete abstinence from alcohol, the constant exercise of self-
restraint, or even ‘everything in moderation’; it is the harmonious order generated by 
the perichoretic presence of self-control, knowledge, mode, and humility.  It does not 
merely regulate the appetites for food, drink, and sexual relations.  Rather, it 
modulates and harmonizes the various desires natural to the human person, resulting 
in an internal health and concord. 
This study has, in a sense, explicated the whats and hows of temperance, as 
shaped by the whens and wheres of its sociocultural, theological, and philosophical 
locations.  The final step explores the why of temperance, the impact it might have 
upon the daily exercise of the moral life.  Indeed, this is the central point of the study, 
as any sincere engagement with virtue inevitably ‘demands a certain response from us 
whether we make it or not.’695  What remains is the moral agent’s cultivation of the 
virtue of temperance regarding one particular moral issue.  Thus, the concluding 
chapter applies this interpretation of temperance to the modern Western issue of 
consumerism.  While focusing primarily on the experiences of shopping and material 
purchases, food and alcohol consumption will be also be addressed inasmuch as they 
are related to, and indicative of, the overall consumeristic trend towards unbridled 
pleasure through consumption. 
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7.1 Consumerism and Consumption 
‘Whoever said money doesn’t buy happiness simply didn’t know where to shop.’  
This statement (attributed to actress Bo Derek) summarizes the often explicit, almost 
ubiquitous worldview of the culture of ‘consumerism’.  This section will examine two 
particularities of the practice of consumerism: the tenets of the ethos of consumerism, 
and the relationship between consumerism and happiness.  However, it is important to 
distinguish between the culture and social practice of consumerism and the particular 
acts of consumption, as the terms are commonly but erroneously conflated in popular 
discourse.  Consumption is the acquisition and use of an item for some purpose or 
gain; it can be connected to the intake for food, or the accumulation and ownership of 
consumer goods.  Thus consumption is a biological necessity, an inescapable part of 
the human reality as physical creatures.  However, consumption choices inevitably 
impact the external world, both other persons and the rest of the created order.  Thus, 
consumption is also morally laden and ethically quite complex, as these choices both 
reflect and inform one’s moral norms, values, and teleology.    When consumption 
choices lead to excessive valuation of the act of consuming, the result is the culture of 
consumerism, which moves beyond the physical acts of consumption into the 
promulgation of a way of life.    
 
7.1.1 The Creation of Consumerism and the ‘Consumer’ 
In common vocabulary since the 1960s, consumerism has been variously defined as 
‘efforts to protect the consumer’s interest’ to ‘excess materialism.’696  While the term 
itself may appear recent, the origins of contemporary consumerism can be traced to 
the rise of ‘possessive individualism’ of the seventeenth century, wherein persons are 
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defined by ownership both of their possessions and of their skills and capabilities.  
These capacities are the sole possession of the individual and are ‘given’ to the larger 
society only within economic transactions, which reduces society to a series of 
‘economic relations.’697  This possessive individualism was reinforced by gradual yet 
fundamental changes in both consumption and production practices.  Historian 
William Leach describes the creation and cultivation of consumerism in early 
twentieth century America and the resulting ethical shifts.
698
  Such changes as the 
elevation of personal ‘choice’ (alongside the variety and availability of things from 
which to choose), an increased emphasis upon customer service and satisfaction, and 
the importance of ‘fostering desire’ combined to create a new way of life where 
consumption was valorized alongside production.
699
   
The focus upon amplifying desire was a hallmark of the development, as a 
‘reasonable dissatisfaction with what you have’ was touted as the safeguard against 
‘hard times.’700  Indeed, banker Paul Mazur used explicitly ethical language in 
describing the consumer’s ‘duty’ to ‘the machinery which has developed consumer 
demands.’701  In ‘The Evolution of the Consumer’, Mazer documented the 
construction of the human consumer as a necessary correlate to the increases in 
production capacity.  And although the term ‘consumerism’ emerged in the late 
twentieth century, journalist Samuel Strauss coined the term ‘consumptionism’ as 
early as 1924 to describe ‘the science of intensifying consumption.’702   
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This emphasis upon consumption affected more than purchasing habits.  
Building upon possessive individualism’s reframing of sociopolitical life in economic 
terms, consumptionism altered the fundamental importance of the American citizen to 
their country from citizen to consumer.
703
  The relationship between persons and 
possessions also changed significantly, as material goods developed an a priori life 
and significance that went beyond mere utility.
704
  These goods could – and would – 
provide happiness to the savvy consumer.
705
  Meaning and fulfillment were now 
readily available, showcased in the artfully designed window displays of the 
innovative ‘department stores.’  Significant cultural changes included the substitution 
of consumption focus from ‘survival’ to ‘style’ and the necessity of planned 
obsolescence in maintaining the cycle of production and consumption.  These changes 
were described as ‘conspicuous consumption’, Thorstein Veblen’s term for the 
practice of purchasing merely to display one’s wealth and status.706  Characteristic of 
the ‘leisure class’, wealth served as the gateway to profligacy and valueless purchases, 
which others sought to imitate to demonstrate their comparable economic status.    
This imitation also played a central and commercially beneficial role in the 
rise of consumerism, particularly among the emerging middle class who strove to 
emulate the upper classes as best they could.
707
  The twentieth century saw the 
expansion of ‘conspicuous consumption’ beyond the leisure class, as Americans 
across the socioeconomic spectrum attempted to match the lifestyles they saw in 
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advertising and the media.  Veblen’s ‘conspicuous consumption’ was prevalent in the 
small towns of post-Civil War America, as the emerging middle class sought to 
distinguish itself from the lower classes who promulgated disorder and disquiet 
amidst the newly forming national identity.
708
  A rising emphasis upon gentility 
encouraged conformity to the lifestyle and example of ‘the best society’, i.e. the upper 
classes with origins in the European aristocracy.
709
  Obedience to the system of public 
display was ‘all part of the show, part of the seeking for applause, part of the dread of 
scorn.’710  These patterns of consumption remained a feature of the now-established 
middle class; becoming solidly entrenched in the post-World War Two suburban 
expansion after the hardships of the Great Depression.  The late twentieth century saw 
another rise in emulative consumption, moving beyond the upper and middle classes 
to include the working classes and the working poor.  This ‘national culture of upscale 
spending’, as Judith Schor terms it, acts as ‘the ultimate social art’ in a culture almost 
wholly defined by issues of consumption.
711
  And contained within this ‘culture of 
consumption’ is a moral framework that promises meaning and happiness.    
 
7.1.2 Consumerism as Ethos and Happiness 
In one sense, consumerism is nothing less than the pursuit of meaning, as the ‘-ism’ 
denotes the presence of a system, school of thought, set of behaviors, or ideologies.  
In this way, the language and framework of consumption now describe numerous 
aspects of common life, from ‘church-shopping’ to ‘choosing a spouse’ to unending 
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assessments of education, medicine, and public services via ‘satisfaction surveys.’712  
Characterized by two central components – uninhibited consumption and a 
disproportionately high valuation of the practice and goods of this consumption – the 
‘ethos of consumerism’ assigns great importance to the role of consumption in 
determining the means and ends of human flourishing.
713
  These new parameters 
crowd out any consideration of the ethical components of consumerism.
714
  They 
retard emotional maturity and promote an ‘infantilist ethos’ upon which capitalism 
‘has come to depend.’715  Genuine virtue is marginalized in the quest for temporary 
pleasures, or is recast altogether within the new materialistic worldview.  Virtue is 
now that which facilitates the consumerist telos: ‘Selfishness no longer cloaks itself in 
religion: it has become religion.  Greed is not merely good for me.  The new ethos 
wants us to believe it is good in itself.’716  Thus, consumerism becomes ‘a spiritual 
disposition, a way of looking at the world around us that is deeply formative.’717  
Relationships that once provided moral meaning – relationships with God, with 
others, and with nature – are stripped of their vitality and goodness as their ‘value’ is 
assessed.
718
   Moreover, the ethos of consumerism is increasingly employed as a 
reliable index for such traditional, even classical categories as health, happiness, and 
flourishing.   
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As Bo Derek’s statement implies, happiness is the explicit telos of the culture 
of consumerism.  Advertisers promise happiness if you make the right purchases, as 
when Coca-Cola tells you to ‘Open Happiness.’  Lipton says, ‘You can’t buy 
happiness, but you can buy tea, and that’s the same thing.’  A McDonald’s billboard 
encourages you to ‘Wake up happy!’  And in the TV show Mad Men, advertising 
executive Don Draper maintains, ‘Advertising is based on one thing, happiness.  And 
you know what happiness is?  Happiness is the smell of a new car.  It’s freedom from 
fear.  It’s a billboard on the side of the road that screams reassurance that whatever 
you are doing is okay, that YOU are okay.’  This happiness and flourishing is political 
as well as personal.  The economic category of ‘consumer confidence’ measures the 
degree to which consumers – again, notice the nomenclature – to which consumers 
are confident enough in their economic situation to purchase goods instead of save 
money.  This, in turn, is taken as an indication of the health (or flourishing) of the 
economy and the nation in general.  Yet if Gross Domestic Product is truly ‘the god to 
which we pray’, it does not measure human welfare in any genuine capacity, as it fails 
to account for anything not immediately quantifiable.
719
  Indeed, it overlooks many 
things that can be quantified, such as the number of people in poverty both globally 
and locally.  Moreover, it does not appear to generate the happiness it promises.  
British psychologist Oliver James ironically notes a significant increase in anxiety and 
depression among persons infected with ‘the ‘Affluenza virus.’720   
Should happiness actually be achieved, the interests of consumerism require it 
to be fleeting and fragile.  ‘Consumer society,’ Zygmunt Bauman notes, ‘manages to 
render non-satisfaction permanent.’721  If our purchases actually provided happiness 
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and contentment, the cycle of consumption would grind to a halt.
722
  In this new 
version of consumerism, the pursuit of wealth works alongside the pursuit of pleasure.  
Yet the latter can only bring so much enjoyment before its novelty is exhausted, as the 
physical limitations of the human body restrict the number of ways pleasure may 
actually be experienced.
723
  This, in turn, generates an ‘imaginative hedonism’ which 
increases the anticipated pleasure of consumption items beyond what they can 
actually confer in themselves.
724
  For the imaginative hedonist, the distance between 
‘the constructed ideal and the experienced reality’ feeds a growing dissatisfaction 
with one’s experiences; the pleasure attained in contemplating the perfect scenario are 
essentially subtracted from the experience itself, a zero-sum game in which reality is 
perpetually substandard and disappointing.
725
  Additionally, consumerism thrives by 
keeping people detached from their possessions, in an endless cycle of hope, 
purchase, boredom, and disposal.
726
  This cycle reflects several of the seven deadly 
sins – gluttony, greed, even acedia; and like the seven deadly sins, they reflect the 
moral tenor, the ‘spiritual tone’ for consumerism.727   
 Thus, both the shift from consumption (consuming-to-live) to consumerism 
(living-to-consume) and the details of our consumption choices themselves present 
significant moral dilemmas.  How do we engage in consumption without succumbing 
to consumerism?  How do we consume goods without consuming others?  At present, 
virtue ethics is not a major participant in the conversation, being sidelined by 
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considerations of utility and obligation.  Moreover, temperance has suffered under the 
rise of consumerism, being ‘eclipsed’ and actively impeded’ by the ethos of 
consumerism.
728
  Labelled ‘sales-resistance’, it is literally transformed from virtue to 
vice.
729
  While the control of physical appetites is often applauded in the service of 
such utilitarian goals as long life or sexual attractiveness, there is little concern for 
temperance as pathway to moral integrity and growth.
730
 
Yet virtue language brings particular strengths to the discussion of 
consumerism (particularly its virtually wholesale acceptance into contemporary 
culture) by addressing the deeply ingrained, almost unconscious nature of its ideology 
and view of happiness and success.
731
  And despite its contentious relationship to 
consumerism (or, perhaps, precisely because of it), temperance is particularly suited 
to address these challenges.
732
  As early as 1625, Francis Bacon observed that, just as 
fortitude is required in adversity, temperance is the virtue most needed in times of 
prosperity, ‘for Prosperity doth best discover vice.’733  More recently, President 
Barack Obama advocated a rediscovery of ‘the tempering qualities of humility and 
restraint’ in place of unrestricted consumption.734  However, living into this 
exhortation is a complicated matter.  Thus we arrive at the final question of this study: 
what is temperate consumption? 
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7.2 Temperate Consumption  
Temperance is rediscovered in our consumer society by engaging the components 
from the historical discussion within the context of consumerism, applying the new 
interpretation of temperance to the issues at hand.  It asks the question: what are the 
hallmarks of temperate consumption?  It displays harmonious order, embodied in a 
deliberate mode of living, shaped and informed by knowledge, and strengthened and 
safeguarded by self-control and humility.  Thus, it is modal, informed, controlled, and 
humble.  It is modal because it seeks to regain the measure of the needs of life; 
because it understands and accepts the reality of the limits of life and the need to 
observe them; and because it is oriented to the true ends of life, both physical and 
metaphysical.  It is informed because virtuously constructing the mode of temperate 
consumption requires being informed about these realities, both internal and external.  
It is controlled because consuming in a measured and informed manner can be 
difficult, and exercising control is therefore an essential (though by no means 
sufficient) component of temperate consumption.  Finally, it is humble because 
consumerism is intimately tied to self-aggrandizement and competition, which 
humility opposes by reminding the temperate consumer of their mortality and 
finitude.  With these characteristics, the temperate forms of consumption can be 
distilled from within the quagmire of consumerism. 
 
7.2.1 Modal Consumption 
A disordered mode is where overconsumption may be seen the most starkly.  The 
fundamental form of so many things has been lost or corrupted; there is an 
unprecedented increase in the ‘measure’ of things in contemporary western society.  
Americans’ standard of living increased dramatically in the 1980s, and has more than 
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doubled in recent years.
735
 There is a surprising ‘malignancy’ within consumer 
culture, as homes and expenditures and ‘standards of living’ increase unchecked.  The 
size of the average American home increased from 750 square feet in the late 1940s to 
2320 square feet in 2000; the arrival of these ‘starter castles’ both reflected and 
reinforced prevalent material expectations.  Cars now boast both air conditioning and 
seat warmers; global positioning systems and CD players (and increasingly, DVD 
players) are de rigueur.  Ironically, many of these ‘McMansions’ boast three-car 
garages, containing the same square footage as that average 1940s house, that is 
typically used for ‘storage’.  People now devote as much space to their material 
possessions as they once did to themselves.
736
  Our food is a virtual “United Nations 
of restaurants’, with no more waiting for food to come into season.737  Travel has 
increased; Americans now drive twice as much and fly twenty-five times as much as 
fifty years ago.
738
 
A central reason for this malignant growth is that the definitions of the ‘good 
life’ have expanded.739  ‘Keeping up with the top quintile is not easy,’ remarks Schor, 
‘because they keep getting richer.’  Thus, the dollar amount on ‘dream-fulfilling 
income’ keeps rising, which necessitates longer hours at work and undercuts the 
satisfaction supposedly gained from material items.
740
  Limits have been moved or 
abolished altogether.  Neoclassical economists promote a model in which desires are 
limitless, and they seek to indoctrinate their consumers with this philosophy.  
Shopping has been wrenched from its contexts; instead of being the means by which 
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we acquire the necessities of life, it is now an end in itself –‘retail therapy.’  It is 
assigned a value and purpose it was never meant to have. 
Contemporary society has become unmoored from the true purpose and 
function of things.  Why do we own a house?  What purpose does it serve?  Moreover, 
it has lost the desire to understand these true purposes.  One barometer of the 
contemporary housing mindset is the Home and Garden Network (HGTV).  The 
desires – more than that, the expectations – of home buyers are sizeable and 
intractable, even for first-time homeowners.  ‘We simply must have our own 
bathroom, with double vanities,’ they declare.  ‘I mean, I just can’t live without 
granite countertops.’  I am always struck by the common insistence upon double 
ovens; who needs two ovens?  Are all these people caterers?  I cannot help but 
compare this to my father’s description of his first apartment as a newly married law 
student.  He and my mother used an old door atop two filing cabinets for their dining 
table, which doubled as his work space.  Moreover, they had a single lamp for their 
entire apartment.  ‘We’d use it in the living room in the evening,’ he told me, ‘then 
we’d unplug it and take it back to the bedroom when it was time to go to sleep.’  I was 
struck by my internal response to his story – ‘why didn’t they just buy another lamp?’  
Upon reflection, I realized that what sounded like hardship to me was 
commonsensical frugality to the children of Depression-era parents.  They needed 
only one lamp, and while they desired (and eventually realized) the convenience of a 
lamp in every room, they could fulfill the function of home lighting with only one.  
This level of discipline in consumption almost defies imagination in today’s world of 
dollar stores and cheap box-store goods.  With goods this cheap, why observe any 
limits at all? 
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These changing standards apply to food consumption as well.  We no longer 
know about caloric needs and accurate portion size.  We welcome the oversized 
servings at restaurants and accept them as norms.  We take for granted an array of 
food choices that would astound all but the richest of our ancestor.  An elderly 
Appalachian carpenter described his childhood as ‘if times were good, we had milk 
gravy; if times were tough, we had grease gravy.’  He had no memories of starvation 
or dire want; he viewed his childhood as reasonably comfortable.  Yet most persons in 
the United States today, perhaps even those technically below the ‘poverty line’, 
would manage to live beyond this level of frugality.   
The purpose of physical hunger has also been corrupted, resulting in a 
somewhat schizophrenic relationship with contemporary culture.  On the one hand, 
hunger is never acceptable and should be satiated the very moment it appears.  Ever-
growing fast food meals, endless varieties of snacks, Taco Bell’s late-night ‘Fourth 
Meal’ – these teach the American consumer that the smallest pang of hunger requires 
immediate relief.  Alongside this stands the equally powerful, equally visible message 
that hunger is to be denied for the sake of health (usually women’s) and appearance 
(almost always women’s).  Women’s narratives of eating disorders are striking in 
their portrayals of women’s hunger as immense, frightening, and destructive.  Hunger 
must continually be repressed lest it overwhelm the defenses and result in a 
gluttonous binge.  Spoiled child or rejected exile – hunger is rarely a productive 
member of moral conversation.   
In contrast, to consume temperately requires genuine attention to the purpose 
and meaning of human life.  The ‘standard of living’ evolves not from the desire to 
measure up to our neighbors, nor from the desire for comfort and convenience, but 
from the actual measure of physical, mental, and emotional requirements, what 
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Aquinas called ‘the needs of this life.’  It will not believe the propaganda that our 
choices are limitless, that our capacity for growth is limitless; rather, it will recognize 
and accept the need for limits, both personal and social.  It will recognize and 
welcome the true end of consumption, which is the physical and metaphysical 
flourishing of all creation, and it will align our consumption choices with these ends.  
However, while the ‘norm’ of temperate consumption is based upon a measured, 
informed, needs-based, grounded assessment at the intersection of our desires  (both 
wants and needs) and the realities of the world, there will be ‘outliers’ in every set.  
This is where modulation is clearly superior to moderation as the mode of 
temperance.  The variety encompassed within modulation also frees the moral agent 
to embrace a variety of forms of living temperately.  Feasting, fasting, and ‘ordinary’ 
consumption may co-exist in an intersubjective relationship, together forming a 
harmonious ‘chord of consumption’ that acknowledges, affirms, and celebrates our 
needs and our wants, our proximate ends and our final ends.
741
   
It is important to acknowledge that our consumption does serve an assortment 
of modes and purposes.  In The Christian Consumer, Laura Hartman considers ‘good 
Christian consumption’ within four categories, each expressing one possible mode of 
approaching consumption – avoiding sin, embracing creation, loving the neighbor, 
and envisioning the future.  While not mutually exclusive, these approaches reveal the 
variety of motivations and goals possible for each act of consumption.
742
  Put simply, 
we eat for many reasons: to maintain physical functioning, to assuage some emotional 
need, to celebrate someone or something, for the sheer pleasure of eating itself.  The 
common adage that ‘food is fuel’ states a legitimate and important truth for athletes 
and those pursuing weight loss, but it fails to convey the fullness of our relationship to 
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food and its consumption.  And when we acknowledge and embrace the role and 
purpose of physical hunger, we are empowered to consume in a balanced, healthy 
manner.  Similarly, houses can do more than merely contain our possessions and 
ourselves.  When we purchased our present home, my husband and I decided to seek 
one bedroom beyond our family’s needs, because we value the practice of hospitality 
and wanted to include a space expressly for this purpose.  Our acknowledgement of 
the multiple ‘modes’ of living affected our consumption choices.  We did not blindly 
prioritize living more ‘simply’; rather, we sought to live in orientation to our multiple 
goals and ideals.  Failing to acknowledge the complexity does little to promote 
temperate patterns of consumption. 
 Temperate consumption requires an informed assessment of several things: 
our needs, the world’s capacity to satisfy those needs, and the effect their satisfaction 
has on the rest of the world.  Thus, the next area to consider is the role of knowledge 
and informed consumption.  
 
7.2.2 Informed Consumption 
Mode and knowledge are intimately related; therefore, our knowledge must be well-
grounded and accurate.  When advertisers and economists are allowed to dictate a 
new and disordered mode of living, consumers internalize a false assessment of their 
needs.  American consumers are increasingly convinced of the ‘necessity’ of larger 
homes, manicured lawns, private schools, designer clothes, and unsustainable food 
choices.  On the popular television show House Hunters, home buyers consistently 
frame their desires in the language of necessity, transforming wants into needs.  
Conversely, when knowledge is corrupted, the door is opened for the refashioning of 
the mode in ways completely disconnected from reality.  Fulfilling these ever-
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expanding ‘needs’ requires an increasing amount of time and resources, which then 
limits the time and resources available to other, less materialistic pursuits.  This is 
compounded by our lack of knowledge of reality, particularly the knowledge of the 
impact of our consumption choices.   
In Blessed are the Consumers: Climate Change and the Practice of Restraint, 
ecotheologian Sallie MacFague frames her argument for consumptive restraint around 
the concept of kenosis, ‘the recognition that “something other than oneself is real” and 
not only deserves space but requires and demands it as well.’743  This concept is 
simultaneously foreign and essential to the typical American consumer, who has little 
knowledge of how their goods are produced.  Just this morning, I received five 
separate emails from discount, online clothing stores.  It is the work of a moment to 
select a style, click ‘Add to Basket’ and ‘Proceed to Checkout’, and know nothing 
about my purchase beyond the size, color, and price.  The enticing $20 price tag 
contains a parallel, and entirely different, reality for the woman – or child – toiling in 
virtual servitude in the clothing factory.  Earning mere pennies on the dollar, they can 
scarcely feed their family, let alone purchase the product of their work.  I have no 
knowledge of the materials it contains; the pesticide burden of the cotton or chemical 
burden of the synthetic fabrics; the physical damage occurring amongst the dye 
workers.  Our McMansions are constructed by day laborers, with wood acquired (the 
word ‘harvested’ implies a healthful cycle scarcely applicable here) by ‘clear-cutting’ 
forests; this ravages the diversity of flora and fauna, erodes topsoil, and exacerbates 
environmental issues such as flooding and desertification.  Our manicured, mono-
culture lawns require chemicals that leach into our rivers and water tables and cling to 
our children as they play.  Emulation may seem expensive to our bank balance, but its 
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environmental costs are even greater.  However, when the average consumer never 
sees the ledger sheet, business as usual continues in blissful ignorance. 
To consume temperately requires examining our sources of knowledge for 
accuracy and content, making ‘a hardhearted, sober analysis of the way things are.’744  
An honest assessment of material needs must go beyond the culturally normed 
‘standard of living’, arising as it does from the culture of consumerism.  While 
nutritionists can assist us with calculating our caloric requirements, assessing our non-
physical needs can be more complicated.  Temperate consumption requires 
conversation partners, honest and gracious critics who can moderate discussions about 
our purchases. Information about all parts of life should be applied to our 
consumption choices, interacting in a perichoretic manner.  Our physical and 
emotional needs, the impact of our choices upon the global community, the particular 
shape and impact we hold for our lives – truly informed consumption will attend to 
each of these concerns. 
Somatic knowledge is also a potential source of information.  Our culture does 
not know how to engage physical hunger in a healthy manner.  Hunger is either 
vilified or glorified, a foe to be eradicated at the earliest opportunity or a badge of 
honor in the continuous struggle for physical perfection. Rarely are hunger’s signals 
welcomed as a component of temperate consumption.  A case in point: Some friends 
and I have recently begun a system of eating which emphasizes the importance of 
leaving twelve hours between the evening meal and breakfast the following morning.  
This allows eight hours for digestion to be completed, and then provides four hours 
for the body to complete its healing and restorative functions.  Eating late into the 
night, the theory goes, extends digestion and robs the body of its resources for 
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renewal, and prevents the optimization of wellness.  Therefore, eating is completed by 
7:00pm, and not resumed until 7:00am the following morning.  To people accustomed 
to snacking at bedtime, this new routine has been uncomfortable; the literal meaning 
of ‘breakfast’ as ‘breaking one’s fast’ has been lost.  And for persons accustomed 
(and acculturated) to assuage hunger whenever it appears, it is easy to feel deprived 
and abandon our efforts. 
To strengthen my resolve, I have found it helpful bring these two forms of 
‘knowledge’ into conversation.  When my stomach growls and my resolve weakens, I 
visualize my hunger as an ally, a partner in the journey towards health.  ‘Hello, 
hunger,’ I say.  ‘Here you are.  That means that my stomach is empty, and that my 
body gets to rest and heal for a while.  Isn’t that a nice thing for it to do!  Won’t I feel 
good tomorrow morning, rested and refreshed!  Thanks for being here, hunger, thanks 
for being part of the team.’  Of course, it does not make me any less hungry.  But 
because of my mind’s knowledge about my body’s needs for renewal, discomfort is 
transformed into something with purpose.  Like the Roman Catholic and Orthodox 
rituals of fasting before morning Communion – the origin of the word breakfast – 
mind and body bring their information together for an acknowledged good. 
When properly informed, our consumption choices can reflect an order that is 
both internal and external.  However, virtuous knowledge is insufficient to ensure 
virtuous choices in matters of consumption.  If Socrates and Plato were correct and 
right knowledge was sufficient for virtue, consumerism would fall on hard times.  Yet 
information, even when present, is not enough.  For this reason, temperate 
consumption must also be controlled. 
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7.2.3 Controlled Consumption 
As stated above, my efforts to eat more healthfully have been aided by the integration 
of mental and physical information.  However, knowing the benefits of going to bed 
hungry does not make the choice any easier.  Living virtuously as physical creatures 
is complicated by the connectedness of appetite to both survival and pleasure.  While 
pleasure is a skillfully designed aspect of the human drive for generation and 
substinence, the pursuit of pleasure can take on a life of its own.  Similarly, pride (and 
the pleasure we derive from its satisfaction) often develops a false and disordered 
importance.  These human characteristics need not be fundamentally vicious or 
inferior to other aspects of the self to be problematic.  However, they must be 
‘tempered’ by other considerations, held within the regulatory loop that contains all 
components of virtuous choice and action.  Often, this falls to the controlling aspect of 
temperance. 
If Francis Bacon is correct that prosperity is excellent at discovering vice, then 
self-control – while not sufficient for a healthy moral life – remains particularly 
necessary in these times of unrestrained consumption.  Because it is increasingly easy 
to satisfy our desires and appetites without sacrifice or delay, self-control plays a 
limited but matchless role in temperate consumption.  However, the relationship is not 
immediately obvious.  In the culture of consumerism, self-control is simultaneously 
idolized and parodied, glorified yet unacknowledged.  One fast-food commercial 
shows hunger incapacitating a hungry customer; they are literally ‘out of control’ 
from hunger, and must buy a burger without delay.  The most obvious offenders 
openly mock the practice of self-control by conflating fast food with hypersexualized 
models.  Who needs self-control, they ask, when satisfying appetites feels so good?
745
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Their explicitly sexual advertising declares that self-control is for wimps; real men – 
Hardee’s men – know how to satisfy their appetites.   
One difficulty is that societal standards for self-control, as a category, are far 
from uniform.  They can be excessive, as regarding woman and their consumption of 
food; they can be moderate, as with cigarettes or alcohol; and they can be nonexistent, 
as with houses, clothes, cars, toys, and items of leisure.  Another complication is that 
consumerism does not always result from a lack of self-discipline, but from a 
corrupted view of consumption.  Because consumerism is not generally considered 
vicious, we do not need to exercise self-control with our purchases.   The perceived 
need for self-control may be lower for material items because they are most recently 
brought within the scope of temperance.  Moreover, the excesses of consumerism 
often co-exist with quite rigorous expressions of self-discipline.  It is not uncommon 
for persons who excel at physical fitness or are meticulous in their business practices 
to wholly cave under the cult of consumerism.  Indeed, they may see their 
consumption choices as fitting rewards for their austerity in other areas.  Unless it is 
oriented towards a virtuous and healthy telos, an increase in self-control is not an 
adequate response. 
Clearly, employing self-control in a phronetic manner can be difficult.  
Because we remain creatures of will and appetite, we will continue to face 
temptations to overindulge, to consume in a disordered manner. There are times when 
we will be tempted to supersize our meal, to allow the real estate agent to show us a 
house just a little bit larger, to accept the increased credit limit and indulge in retail 
therapy.  While modulated consumption may allow for feasting at Thanksgiving and 
other celebrations, it is problematic on a daily basis.  Enjoying a fine wine with dinner 
should not spiral into drunkenness at midnight.  Outgrowing one’s college apartment 
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does not necessitate immediately purchasing a starter mansion.  Simply put, we need 
self-control to help us live temperately and harmoniously, to align us with the proper 
mode of life.  When temperance is developing, self-control can be the first step in 
standing firm against consumerism and overconsumption.  And even when virtue has 
truly become engrained, it can still operate as the final word, preserving phronesis 
against the assaults of consumer culture until harmonious order is restored.  
Harmoniously ordered consumption requires an accurate and reality-based 
mode of living, informed by the realities of life and incorporating a measure of 
control as necessary.  Yet these components only function when their relevance to the 
situation and the moral agent is acknowledged.  Consumerism, however, either 
distorts or discards these components to serve its purposes: it inflates the mode of 
living, misinforms the consumer, and mocks self-control.  Because this is tied to 
distorted views of the nature and purpose of the consumer, temperate consumption 
requires humility. 
 
7.2.4 Humble Consumption 
The gospel of consumerism proclaims that the customer is always right and only the 
best will do.  It flourishes in the aggrandizement of the consumer, whose extravagant 
consumption acts as ‘a mark of reputability.’746  Luxury items should be purchased 
‘because you’re worth it’, although they are only ‘for those who can afford the best.’  
Advertising once aimed to inform; now it attempts to seduce.  Other strategies focus 
their message for particular anxieties, as when Mercedes-Benz marketed its 2009 
roadster with the slogan: ‘Men talk about women, sports, and cars.  Women talk about 
men in sports cars.’  One commentator aptly christened this campaign ‘The Advert for 
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the Insecure.’747  Indeed, the combination of insecurity and vanity result in many 
versions of excess.  We need larger, more ornate homes as ‘set design’ for a lifestyle 
of affluence, accessorized by the ‘right’ car, the designer clothes, and the latest 
technology.  The phenomenon of ‘branding’ announces our affiliation with the upper 
crust.
748
  As the moral agent negotiates the competition, displays of vanity, and layers 
of anxiety within consumer culture, humility guards against the relentless appeal of 
upscaling, competition, and emulation. 
Humility overlaps with the other components of temperate consumption.  Like 
self-control, humility serves a ‘restraining’ function, but in a different capacity.  
While self-control controls our patterns of consumption when they contravene a 
virtuous mode of living, humility works to align our mode of living with phronesis so 
that it may be virtuous.  By acknowledging and reflecting the broader and deeper 
realities of the world and of ourselves, humility discourages the temperate consumer 
from diving headlong into the cycle of vanity and emulation.  As a form of correct (or 
corrected) self-knowledge, humility aligns the temperate consumer’s actions with 
actual needs, resisting the slick marketing and seductive entreaties to a bigger, ‘better’ 
life.  Humility aligns our patterns of consumption to the truth of what we need, rather 
than the pernicious deception of what we ‘deserve.’  Moreover, as a posture of other-
centeredness, humility moves the consumer from a place of selfishness into a 
generosity towards the material needs of others.
749
  Humble consumption is, therefore, 
a natural yet ethical consequence of ‘being closer to the truth.’750    
Through its emphasis upon truthful self-knowledge, humility underscores the 
reality of human frailty and the need for sustenance, both physical and spiritual.  This 
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enables the moral agent to recognize their weaknesses, addictions, and gluttony.  It is 
revealing that the Twelve Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous begin with a declaration of 
the addict’s inability to control their consumption: ‘We know that little good can 
come to any alcoholic who joins A.A. unless he has first accepted his devastating 
weakness and all its consequences.’  While self-control plays a part in the journey of 
recovery, humility works at a more fundamental level, providing a firmer foundation 
for true sobriety and happiness.
751
 
Finally, the grounding function of humility will facilitate harmoniously 
ordered consumption.  Pearl Buck’s novel The Good Earth vividly contrasts the 
‘grounding’ of humble living and the disordering of consumptive excess.  Although 
peasant farmer Wang Lung grows increasingly prosperous through hard work and 
frugality, his family prudently eschews luxury as above their social station.
752
  
However, when flooding prevents him from working the land, his newly acquired 
wealth and leisure lead him to a teahouse concubine.  His sexual urges, which were 
once satisfied within his marital relations with O-lan, become literally insatiable.   
When O-lan had come to his house it was health to his flesh and he lusted 
for her robustly as a beast for its mate and he took her and was satisfied 
and he forgot her and did his work and was content.  But there was no 
such content now in his love for this girl, and there was no health in her 
for him …It was as though a man, dying of thirst, drank the salt water of 
the sea which, though it is water, yet dries his blood into thirst and yet 
greater thirst so that in the end he dies, maddened by his very drinking.
753
 
 
Wang Lung’s increasing wealth, coupled with new opportunities for indulgence, 
shatters the harmonious order of village and marital life.  The land, the ‘good earth’ 
that has literally grounded him throughout his life is submerged beneath the waters, 
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and it is only when the flood abates and he can resume working the land that his life is 
re-ordered and harmony is restored. 
So now Wang Lung was healed of his sickness of love by the good dark 
earth of his fields and he felt the moist soil on his feet and the health of 
the earth spread into his flesh …and now that he was full of health again 
and free of the sickness of his love he could go to her and be finished with 
her and turn himself to other things.
754
 
 
Although he eventually brings the concubine into his household, Wang Lung again 
identifies himself as a ‘humble farmer’, largely content with plain meals and ordinary 
pleasures.  Reestablished in his relationship with the land and his work upon it, Wang 
Lung is restored to the health and benefit of balanced, modal appetites. 
 These things have emerged: a measured, modal life, observant of limits and 
oriented towards a virtuous end; balanced and mature knowledge of the various 
realities of the world and how they impact our consumption choices; the participation 
of self-control when tempted to consume badly; and the grounding of humility to 
embrace and apply the requirements of temperate consumption.  It is increasingly 
clear that the culture of consumerism is unhealthy, idolatrous, and unsustainable.  
Imagining an alternative model, despite the difficulties, is both possible and essential.   
 
7.2.5 Temperate Consumption 
As physical creatures, our appetites are inextricably tied to the things that sustain us, 
in food and sexuality and material goods.  As social and political creatures, we engage 
in production, consumption, and commerce.  As citizens of an increasingly global 
context, our consumption choices and their consequences become more and more 
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complex.  They are also, in a sense, circular and self-fulfilling, wherein ‘the ideal 
consumer is one who, in consuming (as well as producing), completes creation.’755 
 One alternative model is modulation between the three practices of fasting, 
feasting, and ‘ordinary consumption.’756   The temperate consumer resides within 
‘ordinary consumption’: we consume as we need, attending to the ‘vital needs’ of 
physical and social life.  We purchase groceries and cook meals; we clothe our 
families and furnish our homes; we participate in social events and recreation and 
travel.  Yet coupled with this ordinary consumption are times of fasting and feasting, 
guided by the phronetic assessment of both circumstance and intentional action.  
Occasions such as buying a new home or planning a wedding may imbue our 
purchases with special meaning.  There is the eager anticipation of purchasing ‘the 
dress’, extravagant in both expense and design, which is set above other purchases 
through its relationship to a singular, momentous event.  Like the culinary feasts of 
holidays or life celebrations, there are legitimate motives for easting in material 
possessions.  Yet within the ethos of consumerism, we have been acculturated to view 
feasting as normative; thus, it is held in tension with fasting from material goods.  
When an unexpected expense tightens the budget, we find the opportunity to detach 
ourselves from material purchases.  By participating in Buy Nothing Day, we protest 
the post-Thanksgiving frenzy of Christmas shopping.  For holidays, we choose to 
make gifts instead of purchasing them; we invest in experiences rather than 
possessions.  Some changes will be modest, such as an increase in the lost arts of 
budgeting and saving.  Other reforms will be more radical; including the trend 
towards downshifting and downsizing and such initiatives as the small house 
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movement.  Central to this modulation is the balance between proximal and final 
ends, and the balance between necessity and beauty.  A common piece of 
organizational advice is ‘keep only what you find genuinely useful or beautiful’.   
While discerning these categories is certainly complex, it points to another 
element in temperate consumption: the importance of an alternative narrative to guide 
and encourage the temperate consumer.  In her thought on ‘blessed consumption’, 
Sallie MacFague affirms the need to ‘imagine, interpret, feel, and moralize within an 
alternative paradigm.’757  Our consumption practices can be vehicles for self-
expression, symbolizing their moral commitments to interdependency within creation 
and envisioning the world we want to inhabit.
758
  The success of consumerism arose 
significantly from their ability to create and convey an idea of ‘the good life.’  Yet 
temperate consumers, imagining and embodying a different ethos, can start to enact 
the life they envision, as ‘whoever has the power to project a vision of the good life 
and make it prevail has the most decisive power of all.’759 
 
7.3 A Virtue of Revolutionaries 
Temperance, therefore, is the virtue both of the most common physical appetites and 
of a central cultural component of contemporary western society.  Far from repressive 
or milquetoast, temperance concerns itself with nothing less than the social religion of 
rampant and idolatrous consumerism. The question now becomes: what effect would 
a return to temperance have on society at large?  Will it support the current state of 
affairs, or will it subvert the status quo?  Will it reinforce the emulation that is 
fundamental to consumerism and champion the continuation of consumer culture, or 
will it propose another ethical position? 
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Earlier, the distinction was noted between the understanding of order as 
decorum and order as kosmos.
760
  Champions of decorum acknowledge, even as they 
emphasize the importance of observing and upholding the social codes, that these 
codes might be ‘pure convention’ and nothing more than social norms.761  These 
norms do not necessarily possess or reflect true virtue; they may simply codify the 
accepted, existing mores of a given culture.  However, these social norms can be quite 
powerful, both reinforcing and reflecting the mores (and through them, the morals) 
imbedded in any particular society.  Indeed, the phrase ‘standard of living’ suggests 
the social normativity of the criteria.
762
  Moreover, accepting status quo as a paradigm 
might hinder the acquisition of virtue, if acting virtuously is counter-cultural.  Thus, 
decorum is virtuous to the extent that the society it supports is itself virtuous.  As 
Indian philosopher Jiddu Krishnamurti remarked, ‘It is no measure of health to be 
well-adjusted to a profoundly sick society.’763   
Contemporary Western society, with its ethos of gluttony and excess, may 
legitimately be considered profoundly sick.  To adjust or align oneself to its 
misaligned moral compass reveals a corresponding sickness of self.  Decorum, in a 
culture of consumerism, results in bondage to the cycle of satiation and emulation.  
Indeed, the ‘virus values’ of Affluenza – wealth, material possessions, physical 
appearance, and social standing – are textbook components of decorum.764  Decorum 
worships the ‘social art’ and ‘national culture of upscale spending’ and will prioritize 
‘keeping up with the Joneses’ because falling behind is shameful.765  It eschews self-
control as antithetical to luxury and the ‘good life’ that we ‘deserve’; it encourages 
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product ‘branding’ and the resulting social normativity.  It confuses the mode and 
measure of life – the ‘standard’ of life – with an ever-increasing ‘standard of living.’  
It inflames the pride of wealth and pleasure, creating distance between the compliant 
consumer and the other, ‘little’ people.  It champions the pursuit of pleasure and 
corrupts the pursuit of meaning.  It fosters the idea that happiness is purchased and 
transitory.  Finally, it reduces personal identity to ‘consumer’, mediating all social and 
institutional relationships through its lens of unlimited choice and endless change.  
Even when it is not explicitly seeking social approval through the accumulation of 
wealth and consumer goods, it will hesitate to challenge the normativity of our 
consumerist culture.  Like the advertising billboard that reassures and placates the 
consumer, decorum anaesthetizes humanity to the sickness of our situation. 
But kosmos, arising as it does from authentic internal concord and a phronetic 
orientation to a virtuous telos, will generate actions quite different from those which 
prioritize social esteem.  If kosmos says ‘Eat Less’, as did the recent advertisement by 
clothiers Abercrombie & Fitch, it will not be to fit into size-0 clothing but because the 
average American consumes much more than they need.  If it says ‘Buy Less’, it is 
because our efforts and attention have more virtuous – and more satisfying – objects 
than an endless array of material goods.  Temperance as kosmos will not be concerned 
with ‘keeping up with the Joneses’; it will ask whether the Joneses are virtuous moral 
exemplars.  It will not evaluate its consumption choices in light of an arbitrary 
‘standard of living’; it will work to align itself with the ‘standard’ of the rule of life, 
distinguishing needs from wants.  The ‘person of means’ will again be recognized as a 
person with means – means to an end, not the end itself.  It will reorient the search for 
meaning and happiness towards those things that actually provide them.  Meaning 
will arise within the wholeness of the entirety of being human, not from the 
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deformation of one aspect of our humanity.  It will recognize happiness as something 
to create and cultivate, not purchase and replace.  Finally, it will recover and 
encourage true human flourishing, rediscovering the complex and layered 
functionality of humanity as consumers and producers, creatures and creators, 
pleasure-seekers and wisdom-seekers.   
This, finally, is the deepest significance of a recovery of the virtue of 
temperance. Genuine temperance will not promote decorum in a sick society; but by 
promoting the internal harmony of kosmos, it may help in restoring that society to 
health, happiness, and flourishing.  Authentic temperance – ‘perennial’ in its 
longevity yet ‘timely’ in its import – is radical, even revolutionary.766  And here this 
study comes full circle, revisiting the familiar and oft-cited critique of temperance by 
Geach: uninteresting in its objects and hazardous in its implementation, humdrum and 
commonsensical – temperance is scarcely worth our notice.767  Yet as this thesis has 
demonstrated, authentic temperance may well result in conflict with the larger society, 
as the ‘goods’ life is abandoned in favor of the good life.  This should not be 
surprising, as philosophy can be a ‘subversive’ enterprise that challenges conformity 
and conventional mores.
768
  Because authentic virtue always orients the moral agent 
towards a true telos, it undermines any ethos oriented towards immoral ends.
769
  The 
practice of genuine virtue will, therefore, be ‘at revolutionary odds’ with immoral 
society, ‘so that one can only be virtuous by being in systematic conflict with the 
established order.’770  The harmonious order and moral realignment inspired by 
temperance stands directly against the canons of consumer culture, rousing consumers 
from their hypnosis and instigating a mutiny against the false telos of the day.  So 
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often regarded as a virtue of conformity, temperance is clearly nothing of the sort.  
Challenging the materialism and consumerism of the day and calling the moral agent 
from social approbation to internal harmony, temperance is ‘a virtue of 
revolutionaries.’771 
Promoting a revolutionary virtue will not be simple or painless. Adjudicating 
between different, often competing moral goods requires practical wisdom; professing 
and pursuing a counter-cultural lifestyle requires courage.  When our children are 
excluded for not having the latest technology or wearing generic clothing, we begin to 
question our choices.  When family gatherings and neighborhood functions are 
strained and awkward because decorum has been abandoned, we wonder if the cost is, 
perhaps, too high.   
It becomes hard to take a stand against consumerism without taking a 
stand against the very people with whom we share our lives …So of 
course we give in again and again to the pressure to conform, for 
otherwise we will appear not only eccentric, but rude and even heartless. 
In a society that despises simplicity, the virtue of temperateness can seem 
not so much humdrum as impossibly, and ambiguously, heroic.
772
 
 
So often, persons committed to temperance are labelled ‘saints’, simultaneously 
praised and consigned to practical irrelevance.  Yet temperance is heroic – the 
heroism of Homeric virtue in the Iliad and the Odyssey, wherein virtue is 
characteristic of and defined by the heroes of battle.  Temperate living is a campaign 
against an unhealthy way of life; it requires sacrifice, commitment, and a clear vision 
of the desired telos.  It is necessary, beneficial, and clearly revolutionary.  
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